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Introduction
In November 1944, towards the end of the Second World War, representatives
from fifty-four nations gathered in Chicago to design a blueprint for the world-
wide regulation of post-war international civil aviation.1 The Conference
resulted in the adoption of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago
Convention) on 7 December 1944 and the establishment of the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) on 4 April 1947, when the Convention came
into force.2 The main mission of ICAO is to “insure the safe and orderly growth
of international civil aviation throughout the world”.3 Accordingly, since the
date of its birth, ICAO has been closely linked with aviation safety.4
More than sixty years have passed. Has ICAO lived up to the expectations
of its founders? Some believe that it is “one of the most effective international
organizations in the United Nations system”;5 others, while praising the work
of its first 50 years, mention that it has been “losing ground” in the past
decade.6 Without any doubt, ICAO is confronted with huge challenges. If it
does not fare well, its constituents may bid farewell to it. If it does not wish
to retire at the same age as a natural person normally does, it needs to re-
juvenate itself.
The purpose of the current study is to explore, from a legal point of view,
the safety mandate of ICAO in the context of international civil aviation. The
1 Haanappel, P.P.C., The Law and Policy of Air Space And Outer Space: A Comparative Approach
(The Hague and New York: Kluwer Law International, 2003) at 17. Fifty two States signed
the Final Act of the Chicago Conference. See Proceedings of the International Civil Aviation
Conference, Vol.1 (United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1948). See also
infra Ch.1.2.
2 Id. See ICAO Doc 7300/9 Convention on International Civil Aviation.
3 Art. 44 a), Chicago Convention. The Preamble also mentions that the undersigned govern-
ments have agreed on certain principles and arrangements in order that international civil
aviation “may be developed in a safe and orderly manner”.
4 See infra Ch.1, 1.2 to 1.4. Throughout the present study, the term “safety” or “aviation
safety” refers to the safety of international civil aviation. It does not deal with the use of
aircraft for military services, or the law of air warfare, except to the extent that they have
impact on the safety of international civil aviation.
5 Broderick, A. J., & Loos, J., “Government Aviation Safety Oversight – Trust, But Verify”
(2002) 67 JALC 1035 at 1036.
6 Onidi, O., “A Critical Perspective on ICAO” (February 2008) xxxiii/1 Air & Space Law 38
at 38 and 41. It is said, among other things, that dramatic growth in air traffic and technical
complexity of aviation have made ICAO’s role of maintaining a satisfactory safety system
worldwide virtually unsustainable.
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author intends to present, in retrospect, the major contributions of ICAO to the
global safety framework. At the same time, on the basis of the lessons learned
in the past, certain proposals will be made to rationalize the safety framework
in order to enhance aviation safety through the rule of law.
Chapter 1 begins with the analysis of the concept of aviation safety, in view
of the growing concern of the global aviation community on this matter. Com-
mencing with a survey of different views about the definition of safety, it will
try to focus on what safety means from a legislative point of view. Then the
development of safety regulations in the history of civil aviation will be briefly
reviewed, underlining the trend to move from national to international regula-
tion. Following that is the demonstration of strong demands in the contempor-
ary world for the improvement of safety, as well as the heavy responsibility
put on ICAO in this respect.
The next three chapters cover the three major dimensions of safety concerns.
Chapter 2 mainly addresses technical regulations of aviation safety. It describes
the safety oversight function of States and the ICAO framework for the adoption
of technical standards to deal with the natural or inherent hazards of aircraft
operations, such as mechanical failure, bad weather or human errors. The more
recent initiatives of ICAO to audit its member States for their compliance with
ICAO provisions, as well as their legal basis, will be analyzed.
Chapter 3 considers the relations between military activities and aviation
safety, as well as the work of ICAO in this respect. While military activities
represent legitimate interests of States, they may present man-made dangers
to civil aviation, if they are not properly coordinated. Interfaces between
military activities and civil aviation sometimes present difficult issues, which
require a careful study.
Chapter 4 deals with terrorist and other unlawful acts, which represent the
most serious man-made dangers to civil aviation. The pioneering efforts of ICAO
since 1960s in this area will be analyzed in the context of the new trend in the
legislation against terrorism.
Chapter 5 will be the focus of the present undertaking. To meet with its
new challenges, ICAO should learn from the past and muster for the future.
If the organization is mandated to police aviation safety in the world, it must
first and foremost be able to police itself. The past experience of ICAO has left
abundant food for thought for its institutional reform, including a number of
basic but crucial issues. What is the normative value of ICAO regulatory
material? Is there any system of hierarchy for these norms? Are there any
grounds to put safety considerations above some other considerations? How
should ICAO stand vis-à-vis powerful States or regional organizations? What
are the appropriate mechanisms for checks and balances in the ICAO’s decision-
making process? While the answers to these questions may not be readily
available, efforts should be made to tackle them with a view to enhancing the
rule of law.
1 Defining Aviation Safety in view of the
Global Interest
Aviation safety is the concern of the whole world. Its importance is unanimous-
ly recognized. While air transportation is by far the safest mode of travel, as
measured by the ratio between the number of accidents and that of passenger/
kilometers,1 it is susceptible to inherent risks of flight, the use of force, and,
more dangerously, terrorist acts. From time to time, when major aviation-
related accidents or tragic events take place, the whole world is shaken.2
Consequently, aviation safety has been and will be a matter of vital importance
for governments, industry, the academic community and the traveling public.
It is also the raison d’être of ICAO, a global, inter-governmental organization
which became a specialized agency of the United Nations in 1947.
1.1 THE CONCEPT OF AVIATION SAFETY
While everyone agrees that aviation safety is important, opinions vary when
an attempt is made to define the term “safety”.3 The Oxford Dictionary defines
1 ICAO, Report of Accident Investigation and Prevention (AIG) Divisional Meeting (1999)
at ii-4. The accident rate (measured in passenger fatalities per 100 million passenger-kilo-
meters) was approximately 0.025 in 2000 and 0.02 in 2006). ICAO News Release, PIO 5/02,
9 April 2002 and ICAO Doc 9876, Annual Report of the Council (2006), at 27.
2 The most obvious example is the media coverage of the tragic events on 11 September 2001,
in which four aircraft were hijacked in the United States, two of which were used for
suicidal attacks to destroy the World Trade Center, then the highest buildings in New York,
killing thousands of innocent people and causing immeasurable damage to the world
economy. See, for example, New York Times, 12 September 2001. Aside from these big events,
even relatively minor aircraft accidents or incidents may also occupy the front page in local
newspapers. See, for example, “Tragic end to vacation, 6 Quebecers die in Cuban crash”,
The Gazette (published in Montreal, Canada), 16 March 2002. For analysis of the reasons
for public reaction to aircraft accidents, see infra notes 39 to 47 and accompanying text.
3 See Miller, C.O., “State of the Art in Air Safety” (1957) 34 JALC 343 at 347, where 18
perceptions of safety are mentioned. Some of them are:
The Public: Safety is restrictive: don’t do this, don’t do that ...
Federal Aviation Administration: Standards have been issued. … It is the FAA’s duty to
enforce those standards. All FAA work pertains to safety.
National Transportation Safety Board: Senator Magnuson called NTSB the “Supreme Court
of Transportation safety”...
Airline Pilot Association: Pilot’s opinion must be followed ...
American Bar Association: Punishment or threats thereof represent deterrents to accidents.
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“safety” as “freedom from danger or risks”. It also means “the state of being
protected from or guarded against hurt or injury”.4 Clearly, if aviation must
be free from any dangers or risks, it will not exist at all. Flight is inherently
a risky venture, carried out in a hostile environment at great speed. The only
way to assure risk-free flight is never to allow the airplane to leave the gate.
Accordingly, some commentators tend to link the concept of safety with
accident prevention. They consider “safety” as meaning “no (avoidable)
accidents”, or more realistically, “as few accidents as possible”.5
From a micro and operational point of view, this definition is helpful since
much of the safety concern is related to accident prevention. From a macro
and policy-oriented point of view, “accident prevention” is too tight a strait-
jacket to coat the much broader policy consideration underlying the safety
issues. Aviation safety includes but is not limited to operational flight safety.
The tragic events of 11 September 2001, which constituted not only the most
serious threat but also unprecedented damage to aviation safety, have con-
clusively demonstrated that aviation safety goes beyond accident prevention
from a technical point of view and extends to more profound political, strategic
and legal dimensions. It includes preventive, remedial and punitive measures.
Accordingly, safety is not limited to accident prevention, but should be con-
sidered in a broader term as risk management.6 After a period of study, the
ICAO Air Navigation Commission defined “aviation safety” as “[t]he state of
freedom from unacceptable risk of injury to persons or damage to aircraft and
property”.7 Risks could be at a lower or higher level. Depending on the risks
involved, the scope of the aforementioned management may range from
routine suspension of a license of an unqualified pilot to the temporary
grounding of all civil aircraft at the time of a crisis. Sometimes, a particular
safety standard is very attractive from a technical point of view, but it may
not be cost-effective or may even be economically prohibitive to implement.
In that case, a careful policy judgement is needed to determine what standard
should be imposed. Consequently, aviation safety requires a multidisciplinary
approach: technical, economic, managerial, and, obviously for the purposes
of the present study, legal.
Safety is also a dynamic rather than static concept. It has a strong temporal
sense. What was considered safe or unsafe yesterday may not be so today.
In 1919, when two British airmen, Captain John Alcock and Lieutenant A. W.
Brown, made the first flight across the Atlantic non-stop from Newfoundland
4 The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 9th ed. (Oxford University Press, 1995).
5 Wassenbergh, H., “Safety in Air Transportation and Market Entry” (April, 1998) XXIII:2
Air and Space Law 83.
6 Lofaro, R.J. and Smith, K.M., “Rising Risk? Rising Safety? The Millennium of Air Travel”
(1998) 28 Transportation Law Journal 205 at 216, see also, Isaac, F. M., “Is it Safe Up There?”
(1998) 28 Transportation Law Journal 183.
7 ICAO Working Paper AN-WP/7699, “Determination of a Definition of Aviation Safety”,
11 December 2001 at para. 2.2.
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to Ireland, the aircraft used was a twin-engine Vikers Vimy biplane.8
Subsequently, due to the development of aviation technology and safety
requirements, twin-engine aircraft were not allowed for cross-ocean flights
for a long period of time. In 1984, however, this rule was again changed.9
Nowadays, twin-engine aircraft are commonplace in cross-ocean flights. This
example demonstrates the close relationship between the advance of technology
and law-making activities as well as the dynamic concept of safety.
Safety also includes security. In ICAO terminology, a distinction is made
between “safety” and “security”. The former is related to the operational safety
of aircraft, including personnel licensing and airworthiness, whereas the latter
means “safeguarding civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference”.10
While this distinction may be convenient, it should nevertheless be pointed
out that aviation security is but one important aspect of aviation safety. No
matter how airworthy an aircraft is, and how competent its crew members
are, air travel will not be safe if it is subject to terrorist attacks, which have
become the most serious threat to the safety of civil aviation.
Safety requires, first and foremost, technical expertise. However, it is not
the exclusive domain of the technical profession. It has a policy and legal
dimension. As Wassenbergh observes: “Safety in civil aviation is a technical
and operational matter, to begin with. It becomes a matter of public law as
soon as the public is involved and private people participate under government
control.”11
Having regard to the temporal, multidisciplinary nature of aviation safety,
it may be asked how safe is safe. Who will actually decide the standards of
safety, or the threshold of acceptable risk? It has been said that safety, like
beauty, is in the eyes of the beholder. Speaking from the perspective of the
United States, Isaac, a former officer of the Federal Aviation Administration,
writes:
While 100 people may have 100 different answers to that question, our democratic
system itself provides the answers. In my opinion, the Congress of the United States
has the greatest influence on the level of safety, or acceptable risk under which
we operate. Congress, of course, writes the laws that govern the operation and
development of the national aviation system. Congress also controls the budget
of the Department of Transportation and, in turn, the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion.12
8 Freer, D. W., “A Convention is signed and ICAN is born? 1919 to 1926” (May 1986) 41(5)
ICAO Bulletin 44.
9 Mortimer, L.F., “New ICAO Rules Considered for Long-Range Twin-Engine Aeroplane
Flights” (April 1984) 39(4) ICAO Bulletin 74.
10 Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention, 8th ed., April 2006.
11 See supra note 5.
12 Isaac, F. M., supra note 6 at 185.
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It may be concluded, therefore, while aviation safety is a multidisciplinary
matter, the legislator of a sovereign State may, subject to its international
obligations imposed by the Chicago Convention and other sources of inter-
national law, determine how safe is safe for aviation within its areas of com-
petence, such as aircraft registered or operated in its territory, personnel
licensed in its country and airports as well as air traffic service agencies under
its jurisdiction. From this perspective, it may not be difficult to argue that
aviation safety is ultimately a matter of law, namely, a matter of legislation
and its implementation.
While the discussion above may provide an answer with respect to aviation
safety at the national level, a further question may be asked as to who is
determining aviation safety from an international perspective. This question
is of considerable significance since civil aviation is virtually international by
its nature. Its optimal benefit could not be realized if it were confined to
national boundaries. At the same time, its risks are also shared globally. While
every State retains its sovereignty within its territory, it is unable to regulate
the safety of international civil aviation without the cooperation of other States.
A State may ensure the quality of aircraft registered in its country and airports
located therein, but it may not do so for aircraft registered and operating in
other countries and airports located therein, which may also impact aviation
in the former State. In a nutshell, the risks incurred by civil aviation are global
in nature. Global risks require global management and call for international
concerted action. As demonstrated below, the history of civil aviation has
crystallized into the establishment of ICAO. The current reality has also con-
firmed the ongoing need for ICAO. It is submitted that ICAO, as the specialized
agency of the United Nations responsible for aviation, is the guardian of the
safety of international civil aviation, the global manager of risks relating to
civil aviation, and the worldwide decision-making body on behalf of sovereign
States with respect to aviation safety.
1.2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF AVIATION SAFETY REGULATIONS
The history of aviation is the history of improving safety. Review of the
scientific and technical developments, which have been the driving force for
enhancing safety, is beyond the scope of the present undertaking. From a legal
perspective, the starting point of safety regulations could be traced back to
the period of the infancy of aviation. The earliest legislation on record focused
more on aircraft impact on the ground, rather than safety on board.13 Thus,
13 As Colegrove points out: “It seems as if legislators feared a sinister element in the navigation
of the air, born of ancient superstition, and sought to safeguard the people from some
diabolical power attacking the human race from the heavens.” Colegrove, K.W., International
Control of Aviation (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1930) at 2.
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five months after the first circuit flight took place on 21 November 1783 on
board a balloon invented by Mongolfier brothers, the first aerial regulation
was promulgated on 23 April 1784. In this regulation, the Paris police intro-
duced a law forbidding balloons to fly without a special license.14 Although
this regulation may have been promulgated due to the concern that aircraft
could present safety implications on the subjacent ground, it also introduced
the concept of licensing for aviation, which is still applicable today. In 1819,
France enacted a law which required that man-flight balloons be equipped
with parachutes,15 thus extending the scope of its law-making activities by
covering not only safety on the ground but also safety on board aircraft.
It was soon unanimously realized that government regulation of aviation
was necessary in order to ensure public safety. Few would deny the wisdom
of the State in requiring aircraft to be inspected in order to test their airworthi-
ness, to be registered in order to establish their ownership and ensure the
responsibility thereof, and to require pilots to be examined and licensed in
order to safeguard citizens from the danger of inexperienced or negligent
pilots.16 However, the diversity of national regulations almost immediately
became apparent, which led to inconvenience as soon as aircraft crossed the
boundary lines of States. A movement for international codification started.
In 1889, the first international aeronautical congress was convened in Paris
by France, in which Brazil, France, Mexico, the United Kingdom and the
United States participated.17 A number of legal issues relating to aviation
safety were discussed, including aeronauts’ certificates, the liability of aero-
nauts towards passengers, the public and landowners, salvage, and the use
of aircraft in war.18
The year 1910 witnessed the first international air law conference, which
marked the serious attempt to provide a global regulatory regime for civil
aviation. The delegations of 19 States gathered in France for six weeks from
18 May to 29 June to prepare the first multilateral air law convention. The
conference did not end with the adoption of a convention because the parti-
cipating States could not agree on whether they should offer equal treatment
to foreign and national aircraft with respect to the freedom of overflight.19
Nevertheless, the contribution of the conference to the future of safety regula-
tion should not be underestimated. With the exception of Articles 19 and 20
14 Colegrove, id. at 3. See also, Shawcross & Beaumont, Air Law (London: LexisNexis Butter-
worths, 1983, loose leaf version) Vol. 1 at I 1; Matte, N.M. Treatise on Air-Aeronautical Law
(Toronto: Carswell Co. Ltd., 1981) at 21.
15 Shawcross & Beaumont, id. at I 1, citing Hatchkiss, The Law of Aviation, 2nd ed. (New York:
Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1938) at 4.
16 Colegrove, supra note 13 at 4.
17 Pépin, E., “Le droit aerien” (1947:II) 71 RdC 481.
18 Id.
19 Freer, D.W., “An aborted take-off for internationalism? 1903 to 1919” (April 1986) 41(4)
ICAO Bulletin 23 at 26.
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in the draft convention dealing with admission of air navigation in foreign
territory, which were never completed, 41 Articles were excellently crafted
and were truly remarkable for their foresight.20 Many important safety related
issues, such as the nationality and registration of aircraft, airworthiness and
personnel licensing, were covered by these provisions, which were inherited
in both substantive content and drafting style by the 1919 Paris Convention21
and the 1944 Chicago Convention. The draft convention also contained three
annexes dealing respectively with nationality and registration marks of aircraft,
characteristics of aircraft relating to airworthiness and the rules of air traffic.
The conference also adopted statements to declare a number of important
principles, which, inter alia, affirmed that rules of the air in free airspace should
be established by international agreements. Indeed, the conference had estab-
lished a basic framework for the regulation of aviation safety, which paved
the way for future development in this respect.
The significance of the conference was further demonstrated by the fact
that as a follow-up to the conference, an Exchange of Notes between France
and Germany was signed on 26 July 1913,22 which is generally believed to
be the first bilateral air agreement in history. By authorizing non-military
airships to fly over the territory of the other party on the basis of reciprocity,
the agreement affirmed the safety rules that an airship must be provided with
a certificate of airworthiness and the pilots must be licensed by the competent
authority of one party. It was stipulated that this agreement would apply
provisionally “pending the conclusion of an agreement on the subject between
a greater number of States”.
Due to the First World War, the contemplated agreement “between a
greater number of States” did not come into existence until 13 October 1919,
when the Convention on the Regulation of Aerial Navigation was signed in Paris.
The Paris Convention, which was part of the Versailles Peace Treaty, rep-
resented the first successful multilateral endeavour to set up a global regulatory
regime for aviation.23 In addition to the declaration that every State has com-
plete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory, the
Convention established an international legal framework to ensure the safety
of international civil aviation through the following provisions:
· common rules for aircraft registration in order to determine its nationality
and the related jurisdiction of the State of registration (Chapter 2);
· regulations for certificates of airworthiness of civil aircraft and mutual
recognition of such certificates by contracting States (Chapter 3);
20 Id.
21 The Convention on the Regulation of Aerial Navigation.
22 For the text of the Exchange of Notes, see 8 AJIL 214 (1914) Supplement.
23 Kuhn, A., “International Aerial Navigation and the Peace Conference” (1920) 14 AJIL 369.
Lupton, G.W., Civil Aviation Law (Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1935) at 18.
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· international rules of the air, including international rules for signals, lights
and the prevention of collisions, as well as the undertaking by States to
enforce them (Article 24);
· application to aircraft of the principles of maritime law governing salvage
(Article 23).
Eight Annexes to the Convention were developed to implement the provisions
mentioned above. Other subjects relating to aviation safety, such as
aeronautical maps and ground markings, log books, as well as collection and
dissemination of meteorological information, were also covered. The Annexes
formed an integral part of the Convention. Their amendments, while adopted
by ICAN, were binding on all member States. This structure displayed the lack
of flexibility and proved to be one of the weaknesses of the framework estab-
lished by the Convention.
The Paris Convention also established an International Commission for
Air Navigation (ICAN), which comprised representatives of States parties to
the Convention. Over the years, ICAN established itself as a focal point for
government and industry co-ordination and as a recognized aviation authority
among international organizations with an interest in air navigation. On its
own initiative, ICAN convened or sponsored many conferences and meetings
relating to the safety of air navigation.24
The safety framework laid down by the Paris Convention was subsequently
inherited by the 1944 Chicago Convention with modifications. The latter
remains valid today with its much more flexible system of Annexes, which
has overcome the weakness of its predecessor. Another weakness of the Paris
Convention is that it did not achieve universal acceptance, which is a desirable
goal from the point of view of aviation safety. While 32 States eventually
ratified or acceded to the Convention,25 two major powers, the United States
and the Soviet Union, never became parties. Furthermore, two groups of States
decided to conclude respectively the Ibero-American Convention Relating to Air
Navigation (Madrid, 1926)26 and the Pan-American Convention on Commercial
24 See Freer, supra note 8 at 46.
25 As at 31 August 1931: Argentine Republic, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czecho-
slovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Greece,
India, Iraq, Ireland (Eire), Italy, Japan, Latvia, Norway, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru,
Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Siam, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Union of South Africa,
Uruguay, Yugo-slavia. See Shawcross and Beaumont on Air Law (London: Butterworth & Co.
(Publishers) Ltd., 1945) at 689.
26 According to Lupton, the Madrid Convention was ratified by only five of the twenty-one
signatories, namely, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Paraguay and Spain; see
Lupton, supra note 23 at 25. Shawcross and Beaumont included Argentina and Salvador
as additional parties; id. at 14. The Madrid Convention has generally been regarded as “a
dead letter” (Shawcross and Beaumont). Therefore, Art. 80 of the Chicago Convention only
mentions that the Convention supersedes the Conventions of Paris and Habana, without
making any reference to the Madrid Convention.
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Aviation (Habana, 1928),27 thereby creating further disunity to the system of
the Paris Convention.
On 12 October 1929, an important convention in the sphere of private
international air law, namely, the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air, was concluded in Warsaw. This Conven-
tion, which primarily deals with the contractual liability of air carriers, has
been the subject of long-standing and intensive discussion in the aviation
community. Numerous attempts have been made to amend or modernize this
Convention.28 While the primary focus has so far been on the Convention’s
limits of liability, its historical contribution to the promotion of aviation safety
should not be ignored. By imposing a presumption of fault on the carrier in
the case of an accident causing death or injury to a passenger, the Convention
has placed a heavy responsibility on the carrier to do its utmost to protect
the safety of the passengers. Since the pilots and engineers have to testify
before the court that they have taken all necessary measures to prevent the
accident, this will lead them to exercise more care in their work, and to dis-
cover and cure the mechanical defects and human errors. Consequently, the
safety record of the carrier will be improved.
December 7, 1944 was a milestone for the international aviation community.
The Chicago Conference successfully ended with the adoption of the Convention
on International Civil Aviation. The Conference immediately established the
Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization (PICAO) which was
succeeded by ICAO in 1947 when the Chicago Convention came into force.
While there were different views at the Chicago Conference with respect to
the issues of transit and traffic rights for international air transport, there was
no controversy on the safety issue. It had been the intention of the United
States, one of the main architects of the Chicago Convention, to consider the
need for a world organization to handle such matters as safety standards and
other technical matters as well as economic problems such as competitive
subsidies and rates.29 At least the first part of this vision, namely, safety
standards and other technical matters, has been realized, since the activities
of ICAO during the past 60 years have been focused on safety-related matters.
While the Chicago Convention undoubtedly benefits from the previous ex-
perience of the Paris Convention, its achievement is more remarkable than
its predecessor’s, due to its universal acceptance. There are currently 190 States
27 Signed on 20 February 1928, and ratified by 11 States: Chile, Costa-Rica, Dominican Repub-
lic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and United States.
See Shawcross and Beaumont, id. at 689.
28 The most recent attempt to modernize the Convention resulted in the conclusion of a
convention bearing the same title, signed in Montreal on 28 May 1999, which came into
force on 4 November 2003. It had 87 parties as of 25 November 2008.
29 Foreign Relations of the United States (1944) at 2:403, 404 and 420.
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parties to the Chicago Convention and ICAO has a Secretariat of approximately
800 staff members as compared to the eight-member Secretariat of ICAN.30
Concurrent with developments under the Chicago Convention, bilateral
air service agreements have also been flourishing since the end of the Second
World War. While these agreements have been primarily used to resolve
“economic problems such as competitive subsidies and rates”,31 they have
also been used, particularly in more recent years, to regulate safety matters,
including aviation security.32
As international civil aviation developed, new safety issues emerged, which
had not been foreseen in 1944. To cope with the new situation, certain amend-
ments to the Chicago Convention were made, including Article 83 bis, which
permits the transfer of certain functions from the State of registry of aircraft
to the State of the operator, and Article 3 bis, which prohibits the use of
weapons against civil aircraft in flight.
Since the 1960s, civil aircraft have become the prime targets of terrorist
attacks. In order to combat hijacking, sabotage and other acts of unlawful
interference against civil aircraft, a number of legal instruments were concluded
under the auspices of ICAO.33 Fights against terrorism have become a new
dimension of safety considerations.
30 See Freer, supra note 8 at 46. ICAO has adopted18 Annexes to the Chicago Convention
which are predominantly related to safety: Annex 1 – Personnel Licensing, Annex 2 – Rules
of the Air, Annex 3 – Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation, Annex 4
– Aeronautical Charts, Annex 5 – Units of Measurement to be Used in Air and Ground
Operations, Annex 6 – Operation of Aircraft, Annex 7 – Aircraft Nationality and Registration
Marks, Annex 8 – Airworthiness of Aircraft, Annex 9 – Facilitation, Annex 10 – Aeronautical
Telecommunications, Annex 11 – Air Traffic Services, Annex 12 – Search and Rescue,
Annex 13 – Aircraft Accident Investigation, Annex 14 – Aerodromes, Annex 15 – Aero-
nautical Information Services, Annex 16 – Environmental Protection, Annex 17 – Security,
and Annex 18 – The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods.
31 See supra note 29 and infra note 53. Bilateral agreements have been the main instruments
dealing with economic issues. For more discussions, see Cheng, B., The Law of International
Air Transport, (London: Stevens & Sons Ltd., and New York: Oceana Publications Inc., 1962);
Haanappel, P.P.C., Pricing and Capacity Determination in International Air Transport: A Legal
Analysis (Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1984), “Bilateral Air Transport
Agreements – 1913-1980” (1980) 5 The International Trade Law Journal 241, and The Law and
Policy of Air Space and Outer Space: A Comparative Approach (The Hague and New
York: Kluwer Law International, 2003).
32 In addition to the model aviation security clauses widely used in bilateral air services
agreements, the ICAO Council recommended in June 2001 a set of model safety clauses
to be incorporated into such agreements. For details, see infra Ch.2, note 44 and 227, Ch.5,
note 121 and accompanying text.
33 The Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo
on 14 September 1963 (Tokyo Convention) (ICAO Doc 8364), the Convention for the Suppres-
sion of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970 (The Hague
Convention) (ICAO Doc 8920), the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971 (Montreal Convention)
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Another important phenomenon which has emerged since the Second
World War has been the strengthening of regional arrangements in the aviation
community. While regional conferences existed as early as 1918,34 permanent
regional institutions are of a more recent origin. In response to the need for
international cooperation, a number of regional civil aviation organizations
were established, assuming certain important roles relating to aviation safety.
Some of these organizations undertake overall responsibility on civil aviation
matters in close coordination with, and receiving assistance from, ICAO, such
as the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) established in 1954,35 the
Arab Civil Aviation Council (ACAC, now called the Arab Civil Aviation Com-
mission) established in 1967,36 the African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC)
established in 1969, and the Latin-American Civil Aviation Commission
(LACAC) established in 1973. Some organizations have specialized mandates,
such as EUROCONTROL established in 1960 by the International Convention for
the Safety of Air Navigation, ASECNA (L’Agence pour la sécurité de la navigation
aérienne en Afrique et à Madagascar) established by an agreement in 1959
which was replaced in 1974 by the Convention relative à la création d’une agence
chargée de gérer les installations et services destinés à assurer la sécurité de la naviga-
tion aérienne en Afrique et à Madagascar, COCESNA (Central American Corporation
for Air Navigation Services) established in 1961 by the Convention for the
Establishment of the Central American Air Navigation Services Corporation, and
the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) which originated in the early 1970s.37
The latter has been gradually phased out and will be completely replaced in
2009 by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is “the centrepiece
of the European Union’s strategy for aviation safety.”38 As a result of these
initiatives, safety regulation at the regional level has become more institutional-
ized and forms an important and integral part of the global efforts to promote
aviation safety.
Looking back several hundred years at mankind’s efforts and experiences
in the achievement of flight, one notices that the material scope of safety
(ICAO Doc 8966), the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 23 September 1971, signed at
Montreal on 24 February 1988 (Supplementary Protocol, 1988) (ICAO Doc 9518), the Conven-
tion on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, done at Montreal on 1
March 1991 (MEX Convention) (ICAO Doc 9571).
34 Shawcross and Beaumont, supra note 14 at I 3.
35 Id. at II 63 B.
36 Agreement on the Civil Aviation Council of Arab States, 1967. See, Said, E.S., The Arab
Civil Aviation Council, ACAC, Master’s Thesis, McGill University, October 1988, AS42
M3 1989 S25, at 65.
37 For the evolution of the JAA, see Balfour, J., European Community Air Law (London: Butter-
worth, 1995) at 107 et seq.
38 EASA Website, http://www.easa.eu.int/ws_prod/g/g_about.php, date of access: 10 May
2008. See also, infra, Ch.5.4.2.
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regulations has been expanded along with aviation development. Regulations
began by focusing on the safety impact of aviation on the ground, then
extended to airborne activities themselves, such as in-flight operation, and
subsequently covered ground activities which impact safety in the air, such
as air traffic services and airport security screening procedures. As for the
geographical scope of the regulations, history has demonstrated a trend to
move from national regulation to international regulation. One valuable
consideration to be drawn is the importance of achieving universal participa-
tion and representation in international civil aviation. The divergent systems
illustrated by the Paris, Madrid and Havana Conventions did not survive the
test of time, whereas the flag of universality carried by ICAO is still waving
today.
1.3 RENEWED IMPORTANCE OF AVIATION SAFETY IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
As mankind enters the third millennium, concern over aviation safety is
stronger than ever. Such concern relates to the public perception of aviation
safety, which is shaped essentially by news reports of aircraft accidents and
other tragic events.39 The media tend to spotlight and give more headline
coverage to fatal accidents or incidents involving aviation than to accidents
involving other modes of transportation. An Air Navigation Commissioner
in ICAO drew a comparison between a rail car accident and an aircraft accident
to illustrate differences in public reaction. In the former case, the accident
involved a public vehicle on rail with a single readily inspectable structural
unit. The implementation of safety measures could have been relatively simple
and the accident was easily preventable. However, it caused very little media
concern and no investigation was undertaken. In the case of the aircraft acci-
dent, it involved thousands of parts operating in a hostile environment. Despite
the full commitment of the industry to impose much more stringent standards
than those used for other modes of transportation, the aircraft accident could
hardly escape from the eyes of the media and the general public. Obviously,
accidents in civil aviation raise much more public anxiety than other transpor-
tation accidents.40
Several factors are responsible for such a perception. First of all, there is
an inherent fear of traveling in a hostile environment. Reports from academic
study demonstrate that roughly one fifth of adults in the general population
experience varying degrees of fear of flying.41 When passengers confine them-
39 ICAO Working Paper, DGCA97 – WP/1 “Safety Oversight Today”, 1 October 1997.
40 Torkington, C., “Aviation Safety in an International Environment”, in Soekkha, H., (ed.)
Aviation Safety (Utrecht: VSP BV, 1997) 545 at 552.
41 For more details, see van Gerwen, L., Fear of flying, Doctoral Dissertation at Leiden Univer-
sity, ISBN 90-9018180-6.
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selves to a limited space in the sky at the mercy of the aircraft operator, there
is a natural sentiment to seek far more guarantees of safety. Secondly, the
degree of fatality associated with aircraft accidents further intensifies such
a fear. As pointed out by the White House Commission on Aviation Safety
and Security in its report: “We fear a plane crash far more than we fear some-
thing like a car accident. One might survive a car accident, but there’s no
chance in a plane at 30,000 feet.”42 In other words, the loss of life is massive.
The combined effect of all these statistics and factors makes the safety issue
a prime focus of public attention.
In addition to the psychological feeling of the public, a renewed emphasis
on aviation safety has emerged due to the important position which civil
aviation has achieved in contemporary society. Today, aviation is no longer
reserved for the privileged class. It has become a daily means of mass transpor-
tation. It is a fundamental feature of today’s society. In all of modern history
no other human accomplishment has contributed so much to the movement
of individuals throughout every part of the world for both business and leisure.
The world has become a global village partly because civil aviation provides
global accessibility in a matter of hours.43 The statistics of ICAO indicate that
the total number of passengers carried in international and domestic flights
reached 1,647 millions in 2000 and 2,105 millions in 2006,44 as compared to
39 millions in 1951.45 The industry is growing rapidly and it would not be
surprising to see that the number of passengers carried in 2000 will double
in 2010. If the rate of accidents remains unchanged, the world will probably
witness a much greater number of accidents, which would not be socially
acceptable in the eyes of the general public.46
The vital role of civil aviation also makes it an attractive target for terrorists.
Enhancing safety is important because civil aviation not only has to deal with
natural or inherent hazards of flights, such as technical failures or human
errors, but also has to deal with the threat of premeditated, organized and
sophisticated attacks by terrorists. The industry may have successfully carried
billions of passengers and their baggage, but its takes only one hijacker or
42 White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, Final Report to President
Clinton, 12 February 1997. (http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/212fin~1.html) Ch.3. Date of
access: 17 October 2008.
43 Opening Address and Overview by the President of the Council of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), Dr. Assad Kotaite, to the High-level, Ministerial Conference
on Aviation Security, Montreal, 19 February 2002.
44 62 ICAO Journal (No. 1, 2007) at 5.
45 “Annual Civil Aviation Report, 2000”, 56 ICAO Journal 10; ICAO Doc. 7270. A6 – P/1, Report
of the Council to the Assembly on the Activities of the Organization in 1951, Montreal, May 1952,
at 1.
46 The Final Report of the Commission on Aviation Safety and Security refers to the projection
by Boeing that unless the global accident rate is reduced, by the year 2015, an airliner will
crash somewhere in the world almost weekly. See the report referred to in supra note 42
at 8.
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one of the billion pieces of baggage containing an explosive to shake the public
confidence in air travel, to undermine its global accessibility and consequently,
to produce catastrophic effects on economic development directly or indirectly
driven by air transport. As Dr. Assad Kotaite, then the President of the ICAO
Council, stated: “The shadowy and elusive nature of an adversary with poten-
tial to wreak great destruction will warrant all the efforts and resources that
we can muster.”47 In this sense, aviation safety is paramount in order to
protect human lives and to ensure aviation as the means of global accessibility.
All of these factors have further elevated aviation safety from a national
community concern to the concern of the global community. It is hardly
surprising, therefore, that the ICAO Assembly has time and again confirmed
that “the primary objective of ICAO continues to be that of ensuring the safety
of international civil aviation.”48 As stated by today’s Secretary General of
ICAO, Dr. Taïeb Chérif, ICAO’s first priority, as always, must be safety.
1.4 AVIATION SAFETY: THE RAISON D’ÊTRE OF ICAO
In view of its paramount importance, aviation safety has been the raison d’être
of ICAO. Under the Chicago Convention, in line with the principle that every
State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its
territory,49 each contracting State is responsible for safety oversight within
its territory. The same also applies to the aircraft registered therein. It should
be noted, however, that the principle of complete and exclusive sovereignty,
which remains a cornerstone of contemporary international air law, is not the
invention of the Chicago Convention, and therefore could not be considered
as its achievement. The principle had been established in the 1919 Paris Con-
vention and Article 1 of the Chicago Convention is thus purely declaratory.50
The Chicago Conference as well as the Convention concluded thereat would
have been unnecessary if the goal of the Conference had been limited to the
reaffirmation of the principle of sovereignty. In fact, the Conference had greater
aspirations and higher aims arising from the interest of the international
47 Supra note 43.
48 ICAO Doc 9848, Assembly Resolutions in Force (as of 8 October 2004). Resolutions A32-11:
“Establishment of an ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme” at I-56; A33-9 “Re-
solving deficiencies identified by the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme and
encouraging quality assurances for technical cooperation projects” at I-58 and A35-6;
“Transition to a comprehensive systems approach for audits in the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight
Audit Programme (USOAP)” at I-57.
49 Art. 1, the Chicago Convention. See also infra Ch. 2.1.
50 It is worthy of note that Art. 1 of the Chicago Convention refers to “every State” instead
of “every contracting State” which has sovereignty. The principle is therefore applied not
only to the mutual relations between the contracting parties but also to other States which
are not parties. Cf. Cheng, supra note 31 at 120.
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community,51 namely, to ensure that “international civil aviation may be
developed in a safe and orderly manner”. As the then President of the United
States, Franklin Delano Roosevelt put it, the goal of the Conference was for
all nations to “work together, so that the air may be used by humanity, to
serve humanity...”52
Many of the founders of ICAO may have envisioned a blueprint which
would go beyond safety regulation. Indeed, there was a serious attempt in
1944 to develop a multilateral economic mechanism for determining routes,
capacities and fares in an equitable manner and thereby to turn ICAO into an
international economic regulatory body. The history of ICAO has demonstrated
that it is not such a regulatory body.53 With respect to safety regulation, the
vision of Chicago in 1944 has proven to be successful.
First and foremost, the Chicago Conference laid down a legal framework
for safety regulation, which is still operating today. Safety considerations
permeate the whole Convention. In addition to the Preamble and Article 44,
there are numerous other provisions which are designed to enhance aviation
safety. One notable example is Article 3, paragraph d), which provides that
the contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their State
aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil
aircraft. Since State aircraft include military and police aircraft, regulation of
these aircraft may be regarded as core elements of sovereign rights which a
State will jealously guard against interventions from outside. Despite this, the
parties to the Convention were able to recognize at an early stage in the
development of international civil aviation that the freedom to exercise sover-
eign rights in domestic affairs may be subject to certain limitations. Safety
considerations for civil aircraft could constitute such a limitation.
One important feature of the framework under the Chicago Convention
is the emphasis on uniformity of standards, which will enhance aviation safety.
An innovative system was wisely designed by the drafters of the Convention,
under which international standards could be adopted by the ICAO Council,
and become applicable to all member States, unless they notify ICAO that they
51 For more discussion of the interest of the international community, see Ch. 5.1.
52 Cited by the Presentation by the President of the Council of the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), Dr. Assad Kotaite, of the Annual Report for the Council for 1998, 1999,
and 2000, and the Supplementary Report for the First Six Months of 2001 during the 33rd Session
of the Assembly.
53 At the 50th anniversary of ICAO, Freer wrote: “The organization’s other challenge of
daunting dimension is to finally establish a multilateral, if not universal, mechanism for
ensuring equity in allocating routes, setting fares and rates and assigning capacities for
different airlines, where necessary. However desirable such a mechanism may be in
furthering international civil aviation, more than a few States still view it as an unwanted
impingement on sovereignty or an unwarranted intrusion in a competitive economic arena.
... Thus, the philosophical dilemma which so troubled the Chicago Conference has not yet
been fully resolved.” Freer, D. W., “ICAO at 50 Years: Riding the Flywheel of Technology”
(September 1994) 49 ICAO Journal 19 at 32.
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could not comply with them. This system, which aims at uniformity while
permitting certain flexibility, has overcome the weakness of the Paris Conven-
tion and proven to be a very valuable asset of ICAO.54
In addition to the legal framework for safety regulation, the Chicago
Conference had also established an institutional framework, namely, ICAO.
Creation of machinery is as important as the substantive issue.55 ICAO not
only provides a forum for its member States to take concerted action on safety
issues, but also provides institutional mechanisms to fulfill the aims and
objectives of the Chicago Convention. The institutional structures of ICAO
include a plenary body, the Assembly; a permanent body responsible to the
Assembly, the Council; and the Secretariat headed by the Chief Executive
Officer of the Organization, the Secretary General.56 The ICAO Council is
somehow unique in the United Nation system, since its members, particularly
its President, reside all the year round in the place where ICAO has its head-
quarters to oversee the overall daily activities of the organization. One of the
mandatory functions of the Council relating to safety is the adoption and
amendment of the Annexes to the Chicago Convention, which contain inter-
national standards and recommended practices. The Annexes are constantly
reviewed and amended to keep pace with new development and advanced
technology. When ICAO celebrated its 50th anniversary, the number of amend-
ments to the Annexes had reached nearly 800.57 As mentioned before, ICAO
has also taken initiatives to strengthen the protection of civil aircraft in flight
from certain military operations. It also led pioneering efforts in the adoption
of international conventions to combat unlawful interference against civil
aviation.58
The Chicago Convention has stood the test of time and is capable of
providing a suitable framework for the promotion of aviation safety.59 On
54 Kotaite, A., “Sovereignty under great pressure to accommodate the growing need for global
cooperation” (December 1995) ICAO Journal at 20. For more details of discussion relating
to uniformity, see infra Ch.2.2.2 and 2.2.4. See also supra the text preceding note 25.
55 Vallat, “The Competence of the United Nations General Assembly” (1959) 87 RdC 203 at
228. See also Skubiszewski, K., “The General Assembly of the United Nations and its Power
to Influence National Action”, in Falk, R.A. and Mendlovitz, S. H., (ed) The Strategy of World
Order, Vol. III, The United Nations (New York: World Law Fund, 1966) 238 at 240.
56 Arts. 48, 50, 54 h) of the Chicago Convention. In practice, the Assembly only meets every
three years, while the Council meets three times a year. Extraordinary sessions for the
Assembly and the Council may also be held. For more details of ICAO’s structures and
their functions, see Cheng, B, supra note 31at 37 et seq. For more updated information, see
Haanappel, supra note 31, The Law and Policy of Air Space And Outer Space: A Comparative
Approach, in Ch. 3.
57 Freer, supra note 53 at 28.
58 See supra note 33.
59 The statistics of ICAO indicate that in 1960, in scheduled air services worldwide, a quarter
of a million safe landings took place for every one fatal accident. In 2000, more than a
million safe landings were made for every one fatal accident. See, Kotaite, A., supra note
54 at 3. See also, supra note 1 and the statistics therein.
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the other hand, the acceleration of globalization and growing interdependence
among sovereign States have presented to ICAO new challenges on safety issues.
The structure of the international civil aviation community has undergone
tremendous changes since the conclusion of the Chicago Convention in 1944.
When the Chicago Convention entered into force on 4 April 1947, there were
26 contracting States to the Convention. Today, in 2008, ICAO has 190 contract-
ing States. The expansion of the ICAO family is a positive factor since this has
made the organization truly universal, as compared to its predecessor, ICAN,
which was somewhat concentrated on Europe. On the other hand, the increas-
ing number of contracting States has also presented an enormous task for ICAO
with respect to the uniform implementation of international safety standards.
At one end of the spectrum, due to the different degree of economic and
technological development, a significant number of developing countries do
not have adequate means and expertise to comply with the ICAO standards.
Consequently, a new agenda item before ICAO is how to ensure global rather
than national implementation of such standards. At the other end of the
spectrum, ICAO has witnessed strong national and regional initiatives to re-
inforce the safety regime for civil aviation. The higher standards imposed in
certain States or regions serve as an impetus to improve safety, but at the same
time place a heavier burden on ICAO for maintaining a global equilibrium of
standard-setting. Despite all this, there is still broad consensus that the matter
of safety is global in nature, and that ICAO should remain the world regulatory
authority for the safety of civil aviation.60
In contrast with what may be referred to as horizontal diversification of
the membership of ICAO, there are profound vertical changes in the airline
industry which indicate a trend toward transnational integration. An airline,
especially a flag carrier, was regarded as a national symbol. States used to,
and some still do, subsidize their airlines to operate as their mobile ambassa-
dors rather than profitable commercial entities. Following the process of
deregulation, privatization and liberalization in the last two decades of the
20th century, the mainstream airlines, and indeed other aviation infrastructures
such as airports and air traffic services, are operating more and more on the
basis of commercial principles. While the preliminary data indicate that safety
is not negatively affected by this trend, it does present new implications for
safety.61 Firstly, the privatization or corporatization process has raised an
issue regarding the effective supervision and control by States with respect
to safety requirements. Instead of operating airlines, airports and air traffic
services directly and implementing safety standards on its own, a State will
need to implement the safety requirements indirectly through private or
60 See Onidi, supra note 6 in Introduction. See also infra note 268 in Ch.5 and accompanying
text.
61 ICAO Council Working Paper C-WP/12480 “Report on the Study on the Safety and Security
Aspects of Economic Liberalization”, 11 May 2005.
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corporatized entities. This will involve a transition from managing operational
activities to assuming regulatory control and supervision.
Given the pressure of market forces, which requires the aviation industry
to produce “more with less” in order to remain economically viable, it is
important to ensure that safety requirements will not be compromised by the
consideration for profit. Secondly, liberalization has been accompanied by the
burgeoning of airline alliances, code-sharing and franchising, as well as the
outsourcing of such activities as aircraft repair and maintenance, flight opera-
tions and crew administration, and ground handling. An Austrian airline may
operate code-share flights with a Belgian carrier to Canada, while the aircraft
is leased from a company in Denmark, which is in turn controlled by a trustee
in Estonia. The aircraft may be operated by a pilot from France, subject to
regular maintenance in Germany, beneficially owned by the nationals of
Hungary and registered in Ireland.62
Consequently, it will be difficult to confine the regulatory framework within
the boundaries of a single country. Harmonization of national regulations or
formulation of international regulations becomes all the more necessary.
Competition in the market also requires airlines to be cost-efficient, thereby
calling for simplification and unification of certain regulatory procedures.
The globalization process is also accelerated by the development of new
technology, such as satellite-based navigation systems.63 As we all know,
aircraft could not fly safely without air traffic services. Provision of such
services is organized on the basis of flight information regions assigned by
ICAO, which are more or less aligned with national boundaries. Therefore,
traditionally, air traffic services, including air navigation aids by radar, are
provided on a national basis. The introduction of the satellite-based systems
will make it possible to provide service coverage which far exceeds national
boundaries. Consequently, “the full implementation of an integrated global
satellite-based navigation system is bound to infringe on States’ sover-
eignty”.64 For the purposes of achieving efficiency and economy, States will
be inclined to display certain flexibility in the exercise of sovereign rights by
jointly providing air traffic services with neighbouring countries.
Last but not least, the catastrophic effects of terrorist attacks and other acts
of unlawful interference against civil aviation could not be confined to a
territory or to citizens of a particular country. Combat against terrorism has
been globalized. Preventive measures must be as globally uniform as possible.
62 See Haanappel, The Law and Policy of Air Space and Outer Space: A Comparative Approach,
supra note 31 at 147 et seq.; Lyle, C., “Economic liberalization and globalization have
implications for safety regulation” (2001) 56 ICAO Journal 5 at 6.
63 For more discussion of the satellite-based systems which have come to be known as the
ICAO communications, navigation and surveillance/air traffic management (CNS/ATM)
systems, see infra Ch. 2.2.1, note 63 et seq.
64 Kotaite, A., supra note 54 at 21.
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Otherwise, sophisticated criminal groups could target the weakest element
in the chain of protection.
In view of all these, ICAO is confronted with more complicated tasks. The
new millennium has imposed new safety requirements and may expect ICAO
to take a more dynamic approach to promote the safe and orderly development
of international civil aviation.
1.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Safety in civil aviation is not a purely technical matter; it involves a complex
law-making process for determining and managing acceptable risks. Safety
matters are also international by their nature. From the history of civil aviation,
one could observe the clear and continuous movement from national to inter-
national regulation. Due to the changes which have taken place since the
conclusion of the Chicago Convention, including the expansion of the inter-
national civil aviation community, the liberalization of the aviation industry,
the introduction of new technology, and the existing as well as the new and
emerging threats by terrorism, aviation safety has already become a global
issue and could not be adequately and effectively addressed within the limits
of national boundaries. Confronted with this challenge, ICAO, as the worldwide
governmental organization for international civil aviation, needs to take a more
proactive role in enhancing aviation safety, as demonstrated in the following
chapters.
2 Regulation of Aviation Safety by Means of
a Technical Safety Code
Global aviation is a large industry comprising various essential elements such
as aircraft, air crew and airports. While these three elements could form the
basic classical prerequisites for the conduct of flights, modern aviation is much
more complex and requires even more components. For instance, due to the
great number of aircraft flying at the same time, an air traffic control and
management system is indispensable to avoid collision and to ensure orderly
arrival and departure of these aircraft. In addition, an aircraft also needs
meteorological information, communication devices and other services and
facilities to ensure its safe flight. The provision of all these elements requires
harmonized cooperation between numerous people from different jurisdictions
with different levels of expertise. Obviously, it is practically impossible for
ICAO to be physically responsible for the safety of each stage of every flight.
Within the framework of the Chicago Convention, ICAO promotes the technical
and operational safety of civil aviation on a worldwide basis through a number
of mechanisms: the establishment of safety oversight responsibility on the part
of sovereign States; the adoption of international standards, recommended
practices and other related material; and more recently, through the establish-
ment and implementation of safety oversight and security audit programmes
for verifying State compliance with international standards and recommended
practices.
2.1 ESTABLISHMENT OF SAFETY OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITY
Safety oversight may be defined as “a function by means of which States
ensure effective implementation of the safety-related Standards and Recom-
mended Practices (SARPs) and associated procedures contained in the Annexes
to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and related ICAO documents”.1
In accordance with the principle of State sovereignty, a fundamental premise
has been established that safety oversight responsibility rests with the contract-
ing States to the Chicago Convention. In its Resolution A29-13 of 1992, the
ICAO Assembly reaffirmed the widely held position that each “individual
1 ICAO Doc 9734, AN/959, 2nd ed. (2006), Safety Oversight Manual, Part A, The Establishment
and Management of a State’s Safety Oversight System, para. 2.1.1.
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State’s responsibility for safety oversight is one of the tenets of the Conven-
tion”.2 The basis for the exercise of this responsibility by States is twofold:
the nationality/registration or flag jurisdiction of a State over the aircraft
concerned; and, territorial jurisdiction of the relevant State.
2.1.1 Responsibility of the State of Registry and/or the State of the Operator
Article 17 of the Chicago Convention proclaims a fundamental principle:
“Aircraft have the nationality of the State in which they are registered.” Article
18 prohibits registration of an aircraft in more than one State, thereby complete-
ly ruling out the possibility of “double nationality” of an aircraft. The registra-
tion or transfer of registration of aircraft in any contracting State shall be made
in accordance with its laws and regulations.3
While the act of registering an aircraft per se may not be a safety issue,
such an act may trigger a number of safety-related obligations.4 The concept
of registration implies responsibility of the State of registry.5 For instance,
under Article 12 of the Chicago Convention, each contracting State undertakes
to adopt measures to ensure that every aircraft carrying its nationality mark,
wherever such aircraft may be, shall comply with the rules and regulations
relating to the flight and maneuver of aircraft there in force. Any violation
of these “rules of the air” will be subject to prosecution.6 Also, under Article
31, it is the responsibility of the State of registry to issue or render valid a
certificate of airworthiness for every aircraft engaged in international naviga-
tion. In the same vein, Article 32 requires that the pilot of every aircraft and
the other members of the operating crew of every aircraft engaged in inter-
national navigation be provided with certificates of competency and licenses
issued or rendered valid by the State in which the aircraft is registered. Article
30 requires licensing by the State of registry for the installation, operation and
use of aircraft radio transmitting apparatus.7 All these provisions set out
mandatory duties for the State of registry unless it delegates its responsibility
2 ICAO Doc 9848, Assembly Resolutions in Force (as of 8 October 2004) at I-56. See infra note
207 and accompanying text.
3 Art. 19, Chicago Convention.
4 ICAO Doc 9734, supra. note 1, para.2.3.4.1.
5 ICAO Circular Cir 295 LE/2, Guidance on the Implementation of Art. 83 bis of the Conven-
tion on International Civil Aviation (2003) at 4.
6 Art. 12, Chicago Convention. See also, ICAO Circular, supra note 5 at 4.
7 Through the interpretation of Art. 30, ICAO has in fact loosened the requirement of licensing
for certain radio equipment not used for air navigation purposes. See Brisibe, T., International
law and regulations of aeronautical public correspondence by satellite, Ph.D thesis at Leiden
University, ISBN 10: 90-77596-25-9, ISBN 13: 978-90-77596-25-8, at 71 et seq. For the effect
of interpretation of, or de facto amendment to the Chicago Convention, see infra note 111
in Ch.5.2.1.
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pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Chicago Convention, such as Article
83 bis.
In addition to the foregoing mandatory duties, the State of registry is also
subject to a number of permissive safety-related functions. For instance, the
State of registry may provide assistance to an aircraft in distress which is on
its registry,8 and participate in the inquiry of accidents in which such aircraft
is involved. Furthermore, although not expressly stipulated in the Chicago
Convention, the State of registry is also competent to exercise jurisdiction over
offences and acts committed on board aircraft registered in such State.9
In view of the important safety oversight functions of the State of registry,
a question arises as to whether a “genuine link” is required between the State
and aircraft registered therein. In other words, can a member State of ICAO
decide, according to its laws and regulations, to grant “flags of convenience”
to a particular aircraft? Cheng, citing the “link theory” derived from the
decision of the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm Case, states that
“(t)here appears to be no reason why the rule enunciated by the Court with
regard to individuals cannot be extended to ships and aircraft so as to exclude
flags of convenience.”10 On the other hand, the editors of Shawcross and Beau-
mont Air Law believe that this argument disregards the fact that the criteria
adopted by the court in the Nottebohm Case were “characteristic of human
beings, but quite irrelevant for an inanimate object”, and the fact that the
Chicago Convention specifically calls upon each State to set its own rules for
registration.11
The notion of a “genuine link” as enunciated in the Nottebohm Case refers
to “a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and
sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties.”12 As
early as 1958, the Convention on the High Seas had already prescribed the
following rule with respect to the nationality of ships in its Article 5, para-
graph 1:
Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the
registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have the
nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a
genuine link between the State and the ship; in particular, the State must effectively
exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters
over ships flying its flag.
8 Art. 25, Chicago Convention.
9 See infra Ch.4.1 in the context of the Tokyo Convention.
10 Cheng, B., The Law of International Air Transport (1962, London: Stevens and Sons Ltd.)
131. Nottebohm Case (Second Phase), Judgement of April 6th, 1955, [1955] ICJ Reports 4.
11 Shawcross and Beaumont Air Law (London: LexisNexis Butterworths, 1983, loose leaf version),
Vol. I at V 8.
12 ICJ Reports, supra note 10 at 23.
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The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea inherited this provision
in its Articles 91 and 94. From this, it would be safe to conclude that the
requirement of a genuine link between a ship and its flag State has been deeply
embedded in the law of the sea.
Over time, there has also been a clear indication that the genuine link
requirement does not necessarily require that the ship must be owned by a
national of the flag State. In the MV Saiga (No.2) case, the ship in question was
owned by a company in Cyprus, managed by a company in Scotland, chartered
to Switzerland with a crew of Ukrainian nationality, but registered in Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines. Despite all these, the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea concluded that the evidence adduced was not sufficient
to justify a finding that there was no “genuine link” between the ship and
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines at the material time.13 On the contrary,
the Tribunal stated as follows:
The purpose of the provisions of the Convention on the need for a genuine link
between a ship and its flag State is to secure more effective implementation of the
duties of the flag State, and not to establish criteria by reference to which the
validity of the registration of ships in a flag State may be challenged by other
States.14
Thus the general consensus in the maritime sector is that the objective and
purpose of the “genuine link” requirement is to assure “the ability of the flag
State to effectively exercise its jurisdiction over ships flying its flag”.15
In similar fashion, Article 19 of the Chicago Convention reserves the right
to fix the conditions for registration of aircraft exclusively to sovereign States.
Although the Chicago Convention, unlike the treaties relating to the law of
the sea, does not specifically mention the requirement of a “genuine link”,
there is no doubt that, in the general context of the Convention, “a social fact
of attachment” must exist between an aircraft and its State of registry. For
instance, the owner of an aircraft owes a duty to the State of registry to comply
with its airworthiness standards, which, pursuant to Article 33 of the Chicago
Convention, shall be equal to, or above the minimum standards established
by ICAO. In return, the owner may benefit from the assurances of the State
that the certificate of airworthiness of the aircraft issued by it will be recog-
nized as valid by any other member State of ICAO. Clearly, there is a genuine
connection of interests together with the existence of reciprocal rights and
duties.
13 Judgement of International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 1 July 1999, available at http://
www.itlos.org/start2_en.html, date of access: 26 July 2008.
14 Id. at para. 83.
15 UN Doc A/61/160, Report of the Ad Hoc Consultative Meeting of Senior Representatives
of International Organizations on the “Genuine Link”, 17 July 2006.
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Consistent with the maritime practice mentioned above, the fact that an
aircraft is not owned by a national of the State of registry does not necessarily
deprive it of a genuine link with that State. The central concern is whether
the State of registry would be able to effectively exercise its safety oversight
function to assure that the aircraft complies with ICAO standards. In this
connection, it should be mentioned that ownership and control in the context
of the registration of aircraft should be distinguished from the ownership and
control requirements with respect to airlines designated in air services agree-
ments.16 The latter relates to economic regulation of airlines, whereas the
former relates to safety regulation of aircraft. The Chicago Convention is
principally concerned with the nationality of aircraft, but not particularly
concerned with the nationality of airlines.17 With respect to airlines, the
requirements relating to ownership and control may be lessened due to emerg-
ing trends in the liberalization of air transport policy. With respect to aircraft,
the nationality of the owner does not seem to present any problems. Control
by the State of registry over safety aspects of aircraft should, however, be
maintained or even reinforced.
The grave consequences which may result from the lack of a “genuine link”
between aircraft and their States of registry were illustrated by the situation
in Liberia around 2000. Due to the lack of domestic supervision system, the
civil aviation authority of Liberia had lost control of many aircraft in its
registry, which had created a situation that enabled arms trafficking networks
to camouflage their operations through fake registrations, document fraud
and the setting up of a mystery airline.18 The arms trafficking resulting from
these practices contributed to the instability in the region and drew the
attention of the UN Security Council. A Panel of Experts was established to
investigate the situation. In its report, the Panel observed:
Because of its lax licence and tax laws, Liberia has for many years been a flag of
convenience for the fringe air cargo industry. Liberia also has lax maritime and
aviation laws that provide the owners of ships and aircraft with maximum discre-
tion and cover, and with minimal regulatory interference. A schedule of Liberian-
registered aircraft provided to the Panel by the government listed only 7 planes.
No documentation was available on more than 15 other aircraft identified by the
16 For the issue of the ownership and control of airlines, see Haanappel, P.P.C., The Law and
Policy of Air Space and Outer Space: A Comparative Approach (The Hague and New
York: Kluwer Law International, 2003) 145 et seq.
17 Id. at 47 and 146.
18 UN Doc S/2001/1015, Letter dated 26 October 2001 from the Chairman of the Security
Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia
addressed to the President of the Security Council, 26 October 2001 at 10, para. 143.
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Panel. Many aircraft flying under the Liberian flag, therefore, are apparently
unknown to Liberian authorities, and are never inspected or seen in the country.19
Consequently, the UN Security Council decided, in accordance with Chapter VII
of the UN Charter, to ground all Liberian-registered aircraft operating within
its jurisdiction until it updated its register of aircraft pursuant to Annex 7 to
the Chicago Convention, and provided to the Council the updated information
concerning the registration and ownership of each aircraft registered in
Liberia.20 In this case, not only did the lack of oversight by the civil aviation
authority present safety issues; it also had implications for the overall peace
and security of the world.
Safety oversight responsibility is not limited to the initial certification and
licensing of aircraft and crew but also includes further action to ensure the
continuous airworthiness of the aircraft and continuous competence of the
crew. Without a genuine connection to the aircraft and its crew, it would not
be possible to carry out this follow-up function. In fact, when ICAO conducts
a safety oversight audit in any of its member States, one of most important
areas of concern is to verify whether the audited State has the capability to
carry out the safety oversight function mentioned above. In the event of a
negative finding, a recommendation to rectify the situation will be given to
the State, failing which the deficiency (which is considered significant) will
be reported to other member States. One situation that may trigger a negative
finding is a scenario in which a State has an excessive number of large-trans-
port aircraft on its registry, which are well beyond its capability for safety
oversight.21
The issue as to whether or not the requirement of a “genuine link” excludes
the practice of “flags of convenience” in civil aviation has received close
attention in ICAO over the years, but there appears to be no clear definition
of the term “flags of convenience”. In its Working Paper C-WP/12480, the
ICAO Secretariat referred to it as “a term derived from the maritime industry
which denotes a situation in which commercial vessels owned by nationals
of a State, but registered in another State, are allowed to operate freely between
and among other States”.22 This definition varies from the definitions pro-
vided by a number of reputable publications in international law. For instance,
the Encyclopedia of Public International Law, published under the auspices of
the Max Planck Institute, defines the term as “the registration of merchant
ships under the flags of a number of States. … Such ships are usually bene-
19 UN Doc S/2000/1195, Note by the President of the Security Council: Report of the Panel
of Experts established by resolution 1306 (2000) on the situation in Sierra Leone, 20 Decem-
ber 2001 at 10, para. 25.
20 UN Doc S/RES/1343, 7 March 2001.
21 See infra Ch.5.3.1 note 202 and accompanying text.
22 ICAO Council Working Paper C-WP/12480 “Report on the Study on the Safety and Security
Aspects of Economic Liberalization”, 11 May 2005, App., para. 2.2.3.1.
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ficially owned or controlled by non-nationals of the flag State, and the ships
rarely if ever visit their port of registry.”23 It appears from this definition that
while foreign ownership may “usually” be the case, it is not an adequate or
essential condition for a ship to attain the flag of convenience. Black’s Law
Dictionary defines the term as “practice of registering a merchant vessel with
a country that has favourable (i.e. less restrictive) safety requirements, registra-
tion fees, etc.”24 Again, in this definition, foreign ownership of the vessel is
not the determining factor, since the owner may be tempted to register it in
his or her own country if the conditions therein are less restrictive.
The classical “flag of convenience” status, as defined by the Max Planck
Institute, has been prohibited for civil aircraft due to the effect of Article 18
of the Chicago Convention and, therefore, has no place in the ICAO system.25
The newer definition referred to in the ICAO working paper mentioned above
unnecessarily requires foreign ownership and does not entirely capture the
essence of the concept of flags of convenience (i.e. the evasion of restrictive
requirements, in many cases safety requirements). From the perspective of
the Chicago Convention, the crux of the issue is not whether a State registers
aircraft owned by foreigners,26 but whether it exercises safety oversight on
the aircraft in its register, no matter who owns them. By comparison, the
definition provided by Black’s Law Dictionary appears to reflect the current
concern of the international community.
Accordingly, the practice of ICAO has been not to focus on foreign owner-
ship of aircraft but, rather, on the safety oversight capabilities of the States
which register foreign-owned aircraft.27 This is consistent with recent maritime
23 Ignarski, J.S., Flags of Convenience, in: Bernhardt, R., (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International
Law, published under the auspices of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law
and International Law under the Direction of Rudolf Bernhardt, Vol. II (Amsterdam-
Lausanne-New York-Oxford-Shannon-Tokyo: Elsevier Science B.V., 1995) at 404. It is further
explained that a ship “that sails under the flags of two or more States, using them according
to convenience, may not claim any of the nationalities asserted and may become a ship
without nationality.” Caron, D.D., Flags of Vessels, id. 406; see also Wang Tieya, China Legal
Dictionary: International Law, in Chinese (Beijing: China Prosecutor Press, 1994) at 127.
24 Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1990) at 638.
25 Supra note 3 and its preceding text.
26 Many countries which vigorously exercise safety oversight functions in civil aviation still
allow foreign owned aircraft to be registered therein, subject to certain prescribed conditions.
United States law allows the registration of an aircraft which is “owned by a corporation
(other than a corporation which is a citizen of the United States) lawfully organized and
doing business under the laws of the United States or any State thereof so long as such
aircraft is based and primarily used in the United States”, 14 CFR Ch. 1 (1-1-99 Edition),
Section 47.3. In China, Art. 3 of the Regulations Concerning the Nationality and Registration
of Civil Aircraft (CCAR-45AA, 2 December 1990, in Chinese) also allows the registration
of an aircraft if its “right of operation” belongs to State organs, State enterprises or other
groups and organizations lawfully formed by the nationals of the People’s Republic of
China.
27 Cf. ICAO Council Working Paper, C-WP/13133, “Progress Report on the Issue of Flags
of Convenience”, 20 February 2008.
28 Regulation of Aviation Safety by Means of a Technical Safety Code
practice focusing on “the ability of the flag State to effectively exercise its
jurisdiction over ships flying its flag” as the objective and purpose of the
“genuine link” requirement.28 The “social fact of attachment” is not necessarily
reflected in the ownership of the aircraft by nationals, but in the close super-
vision by the State of registry regarding safety standards over aircraft on its
registry.
ICAO has strengthened the implementation of Article 21 of the Chica-
go Convention as a means of promoting the maintenance of this “social fact
of attachment” between an aircraft and its State of registry. Article 21 requires
a member State to supply to another member State or ICAO, “on demand”,
information concerning the registration and ownership of “any particular
aircraft” registered in the former State. It further requires every member State
to furnish reports to ICAO, “under such regulations as the latter may prescribe”,
giving such pertinent data as can be made available concerning the “ownership
and control of aircraft registered in that State and habitually engaged in
international air navigation.” Since no regulations in this respect were pre-
scribed by ICAO until 2006, this provision had been largely dormant for a long
time, save in those cases where information was supplied “on demand”. In
2005, however, ICAO undertook a study on the implementation of Article 21.29
Following the study, and for the first time in ICAO’s history, the Council
approved in principle the Rules for the Provision of Pertinent Data Concerning
Aircraft Registered in a State Pursuant to Article 21 of the Convention on Inter-
national Civil Aviation30 in December 2006.
As a result of this initiative, the provision of pertinent data concerning
aircraft registration is no longer occasional, i.e., “on demand”, but on a regular
and ongoing basis. Under the Rules, all aircraft registered in a member State
of ICAO are deemed to be “habitually” engaged in international air navigation,
except those specifically limited to domestic operations by the State civil
28 Supra note 15.
29 ICAO Working Paper AN/WP 8113, “Review of a Proposal for the Provision of Data
Concerning Aircraft Registered in a State, in accordance with Art. 21 of the Chicago Conven-
tion”, 16 February 2006. See, also, ICAO ANC Minutes, AN Min. 169-1, 18 April 2005. In
the Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council resolution 1343 (2001)
concerning Liberia (S/2001/1015, 26 October 2001), the Panel found illegally registered
aircraft “an endemic problem” and felt that “ICAO’s response was inadequate to deal with
this growing problem”. It recommended that:
· ICAO proactively educates its members on the dangers of illegal registrations;
· ICAO’s member States computerize their registration lists and centralize them on the
ICAO website so that users could check the situation and status of each aircraft;
· ICAO’s Safety Oversight programme should place greater emphasis on aircraft registra-
tion.
30 ICAO Council Working Paper C-WP/12697, “Proposal for the Implementation of a System
for the Provision of Pertinent Data Concerning Aircraft Registered in a State Pursuant to
Article 21 of the Chicago Convention”, 27 November 2006; ICAO Doc 9003-C/1155 C-Min.
179/1-20, Council – Special Session (August 2006), Council – 179th Session, Summary Minutes
with Subject Index (2007) at 246.
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aviation authority. The information to be provided under the Rules shall
include, inter alia, the name and address of the owner of the aircraft, the name
of its operator, and the State of the operator if it is not the same as the State
of registry. Data shall be updated on a monthly basis and shall be accessible
by other member States. The Rules further require that the data submitted
and updated shall include the name of the civil aviation authority official
responsible for reporting the data to ICAO. A list of States which have neither
reported nor updated their data shall be maintained on the ICAO website.31
These provisions are clearly intended to strengthen the link between an aircraft
and its State of registry, and to curtail the use of flags of convenience for
avoiding safety oversight in aviation.
In summary, while the aircraft registered in a member State of ICAO do
not have to be owned by nationals of that State, there ought to be a “genuine
link” between the aircraft and the State of registry in the form of close super-
vision or oversight by the State of registry over such aircraft, in the vital
interest of aviation safety.
When a State of registry finds itself unable to discharge adequately the
functions and duties assumed under the Chicago Convention, certain mechan-
isms exist for the transfer of such duties and functions to other States, or
probably to an international organization. At the time the Chicago Convention
was negotiated, its architects had envisaged the possibility of two or more
contracting States establishing joint air transport operating organizations or
international operating agencies, or pooling their air services on any routes
or in any regions. Based on this foresight (which may have significant implica-
tions in the era of liberalization of air transport in the 21st century), the second
sentence of Article 77 of the Chicago Convention mandates the ICAO Council
to determine in what manner the provisions of the Convention relating to
nationality of aircraft shall apply to aircraft operated by international operating
agencies. In the 1960s, ICAO Legal Committee spent a number of years system-
atically exploring the possibility of registering aircraft operated by international
operating agencies on an international rather than a national basis.32 Some
believed that international registration was incompatible with the provisions
of Articles 17 to 19 of the Chicago Convention, according to which aircraft
must have one nationality, must be registered in a State, and must have the
nationality of the State of registry. It was felt that if international registration
was to be allowed, it would de facto amend the Chicago Convention.33 Others
31 Id.
32 See, for more details, FitzGerald, G, “Nationality and Registration of Aircraft Operated
by International Operating Agencies and Article 77 of the Convention on International Civil
Aviation, 1944” (1967) CYIL at 193. See also Cheng, B. “Nationality and Registration of
Aircraft – Article 77 of the Chicago Convention” (1966) 32 JALC 551; El Hussainy, K.,
“Registration and Nationality of Aircraft Operated by International Agencies in Law and
Practice” (1985)10 Air Law 15.
33 Shawcross and Beaumont Air Law, supra note 11 at V 21.
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believed that Article 77 gave the ICAO Council the duty and thus the power
to interpret the provisions of the Convention so as to permit international
registration. If joint registration or international registration is not permitted
at all, the second sentence of Article 77 would have no meaning.34 In 1967,
a legal sub-committee established specifically to deliberate on this issue arrived
at a consensus that the second sentence of Article 77 would be applicable to
cases of joint registration or international registration of aircraft only if certain
conditions were fulfilled. The key point of those conditions was the fulfillment
of obligations relating to aircraft so registered. Several scenarios were pres-
ented:
A. The States constituting the international operating agency shall be jointly and
severally bound to assume the obligations which, under the Convention, attach
to a State of registry.
B. The States constituting the international operating agency shall identify for each
aircraft, as between the States constituting the agency, an appropriate State which
shall be primarily responsible for receiving and replying to representations made
by other contracting States to the Convention. This identification shall be without
prejudice to the joint and several responsibility assumed by each of the participating
States in the agency, the duties assumed by the State so identified being exercised
on its own behalf and on behalf of all the other participating States.
C. In lieu of B above, the States constituting the international operating agency
may devise such other system (for example, registration with a public international
organization, with legal personality, established for this purpose by the States
constituting the international operating agency) as shall satisfy the Council that
the other contracting States of the Convention have equivalent guarantees and that
the provisions of the Convention are complied with.35
Based on this conclusion, on 14 December 1967, the Council adopted a resolu-
tion setting out the conditions to be fulfilled in such cases.36 As of now, due
to the lack of major examples of international operating agencies, the issue
of international registration of aircraft has remained an academic rather than
a real issue, although it may re-emerge in the future. From the point of view
of this study, however, what may be considered significant is that during
discussions on this issue, there was general consensus that the obligations
attached to the State of registry under the Chicago Convention must be ful-
filled, regardless of whether the aircraft in question are registered on national
basis or otherwise. While the door may be open for transferring those obliga-
tions to an international organization, there must be “equivalent guarantees”
that the provisions of the Chicago Convention will be complied with. In other
34 FitzGerald, supra note 32 at 206.
35 Id. at 209 and 211. See also Report of the Sub-Committee (1967) at 2 (para.4.1).
36 ICAO Doc 8707-C/974, Council –Sixty Second Session, Minutes with Subject Index, August
1969 at 68.
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words, there is a strong conviction in the minds of ICAO member States which
may sufficiently establish opinio juris, that there must be a “genuine link”
between an aircraft and its State of registry, since the act of registration is
inevitably accompanied by the responsibility to exercise a safety oversight
function over such aircraft.
The drafters of the Chicago Convention did not address the issue concern-
ing the transfer of functions and duties from the State of the registry to the
State of the operator, since the need for such a transfer was not apparent at
the time. As modern aviation technology developed, aircraft have become
larger, more sophisticated and more expensive, thereby giving rise to the need
for international financing. Gradually, the practice of leasing, charter or inter-
change of aircraft has become popular. Very often, a special purpose entity
registers an aircraft in one State only for financing purposes, but the aircraft
so registered is operated by another entity in a different State, and probably
has never landed in the State of registry. Under such circumstances, the State
of registry may experience difficulties in ensuring compliance with safety
standards since it has practically lost any control it might have had over the
aircraft. A major difficulty may arise particularly with the supervision of
maintenance requirements and therefore the State of registry may not find
itself in a good position to renew the certificate of airworthiness when
required.37
To cope with this new situation, Article 83 bis of the Chicago Convention
was adopted under the auspices of ICAO, and it came into force on 20 June
1997 with respect to the States which have ratified it. Under this new article,
notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 12, 30, 31 and 32(a), when an aircraft
registered in a contracting State is operated pursuant to an agreement for the
lease, charter or interchange of the aircraft or any similar arrangement by an
operator who has his principal place of business or, if he has no such place
of business, his permanent residence in another contracting State, the State
of registry may, by agreement with such other State, transfer to it all or part
of its functions and duties under Articles 12, 30, 31 and 32(a) in respect of that
aircraft. The State of registry shall be relieved of responsibility in respect of
the functions and duties transferred.
Article 83 bis may be regarded as one of the few lawful exceptions to the
requirement of a “genuine link” between an aircraft and its State of registry.
The said article imposes certain conditions for the transfer of responsibility.
Firstly, as pointed out in the guidance material prepared by ICAO, “Article
83 bis is an umbrella provision, the ratification of which does not entail the
automatic transfer of functions and duties from the State of Registry to the
State of the Operator; it requires that such a transfer be expressly arranged
through an agreement between the States concerned”.38 Secondly, Article 83
37 ICAO Circular 295 supra note 5 at 4.
38 Id. at 5. A model of such an agreement is provided in the guidance.
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bis delineates the limits of transferable responsibility, namely: matters relating
to the rules of the air (Article 12); radio licensing (Article 30); airworthiness
of aircraft (Article 31); and, crew licensing (Article 32(a)).39 The transfer is
further limited to aircraft which are identified in the transfer agreement.
Thirdly, the transfer will be recognized by third-party States which have
ratified Article 83 bis only when the latter has been officially informed of the
transfer through direct communication between the relevant States, or through
the registration of the transfer agreement with ICAO under Article 83 of the
Chicago Convention, which, in turn, is required to make it public.
To date, Article 83 bis has been ratified by 156 States.40 However, this
number is still smaller than the total number of 190 contracting States to the
Chicago Convention. As regards those States which have not ratified Article
83 bis, the responsibility which would otherwise be transferable under the
Article remains with the State of registry. As between the States parties to it,
“Article 83 bis is a discretionary and flexible instrument available to those that
ratify it, but unless functions and duties are clearly identified and reassigned
by a transfer agreement, they continue to rest with the State of Registry”.41
The amendment to the Chicago Convention through Article 83 bis reinforces
the principle that the concept of “flags of convenience” has no place within
the ICAO system. The rationale behind Article 83 bis is that “the State having
the closest ties with the operator concerned will have the necessary supervisory
authority to carry out effective safety oversight of the aircraft and its crew
in accordance with the requirements of the relevant Annexes to the Conven-
tion.”42 Had “flags of convenience” been acceptable, it would not have been
necessary for ICAO to spend several decades in negotiating and adopting Article
83 bis and to bring it into force. The vigorous requirements of the conclusion
of a transfer agreement and notification of such an agreement further demon-
strate that Article 83 bis is an exception which proves the existence of the rule
that the State of registry must exercise supervisory or oversight function over
the aircraft registered therein.
2.1.2 Responsibility of States in their Respective Territories
The responsibility to exercise safety oversight does not only rest with the State
of registry and the State of the operator of aircraft, but, to a certain extent,
also with the State in whose territory the aircraft operates. For instance, under
Article 12 of the Chicago Convention, a contracting State undertakes the same
39 Other functions and duties, such as those under Art. 25 relating to aircraft in distress, and
Art. 26 concerning inquiry of accidents, remain with the State of registry.
40 As of 21 July 2008.
41 ICAO Circular 295 supra note 5 at 5.
42 Id. at 6.
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responsibility as the State of the registry to ensure that every aircraft flying
over or maneuvering within its territory shall comply with the rules and
regulations relating to the flight and maneuver of aircraft there in force. Article
25 requires each contracting State to provide such measures of assistance to
aircraft in distress in its territory as it may find practicable. Article 26 imposes
an obligation upon a contracting State to investigate an accident involving
an aircraft of another contracting State which occurs in its territory if such
an accident involves death or serious injury, or indicates serious technical
defects in the aircraft or air navigation facilities. In many cases, the State in
which the accident occurs has to incur certain expenditures in conducting the
investigation even if the accident does not have a significant impact on it. The
acceptance of this obligation is another significant indicator that aviation safety
is a matter which goes beyond the concern of only one State and requires
international cooperation.
Under Article 16, each contracting State has the right, without unreasonable
delay, to search aircraft of other contracting States upon landing or departure,
and to inspect the certificates and other documents prescribed by the Conven-
tion. While this provision does not impose an obligation on the part of the
searching State, it has been invoked as a legal basis to support the acts of
certain States to strengthen safety measures.43 In 2001, the ICAO Council
adopted a resolution recommending a model clause on aviation safety to be
included in agreements on air services, which specifically mentions the applic-
ability of Article 16.44 The scope of the search provided for under the recom-
mended model clause extends beyond the list of documents required under
Article 33 of the Convention. That article exclusively addresses aircraft certifi-
cates of airworthiness and flight crew certificates of competency and licenses,
whereas the model clause covers other additional documents such as air
operator certificates. In a 2007 resolution of the ICAO Assembly, Article 16 was
again referred to, and member States were reminded of the need for sur-
veillance of all aircraft operations, including foreign aircraft within their
43 See, for example, the Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft (SAFA) programme, infra
Ch.5.4.2, note 230.
44 ICAO Doc 9785-C/1139, C-Min. 163/1-22, Council – 163rd Session, Summary Minutes with
Subject Index (2001) at 93. The model provision relating to Art. 16 reads as follows: “Pursuant
to Article 16 of the Convention, it is further agreed that, any aircraft operated by, or on
behalf of an airline of one Party, on service to or from the territory of another Party, may,
while within the territory of the other Party be the subject of a search by the authorized
representatives of the other Party, provided this does not cause unreasonable delay in the
operation of the aircraft. Notwithstanding the obligations mentioned in Article 33 of the
Chicago Convention, the purpose of this search is to verify the validity of the relevant
aircraft documentation, the licensing of its crew, and that the aircraft equipment and the
condition of the aircraft conform to the Standards established at that time pursuant to the
Convention.”
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territory, and for appropriate action to be taken when necessary to preserve
safety.45
Moreover, Article 28, paragraph 1 of the Chicago Convention stipulates
that each contracting State undertakes, so far as it may find practicable, to
provide, in its territory, airports, radio services, meteorological services, and
other air navigation facilities to facilitate international air navigation in accord-
ance with the standards and practices recommended or established form time
to time pursuant to this Convention.
The undertakings provided in Article 28 are obviously vital for ensuring
the safety of air navigation. On the other hand, a number of commentators
have noted the escape-valve nature of the phrase “so far as it may find practic-
able” included in this article.46 It has been pointed out, for instance, that “the
obligations undertaken by the contacting States are subject to limitations and
safeguards which make it impossible for a State to be compelled to take action
against its will”.47 Indeed, the existence of the escape-valve is one of the
features of the Chicago Convention and its effect needs to be evaluated.48
As far as Article 28 is concerned, experience has shown that ICAO may, through
its institutional regimes, reduce or minimize the negative impact of this escape-
valve.
In practice, ICAO and its member States implement Article 28 through
regional air navigation plans. The plans are ICAO documents established by
the Council, which set forth in detail the facilities, services and procedures
required for international air navigation within specified regions. Such plans
constitute recommendations for States to follow in programming the provision
of their air navigation facilities and services, with the assurance that facilities
and services furnished in accordance with the plan will, together with those
of other States, form an integrated system adequate for the foreseeable
future.49
In their material scope, the plans describe the required facilities and services
in the fields of aerodromes, air information services, air traffic services, com-
munications, meteorology, and search and rescue. In their geographical scope,
the plans are usually related to one or more ICAO air navigation regions.
Traditionally, a regional air navigation plan was prepared or amended by a
regional air navigation conference, subject to the approval of the ICAO Council.
45 Assembly Resolution A36-2: Unified strategy to resolve safety-related deficiencies, in ICAO Doc
9902 Assembly Resolutions in Force (as of 28 September 2007) at I-92.
46 Buergenthal, T., Law-Making in the International Civil Aviation (Syracuse University Press,
1969) at 76. Cheng, supra note 10 at 146.
47 Shawcross and Beaumont Air Law, supra note 11 at VI [4].
48 See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
49 ICAO Doc 7754, Air Navigation Plan – European Region, 23rd Edition (1985), in Introduc-
tion 1.1.
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Recent practice in ICAO, however, allows the amendment of a plan through
the circulation of the draft amendment without convening a conference.50
With respect to the legal status of regional air navigation plans, some
commentators consider that they have the status of a Council recommendation,
similar to the one mentioned in Article 69 of the Chicago Convention, under
which the Council may make recommendations to a member State if its facil-
ities are considered inadequate, but no State shall be “guilty of an infraction”
of the Convention if it fails to carry out these recommendations.51 Within
ICAO circles, there is a feeling that member States are generally scrupulous
in honouring their undertakings contained in the plans. This may be the reason
why Milde states that most States believe, or are made to believe, that a
regional air navigation plan has binding force. However, he questions the
constitutional basis of the planning authority of the regional air navigation
conferences.52 In the view of this writer, regional air navigation plans form
a part, and probably the major part of the “regional air navigation agreements”
referred to in paragraph 2.1.2 of Annex 11.53 They represent commitments
made by the member States involved in the plans with respect to the degree
of practicability of providing services within their respective territories under
Article 28. The plan-formulation process is less formal than the treaty-making
process, but is still safeguarded by certain procedures. Regional air navigation
plans may not be strictly binding legal obligations in the sense of their
enforceability in courts, but, in practice, they determine the way in which States
act. While the provisions in the plans are classified as “recommendations”,
the term might signal more than one would expect from a literal reliance on
that word.54 They supplement the otherwise flexible obligations stipulated
under Article 28 and make them more definitive. Since the facilities and
services set forth in the plans “should be adequate for at least approximately
the next five years”,55 it is submitted that States which withdraw the facilities
50 Id.
51 Buergenthal, supra note 46 at 117 and 118. For more discussions on this issue, see van
Antwerpen, N., Cross-border provision of Air Navigation Services with specific reference to Europe:
Safeguarding transparent lines of responsibility and liability (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law
International, 2008) at 154-162.
52 Milde, M., “Chicago Convention at Sixty – Stagnation or Renaissance” (2004) (unpublished)
at 12-13, cited by van Antwerpen, supra note 51 at 160.
53 Para. 2.1.2 reads: “Those portions of the airspace over the high seas or in airspace of
undetermined sovereignty where air traffic services will be provided shall be determined
on the basis of regional air navigation agreements. A Contracting State having accepted
the responsibility to provide air traffic services in such portions of airspace shall thereafter
arrange for the services to be established and provided in accordance with the provisions
of this Annex.”
54 See infra Ch.5.2.2 regarding the concept of quasi-law, particularly notes 159 and 164.
55 ICAO Doc 8144-AN/874/6 Directives to Regional Air Navigation Meetings and Rules of Procedure
for their Conduct, 6th ed. (1991) at 4.
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or services before the end of the five-year term should, to say the least, have
the burden of providing justification.
By its ordinary meaning, Article 28 unequivocally requires contracting
States to “provide” facilities and services “in accordance with the standards
and practices recommended established from time to time” pursuant to the
Convention. Stated differently, in addition to the “regulatory burden” imposed
upon contracting States to ensure compliance with standards and recom-
mended practices, Article 28 also prescribes an “operational burden” to provide
facilities and services.56 Today, while there might still be instances in which
governments are virtually omnipresent and omnipotent in aviation activities,
the noticeable trend is that more and more operational activities are carried
out by privatized or corporatized entities.57 Very often, these autonomous
entities operate on the basis of commercial principles, remain financially
independent, and do not form a part of traditional governmental structures.
The need to pool expertise and resources, the rapid advancement of tech-
nology, and the nature of certain cross-border activities have also prompted
certain States to delegate some of the functions stipulated under Article 28
to international agencies or other States. Examples of these agencies are
ASECNA, COCESNA and EUROCONTROL in the area of air traffic services.58 As
new technology develops, international joint efforts will be intensified.
The practice of States and international agencies inside and outside ICAO
has led to the consensus that Article 28 of the Chicago Convention does not
prevent a contracting State from delegating its functions thereunder to a non-
governmental entity, another State or an international agency.59 For instance,
paragraph 2.1 of Annex 11 to the Chicago Convention, which is an inter-
national standard, provides that “a State may delegate to another State the
responsibility for establishing and providing air traffic services in flight in-
formation regions, control areas or control zones extending over the territories
of the former”.60 The note inserted to the Annex immediately after this
standard explains further:
If one State delegates to another State the responsibility for the provision of air
traffic services over its territory, it does so without derogation of its national
sovereignty. Similarly, the providing State’s responsibility is limited to technical
and operational considerations and does not extend beyond those pertaining to
the safety and expedition of aircraft using the concerned airspace.
56 van Antwerpen, supra note 51 at 140.
57 ICAO Circular 284 AT/120, Privatization in the Provision of Airports and Air Navigation Services
(March 2002) at 5.
58 See supra note 35 in Ch.1 and accompanying text.
59 ICAO Circular 284 supra note 57 at 13; See also ICAO Assembly Working Paper A35-WP/75,
“Report of the Establishment of a Legal Framework with Regard to CNS/ATM systems
Including GNSS”, 28 July 2004.
60 Annex 11, Air Traffic Services, 13th ed. July 2001.
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As indicated in the foreword of each Annex, “notes” included in the Annexes
give “factual information or reference” bearing on the standards and recom-
mended practices in question, but not constituting part of the standards or
recommended practices.61 Accordingly, the “responsibility” of the providing
State mentioned in the note should be construed as a factual rather than a legal
responsibility. Article 28 clearly places primary responsibility on the State(s)
in whose territories the services are provided. An international standard in
the Annex or for that matter a note to a standard which attempts to alter this
principle would be patently ultra vires. The agreement between the delegating
State and the providing State may be binding inter se but does not create rights
and obligations for third parties. In the absence of a provision similar to Article
83 bis, it will be difficult to assert against a third-party State that the respons-
ibility of the delegating State has been legally transferred to the providing
State.
The same principle will apply when a State delegates its functions under
Article 28 to a non-governmental entity. While a contracting State’s obligation
to provide air navigation facilities under Article 28, paragraph (a) of the
Convention is qualified by the phrase “so far as it may find practicable”, a
contracting State cannot escape from this obligation on the ground that its
air navigation facilities have been privatized and are no longer under the direct
control of the government. On the contrary, it is ICAO’s policy that contracting
States are “responsible for meeting their obligations under the Chicago Conven-
tion to ensure aviation safety, regardless of the status accorded to airport
operators and providers of air navigation services in their respective terri-
tories”.62 The responsibility rests with the contracting States to supervise those
operators and providers. This is of particular importance in view of the fact
that a great number of airports and air traffic control agencies enjoy a strong,
sometimes monopolistic, position in the market. Care should therefore be taken
to ensure that these non-governmental entities will not abuse naturally mono-
polistic powers, e.g., to deny access or to charge discriminatory or unreasonab-
ly high fees, etc. If that happens, the contracting State responsible for the non-
governmental entities may be considered as not having fulfilled its obligations
or even committing an infraction under Article 15 of the Convention, which
establishes the principle of non-discrimination.
The possibility of channeling or transferring State responsibility under
Article 28 of the Chicago Convention was discussed in the context of the
implementation of the Communication, Navigation and Surveillance/Air Traffic
Management (CNS/ATM) systems. An attempt was made to follow the precedent
of Article 83 bis to amend Article 28 through the introduction of an Article
61 Id. in the Foreword.
62 ICAO Doc 9779-C/1138, C-Min. 162/1-13 Council – 162nd Session, Summary Minutes with
Subject Index (2001) at 88.
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28 bis or some other similar provisions, but it was not successful.63 The CNS/
ATM systems are satellite-based systems which ICAO has promoted since the
1990s with the view to providing safety-critical services for aircraft naviga-
tion.64 They have been identified as “the only viable solution” for overcoming
the shortcomings of the traditional terrestrial system based on line of sight
and for fulfilling the requirements of future aviation.65 The key element of
the systems is the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), which is a
worldwide positioning and time determination system, including elements
such as satellite constellations, aircraft receivers, and system integrity monitor-
ing, augmented as necessary to support the required navigation performance
for the actual phase of aircraft operation. At present, only the United States
and the Russian Federation are capable of providing the constellation of
satellites needed for primary GNSS signals. A new system in Europe, called
Galileo, is under development.66 In view of this oligopoly, it has been realized
that if the CNS/ATM systems are implemented on a global scale, most States
will have to rely on primary signals provided by others. A fundamental
question which then arises is: how will a State assume safety responsibility
(including oversight responsibility) for the navigation facilities under Article
28 of the Chicago Convention when it does not have any control over the
crucial elements of the facilities? A “link” is considered necessary between
a State responsible under Article 28 and another State or an entity which
provides the GNSS signals. Starting from the early 1990s, various ICAO legal
bodies have been pondering over this issue for more than a decade. The
majority of member States have indicated a preference for an international
convention to establish this “link”. At a conference held on the subject in
Rio de Janeiro in 1998, a delegate from Jamaica, Dr. Kenneth Rattray, stated:
It is absolutely essential that the foundation of GNSS on a world-wide basis
be constructed on pillars of political confidence, financial confidence, and
technical and technological confidence. The three pillars must be anchored
and secured by legal and institutional foundations which can only be provided
63 ICAO Council Working Paper C-WP/11386, “Report of the Third Meeting of the Secretariat
Study Group on the Legal Aspects of CNS/ATM systems”, 22 November 2000, para. 2.1.
64 ICAO Assembly Resolution A35-3: A Practical Way Forward on Legal and Institutional Aspects
of Communications, Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) systems, in
ICAO Doc 9848 supra note 2 at V-6. See also supra Ch. 1, note 63 and accompanying text.
65 Towards Acceptable Institutional Arrangements for the Continued Provision of GNSS for Civil
Aviation, ICAO Doc FANS (II) 4-WP/9 (7 July 1993), para. 1.2.1. For instance, the use of
satellite technology may improve air traffic services in mountainous and oceanic areas,
which are difficult to reach by the radar system. It may also facilitate the reduction of
separation minima of aircraft, thereby improving capabilities to deal with congestion in
the skies.
66 See Haanappel, supra note 16 at 163 and the citations therein. See also ICAO Assembly
Working Paper A35-WP/75, supra note 59 in App., para.1.4.
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by an international convention which spells out in detail the fundamental
principles governing the implementation of GNSS.67
His voice was echoed by more than one hundred States from Africa, Asia,
Europe and South America, but there was no consensus. The United States
pointed out:
Just as some countries have unwritten constitutions, the aviation community might
well assure itself that legal and institutional issues can be resolved satisfactorily
without a GNSS-specific multilateral agreement. Thus, a legal framework, in the
sense referred to in the Legal Committee’s work program need not be a single
multilateral agreement. A new multilateral agreement could require many years
to negotiate, and many more to come into force. In an area characterized by fast-
moving technological developments, a new convention would almost surely be
rendered technically obsolete before it could be implemented.68
After the Rio Conference, the widely-supported view at the Conference did
not result in any GNSS convention,69 mainly because the view was not shared
by States “whose interests are specially affected”.70 After eleven meetings,
the Secretariat Study Group on Legal Aspects of CNS/ATM systems has con-
cluded that for the implementation of CNS/ATM systems, no amendment to
Article 28 of the Chicago Convention is warranted at the present time.
Consequently, States, having undertaken to provide air navigation facilities
67 Address at the World-wide CNS/ATM systems Implementation Conference, held from
11 to 15 May 1998 in Rio de Janeiro. See also, Amaleboba, P., “Consideration of International
Convention”, ICAO SSG-CNS/9-WP/1, 13 June 2003. Amaleboba stated that “the only way
to secure confidence is by committing the providers to accept certain international responsi-
bilities in a form of a binding legal instrument.” See, also, Schubert, F.P., “An International
Convention on GNSS Liability: When Does Desirable Become Necessary?” (1999) XXIV
AASL 245.
68 Working Paper Presented by the United States in the Rio Conference, WW/IMP WP/74,
“Information – Legal Implications of CNS/ATM”, 11 May 1998.
69 ICAO Assembly Working Paper A35-WP/75, supra note 66. The culminating point that
ICAO reached in this respect was the adoption by the ICAO Assembly in 1998 the Charter
on the Rights and Obligations of States Relating to GNSS Services in the form of Resolution
A32-19. The Charter embodies fundamental principles applicable to the implementation
and operation of GNSS, including the safety of international civil aviation; universal access
to GNSS services without discrimination; preservation of States’ sovereignty, authority and
responsibility; continuity, availability, integrity, accuracy and reliability of GNSS services;
compatibility of regional arrangements with the global planning and implementation
process, and the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance. Regarding the normative
status of the Charter, some hold the view that it was not binding. Others believe that the
legal value of the Charter should not be underestimated. A Charter adopted unanimously
in the form of an Assembly resolution is not devoid of all legal effects. The key factor is
the willingness of States to agree on standard of conduct, rather than the form of such
standards. See A35-WP/75, id. App., at para. 2.5 and infra Ch.5.4.4.
70 The concept was mentioned by the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental
Shelf, Judgment [1969] ICJ Reports 3 at 42 and 43. See further discussion on this matter in
Ch.5, infra note 259 et seq and accompanying text.
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in their territory, remain responsible under Article 28, whether they provide
the services by using their own signals, services or facilities, or by procuring
their provision by other States.71 Based on this, the ICAO Assembly has in
Resolution A35-3 reaffirmed the position that “there is no need to amend the
Chicago Convention for the implementation of CNS/ATM systems”.72
Correlated with the issue of responsibility, an interesting question is
whether “responsibility” includes “liability”. The issue becomes more compli-
cated because only one word exists in many languages for these two words
in English.73 The Study Group mentioned above, after a long debate, stated
the following in its final report:
The Group also pointed out that responsibility under Article 28 should not be seen
to be the same as liability. From the point of view of international law, Article 28
regulates the relationship between States only and does not give a cause of action
to private persons to claim compensation for damage. Such claims should rather
be handled at the level of the applicable domestic law.74
In its own court, and subject to its own domestic law, a State may be held
liable if it is negligent in providing air navigation facilities or services. Thus,
in Ingham v. Eastern Airlines Inc., when a plane crashed due to the failure of
an FAA controller to inform the pilot that visibility had dropped from one mile
to three quarters of a mile, the US Court of Appeal held that
When the government undertakes to perform services, which in the absence of
specific legislation would not be required, it will nevertheless be held liable if these
activities are performed negligently…In light of this reliance, it is essential that
the government properly perform those services it has undertaken to provide albeit
voluntary and gratuitously…75
Similarly, following the mid-air collision on 1 July 2002 of a Tupolev TU 154
operated by Bashkirian Airlines and a Boeing 757 freighter of DHL Inter-
national Ltd. in Überlingen, Germany, the German District Court of Konstanz
held that Germany as a State is liable according to German law, despite the
fact that the air navigation services were provided by the Swiss-based Sky-
71 A35-WP/75, supra note 59 in para. 2.2.2 and 2.2.5.
72 Resolution A35-3, supra note 64.
73 For example, in French, the two words “responsibility” and “liability” are expressed as
“deux genres de responsabilité”. See supra note 59, the French version of Working Paper
A35-WP/75, App. para. 2.2.6. The International Law Commission always refers to state
“responsibility”. See, for example, draft articles on “Responsibility of States for international-
ly wrongful acts”, annexed to UN A/RES/56/83.
74 ICAO Assembly Working Paper A35-WP/75, supra note 59, App., para. 2.2.6.
75 Ingham v. Eastern Airlines, 373 F. 2d 227 at 236 (2nd Cir., 1967). See also Henaku, B.D.K.,
The Law of Global Air Navigation by Satellite, A Legal Analysis of the ICAO CNS/ATM System
(Leiden: AST, 1998) 197.
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guide.76 It is interesting to note for the purpose of the present study that the
Court based its decision solely on German law. While the Court examined
international agreements, it did not address the issue under Article 28 of the
Chicago Convention. Moreover, the complaint was lodged by a Russian-based
carrier, Bashkirian Airlines, in a domestic court in Germany. The Russian
Federation as a member State of ICAO did not file any application in ICAO
concerning the effect of Article 28. In fact, in the history of ICAO, no State has
ever initiated any legal proceeding within the framework of ICAO alleging
liability under Article 28. Accordingly, the current State practice seems to be
in line with the conclusion of the Study Group mentioned above. This does
not preclude any new evolution in the future. Theoretically, it appears plausible
for a member State to hold another accountable if the latter fails to exercise
the duty of care in the provision of navigation facilities and services. Whether
or not this accountability would include monetary compensation is not very
clear. In the preliminary view of this writer, the criterion of “practicability”
as the escape-valve in Article 28 would probably be used as a defence against
such compensation.
In summary, according to lex lata, a member State of ICAO may delegate
its functions and duties under Article 28 of the Chicago Convention to a non-
governmental entity, another State, an international organization, or a supra-
national organization. However, such delegation, which may be binding as
between the delegating and delegated parties inter se, does not alter the ulti-
mate responsibility of the delegating State with respect to other member States
of ICAO which are not parties to the delegation agreement or arrangement.
In other words, unlike the transfer under Article 83 bis, delegation of the
functions assumed under Article 28 does not relieve the delegating State of
the responsibility attached to the functions so delegated. However, Article 28
does not give a cause of action to private persons to claim compensation for
damage. Moreover, there is no precedent in ICAO in which one member State
claims compensation from another on the basis of Article 28.
2.1.3 Critical Elements of the Safety Oversight System
How should a State ensure that it has fulfilled its safety oversight responsibil-
ity? According to ICAO practice, member States need to consider the critical
elements for safety oversight in their efforts to establish and implement an
effective safety oversight system. Essentially, critical elements are the safety
76 Bashkirian Airlines v. Bundes republik Deutschland, (2006) with the District Court of Konstanz
(Landgericht Konstanz 4. Zivilkammer) under Case No. 4 O 234/05 H. At the time of
writing, the case is still under appeal. In that case, it is believed that the collision was caused
by the errors of the air traffic controller of Skyguide. For a more extensive analysis of the
case, see van Antwerpen, supra note 51 at 6 et seq.
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defence tools of a safety oversight system which are required for the effective
implementation of safety-related policies and associated procedures.77 Eight
critical elements have been identified: primary aviation legislation; specific
operating regulations; the civil aviation authority’s structure and safety over-
sight functions; technical guidance; qualified technical personnel; licensing
and certification obligations; continued surveillance obligations; and, resolution
of safety issues.78
Primary aviation legislation is understood as a national legislative enact-
ment which is often known as “civil aviation code” or “civil aviation act”.
It is normally adopted by a legislative branch of a contracting State, such as
the parliament or its equivalent, and it differs from secondary legislation or
regulations promulgated by the executive branch of a government. The Chicago
Convention does not specifically require a contracting State to promulgate
“primary aviation legislation”.79 It follows from the principle of sovereignty
that a State is free to enact aviation law in whatever form it prefers, provided
that the enactment is compatible with its international obligations under the
Chicago Convention and other applicable rules of international law. The
requirement of “primary aviation legislation” as a critical element could thus
be regarded as a new requirement created or initiated by ICAO.
Specific operating regulations normally refer to legal instruments which
specify and implement the requirements emanating from the primary aviation
legislation, and provide for standardized operational procedures, equipment
and infrastructure, in conformity with the Annexes to the Chicago Convention.
Regulations should be sufficiently comprehensive, detailed, and current with
respect to changes in technology and the operating environment to ensure
that satisfactory compliance will result in an acceptable level of safety.80
The civil aviation authority’s structure and safety oversight functions
contemplate the establishment of a civil aviation authority or its equivalent,
which will be assigned with the responsibilities inherent in safety oversight.
The size and internal organizational structure of the civil aviation authority
are to be internally determined by each State, based on its aviation activities,
but the audits carried by ICAO will normally enquire whether it has appropriate
77 ICAO Doc 9735 AN/960, Safety Oversight Audit Manual, 2nd Edition (2006), Appendix C.
78 There are some variations in ICAO documents regarding the presentation of critical ele-
ments. Cf. ICAO Doc 9735, id. and Appendix 5 to Annex 6, Operation of Aircraft, Part I,
International Commercial Air Transport – Aeroplanes, 8th Edition, July 2001. The presenta-
tion here follows the format of Annex 6.
79 Boteva, M., A New Century and a New Attitude towards Safety Oversight in Air Transportation,
unpublished Master’s Thesis, McGill University, November 2000. For different modes of
implementation of international obligations, see infra Ch.5.4.1.
80 Cf. ICAO Doc 9735, App. C, supra note 77 and Annex 6 – Operation of Aircraft. For imple-
mentation of Annexes to the Chicago Convention at the national and regional level, see
infra Ch.5.4.
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and adequate technical and financial resources to effectively discharge the
responsibilities assumed by the State.
As one of the critical elements of the safety oversight system, technical
guidance requires a contracting State to provide technical guidance material,
tools and safety-critical information, as applicable, to the technical personnel
to enable them to perform their safety oversight functions. It also includes
the provision of technical guidance by the oversight authority to the aviation
industry.81
Qualified technical personnel means the establishment of minimum know-
ledge and experience requirements for the technical personnel performing
safety oversight functions, and the provision of appropriate training to main-
tain and enhance their competence at the desired level. The training should
include initial and recurrent training.
Licensing and certification obligations relate to the implementation of
processes and procedures to ensure that personnel and organizations perform-
ing an aviation activity meet the established requirements before they are
allowed to exercise the privileges of a licence or certificate.
Continued surveillance obligations require a contracting State to put in
place a system, such as inspections and audits, to proactively ensure that
aviation licence or certificate holders continue to meet the established require-
ments.
Resolution of safety issues means that a member State is required to use
a documented process to take appropriate corrective actions, up to and in-
cluding enforcement measures, to resolve identified safety issues.82
Critical elements of a safety oversight system encompass the whole spec-
trum of civil aviation activities, including areas such as aerodromes, air traffic
control, communications, personnel licensing, flight operations, airworthiness
of aircraft, accident/incident investigation, and transportation of dangerous
goods by air.83 Effective implementation of these critical elements is regarded
as a good indication of a State’s capability for safety oversight.
2.2 FORMULATION OF TECHNICAL REGULATIONS
Establishing the safety oversight responsibility of the member States of ICAO
represents only one of many steps in the building of a robust safety system
for air navigation. A considerable number of provisions of the Chicago Conven-
tion expressly oblige contracting States to fulfill their various responsibilities:
“in accordance with the procedure which may be recommended” by ICAO;84
81 ICAO Doc 9735, supra note 77 at C-2.
82 Annex 6.
83 ICAO Doc 9735, supra note 77 at C-1.
84 Art. 26, Chicago Convention.
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“in accordance with the standards and practices recommended or established
from time to time, pursuant to this Convention”; or, “in such form as may
be prescribed from time to time pursuant to this convention”.85 It is obvious
from the foregoing that the Chicago Convention mandates ICAO to establish
certain benchmarks or yardsticks against which State performance of those
obligations can be measured. International standards and recommended
practices (SARPs) are the primary mechanisms used by ICAO for this purpose.
The Chicago Convention itself does not provide definitions for standards and
recommended practices. The first ICAO Assembly defined a standard as “any
specification for physical characteristics, configuration, material, performance,
personnel, or procedures, the uniform application of which is recognized as
necessary for the safety or regularity of international air navigation and to
which member States will conform; in the event of impossibility of compliance,
notification to the Council is compulsory under Article 38 of the Convention”.
(Emphasis added). A recommendation is any such specification, the uniform
application of which is recognized as “desirable in the interest of safety, regular-
ity, or efficiency of international air navigation and to which member States
will endeavor to conform in accordance with the Convention”.86 (Emphasis
added).
In addition to SARPs, ICAO also develops Procedures for Air Navigation
Services (PANS), Regional Supplemental Procedures (SUPPS), regional air
navigation plans,87 and related manuals, circulars and guidance. Together,
all these documents constitute a comprehensive technical safety code for civil
aviation. By joining ICAO, States undertake to collaborate in securing the highest
practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures, and
organization in all matters in which such uniformity will facilitate and improve
air navigation.
85 Arts. 28 and 34, id.
86 ICAO Doc 7670 Resolutions and Recommendations of the Assembly 1st to 9th Sessions (1947-1955),
Montreal, Canada, 1956, Assembly Resolution A1-31 “Definition of International Standards
and Recommended Practices”, now consolidated into Resolution A36-13: Consolidated
Statement of ICAO policies and associated practices related specifically to air navigation, in
Doc 9902, Assembly Resolutions in Force (as of 28 September 2007) at II-3.
87 PANS comprise, for the most part, operating practices as well as material considered too
detailed for SARPs. PANS often amplify the basic principles in the corresponding SARPs
to assist in their application (ICAO Doc 8143-AN/873/3, Directives to Divisional-type Air
Navigation Meetings and Rules of Procedure for their Conduct, Part II, para. 3.) SUPPS supple-
ment PANS in certain regions. For “regional air navigation plans”, see supra note 49 et seq
and the accompanying text.
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2.2.1 Subject Matters Addressed by SARPs
SARPs adopted by the ICAO Council in accordance with the provisions of
Chapter VI of the Chicago Convention are, “for convenience”,88 designated
as Annexes to the Convention. To date, eighteen annexes have been adopted.89
The scope of their multi-disciplinary content extends beyond the comprehen-
sion of any single profession. To borrow the statement of Buergenthal made
almost forty years ago, which, a fortiori, applies today, “[i]t is impossible, of
course, for a lawyer with no aeronautical training to pass judgement on the
content of ICAO legislation or on its technical quality and efficacy”.90 The
current study will refer to the Annexes only for the limited purpose of pro-
viding certain illustrations of the safety regulation processes of ICAO.
2.2.1.1 Personnel Licensing (Annex 1)
Licensing is the act of authorizing defined activities which should otherwise
be prohibited due to the risk inherent in such activities if performed without
proper training, proficiency and fitness.91
Article 32 of the Chicago Convention only requires the licensing of the
members of the operating crew of an aircraft engaged in international naviga-
tion.92 Due to the development of technology and the rapidly changing environ-
ment in which the aviation industry operates (including increasing traffic
density, airspace congestion, highly complicated terminal area patterns, and
more sophisticated equipment), Annex 1 to the Chicago Convention contains
not only SARPs for the licensing of flight crew members (i.e., pilots, flight
engineers, flight navigators,and flight radiotelephone operators), but also SARPs
relating to the licensing of air traffic controllers, aeronautical station operators,
maintenance technicians and flight dispatchers. The SARPs describe the com-
petence, skills, fitness and other requirements for such personnel.
Since pilots and other air and ground personnel are indispensable for the
conduct of international air transport,93 continued maintenance of their com-
petence, skills and fitness remain essential for the safe operation of aircraft.
88 Art. 54 l), Chicago Convention.
89 See supra note 30 in Ch.1 for the list of annexes.
90 Buergenthal, supra note 46 at 57.
91 The material of the Federal Aviation Administration Executive Management Training,
Beijing, China, 13 to 17 March 2006 (unpublished).
92 In ICAO practice, the expression “flight crew member” has the same meaning as the
expressions “member of the operating crew of an aircraft”. Similarly, the expression
“license” used throughout Annex 1 has the same meaning as the expressions “certificate
of competency and license”, “license or certificate” or “license” used in the Convention.
See, http://www.icao.int/cgi/goto_m_anb.pl?anb/fls/flsannex1.html. Date of access: 29
July 2008.
93 Art. 8 of the Chicago Convention prohibits pilotless aircraft without special authorization
of the overflown State.
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By virtue of the provisions of Article 33 of the Convention, the minimum
standards prescribed in the Annexes must be complied with in order to achieve
recognition by other States of the licenses of operating crew members issued
or rendered valid by a contracting State.
The Annex also prescribes training requirements which reflect dynamic
progression of technology in the field of aviation. For instance, the current
version of the Annex contains provisions relating to the use of flight simula-
tors,94 something which did not exist 60 years ago.
In addition to the licensing and training requirements, Annex 1 also pre-
scribes norms relating to licensees’ upper age limits, the state of their medical
condition, and prohibitions upon the use of psychoactive substances by licensed
personnel. The issue concerning the upper age limits of pilots, for example,
is not a simple licensing issue. It has raised grounds for legal or even constitu-
tional challenges under domestic law on the basis of discrimination on the
grounds of age. After a careful balancing process, ICAO came to a compromise
solution by extending the age limit of a pilot-in-command from 60 to 65 years,
subject to the condition that after the age of 60, a pilot-in-command must
undergo regular medical examinations every six months and should be accom-
panied in flight by at least one pilot whose age is below 60.95
2.2.1.2 Rules of the Air (Annex 2)
Like any mode of traffic on the surface, air traffic requires traffic rules to
ensure safety. Annex 2 to the Chicago Convention contains a set of inter-
nationally agreed rules of the air. They consist of general rules, visual flight
rules (VFR), and instrument flight rules (IFR). Flight under VFR is permitted
only under certain prescribed conditions. Most aircraft engaged in commercial
operations fly by IFR at all times.
Annex 2 contains standards mostly; so far there are no recommended
practices included therein.96 Due to the provisions of Article 12 of the Conven-
tion, the standards contained in this Annex are mandatory over the high seas
and contracting States do not have the right to file differences as they do with
other SARPs. As such, the ICAO Council is the sole legislative body which has
power to enact the rules of the air over the high seas on behalf of the inter-
national community.
94 Defined in Annex 1 as an apparatus in which flight conditions are simulated on the ground,
which provides an accurate representation of the flight deck of a particular aircraft type
to the extent that the mechanical, electrical, electronic, etc. aircraft systems control functions,
the normal environment of flight crew members, and the performance and flight character-
istics of that type of aircraft are realistically simulated.
95 ICAO Council Working Paper C-WP/12615, “Adoption of Amendment 167 to Annex 1”,
23 February 2006.
96 Annex 2, Rules of the Air, 10th ed. July 2005, Foreword, at (vi).
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Under the Annex, a flight plan must be filed with air traffic services units
for all flights that will cross international borders and for most other flights
that are engaged in commercial services. The flight plan provides information
on the aircraft’s identity and equipment, the point and time of departure, the
route and altitude to be flown, the destination and estimated time of arrival,
and the alternate airport to be used should landing at the destination be
impossible. The flight plan must also specify whether the flight will be carried
out under VFR or IFR. However, regardless of the type of flight plan filed, the
pilot is ultimately responsible for avoiding collisions when in visual flight
conditions, in accordance with the “see-and-avoid” principle.97 Flights opera-
ting under IFR are either kept sufficiently separated by air traffic control units
or provided with collision hazard information.98 Annex 2 also contains rules
relating to interception of civil aircraft.99
2.2.1.3 Airworthiness of Aircraft (Annex 8)
Although it is essential to have qualified personnel whose knowledge of the
rules of the air is kept up to date for purposes of ensuring the safety of avi-
ation, this alone is by no means sufficient. They must also be equipped with
reliable machines and tools. Accordingly, aircraft, defined as “any machine
that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other
than the reactions of the air against the earth’s surface”,100 must be airworthy.
Annex 8 prescribes the minimum airworthiness standards which form the basis
for mutual recognition by contracting States of a certificate of airworthiness
under Article 33 of the Chicago Convention.
Some of the provisions of Annex 8 are very specific. For instance, para-
graph 1.2 of Chapter 1 provides that an aeroplane shall have not less than
two power-units.101 Some provisions are general and provide only the object-
ive sought to be achieved, e.g., “Crashworthiness shall be taken into account
in the design of aeroplanes to improve the probability of occupant sur-
vival”.102 It is therefore recognized and accepted that those ICAO airworthiness
standards containing broad provisions need to be supplemented by national
codes of airworthiness to form the basis for the certification of individual
97 Annex 2, id., see section 3.2; ICAO Circular 213, Pilot Skills to make “Look-out” more effective
in Visual Collision Avoidance.
98 Annex 2, Sec. 5.2 and 3.6. See also, the material of the Federal Aviation Administration
Executive Management Training, Beijing, China, 13 to 17 March 2006 (unpublished).
99 Annex 2, Attachment A.
100 The Chicago Convention per se does not define the term. Its Annexes use the definition
above. See, for example, Annex 8 – Airworthiness of Aircraft, 10th ed., April 2005. Some writers
believe that this definition has become part of international customary law, see Shawcross
& Beaumont, supra note 11 at V/1.
101 Annex 8, id., at Part III A-I-1.
102 Id., Part III B, Sub-part I, para. I.1, at IIIB-I-1.
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aircraft. Each State is thus obliged either to establish its own comprehensive
and detailed airworthiness code or to select and implement a comprehensive
and detailed code established by another contracting State or a group of
contracting States.103 To assist its member States in the implementation of
Annex 8, ICAO has published the Airworthiness Manual (Doc 9760).
A notable feature of Annex 8 is that it imposes obligations on the State
of registry to develop or adopt requirements and procedures to ensure the
continuing airworthiness of the aircraft during its service life, including re-
quirements to ensure that the aircraft continues to comply with the appropriate
airworthiness requirements after modification, repair or installation of a
replacement part. It further lays down requirements for the exchange of
mandatory continuing airworthiness information between the State of design
and the State of registry of the aircraft.104 These obligations naturally require
the State of registry to maintain a close link with the aircraft and consequently
impose constraints on the State of registry, thereby reducing the possibility
of “flags of convenience”.
2.2.1.4 Operation of Aircraft (Annex 6)
Annex 6 contains the minimum standards applicable to the international
operation of aircraft. It consists of three parts dealing respectively with com-
mercial air transport, general aviation, and helicopters. One of its purposes
is to contribute to the safety of international air navigation by providing criteria
for safe operating practice.105 Unlike Annexes 1, 2 and 8, which separately
address the quality and licensing of personnel, the rules of the air, and the
airworthiness of aircraft, Annex 6 provides regulations which address the
interface between the personnel, the aircraft and the rules in real time and
space. It provides criteria as to how qualified personnel, governed by certain
rules, must control aircraft in given situations.
Annex 6 spells out the responsibility of States in supervising their operators.
Appendix 5 to the Annex specifies eight critical elements of safety oversight
of air operators.106 Paragraph 4.2.2 requires each operator to provide an
operation manual, which must address matters such as the responsibility of
the flight crew, the maximum limits of flight time and flight duty periods,
and the list of equipment on board aircraft.
Given the importance of human performance in the operation of aircraft,
Annex 6 provides that from 1 January 2009, States shall, as part of their safety
103 Id., Foreword. In EU, it is done collectively through the JAA, now through EASA. See Ch.
5.4.2.
104 Annex 8, para. 4.2.
105 Annex 6, 8th ed. (2001), Foreword.
106 See supra notes 78 to 82 and accompanying text concerning the details of eight critical
elements.
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programme, require that operators implement a safety management system
acceptable to the State of the operator. In simple language, a safety manage-
ment system takes a proactive approach to anticipate and address safety issues
before they materialize and lead to incidents or accidents. Instead of using
simple enforcement and disciplinary measures, the new approach encourages
States to develop the ability to identify safety issues and deal effectively with
accidents and incidents so that valuable lessons learned therefrom can be
applied to improve overall safety and efficiency.107
2.2.1.5 Other Annexes
In addition to the Annexes identified above, there are other Annexes which,
to varying degrees, provide safety regulations for air navigation. Some Annexes
deal with the facilities and services to be provided by contracting States, such
as meteorological services (Annex 3), aeronautical telecommunications (Annex
10), air traffic services (Annex 11), aerodromes (Annex 14), and aeronautical
information services (Annex 15). Some others aim at the establishment of
uniform common systems, such as aeronautical charts (Annex 4), units of
measurement (Annex 5), and registration marks (Annex 7). Some Annexes
provide for measures and procedures in the event of distress (Annex 12 –
Search and Rescue), or accidents (Annex 13 – Aircraft Accident Investigation).
Some address matters relating to transport of passengers and goods (Annex 9
– Facilitation, Annex 18 – The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air).
Finally, Annex 16 addresses matters of environmental protection, and Annex 17
covers aviation security.
2.2.2 Criteria for Safety Regulations: Uniformity, Reliability and Affordability
There are certain policy considerations which underlie the legislative process
within ICAO in the formulation of SARPs. Some of the criteria are not necessarily
documented but can be deduced from the practice of ICAO. The most significant
among these criteria are uniformity, reliability and affordability.
The uniformity of international standards is one of the most important
criteria governing the ICAO legislative process. As a prime objective, safety
of international civil aviation may be achieved only if States agree upon a
certain degree of worldwide compatibility in aviation rules and regulations.
As pointed out by the United States delegation at the Chicago Conference:
It is generally agreed that it is true, in the purely technical field, a considerable
measure of power can be exercised by, and indeed must be granted to, a world
body. In these matters, there are few international controversies which are not
107 ICAO Doc. 9859, The Safety Management Manual (SMM).
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susceptible of ready solution through the counsel of experts. For example, it is
essential that the signal arrangements and landing practice at the Chicago Airport
for an intercontinental plane shall be similar to the landing practice at Croydon,
or LeBourget, or Prague, or Cairo, or Chungking, that a plane arriving at any of
these points, whatever its country of origin, will be able to recognize established
and uniform signals and to proceed securely according to settled practice.108
The drafters of the Chicago Convention were unequivocal in reflecting this
principle in Article 37 of the Convention when they stated: “Each contracting
State undertakes to collaborate in securing the highest practicable degree of
uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures, and organization in relation
to aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services in all matters in which
such uniformity will facilitate and improve air navigation”. To this end, the
Convention mandates ICAO to adopt and amend from time to time, as may
be necessary, international standards and recommended practices and pro-
cedures. Article 12 of the Chicago Convention further specifies that with
respect to the rules and regulations relating to the flight and manoeuvre of
aircraft, each contracting State “undertakes to keep its own regulations in these
respects uniform, to the greatest possible extent, with those established from
time to time under this Convention”. While the term “to the greatest extent
possible” probably gives to contracting States some reasonable amount of
flexibility, the principle of good faith has to be followed in bringing domestic
regulations relating to flight and manoeuvre of aircraft in line with the
standards established by ICAO. The common interests in achieving global safety
are at stake and the uniformity of the rules in this respect is essential, regard-
less of any territorial boundaries. “As transport aircraft speed through the sky,
crossing half a dozen small countries in a dozen hours, it is necessary that
there be universal agreement on certain technical matters. Obviously, it would
be confusing and unsafe to require, for instance, an international airline to
circle to the left before landing on an airport of one country, and to the right
before landing in the next”.109 The provisions of Article 12 illustrate that
international uniformity as required in the interest of aviation safety may
override the otherwise complete freedom of a sovereign State to prescribe
traffic regulations at will in its own territory.
In practice, however, the importance of uniformity has not always been
appreciated. There has been a wide-spread belief that ICAO standards are only
minimum requirements, and that sometimes, States are encouraged to go
108 Proceedings of the International Civil Aviation Conference, Vol. 1 (United States Government
Printing Office, Washington: 1948) at 59.
109 Schenkman, J., International Civil Aviation Organization, (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1955)
at 257-258.
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beyond existing ICAO standards and impose more stringent requirements.110
This impression probably originates from a common misapprehension of the
provisions of Article 33 of the Chicago Convention, which refer to “minimum
standards” established pursuant to the Convention. A closer look at Article
33 indicates however that it is limited in scope to certain Annexes only, mainly
Annex 1 – Personnel Licensing and Annex 8 – Airworthiness. It does not even
cover air operator certificates issued pursuant to Annex 6 – Operation of Aircraft.
Also, many provisions of the other Annexes, such as those relating to units
of measurement, rules of the air, as well as nationality and registration marks,
are aimed at establishing common uniform systems. They represent uniform
rather than minimum requirements. Even with specific regard to the standards
in Annex 6, which have been proclaimed as the minimum standards,111 it
is arguable that some of them were designed with the objective of uniformity
in mind rather than as mere minimum requirements. For instance, paragraph 2
of Appendix 1 to Annex 6 essentially requires that a red light be projected
on the left side of the aeroplane and a green light on the right. If a State really
considers this standard as the “minimum”, it may impose more stringent
standards by requiring two lights or more, but it still can not change the
colours of the lights to frustrate the uniform lighting system.
The importance of attaining uniform international regulations was demon-
strated when the ICAO Council considered the issues relating to the “Hatch
Amendment”, i.e., the amendment to the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of the United States, as proposed by Senator Hatch.112 On 23
November 1998, the Federal Aviation Administration of the United States (FAA)
published the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) concerning the “Hatch
Amendment”. In essence, the effect of the proposed new rule would have been
to impose on foreign carriers the requirement of security measures “identical”
to those imposed on the U.S. carriers, whereas the then existing rule only
required “similar” measures. While on the face it appeared to offer equal
treatment to all carriers flying to and from the U.S., the proposed rule was
perceived to be likely to cause difficulty to foreign airlines. For example, one
of the new measures would have limited air carriers to accepting baggage only
inside the terminal building for flights to the United States. Its implementation
may have required additional terminal capacity necessary to accommodate
110 For example, see ICAO Doc 9734 AN/959 Safety Oversight Manual, Part A, The Establishment
and Management of a State’s Safety Oversight System, 2nd ed. (2006), which states in para.
2.1.1: “Safety oversight also ensures that the national aviation industry provides a safety
level equal to, or better than, that defined by SARPs.”
111 Annex 6, 8th ed., July 2001, Foreword (x).
112 See, ICAO Council Working Paper C-WP/11030, “Ramifications of the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) relating to Security Provisions to be Applied to Foreign Air Carriers
by the United States”, 3 February 1999.
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the checked baggage which till then had been handled outside the airport
terminal.113
More importantly, the imposition on foreign air carriers of requirements
which differ from, or are more exacting, than the SARPs in Annex 17 — Security
(or other Annexes) could seriously damage the multilateral framework within
which international civil aviation has developed and operates. Thus, the ICAO
Secretariat has noted:
The rationale behind the uniformity aspect of Article 37 and the desirability of
achieving such uniformity through the Chicago Convention system is clear if one
considers the chaos which could potentially result if States require foreign aircraft
flying to their territory to comply with their own national security provisions where
these differ from Annex 17. Bearing in mind that the State of departure in the
exercise of its sovereignty would also have security provisions to be adhered to
by aircraft leaving its territory, this could lead to a situation where the operator
would have to comply with different and possibly conflicting security provisions
when these differ from Annex 17. For example, if an air carrier flies to 20 different
States from State A, it would have to comply with the requirements of State A as
well as these 20 other States.114
In view of this situation, the ICAO Council adopted a resolution on 5 February
1999 at the first meeting of its 156th Session, requesting contracting States to
refrain from imposing their own aviation security provisions unilaterally upon
foreign airlines even if they believe that the technical provisions adopted by
ICAO are either insufficient or are not being properly implemented. The resolu-
tion further called upon each contracting State to utilize the multilateral
mechanism of ICAO where it believes that changes to the content or level of
implementation of the standards and recommended practices in the Annexes
are necessary or desirable.115 It should be noted that the Council resolution
does not limit itself to Annex 17, but is applicable to all Annexes and their
implementation. The emphasis on uniformity does not in anyway prejudice
or discourage any efforts aimed at enhancing or improving the technical
standards of ICAO. It has been a concurrent goal of ICAO to reach as high a
level of standards as possible in order to ensure the reliability of the global
aviation system. All the resolution requires is that efforts to enhance the
standards must not be unilateral but must be undertaken within the multi-
lateral framework of ICAO.
In addition to the aspect of uniformity, the reliability of the aviation system
is another important consideration that applies to the ICAO legislative process.
Reliability refers to an acceptable level of confidence placed in the aviation
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 ICAO PRESS AK/651, 24 March 1999. See also, ICAO Doc 9738-C/1127, C-Min. 156/1-16,
Council – 156th Session, Summary Minutes with Subject Index (1999) at 12.
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system or any of its element, as tested by various means, including records
of past performance of the system or the element. The degree of reliability
is determined by the state of aviation technology, which is the most dynamic
factor in the promotion of safety. Something which was regarded as reliable
in 1944 will not necessarily be so in 2004. One important mandate of ICAO is
to update the SARPs to reflect the state of the art of modern technology in order
to achieve the highest level of safety. A previous ICAO decision regarding twin-
engined aircraft may be cited to illustrate this point.
As mentioned above in Chapter 1, twin-engined aircraft was not allowed
to be used in long-range operations. In 1980s, there was a proposal to change
the rule. An ICAO panel studied the matter and went over a mass of statistical
data on engine reliability. The study revealed that the chances of both engines
failing independently in the same hour were estimated at 10 billion to one.
Based on this and other considerations, twin-engined aircraft were allowed
to operate on long, over-water routes. However, ICAO has taken a prudent
approach by setting a safety threshold and attaching certain conditions to the
use of twin-engined aircraft on long routes.116
Although it is incontrovertible that ICAO should take reliability into account
in developing and adopting SARPs, questions remain in specific instances as
to what is reliable and what is not. In particular, when different types of
technological means or products compete for ICAO endorsement, both subjective
perceptions and objective assessments could affect the judgement regarding
the preference of one particular technology or product over another.117 It
is therefore desirable to develop certain mechanisms to establish a due process
with checks and balances aimed at ensuring that the evaluation of competing
products or technology for reliability is based, to the largest extent possible,
on fair and objective criteria.
Considerations of uniformity and reliability discussed above are both aimed
at enhancing aviation safety. However, “affordability”, which refers to the
degree of availability of financial and technical resources for designated
purposes, often places practical constraints on safety standards. The notion
of affordability is not explicitly mentioned as an applicable criterion in any
of the ICAO formal documents, but it is an implied consideration based on the
116 Sochor, E., The Politics of International Aviation (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1991)
at 71. See also Mortimer, L.F., “New ICAO Rules Considered for Long-Range Twin-Engine
Aeroplane Flights” (April 1984) ICAO Bulletin at 19 et seq.
117 Sochor provided several instances in which he believed that political considerations
influenced the selection of products. In 1970s, the ANC considered the adoption of one
of several proposed micro wave landing systems (MLS) as the standard equipment for
airports by the end of century. The final decision was made in a technical meeting of all
States to recommend the US-Australian scanning-bean system over the British Doppler
system. Sochor observed: “Since many experts concluded that the British Doppler system
was at the time more advanced and could have been more rapidly implemented, one must
view the decision as being primarily a political choice. See Sochor, id. at 70.
54 Regulation of Aviation Safety by Means of a Technical Safety Code
reality of life, which has important and sometimes decisive effects upon the
law-making efforts of ICAO. As many technical experts have noted, there is
no one hundred percent guarantee for safety. It could only be achieved within
the available economic and technical constraints. The different levels of eco-
nomic development in different parts of the world predetermine that the
member States of ICAO are not on the same level with respect to their indi-
vidual financial capacity to implement safety standards. Aircraft which have
been retired in a certain region or State may still be used for active services
in another region or State. Corresponding to the economic disparity among
nations, their respective capacities to introduce and absorb technical know-how
also contrasts sharply. Consequently, the ICAO SARPs are always subject to the
consideration of affordability.
From time to time, the consideration of affordability counter-balances the
efforts to achieve uniformity and reliability of international safety standards.
What is reliable is not always economically feasible, and therefore it is even
more difficult to achieve its uniform implementation. Accordingly, the legis-
lative process within ICAO is by itself a risk management process requiring
delicate balancing acts. Careful assessments and wise judgements are always
required to harmonize the balance between the aspects of uniformity, reliability
and affordability. A safety standard will stand the test of time only if it strikes
a delicate balance among these three important considerations.
2.2.3 Processes for Formulating Technical Regulations
Under Articles 54 l) and m), and 90 of the Chicago Convention, the Council
of ICAO has a mandatory function to adopt or amend international standards
and recommended practices by a two-thirds majority of its members.118 After
the adoption, the Council is required to submit the adopted text to each
contracting State. The adopted text shall become effective within three months
after its submission or at the end of such longer period of time as the Council
may prescribe, unless in the meantime a majority of the contracting States
register their disapproval with the Council. If not disapproved, the text will
become effective on the date determined by the Council.119 This does not
mean that it becomes immediately applicable. In the resolution for the adoption
118 The wording of Art. 90 once gave rise to the interpretation that the adoption of an Annex
would require two-thirds majority whereas the amendment would only require a simply
majority. For detailed discussions, see Buergenthal, supra note 46 at 64-66; Cheng, supra
note 10 at 63-65. The ICAO Council has always adopted an amendment to an Annex by
two-thirds majority.
119 There was an intensive debate in ICAO concerning the meaning of the phrases “become
effective” and “come into force”. The debate was summarized in Buergenthal, supra note
46 at 69-76. Suffice to mention here that ICAO no longer uses the term “come into force”
in this context.
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of an Annex or its amendment, the Council will usually specify the date of
applicability of the new SARPs so adopted, which is normally several months
later than the effective date.
Given the possibility of disapproval by the majority of the contracting
States, the Council cannot be said to have full and unqualified legislative
power. Cheng describes this function as “quasi-legislative”.120 On the other
hand, in the history of ICAO, there has not been a single instance in which an
Annex or amendment thereto has been disapproved by the majority of member
States. Since the number of contracting States has reached 190 in 2008, it will
be procedurally very difficult, if not impossible, in the future to obtain the
disapproval of at least 96 contracting States within the normal prescribed
period of several months. If there is a well-supported reason for exercising
the power of disapproval by contracting States, such an attempt will most
likely be made during the consultative process prior to the adoption of the
Annex or its amendment. Accordingly, de jure, the power to disapprove con-
tinues to exist and may be used under extraordinary circumstances; de facto,
however, the Council has almost unqualified legislative power for the adoption
of SARPs, subject to the right of a contracting State to file differences under
Article 38.
When the Chicago Convention was ratified by the 26th State and entered
into force on 4 April 1947, it provided for 21 members of the Council, rep-
resenting 80.7% of the total number of the contracting States. As the number
of contracting States kept growing, the Council has been expanded several
times and presently has 36 members. This number represents only 19% of the
total of 190 contracting States. As the adoption of an Annex or its amendment
requires the vote of two-thirds majority of the Council, it implies that 24 States
or 12.7% of the total number of contracting States may exercise the power to
adopt technical regulations for all contracting States.
The Council generally does not draft or prepare amendments to the
Annexes by itself. Article 54 m) of the Chicago Convention mandates the
Council to “consider recommendations of the Air Navigation Commission
(ANC) for amendment of the Annexes”. Consequently, most preparatory work
for amendments to most of the Annexes is carried out by the ANC,121 which
consists of 19 members appointed by the Council from among persons nomi-
nated by contracting States.122 Members of the ANC must have suitable qualifi-
cations and experience in the science and practice of aeronautics.
120 See Cheng, supra note 10 at 64. Furthermore, the right of each contracting State to file a
difference under Art. 38 also indicates that the Council does not have a full legislative
power.
121 Annexes 9 and 17 are basically not within the responsibility of the ANC but are respectively
dealt with by the Air Transport Committee and the Unlawful Interference Committee of
the Council.
122 Art. 56 of the Chicago Convention, amended on 6 October 1989, which entered into force
on 18 April 2005.
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Under Article 57 b) of the Chicago Convention, the ANC shall establish
technical sub-commissions on which any contracting State may be represented,
if it so desires. In practice, the ICAO Council has interpreted the reference to
sub-commissions as meaning divisional air navigation meetings.123 The
primary objective of a divisional-type Air Navigation Meeting is to make
recommendations for new SARPs, PANS, and guidance material, or for amend-
ments thereto.124 In addition to the right to participate in divisional meetings
and to express their views, contracting States are entitled to receive all draft
texts of the Annexes circulated by ICAO and to provide comments thereon for
consideration by the ANC or any other relevant committees of the Council,
before such text is finalized and submitted to the Council for adoption.125
Although divisional meetings are still held from time to time, the trend
that has emerged since the 1980s is that much of the preparatory work for
the amendments to the Annexes is carried out by panels of experts. The use
of panels has evolved from the need to bring together the best available experts
to examine specialized problems and to find technically feasible solutions
acceptable to contracting States as a whole.126 Most Annexes today contain
the input from panels when amendments are introduced.127 With respect
to the most recent ICAO Annex, namely, Annex 18 – The Safe Transport of
Dangerous Goods by Air, its first enactment and all subsequent amendments
have been based on the work of the Dangerous Goods Panel.128 It is an
undeniable fact that panels play an indispensable role in the development and
adoption of amendments to the Annexes.
As compared to divisional meetings, panels may be characterized as small,
informal and personal. The size of a panel normally does not exceed 15 mem-
bers. They are expected to conduct their business in an atmosphere of informal-
ity, through correspondence, working groups or panel meetings. Members
of panels participate in their personal capacity and not as representatives of
123 ICAO Doc 9369-C/1067, C-Min. 105/1-20 Council – 105th Session, Minutes with Subject Index
(1982) at 54.
124 ICAO Doc 8143-AN/873/3, Directives to Divisional-type Air Navigation Meetings and Rules
of Procedure for their Conduct (1983) para. 1.1.
125 ICAO C-WP/7389, “Review of Paras. 5.2 and 5.3 of Doc 7984/4 (Directives for ANC
Panels)”, 30 November 1981, para. 3.2.
126 Para. 1.1, Directives for Panels of the Air Navigation Commission, ICAO Doc 7984/4 (1980).
While most panels are technical groups formed by the ANC, there are also some panels
dealing with Annexes 9 and 17, or addressing other legal or economic issues, which are
not formed by, and therefore not reporting to the ANC.
127 See, for example, Table A of Annex 8. The first 84 amendments were originated from the
sessions of the Airworthiness Division, the 85th amendment was introduced by the Third
Air Navigation Conference in 1956. Starting from the 95th amendment in 1988, the proposals
for amendment were discussed by panels or study groups. The Air Navigation Conferences
would still be convened, but tend to focus on policy issues rather than the preparation
of an Annex or its amendment.
128 Annex 18, Table A, at vii and viii.
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the States or organizations nominating them. They are therefore required to
express their professional opinions rather than the established policies or points
of view of their nominating States or international organizations.129 The con-
cept of panels has its origin in “the desire to reduce the frequency of large
international technical meetings”.130
While panels are considered to be a more efficient means of initiating
amendments to the Annexes, two drawbacks are apparent: first, they restrict
wide participation of States in the rule-making process; and, secondly, they
tend to enlarge the disparity between the developed and developing countries.
Due to the small size of a panel, as compared to a divisional meeting, the
majority of the member States of ICAO are excluded from participating in its
work. Originally, panels did not even include persons having the status of
“observers”. It was only after numerous interventions at the Assembly and
a long debate in the Council that the Directives were amended to allow admis-
sion of observers, and even then, upon the condition that their number should
not become so large as to adversely affect the effectiveness of a panel
meeting.131 Even with the participation of observers, the fact remains that
only a handful of States can send nominees to the panels. The balance between
efficiency and democracy is therefore not easy to maintain.
More acute problems exist concerning the representation of developing
countries on the panels. Despite tremendous efforts aimed at achieving equit-
able geographical distribution in the composition of the panels, the most
developed countries inherently have greater influence in these highly technical
bodies. The more sophisticated the expertise required, the less likely the
developing countries could ever get involved. Even if some qualified experts
from developing countries find their way to the panels, they are not backed
by the same financial resources and technical support as those who are nomi-
nated by the developed countries. Unlike the forum afforded by the Assembly
or other large-scale conferences, where developing countries are usually able
to flex the muscle of the majority, their nominees are very often overwhelmed
in the technical panels.
To offset these drawbacks, a principle has been established and it ensures
that panels do not take final decisions on technical matters, but merely develop
recommendations for the consideration of the ANC. As such, technical advice
provided by panels is subject to subsequent review by the ANC, and the usual
practice is that the ANC in turn refers panel recommendations to all contracting
States for comment. In some instances, the panel recommendations are also
considered by a world-wide ICAO meeting.132 Undoubtedly, these procedures
do provide certain safeguards to prevent domination of the rule-making
129 ICAO Doc 7984, supra note 126 at para. 6.2.
130 Statement of the President of ICAO Council, C-Min 105/1-20, supra notes 123 at 51.
131 ICAO Doc 7984/4, supra note 126, Amend. No. 1, 12 March 1982; C-Min, id. at 42-44, 50-56.
132 C-WP/7389, supra note 125.
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process by a small minority of States. However, experience also demonstrates
that when a subordinate technical body presents a package for the considera-
tion by the superior policy body, it is practically not easy for the latter to
overturn the package and re-invent the wheel. Moreover, since only 10% of
the total number of member States comprises the ANC, and 19% constitutes
the Council, the risk that the rule-making process may be controlled by a small
number of contracting States always exists. Safeguards should therefore be
developed by ICAO to ensure that the elected minority will legislate for the
benefit of all member States and in the interest of safety of international civil
aviation.
Unlike SARPs, the formulation of other regulatory provisions, such as PANS,
SUPPS, regional air navigation plans, and some guidance material requires
the approval of, instead of adoption by, the Council. This typically means that
only an affirmative vote of a simple majority of the Council, namely, 19 States,
is required to promulgate such provisions.133
In some instances, study groups established under the auspices of the ICAO
Secretariat also contribute some valuable input to the process of amending
Annexes. In terms of their composition and the procedures for the conduct
of business, the study groups are even less formal than panels. As the President
of the Council has pointed out, in principle, the work of study groups should
not be the subject of reports to the Council as the purpose of such groups is
to provide assistance to the Secretariat; they do not have the same status as
panels or Council committees.134
2.2.4 Juridical Nature of Technical Regulations
More than 60 years after the conclusion of the Chicago Convention, the legal
status of the SARPs in the Annexes is still, and probably will continue to be,
subject to various interpretations.135 Some commentators believe that with
certain exceptions, the contracting States have no legal obligation to implement
or to comply with the provisions of a duly promulgated Annex or amendment
thereto, unless they find it “practicable” to do so.136 In contrast, some others
consider that an international regulation adopted by virtue of an international
133 Cf. Art. 52 of the Chicago Convention, which states that decisions by the Council shall
require the approval by a majority of the Council, and Art. 90, which states that the adoption
of the Annexes shall require the vote of two-thirds of the Council.
134 ICAO Doc 9779 – C/1138, C-Min 162/1-13, Council – 162nd Session, Summary Minutes with
Subject Index (2001) at 56.
135 For more recent discussion, see Abeyratne, R.I.R., “The Legal Effect of ICAO Decisions
and Empowerment of ICAO by Contracting States” (2007) XXXII AASL 517 at 520 and 521.
136 Buergenthal, supra note 46at 76.
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convention becomes an international agreement, and that a State’s departure
from such a regulation constitutes a reservation to this agreement.137
The drafters of the Chicago Convention clearly did not intend the Annexes
to be an integral part of the Convention. Article 54(l) refers to SARPs as Annexes
to the Convention only “for convenience”. In presenting the report of Commit-
tee II to the Chicago Conference, Dr. Edward Warner made the following
statement which has been published as part of the preparatory work of the
Conference:
No Annex is specifically identified in the Convention; and there is no limit to the
adoption by the Council of any Annexes which may in future appear to be desir-
able. On the other hand and in fact as a necessary consequence of that flexibility,
the Annexes are given no compulsory force. It remains open to any State to adopt
its own regulations in accordance with its own necessities.138
Furthermore, under Article 38, a State may depart from a standard adopted
by the Council by giving notification to ICAO of the differences between its
own practices and that established by the international standards. This may
also lend support to the argument that the Annexes have no compulsory force
of law.
In spite of the foregoing, however, the legal significance of international
standards could hardly be denied. Their legal nature should be viewed and
understood in the context of the object and purpose of the entire Chicago
Convention. The preamble to the Convention describes it as an agreement on
“certain principles and arrangements in order that international civil aviation
may be developed in a safe and orderly manner”. Article 37, as mentioned
above, underlines the importance of “securing the highest practicable degree
of uniformity”.139 Furthermore, Article 38 reads:
Any State which finds it impracticable to comply in all respects with any such
international standard or procedure, or to bring its own regulations or practices
into full accord with any international standard or procedure after amendment
of the latter, or which deems it necessary to adopt regulations or practices differing
in any particular respect from those established by an international standard, shall
give immediate notification to the International Civil Aviation Organization of the
differences between its own practice and that established by the international
standard. In the case of amendments to international standards, any State which
does not make the appropriate amendments to its own regulations or practices
shall give notice to the Council within sixty days of the adoption of the amendment
to the international standard, or indicate the action which it proposes to take. In
137 Saba, H., “Quasi-Legislative Activities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations”,
(in French) (1964) 111 RdC 607 at 678.
138 Proceedings of the International Civil Aviation Conference, supra note 108 at 92.
139 See supra note 108 et seq and accompanying text.
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any such case, the Council shall make immediate notification to all other States
of the difference which exists between one or more features of an international
standard and the corresponding national practice of that State.
Reading all these provisions together, one cannot help but conclude that the
primary focus of these provisions is the achievement of uniformity of inter-
national standards, and not the freedom of action of the contracting States
to file differences. Except in case of war or national emergency as mentioned
in Article 89, the only legitimate way for a contracting State to decline compli-
ance with an international standard is to file a difference pursuant to Article
38. Nothing in the text of the Chicago Convention or the preparatory work
preceding it indicates that an international standard which has become effective
is not binding on contracting States which do not file any differences to it.
On the contrary, concerning the adoption and amendment of Annexes, the
terms “become effective” and “coming into force” used in Article 90 could
only demonstrate the intention of the drafters of the Convention to give
binding force and effect to international standards vis-à-vis those contracting
States which do not file any differences. As Kotaite observes:
The structure put in place by ICAO’s founders is a watertight system: either States
comply with the standards or they file differences. The Convention does not allow
for a situation where States do not comply and do not file differences. It is a
measure of the importance of aviation safety that the Council of ICAO is required,
on the one hand, to help States and, on the other hand, to bring infractions of the
Convention to the notice of Contracting States and the Assembly.140
Accordingly, the earlier quoted statement of Dr. Warner to the effect that the
Annexes are given no compulsory force could only be properly understood
as permitting contracting States to retain their freedom of action through the
notification of differences under Article 38.
What effect then should be given to the term “impracticable to comply”
in Article 38? The terms “practicable” or “impracticable” appear not only in
Article 38 but also in Articles 9(c), 22, 23, 25, 28, and 37, and as such deserve
careful study. According to Buergenthal, while the contracting States have
an obligation to act in good faith in determining what for them is “practicable”,
this, realistically speaking, does not constitute an obligation at all, for a State
can always find the necessary “practical” reason to justify non-compliance
with, or deviation from, international standards.141 In other words, a State
will be its own ultimate judge on this matter, and the provision concerning
the term “practicable” belongs to the so called “auto-interpretative international
140 Kotaite, A., “Sovereignty under great pressure to accommodate the growing need for global
cooperation” (December 1995) 50 ICAO Journal 20 at 20.
141 Buergenthal, supra note 46 at 78.
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law”.142 On the other hand, the practice of member States of ICAO appears
to indicate a modest move from the “auto-interpretative” stage towards the
“justiciable” stage of international law. When a State accepts the entry of an
ICAO audit team into its territory, one wonders whether the term “practicable”
could be auto-interpreted as freely as it used to be.143 In this connection,
reference should be made to the most recent ICAO Assembly Resolution con-
cerning the implementation of SARPs, in which the following new sentence
was added:
If a Contracting State finds itself unable to comply with any SARPs, it should inform
ICAO of the reason for non-implementation, including any applicable national
regulations and practices which are different in character or in principle.144
This associated practice is another indicator that the burden may have shifted
onto those States which do not comply with standards to provide some justi-
fications. Although the justifications may still be given on a discretionary basis,
the transparency expected in the Resolution may serve as a means to prevent
or reduce arbitrariness in the filing of differences.
A further question may be raised as to whether the right to file differences
is applicable to all standards in the Annexes without exception. Some standards
are of such fundamental importance that the departure from them may not
be tolerated. For instance, paragraph 4.1 of Annex 17 – Security requires each
contracting State to prevent unauthorized weapons or explosives from being
introduced on board an aircraft engaged in international civil aviation. It would
be inconceivable if a State could file a difference from this standard and then
allow any weapons or explosives to be placed on board aircraft departing from
its territory for another State. In today’s environment, if that happened many
States would probably react by imposing a ban on entry of any such aircraft
coming from that State. From this, it may be argued that certain standards
have either become customary rules or emerged as the fundamental norms
dictated by the vital interests of the aviation community. Although they still
retain the status of standards, they may have become binding rules which
could not be subject to the filing of differences.
In summary, whereas some writers are of the view that contracting States
have no legal obligation to comply with international standards under
Article 37, unless they find it “practicable” to do so, others believe that con-
142 Cheng classified international law into three different grades: judicial international law,
arbitrable or justiciable international law, and auto-interpretative international law. The
latter is the lowest level of the three, in which each party to a dispute is able to take
advantage of the polysemous character of the law and insist on the interpretation which
best suits its interests. See Cheng, B., “On the Nature and Sources of International Law”
in International Law: Teaching and Practice (London, 1982) at 203-213.
143 See infra 2.3 regarding the audit activities of ICAO.
144 Assembly Resolution A36-13, supra note 86 at II-3.
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tracting States are, in principle, obliged to comply unless they find it “im-
practicable” to do so. The difference in opinion results from the different
perspectives from which the provisions are viewed. The former position leans
towards the principle of State sovereignty and the freedom of action of States;
whereas the latter position leans more on international uniformity and the
safe and orderly development of international civil aviation. The general
context of the Chicago Convention as a whole and the practice of States seem
to indicate that contracting States are generally willing, except in case of war
or national emergency,145 to restrict their sovereignty and freedom of action
to a reasonable extent, in order to promote the safe and orderly development
of international civil aviation. Against this backdrop, one may conclude that
the duty to comply with international standards remains the general rule, while
the right to file differences is an exception to the rule. In some cases, due to
the overarching vital interests of the community, certain provisions originally
promulgated as international standards may have acquired binding effect erga
omnes, irrespective of their continuing status as standards.
By the ordinary meaning of the term, recommended practices, unlike
international standards, are not binding although Article 90 refers to the
“coming into force” of an Annex, which may also include recommended
practices. It is difficult to understand how a non-binding recommendation
could become effective or come into force. The irreconcilable conflict between
the terms “recommendation” and “coming into force” might probably be due
to hasty drafting at the Chicago Conference, as Buergenthal has repeatedly
pointed out.146 The definition of recommended practice adopted by the first
Assembly of ICAO points out that their uniform application is considered
“desirable”,147 suggesting that they are not primarily obligatory in nature.
This definition remains applicable today and has never been challenged. The
preparatory work and doctrinal writing also suggest that State compliance
with recommended practices is optional, implying non-existence of obliga-
tion.148 It may therefore be concluded that recommended practices do not
have legally binding status as traditionally understood. Contracting States
which do not follow recommended practices are therefore not required to file
differences under Article 38.
145 Art. 89, Chicago Convention.
146 See Buergenthal, supra note 46 at 58, 69 et seq. See, for example, the confusing use of the
terms “effective” and “coming into force”.
147 See the definition of SARPs at supra note 86.
148 Proceedings of the International Civil Aviation Conference, supra note 108 at 708, where Commit-
tee II states: “A particular problem of status is that of recommended practice [sic]. The
committee believes that in certain branches of regulatory action some subjects should be
fully standardized, while upon others the internationally agreed documents should present
only recommendations implying no obligations.” See Carroz, “International Legislation
on Air Navigation over the High Seas” 26 JALC 158 (1959) at 166-168; Buergenthal, supra
note 46 at 78 and 81.
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It should be noted, however, that subsequent ICAO Assembly resolutions
have tended to blur the distinctions between standards, recommended practices
and PANS. Over the years, emphasis has been placed on the elimination of those
differences “that are important for the safety and regularity of international
air navigation or are inconsistent with the objectives of the international
standards”, regardless as to whether they are differences pertaining to SARPs
or PANS. The term “important” as used here has not been defined.149 Clearly,
the effect of these Assembly resolutions will require further analysis.150
In addition to SARPs, ICAO has developed abundant guidance material which
is published in the form of attachments to ICAO Annexes, as ICAO manuals,
or in other appropriate forms. Guidance material provides detailed advice
to States concerning the implementation of SARPs and is updated progressive-
ly.151 For example, the Manual of Procedures for Operations Inspection, Certi-
fication and Continued Surveillance (Doc 8335) provides comprehensive guidance
to States in all aspects of air operator certification relating to the implementa-
tion of the standard in Annex 6, Part I, paragraph 4.2.1.3.
Many of the provisions in the Annexes set out the objectives of the
standards and are therefore formulated in broad terms, requiring specification,
illustration, or supplementation. As mentioned above, Annex 8, Airworthiness
of Aircraft, contains very general standards. They are presented as broad
provisions stating the objectives, rather than the means, of realizing these
objectives. Consequently, national airworthiness codes containing detailed
regulations addressing the full scope and extent of the standards are required
as the basis for individual State certification of airworthiness of each aircraft.
To assist States in applying the standards of Annex 8 or in developing their
own national codes in a uniform manner, detailed guidance material has been
developed. To illustrate the foregoing, paragraph 8.4.1 of Annex 8 lays down
the requirement of anti-collision lights for aeroplanes, but it only provides
a broad standard that in the design of such lights, due account shall be taken
of the conditions under which they may reasonably be expected to perform
their functions. The detailed specifications for exterior lights for aeroplanes
are prescribed in the Airworthiness Manual,152 which is guidance material.
Clearly, in the absence of such guidance material, it would be difficult to
implement this standard uniformly.
149 See Assembly Resolution A36-13, supra note 86 at II-5 and infra Ch.5, “Recommendatory
Resolutions”. As Buergenthal observes, since 1950 the requirement for filing differences
has been applied not only to recommended practices, but to PANS and SUPPS as well.
The Assembly has lumped these regulatory materials together in setting guidelines for their
formulation and implementation. See Buergenthal, supra note 46 at 117.
150 See infra Ch.5, particularly “Recommendatory Resolutions” and “ICAO Enforcement and
Implementation Functions”.
151 ICAO Council Working Paper C-WP/11526 “Updating the Annexes to the Convention
International Civil Aviation (Doc 7300)”, 6 March 2001.
152 Doc 9760 AN/967, Airworthiness Manual, 1st Edition – 2001.
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However, the guidance material has no formal legal status and lacks
mandatory effect. While many States voluntarily follow guidance material on
the basis of its professionally persuasive value, a question may be raised as
to whether there will be no uniformity if other States do not follow the guid-
ance material.
Lying somewhere between SARPs and guidance material, the Technical
Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods seem to have a sui generis
status. These instructions do not constitute SARPs since they are not designated
as such and were not adopted by a two-thirds majority of the Council. They
are not purely guidance material either, because they are reflected in a
standard under paragraph 2.2.1 of Annex 18 – The Safe Transport of Dangerous
Goods by Air by way of reference:
Each Contracting State shall take the necessary measures to achieve compliance
with the detailed provisions contained in the Technical Instructions for the Safe
Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air (Doc 9284), approved and issued periodically
in accordance with the procedure established by the ICAO Council. Each Contracting
State shall also take the necessary measures to achieve compliance with any amend-
ment to the Technical Instructions which may be published during the specified
period of applicability of an edition of the Technical Instructions.
Unless a contracting State registers differences with this standard, it is obliged
to respect it by complying with the detailed provisions contained in the Tech-
nical Instructions. Consequently, the Technical Instructions “amplify” the broad
provisions in Annex 18 and contain all the detailed instructions necessary for
the safe international transport of dangerous goods by air.153 When paragraph
2.2.1 in draft Annex 18 was debated in the Council, it was considered as an
innovative legal technique representing a deviation from the normal pro-
cedure.154 The Representative of France felt that this type of legal form should
not have the validity of setting a precedent. The Representative of the United
States proposed that paragraph 2.2.1 should be downgraded to a recommended
practice since he was not in a position to ensure mandatory compliance with
all of the detailed provisions of the Technical Instructions due to the domestic
law requirement that regulations must be promulgated. The United States
would have had to file a difference with paragraph 2.2.1 if it became a
standard and indeed did so when the provision was so adopted.155 Some
other States expressed the view that it is innovative and constructive to give
the Technical Instructions the force of standards, and that this did not exclude
153 See ICAO Doc 9284-AN/905, Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods
by Air, Foreword, at (iii). See also Annex 18, 3rd edition, July 2001, Foreword.
154 ICAO Doc 9347-C/1063 C-Min. 103/1-19, Council – 103rd Session, Summary Minutes with
Subject Index (1981) at 14, 20 and 21.
155 Id. at 22. As of January 2007, the United States remains to be the sole country which has
registered a difference with respect to para. 2.2.1. See Supplement to Annex 18 (3rd ed.).
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the possibility that it would be taken as a precedent. After long deliberations,
the Council adopted paragraph 2.2.1 in virtually the same language as con-
tained in the first sentence of that paragraph as it stands today. The underlying
reason is explained by the ANC as follows:
The Technical Instructions contain myriad mandatory and relatively dynamic
detailed instructions (estimated to change about 10% annually) which are necessary
for the standardized implementation of the annex provisions and essential for the
safe and orderly transport of dangerous goods by air. Thus, the proposed annex
and the Technical Instructions are very closely related and are both of regulatory
character. However, the Commission wishes to draw attention to the fact that the
18-24 month amendment procedure which is normally required in ICAO for regula-
tory documents is not compatible with the requirements of the Technical Instruc-
tions which is an operational document and needs to be updated and published
in a relatively short time period. In this regard, the comments of States indicated
acceptance of the requirement that the Technical Instructions need to have the
character of Standards and also require special arrangements for timely amend-
ments, which would of necessity be different from the procedure used for annex
amendments.156
Consequently, ICAO has two sets of regulations concerning the safe transport
of dangerous goods, which are promulgated using two different procedures,
and are subject to two different mechanisms concerning notification of differ-
ences or variations. The provisions in the Annex are adopted by the Council
by the vote of a two-thirds majority of the Council, whereas the provisions
in the Technical Instructions are approved by the Council by a simple majority.
Regarding the systems of notification, if a contracting State is unable to comply
with the Technical Instructions in general, it is obliged to file a notification
of differences with the standard in paragraph 2.2.1 under Article 38 of the
Chicago Convention, and such a notification will be recorded in Annex 18.
If a contracting State accepts to comply with the Technical Instructions in
general, but its regulations differ from the specific provisions of the Technical
Instructions, it is only required to notify ICAO of the variations from the Tech-
nical Instructions.
Paragraph 2.2.1 of Annex 18 has been applicable for more than two
decades, but the pros and cons thereof have not been subject to any in-depth
analysis. Should it be regarded as setting a precedent? Can the Council develop
some sort of “secondary legislation” in addition to the Annexes, or even
delegate the power to make such legislation to a subordinate body? Is there
any limit on the power to incorporate into an Annex an external document
by way of reference? Does the special case of Technical Instructions for the Safe
Transport of Dangerous Goods have any applicability in another set of circum-
156 ICAO Council Working Paper C-WP/7261, “Adoption of Annex 18 – The Safe Transport
of Dangerous Goods by Air”, 31 March 1981 at page 4, para. 4.
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stances? For instance, in the context of aviation security, will a similar situation
arise where regulatory material needs to be constantly updated to cover new
and emerging threats? Answers to the foregoing questions appear not to be
readily available and they may well depend on the development of future
practice. But paragraph 2.2.1 of Annex 18 provides abundant food for thought
that needs to be digested further.
2.2.5 Scope of Application of Technical Regulations
As mentioned above, while there are 18 Annexes to the Chicago Convention
today, they do not by any means exhaust the full scope of matters that could
be addressed in the Annexes. The last portion of Article 37 leaves a broad
discretion to ICAO to adopt SARPs and procedures dealing with “such matters
concerned with safety, regularity, and efficiency of air navigation as may from
time to time appear appropriate”. As noted by Dr. Edward Warner during
the Chicago Conference, no Annex is specifically identified in the Convention;
and there is no limit to the adoption by the Council of any Annexes which
may in future appear to be desirable.157
When the ICAO Council adopts a new Annex or amends an existing one
to cover a new item, queries occasionally arise concerning the competence
of the Council to do so. One common ground for such queries is whether ICAO
could or should traverse the domain of national jurisdiction, or should stay,
as its name suggests, strictly within the four corners of international civil
aviation.
When Annex 18 was initiated in 1981, the Representative of Egypt to the
Council, who later became the Chairman of the ICAO Legal Committee, ques-
tioned the competence of the Council to adopt an Annex on the safe transport
of dangerous goods in view of Article 35(b) of the Chicago Convention, which
provides that each contracting State reserves the right to regulate or prohibit
the carriage in or above its territory of articles other than munitions and
implements of war. The explanation given to him was that States had not
questioned the validity of adopting a new Annex on the carriage of dangerous
goods during the five years of study on the subject. Furthermore, the right
reserved to States in Article 35(b) did not prevent the adoption of a multilateral
regulation acceptable to States.158 As a result, Annex 18 was adopted even
though Article 37 does not specifically mention the safe transport of dangerous
goods as one of the issues upon which SARPs may be adopted. It appears that
safety considerations and pragmatic approach prevailed over the sentiments
of sovereignty.
157 Statement of Dr. Edward Warner, supra note 138.
158 ICAO Doc 9347-C/1063, supra note 154 at 7.
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From time to time, when the subject matter of a provision of an Annex
is clearly within ICAO’s mandate, an issue may arise as to whether ICAO could
extend the application of this provision to domestic civil aviation operations.
Throughout its history, ICAO has been cautious in this respect since its juris-
diction is generally confined to matters concerning international civil avi-
ation.159 However, despite the extensive search by this writer, a definition
of “international civil aviation” could not be found in any ICAO document.160
Consequently, no clear demarcation exists between international and domestic
civil aviation. On some occasions, ICAO had to determine whether or not a
provision of an Annex should be applicable to domestic civil aviation opera-
tions. For instance, paragraph 2.3 of Annex 18 – The Safe Transport of Dangerous
Goods by Air provides that in the interests of safety and of minimizing inter-
ruptions to the international transport of dangerous goods, contracting States
should also take the necessary measures to achieve compliance with the Annex
and the Technical Instructions for domestic civil aircraft operations. In this
instance, the relevant provision of Annex 18 is a recommended practice.
After the abhorrent terrorist acts on 11 September 2001, the Council on
7 December 2001 adopted Amendment 10 to Annex 17 – Security. This amend-
ment introduced a new paragraph 2.1.3, now renumbered as paragraph 2.2.2
of Annex 17, which provides that each contracting State shall ensure that
principles governing measures designed to safeguard against acts of unlawful
interference with international civil aviation are applied to domestic operations
to the extent practicable. When the draft amendment was considered by the
Council, the Representative of Australia was “unsure” whether ICAO had the
authority to impose as a standard the application of Annex 17 provisions at
the domestic level.161 He was supported by several other representatives,
including the Representative of the United Kingdom, who stated that ICAO
was beginning to trespass outside the bounds of its limits in terms of legal-
159 ICAO Council Working Paper, C-WP/11795, “Legal Opinion on Application of AVSEC-
Conf/2 Recommendation 4.1 (Locking of flight deck doors) to Domestic Flights” 14 May
2002.
160 In 1987, in the preparation of the instrument which was subsequently adopted as the Protocol
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation,
Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, done at Montreal on 23 September 1971, there was an extensive debate in the 26th
Session of the Legal Committee regarding the need for defining the term “airport serving
international civil aviation”. One proposal was to qualify the term “airport” by the words
“if the act interferes with the services provided for international civil aviation, or has an
effect on, or is linked with an international flight from or to the airport concerned”. Even-
tually, the Committee had to resort to a vote to resolve this issue, and it decided to work
on the presumption that there was no need for a further qualification of the words “airport
serving international civil aviation”. ICAO Doc 9502-LC/186, Legal Committee, 26th Session,
Report (1987) at para. 4:44. See infra Ch.4, note 99.
161 ICAO Doc 9796-C/1140, C-Min. 164/1-12, Council – 164th Session, Summary Minutes with
Subject Index (2002) at 113.
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ity.162 On the other hand, the Representative of Nigeria considered the new
provision in paragraph 2.1.3 to be a “crucial element” in the amendment, and
felt that it was “ironic” that those provisions were to be applied to domestic
operations only “to the extent practicable”, given that the tragic events of
11 September 2001 had affected domestic aviation. Others were of the opinion
that the wording proposed in paragraph 2.1.3 had been discussed at length
at the panel level and represented the “best possible compromise”. Eventually,
the standard in paragraph 2.1.3 was adopted unanimously as drafted, including
the affirmative votes by those States who had questioned its legality.163
The issue resurfaced again when a High-level, Ministerial Conference held
in February 2002 recommended immediate action to lock flight deck doors.
On 6 March 2002, the Council decided to seek a legal opinion regarding the
possible application of the said recommendation to domestic flights, to be
presented in May 2002.164 Nine days later, on 15 March, 2002, the Council,
without waiting for the conclusion of the legal opinion, adopted Amend-
ment 27 to Annex 6 – Operation of Aircraft, Part I – International Commercial
Air Transport – Aeroplanes.165 The amendment was contained in para-
graph 13.2.1, of Chapter 13 (Security) and it provided that, in all aeroplanes
which are equipped with a flight crew compartment door, this door shall be
capable of being locked, and means shall be provided by which cabin crew
can discreetly notify the flight crew in the event of suspicious activity or
security breaches in the cabin. It also included a “Recommendation” in para-
graph 13.1 of Annex 6 that “International Standards and Recommended
Practices set forth in this Chapter should be applied by all Contracting States
also in case of domestic commercial operations (air services)”.
In view of this decision of the Council, it would have been unnecessary
to present a legal opinion on this matter. Nevertheless, a legal opinion was
presented on 4 May 2002,166 endeavouring to provide legal justifications for
the “fait accompli”. The opinion concluded that it is compatible with the
Chicago Convention for ICAO to recommend that the new paragraph 13.2.1
of Annex 6 be applied to domestic commercial operations (air services). This
conclusion was based on the concept of “fundamental inseparability of certain
critical elements of domestic and international aviation operations”. It was
advocated that such fundamental inseparability had become more apparent
due to the practice of “hub-and-spoke” operations engaged in by many airlines,
in which regional and domestic feeder services are directed to a major hub
162 Id. at 115.
163 Id. at 115 – 117.
164 ICAO Doc 9802-C/1141 C-Min. 165/1-13 Council – 165th Session, Summary Minutes with Subject
Index (2002) at 60, para. 40.
165 Id. at 163. See also ICAO Council Working Paper C-WP/11757, “Adoption of Amendment
27 to Annex 6 – Operation of Aircraft, Part I – International Commercial Air Transport – Aero-
planes”, 28 February 2002.
166 C-WP/11795, supra note 159.
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to feed long-haul international flights. Under such circumstances, international
regulations would not be effective unless they are at the same time equally
applicable to domestic feeder operations.167
While the notion of “fundamental inseparability” had enormous appeal
to some representatives in the Council, there were strong objections to the
suggestion that the domestic segment of an international air service could be
viewed as being “international”. Whether an operation is international or
domestic should not be characterized by the state of mind of an individual
passenger.168 Eventually, the Council agreed with the conclusion of the
opinion, without endorsing the underlying principles and analysis. It indicated
that the theoretical issue could be revisited if circumstances made it appro-
priate, bearing in mind the interests of passengers.169
Based on the foregoing, it may be concluded that the Council believes that
it can, if the circumstances justify, extend the applicability of certain recom-
mended practices in the Annexes to domestic civil aviation operations. It may
do the same with respect to a standard provided that States are given the
discretion to apply it “to the extent practicable”. The theoretical basis for such
applicability is left to be revisited in the future.170
2.3 AUDITING OF STATE COMPLIANCE WITH TECHNICAL REGULATIONS
The technical regulations formulated by ICAO will be useful only when they
are implemented. In order to verify the status of the implementation of these
regulations, ICAO has established two audit programmes, one is the Universal
Safety Oversight Audit Programme and another is the Universal Security Audit
Programme.
2.3.1 Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme
During the first half-century of its existence, ICAO focused mainly on the
adoption and amendment of SARPs and related regulatory material, leaving
the implementation of these technical regulations wholly in the hands of its
member States. ICAO also expected that its member States would file notifica-
tions pursuant to Article 38 of the Chicago Convention, if they could not
comply with the international standards.
167 Id. para. 3.5.
168 ICAO Doc 9802-C/1142, C-Min. 166/1-14 (2002), Council – 166th Session, Summary Minutes
with Subject Index at 52-53.
169 Id. at 55-56.
170 Cf, Ch.5, in particular, 5.5.2 “Checks and Balances in ICAO Quasi-Legislative Activities”.
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In reality, the picture was much less rosy than what was presumed in
theory. Over the years, only a relatively small number of States communicated
with ICAO to indicate whether or not they were able to comply with ICAO
standards. Many contracting States did not fulfil the obligation they had
assumed to notify ICAO of differences between the international standards
adopted by ICAO and their own national or domestic standards.171 In some
cases, certain developing countries did not even have adequate expertise fully
to appreciate the contents of the Annexes, let alone the capability to determine
whether there were differences to be filed with ICAO. Consequently, there was
no reliable information concerning the implementation of the standards. This
situation gave rise to a major safety concern. Milde, a former Director of ICAO
Legal Bureau, used the metaphor of the “Emperor’s new clothes” to describe
the implementation of ICAO standards: while everybody was praising the
clothes, the Emperor was actually naked.172
The alarm finally sounded in 1997, during a Conference on a Global
Strategy for Safety Oversight, attended by Directors General of Civil Aviation
of ICAO member States (DGCA Conference).173 The Conference recommended,
inter alia, that regular, mandatory, systematic and harmonized safety audits
be introduced, and that greater transparency and increased disclosure be
implemented.174 Based on these recommendations, the ICAO Assembly estab-
lished a Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) during its 32nd
Session in 1998, and directed the Council to bring it into effect as from 1
January 1999.175
The objective of the programme is to promote global aviation safety through
auditing member States on a regular basis to determine their capability for
safety oversight. The audits are carried out essentially by way of assessing
the effective implementation of the critical elements of a safety oversight
system and the status of States’ implementation of safety-relevant ICAO SARPs,
associated procedures, guidance material and safety-related practices.176
The audits are conducted by audit teams composed of ICAO officials and
sometimes including experts seconded by regional aviation organizations or
contracting States other than the audited State. Before an audit takes place,
171 Kotaite, supra note 140 at 20.
172 Milde, M., “Enforcement of Aviation Safety Standards – Problems of Safety Oversight”
(1996) 45 ZLW 3 at 9.
173 ICAO Doc 9707, Directors General of Civil Aviation Conference on a Global Strategy for Safety
Oversight -Report (1997).
174 DGCA Conference Report, id. at 2-5; ICAO Safety Oversight Audit Manual, ICAO Doc.
9735, AN/960 at 2-1.
175 Assembly Resolution A32-11: Establishment of an ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit
Programme. See also Milde, M., “Aviation Safety Oversight Audits and the Law” (2001)
XXVI AASL 165; Weber, L., “Convention on International Civil Aviation – 60 Years” (2004)
53 ZLW 298.
176 ICAO Doc. 9735, supra note 77 at 3-1.
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a memorandum of understanding is signed between ICAO and the audited
State, in which the latter agrees to the conduct of a safety oversight audit by
an ICAO audit team. The memorandum also sets out other terms and conditions
relating to the audit.177 In addition to the review of documents and records,
the audit team performs on-site activities in the audited State. All the eight
critical elements of a safety oversight system identified above are covered.178
Upon completion of the audit, an interim report containing all the audit
findings and recommendations is transmitted to the audited State, on the basis
of which the State is required to prepare a corrective action plan. Then, the
Final Safety Oversight Audit Report is issued, which is similar to the interim
report, but includes an analysis of the corrective action plan submitted, com-
ments, and information on any progress made by the audited State on the
implementation of the corrective action plan.179
During the first cycle of audits, States were audited on the basis of their
implementation of the SARPs contained in Annexes 1, 6, and 8 only. Sub-
sequently, the scope of the audit programme was further expanded to include
the safety-related provisions contained in all safety-related Annexes.180 One
hundred and eighty one member States were audited during the first circle,
seven were not.181 In early 2006, the ICAO Secretariat reported that significant
progress had been achieved in the implementation of State corrective action
plans. At the global level, the lack of effective implementation of the critical
elements of a safety oversight system had declined from an average of 32.6
per cent when all initial audits were completed, to an average of 17.5 per cent
when the follow-up audits of 162 contracting States were completed. Moreover,
ICAO was able to obtain first-hand information from its member States regard-
ing their compliance with standards. Even the most developed aviation nations
found out during the audit process that there were some differences between
their national regulations and ICAO standards, which had not been filed with
ICAO.182
177 Id. App. B to this Manual contains Generic Memorandum of Understanding.
178 See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
179 Supra note 77 at 6-3.
180 ICAO Assembly Working Paper, A32-WP/6, “Transition to the ICAO Universal Safety
Oversight Audit Programme” 6 July 1998. See also, ICAO Assembly Resolution A35-6:
Transition to a comprehensive systems approach for audits in the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight
Audit Programme (USOAP), in ICAO Doc 9848, supra note 2 at I-57.
181 ICAO Working Paper DGCA/06-WP/3, “The Status of Safety Oversight”, 9 January 2006.
Seven States, namely, Afghanistan, Burundi, Iraq, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands
and Somalia were not audited during the first cycle, primarily for security reasons. At that
time ICAO had 188 member States. Timor-Leste joined ICAO on 5 August 2005 to become
its 189th member. Montenegro became the 190th member on 12 February 2007.
182 See, for example, the audit reports or their summaries of France, Japan, the United Kingdom
and the United States, which are available at ICAO website: http://www.icao.int, at Flight
Information Exchange.
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2.3.2 Universal Aviation Security Audit Programme
Immediately after the notorious events of September 11, 2001, the 33rd Session
of the ICAO Assembly adopted Resolution 33-1, which, inter alia, directed the
Council and Secretary General to consider an ICAO Universal Security Oversight
Audit Programme.183 Pursuant to this resolution, a High-level, Ministerial
Conference on Aviation Security held in February 2002 recommended that
ICAO should establish a comprehensive programme of universal, regular,
mandatory, systematic and harmonized aviation security audits, with imple-
mentation beginning in 2003, based on a final work plan established by the
Council.184 The audit programme was included in the Aviation Security Plan
of Action adopted by the Council,185 and was subsequently designated as
the Universal Aviation Security Audit Programme (USAP).186
The USAP represents an important initiative in ICAO’s strategy for streng-
thening aviation security worldwide and for attaining the commitment of
member States in a collaborative effort to establish a global aviation security
system. The objective of the USAP is to promote global aviation security through
the auditing of States on a regular basis to assist States in their efforts to fulfil
their aviation security responsibilities. The audits identify deficiencies in each
State’s aviation security system, and provide recommendations for their
mitigation or resolution.187
Generally, USAP audits follow the methodology of the safety oversight
audits, but two fundamental differences should be noted. First, security audits
are conducted at the national and airport levels concerning the concerned
State’s compliance with Annex 17 and other aviation security related provisions
contained in other Annexes.188 During the first cycle, it was considered
insufficient to audit States only with respect to their security “oversight”
arrangements. It was felt that in situ installations and equipment, namely, those
located at the major airports of each member State, should also be included
in the audits.189 As a result, the term “oversight” does not appear as part
of the name of the audit programme although it was originally suggested by
183 ICAO Doc 9848, supra note 2 at VII-1.
184 ICAO Council Working Paper C-WP/11786, “Outcome of the High-level, Ministerial
Conference on Aviation Security”, 27 February 2002, Appendix, A-5.
185 ICAO Council Working Paper C-WP/11799, “Aviation Security Plan of Action” 17 April
2004; see also, ICAO Doc 9809-C/1142 C-Min. 166/1-14, Council – 166th Session, Summary
Minutes with Subject Index (2002) at 182; Kotaite, Aviation Safety and Security – Two Sides
of the Same Coin. Keynote Address to the Aviation Study Group at Linacre College, Oxford
University, 27 June 2003 at 2-3.
186 See ICAO website: http://icao.int at “Aviation Security”; see also Assembly Resolution
A35-9, Appendix E, in ICAO Doc. 9848, supra note 2 at VII-6.
187 ICAO website, id.
188 C-WP/11786, supra note 184 at A-5.
189 Weber, supra note 175 at 307.
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Assembly Resolution A33-1.190 Secondly, USAP audits strictly comply with
the principle of confidentiality. The sensitive nature of security information
is such that the principle of confidentiality is of the utmost importance to the
USAP. Unlike safety issues, the unauthorized disclosure of any security vulner-
ability of a State could have an adverse effect on security within the State
concerned. Consequently, all USAP reports receive a security classification; they
are subject to rigorous physical controls; and, no State other than the audited
State is provided with any information contained therein, unless otherwise
agreed to on a bilateral basis. The only information made available to any other
party apart from ICAO staff on a ‘need to know’ basis, is the name of the State
and the airport(s) audited.191
In spite of the foregoing, it should be noted that in 2007, the 36th Session
of the ICAO Assembly decided to introduce a policy of a “limited level of
transparency” for the security audits.192 The purpose of the policy is to
balance the desirability for information sharing among member States and
the need to prevent the sensitive information from going to the wrong hand.
Specific implementing measures for this policy still need to be developed.
There is also a tendency that rather than limiting security audits to particular
Annexes, they will be based on “critical elements” criteria, similar to those
used in the conduct of safety oversight audits.
2.3.3 Legal Issues Arising from ICAO Audits
The two ICAO audit programmes described in the foregoing paragraphs are
considered as having set a milestone in the effort towards establishing a new
and effective air safety regime for international civil aviation.193 Much has
been written about these programmes,194 but there is still the need to analyse
their legal basis, as well as their value in the theory and practice of inter-
national law.
190 Compare with supra note 175 and 183.
191 ICAO Council Working Paper, C-WP/11912, “Audit Functions of ICAO”, 21 October 2002,
in Appendix.
192 ICAO Assembly Resolution A36-20: Consolidated Statement on the continuing ICAO policies
related to the safeguarding of international civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference, in
ICAO Doc 9902, supra note 86 at VII-11.
193 Weber, supra note 175 at 304.
194 See Milde, supra note 175, Weber, id.; Abeyratne, R.I.R., Aviation in Crisis (Burlington:
Ashgate, 2004) at 34-42. Belai, H., “Expanding programme to adopt systems approach to
future audits” (2003) 58:9 ICAO Journal 4.
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2.3.3.1 The Principle of Consent and the Mandatory Nature of Audits
Both audit programmes of ICAO are designed and intended to be implemented
as “regular, mandatory, systematic and harmonized” audits. These terms were
first used in the 1997 recommendations of the DGCA Conference195 and they
appeared again in the recommendations of the High-Level, Ministerial Confer-
ence on Aviation Security in 2002.196 The first Conference did not provide
any standardized definitions for these terms. It somehow appears from the
record of deliberations during and after the Conference that in using the terms
“regular” and “systematic” participants envisaged “a long-term programme
which would go well beyond the three- and six-year cycles”. Accordingly,
the audit programme should not be “a one-time evaluation of all Contracting
States”.197 Further, the Safety Oversight Audit Manual published by ICAO pro-
vides that ICAO safety oversight audits will be conducted in a systematic,
consistent and objective manner. Standardization and uniformity in the scope,
depth and quality of audits will be assured through an initial and refresher
training of all auditors, the provision of guidance material, and the imple-
mentation of an audit quality control system within the Universal Safety
Oversight Audit Programme. Moreover, during deliberations in the first
Conference, the term “harmonised” or “harmonization” was used together
with standardization to refer to an approach which would “instill confidence
in the safety oversight system, provide safeguards against its abuse, and
preclude any possibility of discrimination.”198
The most controversial term, which has been the basis of much debate and
which is also the focus of the present inquiry, is the term “mandatory”. Origin-
ally, ICAO’s safety oversight programme was designated as a Safety Oversight
Assessment Programme. Approved by the Council in June 1995 and endorsed
by the 31st Session of the Assembly in the same year, this Programme was a
voluntary assessment of a State’s implementation of the ICAO SARPs, and
assessment-related reports were provided only to the assessed States. Other
contracting States were provided with a summary report on differences identi-
fied by the assessment team.199 In June 1997, when the Council had another
195 ICAO Doc 9707, supra note 173 at 2-5, para. 2.1 b).
196 ICAO Council Working Paper C-WP/11786 “Outcome of the High-level, Ministerial
Conference on Aviation Security” 27 February 2002, in Appendix, A-5, at para. 6.1: The
Conference recommends that “ICAO establish a comprehensive programme of a universal,
regular, mandatory, systematic and harmonized aviation security audits, with implementa-
tion beginning in 2003 based on the final work plan established by the Council.” The term
“universal” was not used in the Conference of Directors General in 1997, but it was clearly
intended that the safety oversight audit programme would be “universal”, which should
“include all Contracting States”. See ICAO Doc 9707, id.
197 ICAO Doc 9712-C/1124, C-Min. 153/1-16 Council – 153rd Session, Summary Minutes with
Subject Index (1998) at 101.
198 ICAO Doc 9707, supra note 173 at 1-5.
199 ICAO Doc 9735 supra note 77 at 2.1.1.
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opportunity to discuss the possibility of audits by ICAO, the Representative
of Senegal queried whether the mandatory nature of the audits would be
contradictory to the principle of sovereignty enshrined in the Chicago Conven-
tion. The opinion provided by the Legal Bureau implied that the audits could
be carried out upon the initiative of ICAO, but always with the audited State’s
consent, as the principle of sovereignty had to be fully respected. It was
suggested that an Assembly resolution approving the audit program, supple-
mented by bilateral expressions of consent, would provide a proper legal basis
for such a programme.200
If the Safety Oversight Audit Programme is based on the consent of the
audited States, how could it be branded as “mandatory”? In fact, the original
agenda item under which this matter was discussed at the 1997 DGCA Confer-
ence was “regular safety oversight audits”. The term “mandatory” did not
appear in the agenda.201
During the Conference, the deliberations concerning the mandatory nature
of audits related mostly to the issue of full disclosure of audit information.
Some States were ready to accept full disclosure but only on the condition
that the programme would become harmonized and systematic, and would
involve all contracting States. Thus, the programme as envisaged would no
longer be based on purely voluntary participation.202 Based on the tenor of
views expressed at the Conference, the Chairman summarized that “delegates
were in favour of regular, systematic and mandatory safety audits”, and that
“[s]pecial emphasis had been given to the need for a harmonized approach
to safety oversight and for training for aviation safety inspectors”.203 This
was the basis for the Conference’s recommendation of “regular, mandatory,
systematic and harmonised safety oversight audits”,204 which the Assembly
unanimously endorsed through Resolution A32-11.
Can Resolution A32-11 impose a mandatory audit upon member States?
The effect of ICAO Assembly resolutions is similar to that of UN General Assem-
bly resolutions, which has been the subject of a lengthy debate.205 In its advis-
ory opinion in the case concerning Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, the International Court of Justice noted that “General Assembly
200 ICAO Doc 9704-C/1122, C-Min. 151/1-15, Council – 151st Session, Summary Minutes with
Subject Index (1997)at 94-95, 101; see also ICAO Council Working Paper C-WP/10612,
“Possible Enhancement of the Implementation of ICAO Annexes on Aviation Safety and
Security”, 4 June 1997, at para. 2.3.
201 The full text of the agenda is as follows: Topic 3.3: Regular safety oversight audits. The Council
of ICAO has agreed, in principle, with the concept of safety audits carried out upon the
initiative of ICAO, with the audited State’s consent, as an essential component of a global
strategy for safety oversight. The conference will have an opportunity to review this concept
and recommend appropriate actions. See ICAO Doc 9707, supra note 173 at iv-4.
202 Id. at 1-6.
203 Id. at 1-6, paras 3.7 and 3.8.
204 Supra note 174.
205 See infra Ch.5.2.1.
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resolutions, even if they are not binding, may sometimes have normative value.
They can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence important for establishing
the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris”.206 Analyzing Resolu-
tion A32-11 in the light of the criteria set forth by the Court, it would appear
that the statement “ultimate responsibility for safety oversight rests with
contracting States, who shall continuously review their respective safety over-
sight capabilities” (emphasis added) may arguably be considered as the expres-
sion of opinio juris, namely, the belief that the law requires States to act in that
way. This responsibility has been repeatedly affirmed by a series of Assembly
resolutions over the years, and no objection has ever been recorded.207 The
resolution also urges “all Contracting States to agree to audits to be carried
out upon ICAO’s initiative, but always with the consent of the State to be
audited, by signing a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding with the
Organization, as the principle of sovereignty should be fully respected”. It
is clear from the above that the opinio juris reaffirms the principle of consent.
Accordingly, in order to ensure that audited States consent to the conduct
of ICAO audits, more than 180 bilateral memoranda of understanding have
been concluded, all based on the single model approved by the Council. Most
States accepted the standard text prepared by ICAO, whereas some requested
certain amendments. The unwritten but firm policy of ICAO has been not to
deviate substantially from the model, in order to safeguard uniformity.
The conclusion of the memoranda of understanding has fulfilled the
requirement of consent, alleviated the concern of the more skeptical minds,
and has provided legal justification for the audits carried out by ICAO. From
a doctrinal point of view, the question may be asked whether, in practice, a
contracting State which ICAO seeks to audit may refuse to conclude a memo-
randum of understanding with ICAO. Aside from the moral pressure and
persuasive force associated with the Assembly resolution, States which are
reluctant to accept ICAO’s audits may not find it worthwhile to refuse them.
This is because such States risk the ever present possibility of creating an
unfavorable impression of themselves in the international aviation community,
and being de facto blacklisted by other States as a result. Accordingly, the
memorandum of understanding is only a formality. Behind it is the commit-
ment to go along with the community expectation, despite the initial reluctance
of certain States.
ICAO’s implementation of audits in the territories of its member States
received a second round of affirmation when the Universal Security Audit
206 Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ Reports 226 at 254 (para. 70).
207 See, Resolutions A29-13, in particular resolving clause 1: “Reaffirm that individual State’s
responsibility for safety oversight is one of the tenets of the Convention. See also, Resolu-
tions A33-9 and A35-6 in ICAO Doc 9848, supra note 2. In Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ also
mentioned that “a series of resolutions may show the gradual evolution of the opinio juris”,
see id.
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Programme was implemented. The cooperation so far received from the
audited States during safety and security audits has demonstrated that not
only have the member States accepted the audits by ICAO in their words; they
have also accepted the audits by their subsequent deeds. With this in mind,
one may venture to conclude that the ICAO audit practice has customarily
developed into a mandatory safety regime in the true legal sense of the word.
2.3.3.2 Confidentiality and Transparency
Confidentiality was regarded as a cornerstone in the voluntary safety oversight
assessment programme introduced in 1996. The model memorandum of
understanding used at that time provided in paragraph 10 that “safety over-
sight interim and final reports will be confidential”.208 Access to information
relating to the assessment was restricted to persons within the ICAO Secretariat
on a need-to-know basis. The same paragraph of the memorandum of under-
standing provided, however, that a summary of the final report would be made
available to States through ICAO, upon request.209
Confidentiality of audit information was one of the core issues debated
during the 1997 DGCA Conference. The majority emphasized that, vis-à-vis
access to information, the interests of the travelling public was the paramount
consideration in addressing the subject of confidentiality. While the sovereignty
of individual States and their legitimate right to fair treatment should continue
to be respected, as much information as possible should be made publicly
available on safety deficiencies. On the other hand, it was felt that the audit
programme needed to move incrementally from the stage of full confidentiality
and voluntary subscription to one of mandatory assessment with full dis-
closure.210 Consequently, it was recommended that greater transparency and
increased disclosure be implemented by way of expanding upon the informa-
tion in the summary reports. In the standard memorandum of understanding
for the first cycle of the audits, the clause concerning confidentiality was
therefore maintained.
When ICAO introduced the comprehensive approach to safety oversight
audits covering all safety-related provisions in the Annexes, greater trans-
parency was promoted. In 2004, the 35th Session of the Assembly recognized
the fact that transparency and sharing of safety information are fundamental
tenets of a safe air transport system. This marked the beginning of the era in
which ICAO would make available the full reports of comprehensive audits
to its member States.211
208 See the Appendix to the ICAO Working Paper, DGCA/97-WP/4, “Dealing with Confiden-
tiality and Sovereign Issues”, 2 October 1997.
209 Id.
210 DGCA Conference Report, supra note 173 at 1-4, para. 2.
211 ICAO Doc 9848, supra note 2, Assembly Resolution 35-6.
78 Regulation of Aviation Safety by Means of a Technical Safety Code
At another DGCA Conference held in March 2006, an even bolder attempt
was made to set up a system of disclosure of the audit results, not only to
the member States, but also to the aviation industry at large and the general
public. One of the working papers introduced at the Conference referred to
transparency as “the corner stone of aviation safety”,212 demonstrating a
significant shift from the previously held view that “confidentiality is a corner
stone” of the previous safety oversight assessment programme. However, while
the sharing of safety information among member States was fully supported,
concerns were expressed about the full disclosure of information to the
public.213 At the end of the Conference, 66 member States indicated their
willingness to authorize ICAO to release information from their safety oversight
audits. By July 2008, all ICAO member States audited under the USOAP had
given their consent for ICAO to release the results of audits conducted in their
respective countries.214 It took a decade for ICAO to transit from a regime
of confidentiality to one of transparency. With respect to the security audits,
transparency has not been given the same level of prominence since the
overarching need to prevent terrorists and other people with malicious intents
from identifying the deficiencies of the security system has been considered
to be more important.
2.3.3.3 Implications for International Law and Practice
ICAO’s successful implementation of safety oversight audits for the past 11
years and of security audits for the last 7 years presents a number of implica-
tions for the theory and practice of international law as traditionally under-
stood. In particular, it provokes new thinking with respect to the relationship
between a United Nations Specialized Agency responsible for civil aviation
and its members who are sovereign States.
The Chicago Convention, which includes the constitution of ICAO, is
founded on the principle of complete and exclusive sovereignty of States. This
principle generally implies that a State has supreme authority in its territory.
When the concept of safety audits was introduced and debated in the Council,
which was then composed of 33 States, ten members of the Council, represent-
ing different regions, different legal systems and different schools of thought,
jointly expressed the following view:215
212 ICAO Working Paper DGCA/06-WP/5, “Transparency and Sharing of Safety Information”,
9 January 2006 at para. 3.1.
213 DGCA/06-SD/2 Summary of Discussion, 21 March 2006.
214 ICAO News Release, PIO 04/08, “All Audited States Now Authorize ICAO to Post Audit
Results on Public Website”, 16 July 2008.
215 ICAO Council Working Paper C-WP/10832, “Safety Oversight Programme – Implementation
in 1999-2001 Triennium” (Presented by Angola, Australia, Bolivia, Canada, Egypt, India,
Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia), 18 February 1998. It should be noted that
while members in the Council are fully entitled to present working papers, it is not their
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The primary role of ICAO, as established in the Chicago Convention, is the adoption
and amendment of SARPs. The Convention does not, in any way, give the Organiza-
tion an executive function in ensuring compliance by States with the SARPs; the
filing of differences is the explicit responsibility of the States. The development
of a more robust safety oversight programme must respect these basic competencies.
In support of this viewpoint, China added that ICAO should not leave the
impression that in the field of flight safety and security, it was acting as the
police. France considered the new proposal as being tantamount to changing
the relationship between the organization and its member States, which would
necessitate the modification of the organization’s charter.216 Indeed, according
to the classical theory of international law, restriction of State sovereignty must
not be presumed.217 One of the key features of sovereignty is that a State
is not subject to any external authority. Safety oversight by an international
team, as Milde has pointed out, may be potentially perceived as “intrusive”
and offending the sensitivities of sovereign States.218
Nevertheless, despite all the scepticism and controversy, it is now an
undeniable fact that ICAO is exercising certain powers relating to safety and
security audits, and there has been no recorded instance in which such audits
have been refused by a contracting State. Why and how could ICAO obtain
such powers “without any formal amendment of the constitutional basis of
the Organization”?219 The answer lies in the commitment of the entire inter-
national community to protect the safety of international civil aviation.
By its very nature, civil aviation is predominantly international. ICAO
statistics show that international traffic represents approximately two-thirds
of the world total revenue air traffic.220 Numerous aviation activities cross
international borders and involve crews, passengers and supporting staff of
different nationalities. It follows therefore that the performance or non-perform-
ance of the safety oversight function of one State will have impacts upon other
States. “When safety standards and procedures are involved on international
flights, one cannot even take the position that non-compliance by a sovereign
State affects only the citizens of that State. Any other State that receives flights
of aircraft registered in the non-complying State has every reason to be con-
frequent practice to do so. Most of the Council working papers are prepared and presented
by the Secretary General of ICAO.
216 ICAO Doc 9704-C/1122, supra note 200 at 97 and 101. See also the Statement of Senegal,
supra note 200.
217 Lotus Case, 7 September 1927, P.C.I.J. Reports, Series A, No.10 at 18.
218 Milde, supra note 172 at 14.
219 Milde, supra note 175 at 175.
220 For example, in 1996, the total tonne-kilometres performed for scheduled traffic was
approximately 341 billions, 225 billions of which were performed internationally (ICAO
Doc 9700, Annual Report of the Council 1997, at A – 42). In 2006, the figure was 545.07 billions
for the total, and 369.35 for international traffic. ICAO Doc 9898, Annual Report of the Council
2007, at App.1.
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cerned about whether international standards and procedures are in fact being
followed with respect to such aircraft and crews”.221 Safety of civil aviation
requires not only uniform safety regulations, but also universal compliance
with such regulations. Gradually, the international community has come to
the realization that a universal system for monitoring State compliance with
international standards is necessary if civil aviation is to develop in a safe and
orderly manner.
In this connection, the assessment programme launched in August 1992
by the United States deserves positive mention.222 Dissatisfied with the
practice of certain “rent-a-flag” foreign airlines, which were virtually subject
to no safety oversight by any State, the Federal Aviation Administration of
the United States (FAA) decided to conduct, on a cooperative and reciprocal
basis, assessments of foreign airlines flying to the United States, and to classify
them in accordance with the degree to which they were found to be in compli-
ance with ICAO Standards according to established categories. In the worst
case, foreign carriers which did not comply with ICAO standards were denied
the right to operate flights into the United States.223
The foreign carrier assessment programme carried out by the US has
triggered certain adverse reactions. For example, Tompkins, an experienced
U.S. lawyer, has described the action of the FAA as “circumventing” the over-
riding safety function of ICAO, an act which he considers to be “contrary to
the commitments undertaken by the United States in the Chicago Conven-
tion”.224 Despite these criticisms, the unilateral initiative of the U.S. did play
an important role in paving the way for the establishment of the ICAO audit
programme. As the FAA has pointed out: “The FAA often uses unilateral and
multilateral approaches simultaneously, or uses the threat of unilateral action
to spur a multilateral initiative”.225 The airlines of many States could not
afford to lose the lucrative markets offered by their established air routes to
and from the U.S. Faced with unilateral safety assessments conducted by the
FAA, States were more inclined to submit to the more neutral solution or the
lesser evil: the universal, systematic and harmonized audits conducted by ICAO,
a neutral international organization.
Aside from the national initiative of the United States, the European Civil
Aviation Conference (ECAC) and other European bodies have also taken
regional initiatives to address safety issues, including the establishment of the
SAFA programme,226 and the introduction of a model bilateral clause on
221 Kotaite, supra note 140 at 20.
222 Jennison, M., “The Chicago Convention and Safety after Fifty Years” (1995) XX AASL 283
at 293.
223 Id. at 297.
224 Tompkins, G., “Enforcement of Aviation Safety Standards” (1995) XX AASL 319 at 333.
225 As quoted by Tompkins, id. at 334.
226 See infra Ch. 5.4, “Implementation at the National and Regional Level”.
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safety for insertion into bilateral air services agreements concluded in the
European region.227 These efforts also accelerated the initiative of ICAO to
embark on the audits.
Step by step, other States also came to the realization that the issue of
aviation safety is of global concern and, as such could not be properly
addressed in exclusive domestic jurisdictions. All these factors eventually
contributed to the consensus which was attained at the DGCA Conference in
1997. As noted above, the Conference recommended regular, mandatory,
systematic and harmonized safety audits to be carried out by ICAO, which
should encompass all contracting States. Accordingly, Milde has hailed it as
a significant development in international practice and international law
despite his lingering doubts about the legal status of the Conference:228
While the Conference had no law-making power, its unanimous recommendations
carried important weight as opinion iuris ac necessitatis expressed by the aviation
experts of the world responsible for the national administration of civil aviation.
It in fact formulated, by implication, a principle that matters of aviation safety are
subject of international concern and that the international community should be
empowered to verify the national implementation of safety standards and pro-
cedures.
It may be further argued that the shift from considering safety matters as being
exclusively within national jurisdiction to the international domain represents
a significant movement which would place the duty of safety oversight for
civil aviation as an obligation erga omnes.229 In this sense, ICAO may be proper-
ly considered as an agent of the international community for purposes of
verifying whether such a duty has been fulfilled.
It is also significant from the point of the international law-making process
that ICAO could successfully achieve a novel means of implementing inter-
national regulations without amending its constitutional instrument. The
establishment of the ICAO audit programmes passed through three stages in
the decision-making process: a recommendation from a conference of States;
endorsement by an Assembly resolution; and, conclusion of bilateral memo-
randa with States, with intervening decisions of the Council at different
stages.230 When the concept of safety audits to be carried out by ICAO was
227 See Statement by Representative of Denmark on the ICAO Council, ICAO Doc 9704-C/1122,
supra note 200 at 94. See also supra note 44.
228 Milde, supra note 175 at 175.
229 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment,
[1970] ICJ Report 3 at 32. See infra Ch.5.1.1 on obligations erga omnes.
230 In the case of the Universal Security Audit Programme, the Assembly, in an immediate
response to the events on 11 September 2001, initiated the request through Resolution 33-1
and endorsed, through Resolution 35-9 the security audit programme established by the
Council.
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introduced, several options were proposed as the means of obtaining the
required consent from States. These included bilateral agreements, an Assem-
bly resolution or declaration, a multilateral instrument, or combination of the
foregoing.231
Bilateral agreements would have been convenient to trigger an initial
project, but this would have resulted in a piecemeal approach, which, in turn,
would have required a considerable amount of time to crystallize into a global
framework. An amendment to the Chicago Convention would have had to
wait for at least 15 years in order to receive sufficient ratifications to bring
it into force. If a new treaty outside the Chicago Convention were to be nego-
tiated, it could have been less time-consuming, but it would still not be able
to secure the level of universal acceptance required to implement it within
a few years. To cope with the rapidly changing nature of circumstances char-
acteristic of modern day civil aviation, ICAO opted for an innovative short cut:
a top-down approach through an Assembly resolution approving the audit
programme, followed by a bottom-up approach through individual memoranda
of understanding between ICAO and each of the audited States.232 It may be
too early to judge whether this type of norm-making process may set a pre-
cedent for the future and stand the test of time, but the practice in ICAO indi-
cates the possibility that an institutional regime applicable to member States
could be developed within the framework of a United Nations specialized
agency without the necessity of concluding a multilateral treaty.
2.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Individual States’ responsibility for safety oversight in civil aviation is one
of the tenets of the Chicago Convention. Safety oversight by a State applies
to aircraft on its national registry as well as civil aviation activities carried
out within its territory. Registration of an aircraft is a sovereign act of discre-
tion, but it entails the responsibility to maintain a genuine link with such
aircraft in order to ensure its continuous compliance with safety standards.
This responsibility rests with the State of registry unless it is transferred
according to the specific criteria provided by law. The notion of “flags of
convenience”, used for purposes of avoiding safety regulations, is incompatible
with this responsibility. The responsibility of a State also extends to the provi-
sion of air navigation facilities and services within its territory in accordance
with ICAO standards. While the operation of the facilities and services may
be delegated to another party, the responsibility of the State remains unaffected
under Article 28 of the Chicago Convention. Currently, the prevailing view
is that Article 28 does not give a cause of action to private persons to claim
231 C-WP/10612, supra note 200 at para. 2.5.1. c).
232 Id.
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compensation for damage. Moreover, there is no precedent in ICAO in which
one member State claims compensation from another on the basis of Article 28
In an effort to assist States to fulfil this important responsibility, ICAO has
developed international standards and recommended practices as well as other
related regulatory material encompassing virtually the entire spectrum of
aviation activities with a view to achieving uniformity of safety regulations.
In doing so, ICAO has relied on a rather flexible approach without the usual
legalistic rigidity. The resulting sophisticated aviation safety code comprises
different kinds of regulatory material, some having binding force, and others
being purely guidance material. The implementation of this safety code has
been strengthened since the end of the 20th Century through the establishment
of the audit programmes, which give ICAO an important, albeit limited author-
ity, external to the sovereign powers of its member States. This practice has
broken new ground in international law. Underlying it is the consensus of
the international community that aviation safety is a matter of global concern,
and therefore should not be left within the exclusive domain of domestic
jurisdictions.
ICAO is also confronted with challenges. While the tenet remains that States
are responsible for safety oversight, “there is a growing trend today towards
regionalism, with its piece-by-piece surrender of sovereignty to a larger entity,
as well as simultaneous trend toward the dissolution or diminution of once
federated or unified States, with a splintering into smaller sovereign
entities”.233 The different stages of development of civil aviation in different
countries have placed a heavy task on ICAO with respect to the uniform devel-
opment and implementation of safety standards. There is also the continuing
tendency that legislative power within ICAO will be more and more concen-
trated in the hands of the minority which possesses advanced aviation systems.
Certain issues also exist in ICAO concerning the exact scope of its competence
and the legally binding force of its regulatory material. For example, there
is no clear guideline as to whether ICAO should or should not regulate purely
domestic aviation operations. As the institutional power of ICAO is likely to
grow in the future, it may be necessary to regularize the regulatory functions
of ICAO in order to ensure justice and fairness in its decision-making process.
233 Kotaite, supra note 140 at 20.

3 Protecting Aviation Safety from Military
Operations
Airspace used for civil aviation is also used for military purposes. Military
activities undoubtedly present safety implications for civil aviation. On the
one hand, many military activities are carried out for legitimate purposes; they
are essential for self-defence, an inherent right under Article 51 of the Charter
of the United Nations. In this sense, they represent a fundamental value of
the principle of sovereignty. On the other hand, military activities may also
be associated with unlawful acts, such as a deliberate act of aggression or an
unintended act of destroying civil aircraft in flight. The work of ICAO in this
area is aimed at maintaining equilibrium between the safety of civil aviation
and legitimate military activities. From time to time, when the circumstances
so require, ICAO also takes action against unlawful military acts for the purpose
of protecting the safety of civil aviation. ICAO activities are subject to its consti-
tutional constraint that the Chicago Convention does not apply to aircraft used
in military, customs and police services (Article 3, paragraph a) of the Conven-
tion). A further constraint lies in the provision of Article 89 of the Convention
which states that in case of war, the Convention does not affect the freedom
of action of any of the contracting States affected.
3.1 PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF WEAPONS AGAINST CIVIL AIRCRAFT IN FLIGHT
Historically, the greatest risk posed by military activities to civil aviation has
been demonstrated by occurrences of civil aircraft being shot down deliberately
or by mistake, causing numerous fatalities. For example, on 27 July 1955, an
aircraft of El Al Israeli Airlines Ltd. entered into Bulgarian airspace and was
shot down, causing the death of all 58 persons on board.1 On 21 February
1973, a Boeing 727 belonging to Libyan Arab Airlines was shot down by Israeli
air forces over the Israeli-occupied Sinai Peninsula, resulting in the death of
110 persons.2 On 31 August/1 September 1983, a Boeing 747 of Korean Air-
lines (Flight 007) deviated from its planned route into the airspace of the Soviet
1 ICAO Circular 50-AN/45: Aircraft Accident Digest No. 7, No. 35 at 146. See also, Augustin, J.,
ICAO and the Use of Force against Civil Aerial Intruders, Master’s Thesis, Institute of Air and
Space Law, McGill University, 1998, at 34.
2 ICAO Working Paper C-WP/5764, “Report concerning the Libyan Arab Boeing 727-224:5A-
DAH (Sinai-21 February 1973)” 1 May 1973, Attachment, paras. 1, 2, and 8.
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Union and was shot down by the latter, killing 269 persons on board.3 On
3 July 1988, an Iranian aircraft, an Airbus A300, was shot down by the navy
of the United States while flying from Bandar-Abbas in Iran to Dubai in the
United Arab Emirates, and all 290 persons on board perished.4 On 10 October
1998, a Boeing 727 aircraft of Congo Airlines was shot down, resulting in the
loss of 41 lives.5
3.1.1 Article 3 bis and Customary International Law
As early as 1955, the General Assembly of the United Nations was aware of
incidents involving attacks on civil aircraft innocently deviating from fixed
plans in the vicinity of, or across, international frontiers. Realizing that the
problem is “a matter of general international concern”, the General Assembly
adopted a resolution calling upon all States to take the necessary measures
to avoid such incidents and inviting the attention of the appropriate inter-
national organizations to this matter.6 In response to this resolution, ICAO
commenced its own study of this issue. According to a working paper pres-
ented by the Secretary General in 1956, national laws of several States con-
tained provisions that aircraft would be intercepted and shot down without
warning, or “may be fired upon”, or would be subject to danger or “sanction
in an attempt to bring them to the real course”, if they had not obtained air
traffic control clearance, had deviated from corridors, or had entered a pro-
hibited area. Some States believed it was contrary to international law to shoot
down a civil, unarmed aircraft under any circumstances, while others denied
the existence of this principle.7 Discussions on this issue dominated ICAO for
a long time and, after the destruction of Korean Airlines Flight 007 in 1983,
culminated in the adoption Article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention in 1984,
which reads as follows:
3 ICAO, Memorandum dated 2 September 1983 from the President of the Council to the
Representatives on the Council, Attachment 1.
4 ICAO Pres AK/165, Memorandum from the President of the Council to the Representatives
on the Council, 4 July 1988. Attachment 1-4.
5 Statement of the Delegate of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, reproduced in ICAO
Doc 9738-C/1127, C-Min. 156/1-16, Council – 156th Session, Summary Minutes with Subject
Index (1999) at 94 and 95.
6 UNGA Resolution 927, Question of the safety of commercial aircraft flying in the vicinity
of, or inadvertently crossing, international frontiers, UNGA Official Records, 10th Sess. Supp.
No. 19 at 14.
7 ICAO Working Paper C-WP/2153, “Safety of Commercial Aircraft Flying in the Vicinity
of, or Inadvertently Crossing, International Frontiers” (13 April 1956) at para. 5.
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Article 3 bis
a) The contracting States recognize that every State must refrain from resorting
to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight and that, in case of interception,
the lives of persons on board and the safety of aircraft must not be endangered.
This provision shall not be interpreted as modifying in any way the rights and
obligations of States set forth in the Charter of the United Nations.
b) The contracting States recognize that every State, in the exercise of its sover-
eignty, is entitled to require the landing at some designated airport of a civil aircraft
flying above its territory without authority or if there are reasonable grounds to
conclude that it is being used for any purpose inconsistent with the aims of this
Convention; it may also give such aircraft any other instructions to put an end to
such violations. For this purpose, the contracting States may resort to any appropri-
ate means consistent with relevant rules of international law, including the relevant
provisions of this Convention, specifically paragraph a) of this Article. Each contract-
ing State agrees to publish its regulations in force regarding the interception of
civil aircraft.
c) Every civil aircraft shall comply with an order given in conformity with para-
graph b) of this Article. To this end each contracting State shall establish all
necessary provisions in its national laws or regulations to make such compliance
mandatory for any civil aircraft registered in that State or operated by an operator
who has his principal place of business or permanent residence in that State. Each
contracting State shall make any violation of such applicable laws or regulations
punishable by severe penalties and shall submit the case to its competent authorities
in accordance with its laws or regulations.
d) Each contracting State shall take appropriate measures to prohibit the deliberate
use of any civil aircraft registered in that State or operated by an operator who
has his principal place of business or permanent residence in that State for any
purpose inconsistent with the aims of this Convention. This provision shall not
affect paragraph a) or derogate from paragraph b) and c) of this Article.8
Since the adoption of the Chicago Convention, there have been only two
substantive amendments to it, one is Article 83 bis, which has been discussed
in Chapter 2, and the other is Article 3 bis.9 In view of the lengthy and burden-
some process for amending the constitution of ICAO,10 these two successful
amendments must be considered to represent the strong commitment of the
member States of ICAO to the matters covered therein. Article 83 bis was
8 ICAO Doc 9436, Protocol relating to an Amendment to the Convention on International Civil
Aviation [Article 3 bis], signed at Montreal on 10 May 1984. This protocol came into force
on 1 October 1998 in respect of States which have ratified it. It had 138 parties on 16 July
2008 ( http://www.icao.int/icao/en/leb/3bis.pdf ).
9 Other amendments to the Chicago Convention are related to organizational structures, such
as the increase of the members in the Council.
10 An amendment to the Chicago Convention will take some 15 years or longer to enter into
force, because it requires the ratifications by not less than two-thirds of the total number
(currently 190) of the contracting States (Article 94).
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adopted to ensure the effective exercise of the important safety oversight
function; whereas Article 3 bis was adopted in response to the worldwide
appeal for the prohibition of the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight.
Long before the adoption of Article 3 bis, abundant state practice had
developed regarding the treatment of intrusions of civil aircraft. The classical
principle of “elementary considerations of humanity” as enunciated by Inter-
national Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel case has been repeatedly invoked
to denounce the disproportionate use of force against the intruding civil
aircraft. In that case, British warships incurred loss and damage in the terri-
torial waters of Albania due to the failure of the latter to give warning regard-
ing the existence of the minefield therein. In affirming that Albania had incum-
bent obligations to notify the existence of the minefield and to warn the British
warships of the imminent danger posed by it, the Court stated: “Such obliga-
tions are based … on certain general and well-recognized principles, namely:
elementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in
war, the principle of the freedom of maritime communication; and every State’s
obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary
to the rights of other States.”11 In the context of the aerial intrusions, the same
elementary considerations of humanity would require a State to give warning
to the intruding civil aircraft regarding the dangers it faces before resorting
to the use of force. Coincidently, none of the States which shot down civil
aircraft claimed that they had an unqualified right to do so without any
warning.12 Based on state practice prior to 1984, a number of commentators
who were involved with the drafting of Article 3 bis were of the view that
its paragraph a) is “not a new rule of law”, but the recognition of “the exist-
ence of a prior rule binding on all parties and prohibiting the use of weapons
against civil aircraft in flight”;13 it is declaratory of the principle of general
international law, which “had its independent existence separate from the
written (codified) text of Article 3 bis a)”.14 This is also evident from the text
of paragraph a) of Article 3 bis, where the words “recognize” and “every State”
11 Corfu Channel Case, Merits, Judgement of April 9th 1949 [1949] ICJ Reports 14 at 22.
12 See supra notes 1 to 5. See also “Documents Concerning the Korean Air Lines Incident –
United Nations Security Council Consideration” (1983) 22:5 International Legal Materials
at 1115-1116; ICAO Doc 9073-C/1011, C-Min. 79/1-14, Council - Seventy-Ninth Session,
Minutes with Subject Index (1973) at 38-47.
13 Guillaume, G., “The Destruction on 1 September 1983 of the Korean Airlines Boeing (Flight
KE 007)”, ITA Magazine No. 0-18, September 1984 at 34; Milde, M., “Interception of Civil
Aircraft vs. Misuse of Civil Aviation (Background of Amendment 27 to Annex 2)” (1986)
XI AASL 105 at125.
14 Milde, id. at 113. See also, FitzGerald, G.F., “The Use of Force against Civil Aircraft: The
Aftermath of the KAL Flight 007 Incident” (1984) CYIL 291 at 305. See also ICAO Doc 9647-
C/1089, C-Min. 115/1-19, Council – 115th Session, Minutes with Summary Index (1986) at 154.
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were deliberately chosen to indicate that the effect of the provisions is not
limited to contracting States.15
While there is a virtual consensus that paragraph a) of Article 3 bis reflects
existing law, such reflection could not possibly reach the photographic accuracy
thereof. This is partly due to the imprecise nature of customary international
law and partly due to the nature of the treaty-making process, which tends
to combine both the element of the codification of existing law and the pro-
gressive development of law.16 Augustin, after study of the state practice and
the relevant rules of the international law prior to the adoption of Article 3
bis, came to the conclusion that “paragraph a) of Article 3 bis does not coincide
with the customary international law before 10 May 1984, in the sense that
it seems to lay an obligation not to use weapons in circumstances where the
pre-existing law would allow it”.17 In his view,
customary international law did provide for the possibility of use of force against
civil aircraft when important security interests were threatened, appropriate in-
structions and warnings had been given and ignored, and the requirement of
proportionality was met. Importantly, the customary international law permitted
the possibility of the use of force, even lethal, in circumstances where activities of
the aircraft were not sanctioned by a State (i.e. private in nature) and where an
armed attack had not taken place, provided nevertheless that important security
interests were threatened.18
On the other hand, under paragraph a) of Article 3 bis, “the prohibition on
the use of weapons and endangerment of aircraft and their occupants is subject
to the right of self-defence as set out in Article 51 of the UN Charter. It is this
reference to the UN Charter which imposes a stricter obligation on the subjacent
State than did the principles of customary international law in 1984.”19 To
illustrate, Augustin cites two examples in which a pilot privately decides to
take for sale photographs of important military installations in a subjacent
State or to deliberately incite or incur rebellion in that State. In both cases,
the customary international law would not prohibit the State from the use
of weapons against the pilot provided that warning is given and the use of
force is proportionate. Under Article 3 bis, since these two cases do not involve
an armed attack and therefore a right of self-defence would not exist, the use
of weapons under these circumstances would not be permitted.20
15 See Augustin, supra note 1. In the original drafting, the term “undertakes to refrain” was
used. It was subsequently replaced by the term “recognize that every State must refrain”.
16 See infra Ch.5.2.1.1 relating to “Declaratory Resolutions”.
17 Augustin, supra note 1 at 213.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 212.
20 Id. at 213.
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Accordingly, the principal contribution of ICAO through the adoption of
Article 3 bis is to achieve in times of peace a complete ban on the use of
weapons against civil aircraft in flight.21 “The prohibition of the use of force
against civil aircraft in the amendment is more restrictive of the discretion
of the territorial sovereign than was the customary law in 1984.”22
Consequently, the freedom of action by States is further restricted in the
interest of aviation safety.
It should be noted that Article 3 bis prohibits the use of weapons rather
than the use of force. Paragraph a) expressly allows interception, provided
that the lives of persons on board and the safety of aircraft are not endangered.
Paragraph b) further confirms the right of interception and the resort to any
appropriate means consistent with relevant rules of international law. At the
same time, out of safety considerations, it requires each contracting State to
publish its regulations in force regarding the interception of civil aircraft.
Paragraphs c) and d) impose certain obligations to the State of registry and
the State of the operator of civil aircraft. Traditionally, a State had no duty
to ensure that its nationals in a foreign country comply with the laws in that
country. In the interest of safety, Article 12 of the Chicago Convention deviates
from this tradition by obliging the State of registry of an aircraft to ensure
that the aircraft shall comply with the rules of the air “wherever such aircraft
may be”.23 Article 3 bis, paragraph c) further requires the State of registry
and the State of the operator to declare punishable under its national law the
act of non-compliance with the order given by a foreign country in conformity
with paragraph b). Paragraph d) also imposes the obligation to prohibit the
deliberate use of any civil aircraft for any purpose inconsistent with the aims
of the Chicago Convention.
The drafters took great care to state that paragraph d) shall not affect
paragraph a). In other words, the obligation under paragraph d) is not qui
pro quo for the rule under paragraph a); even if the State of registry or the State
of the operator fails to fulfil its obligation under paragraph d), this does not
justify other States in using weapons against its civil aircraft in flight. As
paragraph a) refers to “every State” and paragraph d) only mentions “contract-
ing States”, it may be argued that the former is intended to have universal
21 Richard wrote in 1984: “while existing law and practice give paramount importance to
the safety of civil aviation, they may not confer the absolute character to the ban on the
use of weapons against civil aviation that is contemplated in Article 3 bis.” See Richard,
G., “KAL 007: The Legal Fallout” (1984) IX AASL 147 at 154. Augustin also tends to believe
that the ban on the use of weapons under Article 3 bis is absolute in nature, since the
exception concerning the right of self-defence will not arise with regard to civil aircraft.
Once an aircraft is used in a State-sanctioned armed attack, it would no longer be considered
as civil aircraft and therefore would fall outside the Chicago Convention, including Ar-
ticle 3 bis. Id. at 212. For more discussions, see infra note 57 et seq and accompanying text.
22 Augustin, id. at 259.
23 See supra note 6 in Ch.2.
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effect, whereas the latter is binding only on the contracting parties. On this
basis, it may be concluded that the safety of civil aircraft is the predominant
consideration underlying Article 3 bis.
3.1.2 Reactions of ICAO to the Use of Weapons against Civil Aircraft
Each of the incidents mentioned above concerning the shooting down of civil
aircraft has triggered heated debates in ICAO. In the case of the Korean airliner
(Flight 007), when the Security Council of the United Nations was not able
to take action due to the veto of the Soviet Union, the ICAO Council was able
to adopt a resolution on 6 March 1984 which “[c]ondemns the use of armed
force which resulted in the destruction of the Korean airliner and the tragic
loss of 269 lives”.24
Long before that, in the case of the Libyan aircraft shot down by Israel
in 1973, the ICAO Assembly made the most unequivocal statement “[c]ondemn-
ing the Israeli action which resulted in the loss of 106 innocent lives”, even
before it directed the Council to institute an investigation.25 As Augustin
observes, “[i]n none of the other instances examined above did the Assembly
or Council condemn by name the State which shot the aircraft, much less
before the investigation was completed.”26 The observer from Israel com-
mented afterward:
The action of my country was condemned – condemnation unparalleled in any
international institution, to my knowledge, in that the condemnation was issued
before any investigation of the facts. The judge passed sentence and then proceeded
to hear witnesses.27
With respect to the Iran Air incident on 3 July 1988, the Council spent some
time debating whether the term “condemn” or “condemnation” should be
used in the resolution. The observer from Iran stated that an “act of violence,
irrespective of who or which country the perpetrator might be, will not be
left unaccounted.” He called for “condemnation of the shooting down” and
a recognition of the responsibilities of the United States.28 The Council was
24 Frowein, J. A., “Reaction by Not Directly Affected States to Breaches of Public International
Law” (1994:V) 248 RdC 345 at 419-420. ICAO Doc 9441-C/1081, C-Min, 111/1-18, Council
– 111th Session, Minutes with Subject Index (1984) at 106.
25 Resolution A 19-1: Shooting down of a Libyan civil aircraft by Israeli fighters on 21 February
1973, in ICAO Doc 9848, Assembly Resolutions in Force (as of 8 October 2004) at I-27.
26 Augustin, supra note 1 at 155.
27 ICAO Doc 9073-C/1011, C-Min. 79/1-14, Council – Seventy-Ninth Session, Minutes with Subject
Index (1973) at 38. See also Augustin, id. at 154.
28 ICAO Doc 9744-C/1129, C-Dec. 126/1, 2, 4, 7-17, 21-26, C-Min. 126/3, 5, 6, 18-20, C-Dec.
127/1-33, C-Dec. 128/1-21, Council – 126th, 127th and 128th Sessions, Summary Decisions and
Minutes with Subject Index (1999) at 147 and 148.
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divided on this issue, and it entrusted its President to hold informal discussions
with a view to preparing a consensus text. After “a slow rate of progress in
his consultation”, the President reported to the Council that he was not able
to present such a text.29 Subsequently, the United Kingdom presented on
behalf of nine States a draft resolution, which did not satisfy Iran.30 The USSR
and Czechoslovakia then proposed to amend the sixth clause of the draft to
read:
CONDEMNS the use of armed force against civil aviation, including the act which
resulted in the tragic destruction of an Iran Air airliner and the loss of 290 lives,
while noting the accidental sequence of events and errors in the identification of
the aircraft.31
The United Kingdom stated that the co-sponsors of the draft resolution “did
not think that condemnation was appropriate to these particular circum-
stances”, since the “mistake had been acknowledged, responsibility had been
accepted and action had been taken to ensure that such a tragic event did not
recur”.32
The United States was strongly opposed to the amendment introduced
by the USSR and Czechoslovakia. In its view, one incident might differ from
another. It would be a far greater risk to ICAO credibility if “all uses of force
against civil aircraft in flight deserved equal condemnation, without due regard
to the particular facts and circumstances surrounding individual cases”. Its
government “had created a new precedent in the degree to which it had co-
operated with the Organization” and had offered ex-gratia compensation. It
would be “unconscionable for the ICAO Council to impose its greatest censure
‘condemnation’.”33
Contrary to this view, Kenya observed that the Council “when considering
a similar incident in the past had ‘condemned’ that act”. Kenya argued that
the Council should be consistent and should not be “influenced by political
considerations”. If it failed to do so, “the Organization stood to lose its credibil-
ity.”34
Eventually, the proposed amendment by the USSR and Czechoslovakia was
put to vote and defeated. In the final text adopted, the word “condemn” is
retained. But instead of condemning the “act”, the Council reaffirms “its policy
to condemn the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight without prejudice
29 Id. at 173.
30 Id. at 181. See also ICAO Council Working Paper C-WP/8821 “Draft Resolution”, presented
by Australia, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, Switzer-
land and the United Kingdom, 16 March 1989.
31 Id. at 180.
32 Id. at 181.
33 Id. at 182.
34 Id. at 182.
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to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations”.35 Sochor, a former
officer of ICAO, pointed out that “the ICAO response was surprisingly mild”,
in view of the “magnitude” of the blunder of the United States.36 Augustin,
another ICAO officer, while agreeing with the point that one incident might
differ from another, was also of the view that the United States’ explanation
of the Iran Air incident “bears many similarities” to the arguments advanced
by Israel in the Libyan airliner incident:
Both Israel and the United States expressed their sorrow over the incident in which
they were respectively involved, described it as an unfortunate error, promised
ex gratia compensation, urged the Council to focus on taking measures to avoid
a repetition of similar tragedies in the future, and facilitated the ICAO investigation.
Both States described what they considered to be mitigating circumstances.
Yet, as Augustin observes, “the two responsible parties were treated differently
by ICAO.”37
ICAO is obviously linked to international politics. The claim that ICAO should
only focus on technical issues is at best wishful thinking. A glance at the
records of the deliberations within ICAO on the issue of the use of weapons
against civil aircraft in flight will convince one that the parties therein engage
in political negotiation more than the settlement of legal disputes. Very often,
the division of views corresponds to the line of political blocs. To illustrate,
“some of the States which favoured condemnation of Israel before the investi-
gation was completed, in later incidents argued strongly that no decision
should be taken before an investigation was finalized.”38 There is no magic
formula to depoliticize ICAO; but promotion of the rule of law with an appro-
priate system of checks and balances would perhaps reduce legally unsustain-
able political considerations.
While the wheels of justice sometimes move slowly, there are still reasons
to be optimistic since the rule prohibiting the use of weapons against civil
aircraft in flight has survived conflicting political considerations. On numerous
occasions, States condemned the shooting down of civil aircraft as “heinous”,39
“barbaric”40 “atrocious”,41 “uncivil”42 and “inexcusable”43 acts, “a blatant
35 Id. at 186.
36 Sochor, E., The Politics of International Aviation (Hamphire: Macmillan, 1991) at 141.
37 Augustin, supra note 1 at 154.
38 Augustin, id. at 155.
39 Egypt, in ICAO Doc 9061, A19-Res., Min., Assembly – Nineteenth Session (Extraordinary),
Resolutions and Minutes at 31. United States, in ICAO Doc 9681-C/1119, C-Min. 148/1-21
Council – 148th Session, Summary Minutes with Subject Index (1996) at 160-161.
40 Soviet Union, in ICAO Doc 9541-C/1106, C-Min. Extraordinary (1988)/1 and 2: Council
– Extraordinary Session (Montreal, 13 and 14 July 1988), Minutes at 26-27
41 Iran, id. at 3-4.
42 Sierra Leone, in ICAO Doc 9415, A24-Min. P/1-15, Assembly – 24th Session, Plenary Meetings,
Minutes (1983) at 43.
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disregard for the principles of international law”,44 which could not be justi-
fied “under any circumstances”45 and “could only be deeply deplored by
reasonable people everywhere.”46 The rule, reflecting a fundamental right
to life, has been irreversibly and deeply embedded into the conscience of the
international community.
3.1.3 Freedom of Action in Times of War or National Emergency
While it may be claimed that in times of peace Article 3 bis contemplates the
“absolute” ban on the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight,47 the
situation is not as clear in times of war or national emergency. Article 3 bis
was adopted in the form of a protocol which is subject to a separate ratification
process from the Chicago Convention. It could have been drafted as a treaty
independent from the Chicago Convention, but its architects chose to incor-
porate it into the body of the latter. As a result, its application is subject to
other provisions in the Chicago Convention, in particular Article 89, which
reads:
In case of war, the provisions of this Convention shall not affect the freedom of
action of any of the contracting States affected, whether as belligerents or as
neutrals. The same principles shall apply in the case of any contracting State which
declares a state of national emergency and notifies the fact to the Council.
It may be argued, therefore, in case of war or national emergency, any member
State of ICAO may choose not to be bound by any provision of the Convention,
including Article 3 bis. This does not mean, however, that States are not bound
by customary international law independent of Article 3 bis. Moreover, they
are also bound by the law of war or international humanitarian law.
The practices of States in the forum of ICAO do not provide a clear indica-
tion of the criteria to determine what would constitute war or national
emergency. On the occasion of the adherence of Israel to the Chicago Conven-
tion, Egypt wrote a letter to ICAO advising that “in view of the considerations
of fact and of law which still affect Egypt’s special position with regard to
Israel, and in pursuance of Article 89 of the above Convention,” Israeli aircraft
43 Ghana, in ICAO Doc 9061, supra note 39 at 39. The Republic of Korea, in ICAO Doc 9415,
id. at 40.
44 Papua New Guinea, in ICAO Doc 9415, supra note 42 at 32.
45 Nigeria, in ICAO Doc 9676-C/1118, C-Min. 147/1-16: Council – 147th Session, Summary
Minutes with Subject Index (1996) at 79. Germany, in ICAO Doc 9416-C/1077, C-Min. Extra-
ordinary (1983)/1-4: Council – Extraordinary Session (Montreal, 15 and 16 September 1985)
Minutes at 16-17.
46 Canada, ICAO Doc 9061, supra note 39 at 57.
47 Richard, supra note 21.
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may not claim the privilege of flying over Egyptian territory. When the ICAO
Council decided that the letter “should not be accepted as a notification of
a state of national emergency under Article 89”, Egypt replied on 6 December
1950 that its letter did not refer to national emergency but to “the state of war
existing since 14 May 1948, the date of outbreak of hostilities in Palestine”.48
On 28 November 1962, due to its conflicts with China, India informed ICAO
that “a state of grave emergency existed and the Government of India may
not find it possible to comply with any or all provisions of the Convention.”49
In December 1971, both India and Pakistan notified ICAO of the existence
of a grave emergency due to hostilities having broken out between the two
countries which might result in the two countries not finding it possible to
comply with any or all provisions of the Chicago Convention.50 There were
also other instances in which Honduras and Iraq, respectively, informed ICAO
of the state of emergency in their respective countries.51
In these instances, except the initial reaction to Egypt, ICAO acted more
or less as a mail distributor forwarding the relevant communications to its
member States without passing its judgement on the merits. It also appears
that there was no clear distinction between the situation of war and national
emergency. The reports of States, whatever they said, were taken at face value.
In some cases, a situation which might be considered as war was not so
reported, but reported as an emergency.
In other cases subsequently considered by ICAO, the criteria were not made
clearer. When an Airbus A300 (IR 655) of Iranian Air was shot down by the
U.S.S. Vincennes on 3 July 1988, the Representative of the United States on
the Council of ICAO mentioned that the incident had taken place in the context
of the war between Iran and Iraq, but did not invoke Article 89 of the Chicago
Convention to claim that the freedom of action of his country is not affected
by the provisions of the Convention.52 The debates in the Council on this
matter also frequently confirmed the applicability of the Chicago Convention,
notwithstanding Article 89.53 The Council directed the Secretary General to
institute an immediate fact-finding investigation of the incident, thereby
affirming the competence of ICAO even in the situation of war.
Similarly, when the Council considered the request of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo in March 1999 to condemn the act of shooting down
a civil aircraft of Congo Airlines, it was clear in the context of the case that
48 ICAO Doc 8900/2, Repertory – Guide to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 2nd ed.
1977. Article 89 at 1 and 2.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 3.
51 Id.
52 ICAO Doc 9541-C/1106, supra note 40 at 9 and 10.
53 For example, Czechoslovakia condemned the action of the U.S. as a “gross violation” of
the Chicago Convention. Id. at 15; Mexico stated that unconditional compliance with the
postulates in the Chicago Convention and its Annexes must be guaranteed. Id. at 22-23.
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the country was in the situation of armed conflict. The Representative of the
United States specifically raised the question how Article 89 of the Chicago
Convention applied to this situation. In his reply, the President of the Council
indicated that the Council had not received any notification as required in
accordance with the last sentence of that article.54 The issue relating to Article
89 was therefore not addressed. It should be noted, however, that the require-
ment of notification in the last sentence of Article 89 only applies to the situ-
ation of national emergency. In case of war, Article 89 does not require any
notification. This is the plain meaning of the provision. From the facts pres-
ented before the Council, one could not readily conclude whether the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo was in a situation of war or national emergency.
Accordingly, it appeared premature to indicate that a notification was required.
From the above, it appears that ICAO and its member States have not
provided a clear precedent concerning the exact mode of application of Article
89. Several factors may account for this. Article 89 allows but does not obligate
States to retain freedom of action. In other words, States may decide to con-
tinue to apply some or all provisions of the Chicago Convention in the situ-
ation contemplated in Article 89, and they in fact have done so in practice.
Moreover, from the instances cited above, a State may, for example, invoke
Article 89 to close its airspace and prohibit all flights for a limited period of
time in the state of emergency;55 but there has been no single precedent in
the history of ICAO where a member State invoked Article 89 to justify its act
of shooting down a civil aircraft. In view of the declaratory nature of Article 3
bis, paragraph a), even if States have expressly invoked Article 89, it is serious-
ly questionable whether their freedom of action could be exercised to such
extent as allowing them to shoot down civil aircraft unconditionally.56 From
this point of view, one may tentatively trace the sign of “opinio juris” from
the subsequent practice of States that Article 89 could not exclude the applica-
tion of Article 3 bis, paragraph a) as a customary rule, although it may exclude
the application of some other provisions of the Chicago Convention. Finally,
the understanding of the concept of war today might be different from what
was understood when the Chicago Convention was drafted against the back-
ground of the Second World War. The global scale of that war rendered many
international organizations, including the League of Nations, virtually
54 ICAO Doc 9738, supra note 5 at 111.
55 For example, in the case of 11 September 2001, the Federal Aviation Administration of the
United States issued an order to close completely the airspace of the United States to any
civil aircraft, in view of the state of emergency. This action, which would have been
incompatible with certain provisions of the Chicago Convention, such as Article 5 concerning
the right of non-scheduled flights into the territory of contracting States, is justifiable under
Article 89.
56 During the debates concerning the shooting down of civil aircraft, many delegations stated
that the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight could not be justified “under any
circumstances”. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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dysfunctional. In the contemporary world, wars are generally limited to certain
geographical areas and do not directly affect civil aviation activities elsewhere.
Historically, more often than not, even the “belligerent” States came to ICAO
to debate their disputes, and therefore implicitly acknowledged that the
Chicago Convention continued to apply, at least those provisions concerning
the functions of ICAO. The effect of Article 89 is thus limited, and its provisions
should not be invoked to exclude the application of Article 3 bis, paragraph a),
although it would have been clearer had the drafters of Article 3 bis inserted
a clause of “notwithstanding Article 89” in the text.
3.1.4 Revisiting Article 3 bis in the Context of 11 September 2001
The events of 11 September 2001 presented a serious and difficult question:
in a similar situation, can a subjacent State use weapons to shoot down a civil
aircraft which is presenting imminent danger and will cause devastating
catastrophe? As mentioned above, the ban on the use of weapons against civil
aircraft in flight under Article 3 bis is considered as having absolute character,
subject only to the exception that it shall not be interpreted as modifying in
any way the rights and obligations of States set forth in the Charter of the
United Nations. Another possible built-in exception under the Chicago Conven-
tion is Article 89 which allows States not to comply with the provisions of
the Convention in case of war or national emergency. Based on the scenario
of 11 September 2001, the issue can be divided into four sub-issues:
1 Will attacks similar to those conducted on 11 September give rise to the
right of self-defence?
2 When a civil aircraft is misused as a weapon of destruction, will it become
a non-civil aircraft?
3 Can Article 89 be invoked under these circumstances by the relevant State
to justify its non-compliance with Article 3 bis?
4 Can Article 3 bis, paragraph a) be considered as inapplicable to the relation-
ship between the aircraft in question and the State of its registry?
An affirmative answer to any of the four questions may provide grounds for
the use of weapons against the perpetrators misusing civil aircraft in the
scenario of 11 September.
With respect to the right of self-defence, there was a proposal during the
negotiation process of Article 3 bis to include in the text a direct reference to
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which provides that nothing in the
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence
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if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations.57 Views
were expressed, however, that such reference is not justified because Article 51
is not applicable in this context.58 Finally the deliberations settled for the
general reference to the rights and obligations under the Charter. The dis-
cussion was clear that this reference was related to the right of self-defence.59
Even so, commentators were of the unanimous view that reference to the UN
Charter seems superfluous or even misconceived.60 Firstly, the right of self-
defence is inherent irrespective of its reference or non-reference in Article 3
bis, or even in the UN Charter itself. Secondly, self-defence could only be
exercised when there is an armed attack. If an aircraft is used for an armed
attack, it may no longer be considered as a civil aircraft and therefore is out
of the scope of Article 3 bis.
The concept of “armed attack” is therefore crucial in determining whether
the right of self-defence exists under the scenario of 11 September. According
to ICAO Assembly Resolution A33-1: Declaration on misuse of civil aircraft as
weapons of destruction and other terrorist acts involving civil aviation, adopted in
October 2001, the terrorist acts on 11 September “are not only contrary to
elementary considerations of humanity but constitute also use of civil aircraft
for an armed attack on civilized society and are incompatible with international
law”.61 While the term “armed attack” is used, it is submitted that the term
is not used strictly within the meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter. The
International Court of Justice, as the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations, has interpreted the term in a number of cases. In the Nicaragua case,
the Court states:
…an armed attack must be understood as including not merely action by regular
armed forces across an international border, but also “the sending by or on behalf
of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts
of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to” (inter alia)
an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, “or its substantial involvement
therein”.62
57 ICAO Doc 9438, A25-EX, Assembly 25th Session (Extraordinary), Executive Committee, Report,
Minutes and Documents (1984) at 94 and 164. See also Augustin, supra note 1 at 194.
58 Id., the statements of delegations, for example, France at 8, Syria at 52, the United States
at 44, the USSR at 15.
59 Augustin, supra note 1 at 194 and 213.
60 Augustin, id. at 194. Cheng, B., “The Destruction of KAL Flight KE 007, and Article 3 bis
of the Chicago Convention”, in van’s Gravensande, J.W.E. S., and van der Veen Vonk, A.,
ed., Air Worthy – Liber Amicorum Honouring Professor Dr. I.H.PH. Diederiks-Verschoor (Deven-
ter: Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1985) 47 at 70. Hailbronner, “Topical Problems of Inter-
national Aviation Law” (1973) 8 Law and State 96 at 102.
61 ICAO Doc 9848, supra note 25 at VII-1.
62 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), Merits, Judgment [1986] ICJ Reports 14 at para. 195.
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In its advisory opinion in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Court affirms this position:
Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the existence of an inherent right of
self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against another State.63
While the concept in customary law may undergo dynamic changes,64 it may
be concluded that according to lex lata, an “armed attack” within the meaning
of Article 51 of the UN Charter does not cover non-State actors. Unless it could
be established that the attacks on 11 September were acts of or on behalf of
a State, they could not be considered as armed attacks which give rise to the
right of self-defence. The sole exception provided by Article 3 bis is not applic-
able.
Based on the conclusion that an armed attack must be an act of a State,
one may further argue that when a civil aircraft is misused by non-State actors
as a weapon of destruction, such an act is not the act of a State and does not
turn the aircraft into a state aircraft. As it remains a civil aircraft, the ban on
the use of weapons against civil aircraft under Article 3 bis continues to apply.
In fact, during the negotiation of Article 3 bis, Peru had pointed out that some
civil aircraft were used to carry out certain activities “incompatible” with the
Chicago Convention, “such as the spraying of areas with bacteriological
contaminants, the transport of drugs, contraband, gun running, the illegal
transport of persons …” It requested the ICAO Assembly to go more deeply
into this matter and to answer the question of what the government of a State
should do with these aircraft.65 This concern was not adequately addressed
in the final text of Article 3 bis. Accordingly, shortly after the adoption of
Article 3 bis, Cheng acutely observed that the new amendment may lead to
a strange situation that if a helicopter were to be used by criminals to rescue
a convict from a prison, the law enforcement officers may use weapons against
the helicopter while it is on the ground but could not do so when it is deemed
63 Advisory Opinion, [2004] ICJ Reports 136 para. 139.
64 See, the separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans: Resolutions 1368 and 1373 recognize the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence without making any reference to an
armed attack by a State. The Security Council called acts of international terrorism, without
any further qualification, a threat to international peace and security which authorizes it
to act under Chapter VII of the Charter. And it actually did so in resolution 1373 without
ascribing these acts of terrorism to a particular State. This is the completely new element
in these resolutions. This new element is not excluded by the terms of Article 51 since this
conditions the exercise of the inherent right of self-defence on a previous armed attack
without saying that this armed attack must come from another State even if this has been
the generally accepted interpretation for more than 50 years. The Court has regrettably
by-passed this new element, the legal implications of which cannot as yet be assessed but
which marks undeniably a new approach to the concept of self-defence. Id. at para. 35.
65 ICAO Doc 9438, supra note 57 at 84 to 85.
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to be “in flight”.66 If Article 3 bis does not allow the use of weapons against
aircraft engaged in jail breaking and drug trafficking, it may present similar
implications for the use of weapons against the aircraft used to commit suicide
attacks.
As for the possibility to invoke Article 89, it has been discussed previously
that due to the effect of customary international law, even if a State declares
that the provisions of the Chicago Convention do not apply in times of war
or national emergency, it does not mean that it automatically has the right
to shoot down a civil aircraft. While customary international law permits a
State to resort to the use of weapons against civil aircraft on the basis of
necessity and proportionality, it is questionable whether the elementary con-
siderations of humanity would allow a State to shoot down a commercial
airliner and deliberately end innocent lives on board.
With respect to the question whether Article 3 bis is applicable to the
relationship between an aircraft and the State of its registry or its operator,
answers among commentators differ. Article 3 bis refers to “civil aircraft in
flight”, without distinguishing their nationalities or the States of operators.
This provision was developed from the Austro-French draft, which used the
term “to refrain from resorting to the use of force against aircraft of the other
contracting State”.67 It was said that the words “of the other contracting State”
were deleted because “the protection is to be extended not only to aircraft of
other State parties to Article 3 bis or members of ICAO but to aircraft of all
States”.68 However, the deletion has created confusion. As Cheng points out:
…one unexpected result of this deletion is that Article 3 bis is now applicable not
only to all foreign registered aircraft, but also to aircraft of a State’s own registra-
tion. Such a provision, one which involves no foreign or international element,
is most unusual in international agreements even nowadays. It has been suggested
that this very unusualness would preclude the article from being interpreted as
being applicable also to national aircraft. Such an interpretation is not tenable in
view of the very explicit wording of the provision.69
Milde, on the other hand, believed that the protection “is reserved to ‘foreign’
aircraft and does not include aircraft of the State’s own registration”. Being
one of the participants in the deliberations and drafting of the provision, he
noted that the Assembly did not contemplate regulation of the status of an
aircraft in relation to the State of its own registration, since “such regulation
would have exceeded the scope of the Convention which deals with inter-
national civil aviation.”70 The purpose of the Convention is “to establish
66 Cheng, supra note 60 at 66.
67 Draft proposed by Austria and France, in ICAO Doc 9438, supra note 57 at 164.
68 Augustin, supra note 1 at 188.
69 Cheng, supra note 60 at 63.
70 Milde, M., supra note 13 at 126.
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conventional rules of conduct in the mutual relations of sovereign States but
not to govern matters of their exclusive domestic jurisdiction.”
While Milde’s argument is jurisprudentially sound and convincing, one
may recall the several instances in which the ICAO Council decided to apply
the provisions of ICAO Annexes to domestic operations.71 Moreover, in the
absence of the definition of international civil aviation, it is not easy to deter-
mine whether a particular aircraft has an international element or not. In
today’s environment, it may not be realistic to claim that Article 3 bis, para-
graph a) is inapplicable to the relationship between an aircraft and its State
of registry. To give a hypothetical example, an Australian airline, Qantas, may
lease an aircraft registered in Brazil and use it for commercial air services
between the two countries. In that case, can Brazil shoot down that aircraft
by contending that Article 3 bis, paragraph a) does not apply to its relationship
with the aircraft on its registry? In a reversed case, when the aircraft is used
by Qantas for domestic air services within Australia, should the latter apply
Article 3 bis to such flights because a “foreign” aircraft is involved? Obviously,
the concept of the State of the operator needs to be taken into account. There
is no doubt that the drafters of Article 3 bis were aware of this concept, since
they explicitly referred to it in paragraphs c) and d). They certainly could have
provided a better drafting for paragraph a) to avoid the confusion mentioned
above, bearing in mind that their entire exercise was supposed to provide
written law which could “remove the uncertainties” of the customary law and
give “precision to abstract general principles, the practical application of which
have not previously been settled.”72
On the assumption that Article 3 bis does not apply to the relationship
between the aircraft in question and its State of registry or the State of its
operator, one still needs to examine whether the domestic law of the relevant
State would permit the use of weapons by such a State against civil aircraft
in flight in its territory. After 11 September 2001, Germany adopted in January
2005 Section 14.3 of the Aviation Security Act (Luftsicherheitsgesetz – LuftSiG),
which authorizes the armed forces to shoot down aircraft that are intended
to be used as weapons in crimes against human lives.73 However, the Federal
Constitutional Court in its judgment of 15 February 2006 declared that the
legislation is incompatible with the Basic Law and hence void.
According to the press release, the Court distinguished between two cases:
in the first case, the use of weapons is aimed at a pilotless aircraft or
exclusively at persons who want to use the aircraft as a weapon in a crime
71 See supra Ch.2.2.5 “Scope of Application of Technical Regulations”.
72 Opening Address of the Acting President of the Extraordinary Assembly adopting Article 3
bis, citing the statement of the UN Secretary General. ICAO Doc 9437, A25-Res., P-Min.,
Assembly – 25th Session (Extraordinary), Plenary Meetings, Resolutions and Minutes (1984) at 20.
73 Press Release, No. 11/2006 of 15 February 2006, to be found in http://www.bundesver
fassungsgericht.de/bverfg_cgi/pressemitteilungen/bvg06-011en.html.
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against the lives of people on the ground; in the second case, the use of
weapons would kill all persons on board the aircraft, including passengers
and crew who are not participants in the crime. In the former case, the use
of weapons is justified since the principle of proportionality is complied with:
The objective to save human lives which is pursued by § 14.3 of the Aviation
Security Act is of such weight that it can justify the grave encroachment on the
perpetrators’ fundamental right to life. Moreover, the gravity of the encroachment
upon their fundamental rights is reduced by the fact that the perpetrators them-
selves brought about the necessity of State intervention and that they can avert
such intervention at any time by refraining from realizing their criminal plan.74
With respect to the latter case, the Court is vehemently clear that it is not
compatible with the right to life in conjunction with the guarantee of human
dignity. The passengers and crew members can no longer influence the circum-
stances of their lives independently from others in a self-determined manner:
Such a treatment ignores the status of the persons affected as subjects endowed
with dignity and inalienable rights. By their killing being used as a means to save
others, they are treated as objects and at the same time deprived of their rights;
with their lives being disposed of unilaterally by the State, the persons on board
the aircraft, who, as victims, are themselves in need of protection, are denied the
value which is due to a human being for his or her own sake.75
In the view of the Court, “it is absolutely inconceivable to intentionally kill
persons who are in such a helpless situation on the basis of a statutory author-
isation.” The assessment that the persons affected are doomed anyway “cannot
remove from the killing of innocent people in the situation described its nature
of an infringement of these people’s right to dignity. Human life and human
dignity enjoy the same constitutional protection regardless of the duration
of the physical existence of the individual human being.”76
While the decision of the Court only involves domestic law, its reasoning
will nevertheless influence the practice of international law by Germany, and
probably by other States.77 The right to life is universally recognized as a
fundamental human right and must be fully respected.
The judgement of the German Constitutional Court mentions the possibility
of the lawful use of weapons against a pilotless aircraft or exclusively persons
74 Id. para. 3.
75 Id. para. 2.
76 Id.
77 Cf., however, a similar decree in Switzerland: “Verordnung ueber die Wahrung der Luft-
hoheit” (decree concerning the maintenance of sovereignty over the airspace), which is
in force since 1 May 2005. This decree has not yet been subject to the constitutional review.
The author wishes to thank Mr. Maximilian Huttel for his assistance in translating certain
portions of the decree.
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who want to use the aircraft as a weapon in a crime against the lives of people
on the ground. Will such use be considered lawful under Article 3 bis?
Although the current text of Article 3 bis does not seem to provide an ideal
solution, there is no need to amend Article 3 bis or enlarge the concept of “self-
defence” solely for this purpose. Terrorists using civil aircraft as a weapon
of murder and destruction must be regarded as hostis humani generis, the
enemies of the entire human race. “They are scorners of the law of nations”
and therefore “find no protection in that law”,78 including Article 3 bis.
To conclude, international law does not justify the use of weapons against
a civil aircraft in flight if there are innocent passengers and crew members
on board, even in the situation where such an aircraft is misused by a gang
of criminals as a weapon of destruction, as witnessed on 11 September. In the
future, one could not rule out the possibility that when a similar event takes
place, the relevant State authorities might be forced to choose one of the two
evils at this critical juncture: either to destroy the aircraft in flight and deprive
the innocent passengers and crew of their lives in order to protect innocent
lives and vital interests on the ground, or to accept the untold catastrophe
on the ground. While the judgement call may be governed by the balance in
favour of the protection of more vital interest, it would be extremely difficult
to arrive at consensus beforehand regarding the appropriate legal solution
for this crisis.
3.2 COORDINATION OF POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS ACTIVITIES TO CIVIL AIR-
CRAFT
From time to time, States conduct certain activities such as missile firings,
rocket launches and satellite recovery in or over the high seas. Sometimes,
the activities are directly carried out underneath or very close to busy air lanes,
creating a potential hazard to civil aircraft and requiring the re-routing of
traffic or even temporary closing of vital airspace. Lack of coordination for
these activities with the relevant air traffic services authorities may have an
impact on aviation safety. In view of this, the ICAO Council introduced into
Annex 11 to the Chicago Convention certain provisions concerning coordi-
nation of these activities, which became effective on 4 March 1981. The current
Annex 11 contains the following standards in paragraph 2.17:
2.17.1 The arrangements for activities potentially hazardous to civil aircraft, whether
over the territory of a State or over the high seas, shall be coordinated with the
appropriate air traffic services authorities. The coordination shall be effected early
enough to permit timely promulgation of information regarding the activities in
accordance with the provisions of Annex 15.
78 See infra note 166 in Ch.4 and accompanying text.
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2.17.2 The objective of the coordination shall be to achieve the best arrangements
which will avoid hazards to civil aircraft and minimize interference with the normal
operations of such aircraft.
Since then, ICAO has consistently applied these standards when it is aware
of potentially hazardous activities. The purpose of the coordination is to
determine the site, time period and airspace reservations needed for the
activities and to enable the States providing air traffic services to carry out
their obligations of issuing Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs). The ICAO Secretariat
has also developed the Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military
Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Operations (Doc 9554) to provide
guidance for coordination. In many cases, coordination has been successfully
completed but there have been instances in which concern was expressed for
lack of coordination. For example, on 31 August 1998, an object propelled by
rockets was launched by a member State and a part of it hit the sea in the
Pacific Ocean off the coast of Sanriku in northeastern Japan. The impact area
of the object was in the vicinity of the international airway A590 which is
known as composing the NOPAC Composite Route System, a trunk route
connecting Asia and North America where there are approximately 180 flights
of various countries every day. The matter was debated in the ICAO Assembly,
which considered that the launching of such an object was done in a way “not
compatible with the fundamental principles, standards and recommended
practices” of the Chicago Convention. Accordingly, the Assembly adopted
Resolution A32-6 in September 1998, urging all member States to reaffirm that
air traffic safety is of paramount importance for the sound development of
international civil aviation and to strictly comply with the provisions of the
Chicago Convention, its Annexes and its related procedures, in order to
prevent a recurrence of such potentially hazardous activities.79
Despite this resolution, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)
carried out multiple launches of ballistic missiles on 5 July 2006, which were
condemned by the UN Security Council in Resolution 1695. The President of
the ICAO Council wrote a letter on 6 July 2006 to the Director General of the
General Administration of Civil Aviation of DPRK, pointing out that the initial
investigation indicated that the missiles had crossed several international air
routes over the high seas. Furthermore, when extrapolating the projected paths
of some of the missiles, it appeared that they could have interfered with many
more air routes both over Japan and in the airspace of the North Pacific Ocean.
The President referred to Assembly Resolution A32-6 and the provisions of
Annex 11 mentioned above, and asked the Director General to provide infor-
mation “concerning your adherence to the requirements of Annex 11 related
79 ICAO Doc 9848, supra note 25 at I-30.
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to the need to coordinate, with those States affected, the missile firings which
are clearly hazardous to civil aviation.”80
The Director General of the General Administration of Civil Aviation of
DPRK replied on 8 July 2006, attaching a statement of a spokesman for the DPRK
Foreign Ministry. The statement mentioned that the launches were part of the
routine military exercises staged by the Korean People’s Army to increase the
nation’s military capacity for self-defence. The Army “will go on with missile
launch exercises as part of its efforts to bolster deterrent for self-defence in
the future”. Regarding the prior notice of the launches, the statement reads:
It would be quite foolish to notify Washington and Tokyo of the missile launches
in advance, given that the U.S., which is technically at war with the DPRK, has
threatened it since a month ago that it would intercept the latter’s missile in
collusion with Japan.
We would like to ask the U.S. and Japan if they had ever notified the DPRK of their
ceaseless missile launches in the areas close to it.81
The President of ICAO Council stated that the reply from DPRK “neither
addresses my concerns, nor provides any assurances that measures would
be taken to protect civil aviation from such acts in the future.” He wrote
another letter to the Director General on 11 July 2006, which contains the
following passages:
Attached to your letter was a statement made by a spokesman for the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs … You state that the statement reflects the details concerning
the missile launches; however, in my letter of 6 July 2006, I referred to the require-
ments of ICAO Annex 11 – Air Traffic Services, concerning the need for coordination
of activities potentially hazardous to civil aircraft, and I asked specifically for
information concerning your adherence to those requirements.
May I therefore, take this opportunity, once again, to remind you of the obligations
of your State in respect of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Doc 7300)
and its Annexes and request that you provide me with information on any measures
taken, or that will be taken, to protect civil aviation from any activities which may
be hazardous to civil aviation, in accordance with the above requirements.82
80 The letter of the President of the Council was circulated in ICAO under the cover of the
Memorandum of the President of the Council to the Representatives of the Council, PRES
AK/1241, 6 July 2006.
81 The letter of the Director General and its attachment are reproduced in the Memorandum
of the President of the Council to the Representatives of the Council, PRES AK/1246, 19
July 2006.
82 PRES AK/1246, id. No further reply from the DPRK is found in the ICAO records.
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The missile launches by the DPRK involved complicated issues, some of which
were beyond the scope of civil aviation. The approach of ICAO on this matter
was clearly focusing on the safety of civil aircraft, leaving the issues of peace
and security, such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to the UN Security
Council and other related bodies. From this example, it is clear that civil
aviation is not in vacuum. Issues of peace and security may have an impact
upon it. The main focus of ICAO, however, was to ensure the adherence to the
requirements of the Chicago Convention and its Annexes concerning the
coordination of potentially hazardous activities, without commenting on the
legality or propriety of the activities themselves.
The provisions relating to coordination are contained in Annex 11. They
are standards but not treaty provisions of the Chicago Convention per se. The
DPRK does not file any difference to these standards and therefore is bound
by them. Would the situation be the same had they filed differences? The
Convention does not prohibit a member State from filing a difference. Never-
theless, could it be argued that certain standards, due to their special nature,
are not susceptible to the filing of differences? In this instance, notification
and coordination of potentially hazardous activities over one or more inter-
national trunk routes are essential to the safe operation of civil aircraft. If one
or more States could render the relevant standards inapplicable by filing
differences, the entire system of coordination would collapse and the purpose
of the standards would be completely defeated. Accordingly, as pointed out
before, while certain standards are only put in the Annexes, they actually have
more weight than annex provisions and have acquired a binding effect erga
omnes.83
To put the matter in a broader perspective, one may recall that in the Corfu
Channel case, it was established that a State is under obligations to notify, for
the benefit of shipping in general, the existence of a minefield in its territorial
water and to warn approaching ships of imminent danger to which the mine-
field exposes them.84 Based on this reasoning, it is submitted that the duties
of notification and warning apply a fortiori over the high seas, an area which
is not subject to the sovereignty of any State but open for common use of all
nations. It would be inconceivable if a State was allowed to do something over
the high seas which it could not do in its own territorial waters. While a State
enjoys certain freedoms over the high seas, Article 87, paragraph 2 of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides that these freedoms
shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States
in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas. From this perspective, it may
be argued that the duty to notify potentially hazardous activities exists ir-
respective of the provisions of Annex 11.
83 See supra note 144 and accompanying text in Ch.2.
84 See supra note 11.
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The DPRK did not invoke Article 89 of the Chicago Convention but men-
tioned that it was technically at war with the United States. This again may
give rise to the issue concerning the effect of Article 89. In the Corfu Channel
case, the ICJ refers to “elementary considerations of humanity, even more
exacting in peace than in war”. This will leave ample room to claim that even
in times of war the duty to notify potentially hazardous activities cannot be
totally dispensed with.
Another more general issue to be considered from this instance relates to
the effect of ICAO Assembly resolutions. The letters of the President of the
Council are part of the action taken to implement the relevant resolution. In
the event that the resolution and its reminder go unheeded or produce little
effect, what further course of action can be taken by ICAO? If ICAO is to fulfil
its safety mandate effectively, it should more vigorously police the compliance
and implementation of the provisions of the Chicago Convention and its
Annexes.85
3.3 GENERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN CIVIL AND MILITARY AVIATION
The issue relating to the missile launches may be acute but it is only the tip
of the iceberg of the work on the relations between civil and military aviation.
Airspace is a resource which is becoming increasingly limited as civil and
military aviation activities continue to increase. Coordination between them
is essential for aviation safety. According to the ICAO Secretariat’s report, the
tragic destruction of an Airbus A300 of Iran Air with the loss of 290 lives was
partly attributable to “the absence of adequate co-ordination by certain military
units operating in the Gulf area with the civil units responsible for provision
of the air traffic services in the airspace concerned”.86 Accordingly, civil/
military coordination for the purpose of air traffic management is a part of
daily aviation activities for many countries. Surprisingly, in this respect, legal
literature in academic circles is extremely scarce, probably due to the political
sensitivity and technical complexity of the matter.87
85 For more discussions of the implementation function of ICAO, see Ch.5.
86 ICAO Doc 9743 – C/1128, Council, 123rd-124th-125th Session, 1988 (published in 1999), C-Min.
125/12 at 202.
87 As one of the few exceptions, see Schubert, F., “The Role of Civil/Military Coordination
in Respect of ANS Performance”, presentation at the International Conference on Contem-
porary Issues, New Delhi, India, 21-25 April 2008. See also Shawcross and Beaumont, supra
note 14 in Ch.1 at VI [6] and non-legal publications cited therein. Certain material is
available in the official websites of ICAO and EUROCONTROL. See, for example, http://
www.eurocontrol.int/airspace/public/standard_page/1410_Civil_Military_Coordination.
html. See also, ICAO Asia and Pacific Office, Summary Report of the Civil/Military Coor-
dination Seminar, Bangkok, Thailand, 14-17 December 2004, http://www.icao.int/icao/en/
ro/apac/2004/Civil_Military_Coord/CivilMilitaryFinalRpt.pdf.
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In Europe, civil/military coordination is conducted not only at the national
level, but also at the regional or Community level. One of the missions of
EUROCONTROL is “to strengthen the cooperation between its Member States
with the aim of efficiently organising and safely managing the airspace for
both civil and military users”.88 At the highest institutional level, its General
Assembly is composed of the Ministers of Transport and the Ministers of
National Defence. The Civil/Military Interface Standing Committee, composed
of civil and military representatives at senior executive level from all the
EUROCONTROL Member States, provides advice to the EUROCONTROL Council,
which supervises the Agency’s work.89 Since 1996, the issue of civil/military
coordination has been discussed in conjunction with the implementation of
the flexible use of airspace (FUA) concept. With the application of the concept,
airspace should no longer be designated as either purely civil or military, but
rather considered as one continuum and allocated according to users’ require-
ments. The FUA concept provides Air Traffic Management (ATM) with the
potential to increase the capacity of the air traffic system. It allows the maxi-
mum joint use of airspace through appropriate civil/military coordination.
Its application also ensures, through the daily allocation of flexible airspace
structures, that any necessary segregation of airspace is temporary, based on
real usage within a specified time period.90 This concept, when implemented,
will alleviate the congestion of the skies over Europe and promote safety. On
23 December 2005, the European Commission adopted Regulation (EC) No 2150/
2005 laying down common rules for the flexible use of airspace,91 which sets out
a number of principles to govern the implementation of the FUA concept. One
of the principles in Article 3 provides that
[C]oordination between civil and military authorities shall be organized at the
strategic, pre-tactical and tactical levels of airspace management through the
establishment of agreements and procedures in order to increase safety and airspace
capacity, and to improve the efficiency and flexibility of aircraft operations.92
88 EUROCONTROL website, id.
89 Id.
90 http://www.eurocontrol.int/airspace/public/standard_page/1488_FUA_Reference_Material.
html. Date of access: 6 October 2008. See also, Report, Status of Civil-Military Co-ordination
in Air Traffic Management, Phase 1, Fact-finding, Joint study PRU-Agency, EURO-
CONTROL, October 2001.
91 OJ L 342 342/20, 24 December 2005 at 20-25.
92 Id. The first level (Strategic Airspace Management) relates to the high level definition of
the national airspace policy and the establishment of airspace structures; the second level
(Pre-tactical Airspace Management) relates to day-to-day allocation of airspace according
to user requirements; the third level (Tactical Airspace Management) consists of the activa-
tion, de-activation or real-time reallocation of the airspace allocated at Level 2, and the
resolution of specific airspace problems and/or individual traffic situations between civil
and military traffic flights. See, Report, supra note 90 at 14-16.
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Article 6 of the regulation further lays down obligations in the context of the
tactical level, which relate to establishment of civil-military coordination
procedures and supporting systems to facilitate the exchange of airspace data,
their modification, and the direct communication between the civil and military
air traffic service units for resolving specific traffic situations. From the point
of view of international civil aviation, it is interesting to observe that Article
6, paragraph 5 requires that in the case of cross-border activities, a common
set of procedures for management of specific traffic situations and for real-time
airspace management be agreed among the relevant civil and military author-
ities.
The European regulation, which is innovative, proactive and future-
oriented, may serve as a useful point of reference for ICAO. The global situation
is not, however, comparable to that of the Europe. The member States of ICAO
as a whole do not have the same political, economic and social affinity as the
European States do, but at least the principle of coordination should be
affirmed. The main difference between the European regulation and the current
provisions of ICAO is that civil/military coordination is mandatory in the
former but recommendatory in the latter. Certain ICAO regulatory material
deals with coordination in limited aspects, such as the coordination of poten-
tially hazardous activities93 and coordination relating to strayed or intercepted
aircraft,94 but there is no specific provision imposing a general obligation
for coordination, particularly concerning airspace organization and manage-
ment. The ICAO Assembly resolves in Resolution A36-13 that the common use
by civil and military aviation of airspace “shall be arranged so as to ensure
the safety, regularity and efficiency of international air traffic”, and that the
member States “shall ensure” that the operations of their state aircraft over
the high seas “do not compromise the safety …”, but it is short of saying that
civil/military coordination “shall be organized”. The same resolution further
provides that “Contracting States should as necessary initiate or improve the
coordination between their civil and military air traffic services …”95 Clearly,
in addition to the weaker term “should”, the words “as necessary” further
weaken the need to initiate or improve the coordination. This is hardly in line
with the observations at the Asia/Pacific regional seminar on civil/military
coordination, in which the participants “urged States not to be complacent
in regard to existing national provisions relating to civil/military
coordination”.96
93 See supra 3.2.
94 See, for example, paragraphs 2.23.1 and 2.23.2, Annex 11.
95 A36-13: Consolidated Statement of continuing ICAO policies and associated practices related
specifically to air navigation, ICAO Doc 9902, Assembly Resolutions in Force (as of 28
September 2007) at II-17, Appendix O.
96 Summary Report, supra note 87.
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The root cause of the hesitancy of ICAO on this matter may be traced back
to the earlier controversy and uncertainty concerning the competence of ICAO
in dealing with state aircraft. The Chicago Convention deals with “civil”
aviation, and its Article 3 provides that it “shall not be applicable to state
aircraft” including aircraft used in military services. In 1983, Canada presented
a proposal for a convention on the interception of civil aircraft, which may
have contained provisions applicable to aircraft used for military services,97
but the Special Legal Sub-Committee established for this purpose “unanimously
came to the conclusion that the question of drafting an instrument on the
interception of civil aircraft can best be considered only after the entry into
force of Article 3 bis …” As of October 2008, Article 3 bis has been in force
for a decade, but no further action on the convention relating to the inter-
ception of civil aircraft has been taken by ICAO. Regulatory material relating
to interception is mainly embodied in Annex 2 – Rules of the Air. The key
provision is paragraph 3.8.1 which reads as follows:
Interception of civil aircraft shall be governed by appropriate regulations and
administrative directives issued by Contracting States in compliance with the
Convention on International Civil Aviation, and in particular Article 3(d) under
which Contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft,
to have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft. Accordingly, in
drafting appropriate regulations and administrative directives due regard shall
be had to the provisions of Appendix 1, Section 2 and Appendix 2, Section 1.98
When this paragraph was tabled in the Council in 1985, the Representative
of the United States was opposed to its adoption because it would “clearly
violate the Chicago Convention by going beyond the legal parameters which
it provided”. In his view, since Article 3 of the Chicago Convention clearly
provides that the Convention shall not be applicable to state aircraft, the
adoption by the Council of this paragraph as a Standard “would be ultra vires,
i.e. beyond the legal authority of ICAO and therefore of no legal effect.”99
Probably because of this position, the United States did not file any difference
97 ICAO Doc 9415, A24-Min. P/1-15: Assembly – 24th Session, Plenary Meetings, Minutes at
7-10. For further details, see Augustin supra note 1 at 227 et seq.
98 Appendix 1, Section 2 deals with signals used during the interception, whereas Appendix
2, Section 1 lists the principles to be observed in the interception, which, for example,
include the following: a) interception of civil aircraft will be undertaken only as a last resort;
b) if undertaken, an interception will be limited to determining the identity of the aircraft,
unless it is necessary to return the aircraft to its planned track, direct it beyond the bound-
aries of national airspace, guide it away from a prohibited, restricted or danger area or
instruct it to effect a landing at a designated aerodrome.
99 ICAO Doc 9479-C/1091, C-Min. 116/1-31: Council – 116th Session, Minutes with Summary
Index (1985) at 32-33. This view was shared by a number of States, including the Soviet
Union. For further details, see Augustin, supra note 1 at 240 et seq.
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to paragraph 3.8.1 when it was adopted as a Standard by the majority of the
Council.
This debate presents two interesting issues. Firstly, if the Council is alleged
to be ultra vires in adopting a Standard, who will be the judge that decides
this issue? The Council could not be its own judge. The Assembly, by virtue
of Article 49 k) of the Chicago Convention, can deal with matters “not specific-
ally assigned to the Council”. Since the adoption of Standards is a mandatory
function assigned to the Council by Article 54 l) of the Convention, the matter
is not within the competence of the Assembly. The only practical alternative
is to have a body for judicial or quasi-judicial review, which will be discussed
in Chapter 5.
Secondly, what is the scope of ICAO’s competence in dealing with civil and
military interface in aviation? The argument that ICAO could not deal with
state aircraft seems to be outdated in view of the fact that Article 3 bis of the
Chicago Convention was adopted under the auspices of ICAO and has become
an enforceable treaty provision for 138 States. It would lead to “a result which
is manifestly absurd or unreasonable”100 if one were to conclude that Article 3
bis is not applicable to state aircraft. While the use of weapons against civil
aircraft in flight was often, but not necessarily resorted to by state aircraft,
the act of interception, as specifically addressed by Article 3 bis, would most
likely be carried out by state aircraft. Therefore, it may be argued that the
Chicago Convention, as amended by Article 3 bis, does apply to state aircraft,
at least to the extent that is defined in that article.101
Moreover, Article 3, paragraph d) of the Chicago Convention provides
that the contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state
aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil
aircraft. When ICAO considered paragraph 3.8.1 of Annex 2 mentioned above,
the Legal Bureau observed:
[The] purpose of drafting new provisions on interception of civil aircraft did not
necessarily mean drafting provisions relating to military aircraft; the real legislative
purpose would be to draft provisions pertaining to the safety of international civil
aviation which was a legitimate constitutional purpose of the Organization. In the
past, the Organization never refrained from adopting decisions and regulations
dealing with the safety of international civil aviation even if that meant interfacing
or coordination with the operation of state aircraft…While Article 3(d)… was not
a source of legislative authority of the ICAO Council, it did not constitute an obstacle
100 Article 31, paragraph (3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May, 1969, 1155
UNTS 331.
101 For those States which have not ratified Article 3 bis, they may continue to argue that the
Chicago Convention does not apply to state aircraft. However, since Article 3 bis was
unanimously adopted by the ICAO Assembly, States participating in that Assembly are
under an obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the amendment even before
they ratify it. See infra Ch.5.2.1.3.
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to adoption of Standards relating to the safety of civil aviation in the situations
of interception.102
It is clear from this passage that the determining criterion for the competence
of ICAO is whether the contemplated matter pertains to the safety of inter-
national civil aviation. If it does, the competence of ICAO should be presumed
even if that may affect military activities directly or indirectly, including the
operations of aircraft used in military services. To illustrate, when safety so
requires, ICAO could even regulate the marking of the plastic explosives used
for military purposes, as demonstrated in the following chapter of this study.
The competence for interfacing with military activities is of course limited by
the extent to which the safety of international civil aviation so requires. More-
over, the term “due regard for the safety” in Article 3 d) should be interpreted
with a dynamic perspective. Its parameters may be different from time to time.
“Due regard” in 1984 or even earlier may have dictated the requirement not
to shoot down a civil aircraft in flight. Today in 2008, it may further require
coordination in the management of increasingly congested airspace. In this
respect, the work programme of ICAO in the legal field should not only be
reactive,103 but also be proactive in order to enhance the future safety of
international civil aviation, since the true task of law “must also be aimed at
regulation a priori, far-sighted looking ahead, in order to make facts move
toward law, not law towards facts.”104
3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The relations between civil aviation and military activities represent a crucial
aspect of aviation safety, one which generally requires a delicate balance. While
ICAO’s mandate is limited to civil aviation, the paramount consideration of
safety inevitably gives rise to the need for certain interface with military
activities. Safety requirements not only restrict some freedom on the high seas,
but also impose limitations on the sovereign right of a State to use weapons
against civil aircraft in flight in its territorial airspace. In both cases, elementary
considerations of humanity prevail over freedom of action by sovereign States.
In the former case, the considerations require a State to provide notice when
it engages in activities potentially hazardous to civil aircraft. This principle,
102 Milde, supra note 13 at 109. See also Augustin, supra note 1 at 241.
103 See, for example, the adoption of Article 3 bis as a reaction to the shooting-down of Korean
airliner (Flight 007), and other events leading to the adoption of aviation security conven-
tions as mentioned in Ch.4.
104 Dauses, M.A., “The Relative Autonomy of Space Law” (1975) XVIII Colloquium on the Law
of Outer Space 75 at 79.
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which has been long established in the Corfu Channel case as being applicable
to territorial seas, applies a fortiori to the high seas.
In the latter case, elementary considerations of humanity have led to a
complete ban, in times of peace, on the use of weapons against civil aircraft
in flight, as stipulated in Article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention. State practice
also indicates that even in times of war or national emergency, when States
retain complete freedom of action under the Chicago Convention, they have
refrained from claiming any unqualified right to endanger the safety of civil
aircraft in flight. State practice has moved a long way from national law
provisions stating that intruding aircraft “may be fired upon”105 to the prohi-
bition of the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight. The decision of the
German constitutional court, as an illustration of state practice, demonstrates
that the use of armed force against civil aircraft in flight is incompatible with
the fundamental right to life and with the guarantee of human dignity to the
extent that the use of armed force affects innocent persons on board the
aircraft. Clearly, the international community has awarded the highest stake
to the protection of the fundamental right to life, which is the rationale under-
lying Article 3 bis.106 Shooting down a civil aircraft in flight is regarded “as
a transgression from the basic concept of humanity”,107 and goes against
the “highest dictate of conscience”.108
On the basis of the foregoing, one may have some reasons to argue that
the safety consideration, to the extent that it has imposed prohibition on the
use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight, has been given peremptory status
in international law.
In other areas where civil and military aviation activities interface, the
principle of safety is still developing. Coordination between civil and military
authorities is essential for maintenance of the safety of international civil
aviation. In determining ICAO competence in this respect, safety should prevail
over other considerations.
105 Supra note 7.
106 ICAO Assembly Resolution A25-1 adopting Article 3 bis mentions in the fifth paragraph
of the preamble: “Having noted that in keeping with elementary considerations of humanity
the safety and the lives of persons on board civil aircraft must be assured.” ICAO Doc 9848,
supra note 25 at I-6.
107 Statement of Canada, in ICAO Doc 9415, supra note 42 at 7-9.
108 Statement of the Republic of Korea, in ICAO Doc 9415, id. at 32.

4 Strengthening Aviation Safety against
Unlawful Interference
Civil aviation needs to overcome not only the hazards and safety deficiencies
intrinsic to its own system in areas such as personnel, equipment and facilities,
but must also resist extrinsic threats and dangers, such as the man-made threats
of terrorists or other actors of unlawful interference. Consequently, in addition
to its efforts to formulate technical regulations or safety codes, ICAO has devel-
oped a number of treaties and other instruments to combat terrorism and other
acts of unlawful interference. ICAO has become an avant-garde in this frontier.
Out of thirteen global treaties against terrorism adopted by the United Nations
system which are in force, there are five which have been adopted under the
auspices of ICAO.1 These “international air law instruments”, to use ICAO’s
lexicon, have received wide or even virtually universal acceptance by States.2
The contents of the instruments have been the subject of comprehensive
coverage in widely circulated legal literature.3 It is not necessary to repeat
this exercise here. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the contribution
of these instruments to the safety regime of international civil aviation, and
to the safety-related functions of ICAO.
1 For the complete list of these five treaties, see supra note 33 in Ch.1.
2 As of 16 July 2008, the numbers of states parties to the five aviation security conventions
and protocol are as follows: the Tokyo Convention: 183, The Hague Convention: 183, the
Montreal Convention: 186, the Montreal Supplementary Protocol: 165, the MEX Convention:
138.
3 See, for example, Boyle, R.P., & Pulsifer, R., “The Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain
Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft” (1964) 30 JALC 305; Cheng, B., “International
Legal Instruments to Safeguard International Air Transport: the Conventions of Tokyo,
The Hague, Montreal, and a New Instrument Concerning Unlawful Violence at International
Airports”, in Conference Proceedings, Aviation Security, January 1987, Peace Palace, The Hague,
published by International Institute of Air and Space Law, University of Leiden;
McWhinney, E., Aerial Piracy and International Terrorism, 2nd revised ed. (Dordrecht/Boston/
Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1987); Guillaume, G., “Terrorisme et Droit Inter-
national” (1989:III) 215 RdC 287; Abeyratne, R.I.R. Aviation Security – Legal and Regulatory
Aspects (Ashgate, Aldershot, 1998). Zhao, W., International Air Law (Beijing: Publications
for Treatises of Social Sciences, 2000, in Chinese) at 419-482.
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4.1 THE TOKYO CONVENTION
The Tokyo Convention is the first multilateral treaty adopted by the inter-
national community to combat hijacking.4 Since numerous acts of hijacking
were carried out by terrorists, the Convention is also regarded as the first
worldwide treaty on counter-terrorism.5 In fact, its significant contributions
to aviation safety go beyond the realm of counter-terrorism.
The Tokyo Convention not only applies to “offences against penal law”,
but also to “acts which, whether or not they are offences, may or do jeopardize
the safety of the aircraft or of persons or property therein or which jeopardize
good order and discipline on board.”6 The terms “safety”, “good order” and
“discipline” are clearly not just aimed at terrorism, but are also broadly
designed to maintain law and public order on board civil aircraft. To fulfill
this purpose, the Convention clarifies the issue of the jurisdiction of the State
of “registration”7 and empowers the aircraft commander with certain authority
on board aircraft.
The existence of jurisdictional vacuum or lacunas on board aircraft may
compromise aviation safety, as demonstrated by the facts of US v. Cordova.
In that case, two drunken passengers started a fight on board an aircraft during
a flight from Puerto Rico to New York, with other passengers crowding aft
to watch them, causing the plane to become tail heavy and to lose balance.
The pilot tried to intervene, but Cordova bit him on the shoulder and struck
another crew member. When Cordova was prosecuted, a US Federal Court
declared that it had no jurisdiction over the offence alleged to have been
committed on board a US registered aircraft flying over the high seas. Judge
Kennedy stated in his judgement that the acts of Cordova “were vicious in
the extreme”. “He jeopardized the lives of others on the plane, including a
considerable number of infants.” However, “as current law stands, acts like
those committed by Cordova will go unpunished”. He strongly felt that the
government should review this case and take action for correction of juris-
diction.8
Article 3 of the Tokyo Convention was intended to close this type of
jurisdictional gap. Paragraph 1 of the Article provides that the State of registra-
tion of the aircraft is competent to exercise jurisdiction over offences and acts
committed on board. This clause was regarded as “probably the most im-
portant aspect of the Convention” by Boyle, who had been the Chief of the
4 Abeyratne, id. at 144; Sarkar, A.K., “International Air Law and Safety of Civil Aviation”
(1972) 12 Indian Journal of International Law 200.
5 Cf. Guillaume, supra note 3 at 311-312. The Convention on the Prevention and Suppression
of Terrorism, signed in Geneva on 16 November 1937, never came into force.
6 Art. 1, para. 1.
7 This term is different from the term “registry” in the Chicago Convention, but there is no
reason why the two could not be used interchangeably.
8 See, 3 CCH Aviation Cases 3 (1950-1953) at 17,306.
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United States Delegation to the Tokyo Conference adopting the treaty.9 Milde
also considers it as a “contribution to international law”, because it has estab-
lished “a principle that has evolved over centuries in the maritime field but
was not internationally established with respect to aircraft”.10 Cheng, on the
other hand, draws a distinction between the international law aspect of state
jurisdiction and its municipal law aspect. Under international law, a State “is
entitled to quasi-territorial jurisdiction over all aircraft bearing its nationality
and all persons and objects on board wherever they may be.”11 However,
some States “have simply omitted to exercise that jurisdiction in their domestic
laws in not extending their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to their
aircraft, when they are outside the national boundaries, and to all persons and
objects on board.”12 This has been illustrated in Cordova mentioned above
and in another case, R. v. Martin.13 For this reason, Cheng believes that it
would be wrong to view Article 3 as “a conferment by the treaty on the
contracting parties of a right which the contracting parties did not previously
possess”.14
From this perspective, the important contribution of the Tokyo Convention
is not just the recognition of the competence of a State to exercise jurisdiction
over offences and acts committed on board aircraft bearing its registration,
but the commitment of the States parties under Article 3, paragraph 2 to
establish such jurisdiction.15 It is this provision that has sealed the loophole
demonstrated by such cases as Cordova and Martin, and ensured that aircraft
flying over the high seas are not to become “oases of lawlessness”.16 From
a safety perspective, it is significant that the State of registry is not only
required to exercise safety oversight over its aircraft, but is also obliged to
establish jurisdiction over offences and acts on board such aircraft, which may
or do jeopardize the safety of the aircraft or of persons or property on board.
9 Boyle & Pulsifer, supra note 3 at 329.
10 Milde, M., “The International Fight against Terrorism in the Air” in Cheng, C.J., ed. The
Use of Airspace and Outer Space for All Mankind in the 21st Century (The Hague and London:
Kluwer Law International, 1995) 141-158 at 147.
11 Cheng, supra note 3 at 26.
12 Id.
13 [1956] 2 Queen’s Bench 272.
14 Cheng, supra note 3 at 27.
15 The exact provision of Art. 3, para. 2 is as follows: “Each Contracting State shall take such
measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction …”, which might leave some
ambiguity regarding the strictness of the obligation. However, it is clear from the records
of the Conference that the Drafting Committee was instructed to “reflect the principle that,
while each State is obliged to establish jurisdiction over offences committed on board aircraft
registered in that State. each State has power to define the precise offences over which
jurisdiction is to be asserted and to decide whether to enforce its jurisdiction”. See, ICAO
Doc 8565-LC/152-1, International Conference on Air Law, Tokyo, August-September 1963, Volume
1, Minutes (1966) at 97. See also Boyle & Pulsifer, supra note 3 at 355.
16 Cheng, supra note 3 at 25.
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Such duty further confirms a genuine link between an aircraft and its State
of registry and militates against the concept of the “flags of convenience”.
When an aircraft is flying above the territory of a State other than that of
its registry, the offences on board are subject to the concurrent jurisdiction
of the flag State and the subjacent State. According to the study of Cheng, in
many cases, the jurisdiction of the State of registry to enforce must give way
to the same jurisdiction of the State in which the aircraft is found.17 In the
Tokyo Convention, the enforcement power of the subjacent State is restricted
by Article 4. The article provides that a “Contracting State which is not the
State of registration may not interfere with an aircraft in flight in order to
exercise its criminal jurisdiction over an offence committed on board”, except
in the cases where the offence has effect on its territory, is committed by or
against its national or permanent resident, is against its security, is a breach
of the rules of the air, or is an offence over which the exercise of jurisdiction
is necessary to ensure the observance of any obligation of such State under
a multilateral international agreement. The reason for such a restriction,
according to FitzGerald, who was one of the secretaries of the Tokyo Confer-
ence, is “to preserve the safety of air navigation”.18 Milde, another veteran
of ICAO, believes that this provision “appears to derogate from the general
provisions of the Chicago Convention (Articles 11-13), according to which a
foreign aircraft is subject to the laws and jurisdiction of the State in whose
territory it is found.”19
The observation of Milde presents a very interesting issue for the study
of the relationship between the two treaties, particularly in view of Article
82 of the Chicago Convention, which provides that the contracting States
undertake not to enter into any obligations or understandings which are
inconsistent with its terms. If the derogation would be regarded as being
inconsistent with the terms of the Chicago Convention, it would lead to a result
which is “manifestly absurd or unreasonable”,20 since it would implicate 183
States parties to the Tokyo Convention for committing, under the auspices
of ICAO, an infraction under Article 82 of the Chicago Convention. On the other
hand, since the terms of Article 4 of the Tokyo Convention appear to restrict
the freedom of a State to exercise territorial jurisdiction in accordance with
its laws, and therefore deviate from Articles 11 to 13 of the Chicago Conven-
tion, it must be explained how it could be regarded as being consistent with
the terms of the latter. The most logical interpretation is that while such a
17 Cheng, B., Air Law, in Bernhardt (ed), supra Ch.2, note 23 at 69.
18 FitzGerald, G. F., “Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft: The Tokyo
Convention of 1963” (1964) 2 CYIL 191 at 195. See also Art. 17 which provides that in
exercising their jurisdiction, the Contracting States shall pay due regard to the safety and
other interests of air navigation.
19 Milde, supra note 10 at 147.
20 The terms used in Art. 32 (b), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155
UNTS 331 at 332.
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deviation may be considered as derogating from the specific textual provisions
of the Chicago Convention, it is justifiable by the quintessential principle
underlying that Convention, namely, the paramount consideration of safety.
In this sense, one may even raise the question as to whether safety considera-
tions could have some overriding effect in the system of ICAO or even lead
to a de facto amendment to the Chicago Convention.21
Another contribution of the Tokyo Convention to the legal order on board
aircraft is the establishment of the authority of the aircraft commander over
flights which contain international elements as defined in Article 5, para-
graph 1.22 For the first time in history, the aircraft commander is expressly
granted certain police power on board aircraft by a worldwide treaty:
The aircraft commander may, when he has reasonable grounds to believe that a
person has committed, or is about to commit, on board the aircraft, an offence or
act contemplated in Article 1, paragraph 1, impose upon such person reasonable
measures including restraint which are necessary:
a) to protect the safety of the aircraft, or of persons or property therein; or
b) to maintain good order and discipline on board; or
c) to enable him to deliver such person to competent authorities or to disembark
him in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.23
As mentioned above, the offences or acts contemplated in Article 1, para-
graph 1 are “offences against penal law”, and “acts which, whether or not
they are offences, may or do jeopardize the safety of the aircraft or of persons
or property therein or which jeopardize good order and discipline on board”.
Article 6 makes it clear that one of the purposes for imposing reasonable
measures, including restraint, is “to protect the safety of the aircraft, or of
persons or property therein.” The maintenance of good order and discipline
on board is also a prerequisite condition for the safety of flights, as demon-
strated in the facts of Cordova above. To deliver or disembark a person is not
an end in itself. Accordingly, the ultimate end of Article 6 is the safety of
aviation.
The terms “disembark” and “deliver” represent two different concepts,
which contemplate two different courses of action, exercised on two different
bases and leading to two different consequences. The aircraft commander may
disembark a person in the territory of any State in which the aircraft lands,
21 For more discussions, see infra Ch.5.1.2 relating to Jus Cogens.
22 Under Art. 5, the provisions concerning the power of the aircraft commander do not apply
to offences and acts committed or about to be committed by a person on board an aircraft
in flight in the airspace of the state of registration or over the high seas or any other area
outside the territory of any state unless the last point of take-off or the next point of
intended landing is situated in a state other than that of registration, or the aircraft sub-
sequently flies in the airspace of a state other than that of registration with such person
still on board.
23 Art. 6, the Tokyo Convention.
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if he has reasonable grounds to believe that such a person has committed or
is about to commit, on board the aircraft an act which, whether or not it is an
offence, may or does jeopardize the safety of the aircraft or of persons or
property therein or which jeopardize good order and discipline on board.24
Once the person is disembarked, no further action by the authorities of the
place of disembarkation is contemplated. In the case of delivery, the aircraft
commander must have reasonable grounds to believe that the person so
delivered has committed on board the aircraft an act which, in his or her opi-
nion, is a serious offence according to the penal law of the State of registry of
the aircraft.25 Obviously, the threshold required for delivery is much higher
and the person so delivered would be subject to further legal process of the
State taking delivery. Article 13 of the Tokyo Convention not only obligates
each contracting State to take the delivery of such a person, but also requires
the State to immediately make a preliminary inquiry, and, if the circumstances
so warrant, take custody or other measures to ensure the presence of such
a person for any criminal or extradition proceedings.
The power granted to the aircraft commander is very broad. For instance,
the aircraft commander may impose certain measures, including restraint, if
he or she has reasonable grounds to believe that a person is about to commit
an act contemplated in Article 1, paragraph 1.26 The term “reasonable
grounds” gives the aircraft commander a certain discretion and does not
require that his or her judgement be proven as correct. Moreover, it would
be irrelevant if the person did not actually commit the act, or if the act did
not actually jeopardize safety. To ensure that the aircraft commander would
not be blamed for his or her possible mistake, Article 10 provides a blanket
immunity for the aircraft commander and for other persons who have taken
action, from any responsibility in any proceeding on account of the treatment
undergone by the person against whom the actions were taken. This presump-
tion is in favour of safety and of the persons who have acted to preserve the
safety of the aircraft. Accordingly, in one United States case, a court held that
the action taken by the aircraft commander to disembark a passenger was
completely justified when the passenger made the statement that he planned
to hijack the aircraft. The court went on to state that the aircraft commander
“did not have to tempt fate so that the prospect of hijacking became reality.”27
The broad power and extraordinary protection granted to the aircraft
commander had been a subject of intense debate during the Tokyo Conference.
It had been said that the aircraft commander was neither a lawyer nor a police
24 Arts. 8 and 12, id.
25 Art. 9, id.
26 Art. 6, id. See also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
27 Zervignon v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D.N/Y.), cited by Ginger, S.R.,
“Violence in the Skies: The Rights and Liabilities of Air Carriers when Dealing with
Disruptive Passengers” (1998) XXIII Air and Space Law 106 at 116.
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officer, that he or she could not determine if there had been an offence, and
that the immunity clause conflicted with the principle that no one can be
wholly freed from responsibility for his actions. In the end, the paramount
consideration of safety prevailed. States not only recognized the power of the
aircraft commander but also demonstrated a spirit of cooperation in facilitating
his or her functions by allowing the aircraft commander to disembark any
person in accordance with the provisions of the Convention,28 by taking any
person delivered by the aircraft commander,29 and by taking all appropriate
measures to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful commander in the event
of hijacking or other acts of unlawful interference.30
In addition to the power of the aircraft commander to impose certain
measures, any crew member or passenger may also take reasonable preventive
measures when he or she has reasonable grounds to believe that such action
is immediately necessary to protect the safety of aircraft or of persons or
property therein.31 These crew members and passengers are also protected
by Article 10 and shall not be held responsible for actions taken.32 Again in
this case, safety was the central concern.
As the first global convention on aviation security, the Tokyo Convention
also contains certain weaknesses. The Convention has basically been anchored
to the notion of the State of registry, while deliberately ignoring that of the
State of the operator. For instance, the decision to deliver a person to a State
of landing is based on the opinion of the aircraft commander that such a
person has committed “a serious offence according to the penal law of the
State of registration of the aircraft”.33 If the aircraft commander, who is not
a lawyer, has difficulty in understanding the penal laws of his home, he will
be confronted with even more serious problems when the aircraft operated
by him is registered in a foreign State on which he has never set foot. As
FitzGerald pointed out before the conclusion of the Tokyo Convention,
an aircraft registered in State A (located in the Far East) could be chartered without
crew by an operator of State B (located in Europe) for use in flights between State
B and State C (also located in Europe). The aircraft commander might be from State
B, might never have visited State A and could hardly be expected to have any
knowledge of the penal laws of the latter State.34
28 Art. 12, id.
29 Art. 13, id.
30 Art. 11, id.
31 Art. 6, para. 2, id.
32 Art. 10, however, is not intended to take away the right of an innocent third party to
institute legal proceedings. Such a party could be a passenger on board the aircraft whose
camera might have been damaged in a scuffle between a crew member and a person who
was endangering the safety of the aircraft. See FitzGerald, supra note 18 at 198.
33 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
34 FitzGerald, “The Development of International Rules Concerning Offences and Certain
Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft” (1963) 1 CYIL 230 at 246.
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The Diplomatic Conference in Tokyo was aware of this issue, but decided not
to incorporate the notion of the State of the operator, mainly based on the
consideration that criminal jurisdiction is a serious matter and should not
depend upon a mere contract of lease between one airline and another.35 In
the 1970s, when the amendment to the Chicago Convention through Article
83 bis was considered, ICAO revisited the possibility of incorporating into the
Tokyo Convention a clause similar to Article 83 bis, but the 23rd Session of
the Assembly decided in 1980 not to pursue this further, based on the argu-
ment that it would be “undesirable to disturb the widely ratified Tokyo Con-
vention with respect to hypothetical problems which had never given any
practical difficulty”.36 It was further believed that Article 3, paragraph 3 of
the Tokyo Convention, which stipulates that the Convention does not exclude
any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law, could
provide a solution to the issue relating to the jurisdiction of the State of the
operator.
The Conference in Tokyo and the 23rd Session of the Assembly may have
made wise decisions on the basis of the prevailing circumstances at that time.
The drafters of the Tokyo Convention focused on the confirmation of the
competent jurisdiction of the State of registry, as well as mandatory establish-
ment of such jurisdiction. At that time, a parallel introduction of the notion
of the State of the operator would have been inopportune and probably
counter-productive. Similarly, the 23rd Session of the Assembly may also have
had its reasons to exercise the utmost caution in order to preserve the hard-
earned results of the Tokyo Convention. On the other hand, one could hardly
ignore that a quarter of a century has passed since the 23rd Session of the
Assembly, while 45 years have lapsed since the Tokyo Convention was
adopted. The world of aviation has changed. The leasing of aircraft has become
the norm in aircraft financing activities, and the notion of the State of the
operator, as distinct from the State of registry, has evolved into a solid legal
concept entrenched in the Chicago Convention and its relevant Annexes. The
functions and duties of the operator, and those of its corresponding State, are
no longer a matter of a mere private contract of lease but have become an
important component of the safety oversight system.
Furthermore, the issues concerning the jurisdiction of the State of the
operator are no longer “hypothetical problems”. For instance, since 11 Septem-
ber 2001, it has become the regular practice of many States to deploy air
marshals, or, to use ICAO’s term, “in-flight security officers” on board aircraft.
Under the Tokyo Convention, these officers would logically fall under the
jurisdiction of the State of registry, since they have certain law enforcement
35 FitzGerald, supra note 18 at 203.
36 FitzGerald, “The Lease, Charter and Interchange of Aircraft in International Operations
– Article 83 bis of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation” (1981) 6 AASL
49 at 61-63.
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power. However, in the event that an aircraft is registered in an off-shore
island State for financial purposes and leased to an airline operated in another
State, it would be inconceivable if the island State, as the State of registry in
this case, could decide to place in-flight security officers on board the aircraft,
without the consent of the State of the operator.
This issue came to ICAO and, after a long debate in an expert panel and
a committee of the Council, the Council finally decided to incorporate into
Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention a provision to the effect that the imposi-
tion of in-flight security officers will require double authorization of the State
of registry and the State of the operator, if they are not the same State.37 This
has for the time being resolved the issue relating to the authority for the
deployment of air marshals but has not clarified which country’s penal law
the relevant law enforcement officers should enforce, particularly when there
is a conflict between the law of the State of registry and that of the State of
the operator. Although there is a tendency to view the State of the operator
as replacing the State of registry for certain practical purposes, the debate in
ICAO mentioned above concerning Annex 17 clearly indicates the lack of
consensus for such replacement. Ideally a provision similar to Article 83 bis
of the Chicago Convention should be introduced to allow the transfer of
jurisdiction over the offences and acts on board aircraft from the State of
registry to the State of the operator.
The Tokyo Convention is also widely perceived by academic writers to
have another weakness, since it neither specifically criminalizes any act endan-
gering the safety of civil aviation, nor does it create an obligation for extra-
dition.38 In fact, Article 11 of the Convention was hastily introduced to
address the issue of unlawful seizure of aircraft and other wrongful acts, but
the Article’s focus was restricted to the restoration of lawful control of aircraft
and the continuous journey of passengers and crew. The Convention failed
to declare that wrongful acts were internationally punishable. Overall, the
Convention covers offences against penal law, and acts which may or do
jeopardize the safety of the aircraft or of persons or property therein or which
jeopardize good order and discipline on board. In this author’s view, while
this is a wide coverage, the enforcement measure is minimal and non-obliga-
tory. The net is wide, but the hole is big; the mouth is large, but there are no
teeth.
37 The requirement of double authorization is reflected in the definition of “in-flight security
officer”, which the Council agreed on 20 November 2006 to include in the next amendment
to Annex 17. At the time of this writing (October 2008), this definition had not yet been
published in Annex 17.
38 Milde, M., in Cheng, supra note 10 at 147; Zhao, supra note 3 at 446; Abeyratne, supra note
3 at 154-155.
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4.2 THE HAGUE CONVENTION
The weaknesses of the Tokyo Convention were acknowledged by its drafters
even at its conclusion39 and by the ICAO Assembly soon afterward.40 The
Convention entered into force on 4 December 1969. In that year, the total
number of hijackings of aircraft was 82, with 70 of them successful.41 In the
first nine months of 1970, 86 aircraft had been hijacked and more than 8000
passengers were affected,42 the most notorious event being the hijacking of
four aircraft at the same time in September 1970.43 International civil aviation
was in crisis.
It was in this stormy climate that the International Conference on Air Law
was held from 1 to 16 December 1970 in The Hague. The safety of aviation
was at stake and clearly preoccupied the minds of the delegations at the
Conference. His Excellency, the Minister of Justice of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, Dr. Karl Polak stated in his opening speech:
The safety and smooth running of international civil aviation is a matter of prime
and common concern to countries and peoples throughout the world. All States,
however different their interests may be, share the same basic interest in the
preservation and promotion of international air transport. Modern society cannot
function properly without it. Yet today, no airline, no air passenger, no country,
can feel secure against the unlawful seizure of an airplane.44
Other delegations echoed his voice by stating that “safety in flight was a
primordial issue”,45 which was of “supreme importance”.46 Air safety “could
39 FitzGerald wrote: “None of its authors would pretend that it is a perfect instrument; but,
whether perfect or not, it does represent yet another stone added to the edifice of inter-
national law that has been so long abuilding.” Supra note 18 at 204.
40 ICAO Assembly Resolution A16-37 noted that Art. 11 of the Tokyo Convention provides
certain remedies for the unlawful seizure of civil aircraft, but was of the opinion “that this
Article does not provide a complete remedy”. ICAO Doc 8779 A16-RES, Resolution Adopted
by the Assembly and Index to Documentation, Sixteenth Session (1968) at 92. See also Abeyratne,
supra note 3 at 157.
41 Cheng, supra note 3 at 27. Cheng mentioned that between 1930 and 1967, the highest number
of hijackings in any given year was six. In 1968, the number jumped to 38, 33 of which
were successful.
42 Statement of His Excellency, the Minister of Justice of the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Dr. Karl Polak, on 1 December 1971, at the opening of the International Conference on Air
Law in The Hague, recorded in ICAO Doc 8979-LC/165-1, International Conference on Air
Law, The Hague, December 1970, Volume I, Minutes (1972) at 1.
43 As cited by Cheng from 17 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives (1969-70) at 24203-9, the four
aircraft were a VC-10 of BOAC, a DC-8 of Swissair, a Boeing 747 of Pan American and
a Boeing 707 of TWA. Although hundreds of passengers were released as part of the deal,
all four aircraft were destroyed. See Cheng, supra note 3 at 33.
44 Supra note 42 at 1.
45 Statement of the Delegate of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, id.at 13.
46 Statement of the Delegate of Jamaica, id. at 13.
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only be re-established if all States imposed severe sanctions on hijackers.”47
“The grave dangers inherent in the strange antisocial phenomenon of hijacking,
whose effects reached across national frontiers, must be eliminated through
repressive international legislation.”48 “Hijackers should be regarded as
enemies of the human kind and consequently be punishable by all.”49 Indeed,
the Conference demonstrated solidarity of States to set aside political, social
and economic differences in favour of the vital common interests of aviation
safety. One remarkable example of this solidarity was that the then Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, while representing
each of the duopoles in the Cold War, displayed strikingly similar views
concerning the need to severely punish hijackers.50
The Conference successfully concluded The Hague Convention, which
Cheng considers “a remarkable milestone in the development of what is
sometimes loosely called international criminal law”.51 Unlike the Tokyo
Convention which casts a wide net but leaves big loopholes, The Hague
Convention criminalizes only one act, namely, the act of hijacking, but at the
same time provides an undertaking to make the offence punishable by severe
penalties.52 Article 1 of The Hague Convention reads:
Any person who on board an aircraft in flight:
a) unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation,
seizes, or exercises control of, that aircraft, or attempts to perform any such
act, or
b) is an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform any such
act commits an offence (hereinafter referred to as “the offence”).
While the acts mentioned here are clearly related to “hijacking”, the term does
not appear throughout the Convention because it was considered to originate
from a slang word and no equivalence could be found in any other official
language of ICAO. In the statements at the Conference in The Hague, the terms
“hijacking” and “hijacker” were constantly used and well understood by the
delegations.53
47 Statement of the Delegate of Hungary, id. at 12.
48 Statement of the United Nations Observer, id. at 9.
49 Statement of the Delegate of Thailand, id. at 19.
50 For more discussion, see infra note 60 et seq and accompanying text.
51 Cheng, supra note 3 at 28.
52 Art. 2, The Hague Convention.
53 See supra notes 47 et seq and accompanying text. Sometimes, The Hague Convention is
informally referred to as the Hijacking Convention, in order to distinguish it from other
conventions concluded in The Hague. The term “unlawful seizure of aircraft” in the title
of the Convention appears more elegant and less colloquial than the term “hijacking”, but
carries a certain degree of impreciseness. As has been pointed out, it fails to clarify which
proper law will serve as a basis for the determination of unlawfulness. See Zhao, supra
note 3 at 448.
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The most significant contribution of The Hague Convention is the establish-
ment of the legal principle of aut dedere aut judicare, which is widely understood
as “extradition or prosecution”. This principle is expressed in Article 7 as
follows:
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall,
if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether
or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution.
These authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any
ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that State.
The formula of aut dedere aut judicare is adapted from the legal maxim by
Grotius: aut dedere aut punire.54 To roughly paraphrase the concept of the great
founder of international law, a State usually does not permit another State
to send armed personnel to its territory to pursue criminals it wishes to punish.
It will therefore do one of the following: It will either itself punish the culpable
person upon the requisition of another State, or it will return the culpable
person to the latter State for punishment as the latter considers appropriate.55
This concept, which originated almost four hundred years ago, found its
expression in multilateral treaties only recently. According to Zhao, prior to
The Hague Convention, there was only one global convention, namely, the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which had genuinely incorporated the
concept and imposed the obligation of extradition or prosecution.56 However,
54 Guillaume, supra note 3 at 354. Zhao, supra note 3 at 450.
55 Based on the French translation by Barbeyrac in 1724 as provided by Guillaume. The original
text of Grotius is cited as follows: “Cum vero non soliant civitates permittere ut civitas
alteras armata intra fines suas poenae expedentae nomine veniat, neque id expediat, sequitur
ut civitas, apud quem degit qui culpae est compertus, alterum facere debeat, ut ipsa
interpellata pro merito puniat nocentem aut ut cum permittat arbitrio interpellantis; nec
enim illud est dedere, quod in historiis saepissime accurit.” Id.
56 Art. 36 of the Convention, 520 UNTS 204 [1964]. See also Zhao, supra note 3 at 451. More-
over, the four Geneva Conventions on international humanitarian law come close in this
respect. For instance, Art. 146 of the Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War (Geneva, 12 August 1949) provides that each High Contracting Party shall
be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered
to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their
nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the
provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contract-
ing Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.
There might be different views and interpretations as to whether Art. 7 of The Hague
Convention imposes a stricter obligation than this provision. In the view of this writer,
at least in the matter of extradition, The Hague Convention does impose a stricter obligation.
In the Geneva Conventions, extradition is an option but not an obligation. Even if a State
party does not bring the alleged offenders before its own courts, there are no grounds for
other States to request extradition.
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he pointed out that the Narcotics Convention is much less politically sensitive
than The Hague Convention. Accordingly, The Hague Convention may be
considered a successful modern implementation of the Grotius maxim. Further,
the formula of The Hague Convention has been followed as a successful
precedent by a series of international conventions.57 In view of this, The
Hague Convention may be said to represent the pioneering efforts of ICAO
not only in the protection of aviation safety, but also in the development of
general international law.
The safety of international civil aviation dictates the need to have effective
measures to curb hijacking activities. To provide the necessary deterrence, any
sanctuary should be eliminated. Ideally, an effective legal system of deterrence
should require unconditional extradition or mandatory prosecution of hijackers,
coupled with universal jurisdiction of this offence and application of severe
penalties.
Extradition is defined as “the official surrender of a fugitive from justice,
regardless of his consent, by the authorities of the State of residence to the
authorities of another State for the purpose of criminal prosecution or the
execution of a sentence”.58 Under customary international law, a State has
no obligation to extradite an alleged offender to another State. Such an obliga-
tion normally arises from a treaty, which often provides a list of extraditable
offences. Extradition is further restricted by the exception of political offences.
Consistent with territorial supremacy, each State may provide political asylum
to a foreigner59 and may refuse to extradite to another State any person
alleged to have committed a political offence. Consistent with personal suprem-
acy under international law, a State may also refuse to extradite its own
nationals to another State.
At the Conference in The Hague, there was a widely supported proposal
to consider hijacking as a non-political offence in order to prohibit States from
refusing the extradition of an alleged hijacker on the ground of the political
offence exception. The United States proposed that the draft convention
“should contain an unequivocal statement that hijacking was not considered
to be a political offence and should be treated as any other grave, common
and criminal offence.”60 The USSR went further to state that any attempt to
divert aircraft in flight could lead to an accident and therefore constitutes
“clearly an act of a criminal nature and a breach of the principles concerning
the safety of lives”, and should be recognized “as a crime against humanity”.61
57 See, for example, some UN treaties referred to in infra notes 147 and 148. See also, supra
note 3, Guillaume, at 313; Cheng, at 28, Zhao 420; van den Wyngaert, “Aviation Terrorism,
Jurisdiction and its Implications”, in Conference Proceedings, Aviation Security, supra note 3
at 137.
58 Stern, T., Extradition, in Bernhardt, R. (ed.), supra note 23 in Ch.2 at 327.
59 Liang Xi, International Law (Wuhan University Publications, 1995, in Chinese) at 251.
60 ICAO Doc 8979, supra note 42 at 10.
61 Id. at 64.
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It therefore proposed that “a person committing an act of unlawful seizure
of aircraft should be extradited to the State of registration of the aircraft
regardless of his motives. People seeking territorial political asylum must not
be allowed to endanger the lives of innocent passengers.”62 Consequently,
the following text sponsored by 26 States was adopted by 46 votes to 10, and
13 abstentions:
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall,
if it does not extradite him, be obliged, whatever the motive for the offence and
whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case to
its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. These authorities shall
take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any other ordinary offence
of a serious nature under the law of that State.63
The text, by putting “unlawful seizure of aircraft” in parallel with “any other
ordinary offence”, may give rise to the reasonable interpretation that hijacking
would be considered as an ordinary rather than a political offence. The term
“whatever the motive for the offence” also arguably supports such an inter-
pretation. However, despite the majority support, the text did not find its way
to Article 7 in its original form. Following a lengthy debate and consultation
in the German Embassy among “the representatives from the leading
nations”,64 a last minute deal was struck at 4 o’clock in the morning on the
day when the Conference was scheduled to have its closing ceremony. As a
result of the compromise, “whatever the motive for the offence” was replaced
by the term “without exception whatsoever”, and the word “other” was deleted
from the phrase “any other ordinary offence”, suggesting that hijacking may
not necessarily be an “ordinary offence” and opening the door for the applica-
tion of the political offence exception to hijackers.65 Boyle, who was one of
the delegates of the United States at the Conference, explained later that some
States did not want any interference with their sovereign right to permit
political asylum in some form for whatever purposes, despite the gravity of
the offence. He considered this as “a serious weakness in the Convention”,
which “stands in the way of an effective international solution to hijacking.”66
One may wonder why the majority of States did not insist on the already
adopted text of Article 7, but decided to soften their position and to water
down the provision. According to Zhao, it is because they were driven by the
intention to achieve a wider acceptance of the Convention. The fewer States
62 Id.
63 ICAO Doc 8979, supra note 42 at 136, and at Vol. II, Documents, at 131. SA Doc No.72.
64 Cheng, supra note 3 at 31.
65 See Zhao, supra note 3 at 460.
66 Boyle, R.P. “International Action to Combat Aircraft Hijacking”, cited by Abeyratne, supra
note 3 at 162.
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accept the Convention, the more sanctuaries are likely to exist for hijackers.67
After a careful balancing act, the Conference opted for a lower pitched conven-
tion with a higher degree of ratifiability.
With respect to “prosecution”, what was agreed in The Hague is also far
less than mandatory. While many States pressed for the strengthening of the
obligation to prosecute, the final outcome of the key phrase in Article 7 remains
the same as it was originally drafted: “to submit the case to its competent
authorities”. Most writers acknowledge that a certain discretion exists for a
State not to prosecute. The reasons are numerous. For example, Boyle said
that the State having the hijacker may not have available to it proof of a crime,
since the act was committed in a distant State;68 Cheng noted that sometimes
a State has to negotiate with the hijacker in order to secure the freedom of
hundreds of passengers.69 In a nutshell, despite the need to protect aviation
safety, not all States were prepared, at the time The Hague Convention was
concluded, either to abandon their sovereign right to grant political asylum
or their prerogative power of prosecution.70 On the other hand, the discretion-
ary power of the competent authorities of a State is not unlimited. The last
sentence of Article 7 provides that “[t]hose authorities shall take their decision
in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature
under the law of that State.” While the term “under the law of that State” may
allow certain flexibility, good faith still requires that a State maintain a consist-
ent standard. Moreover, as subsequently illustrated in the Lockerbie case, the
prerogative of a State may still be challenged under certain circumstances.71
The Hague Convention also made a breakthrough on jurisdictional issues.
In addition to traditional grounds of jurisdiction, such as the jurisdiction of
the State of registry, the Convention also includes the jurisdiction of the State
of the operator and that of the State of landing when the alleged offender is
still on board.72 More significantly, the Convention obligates each contracting
State to establish its jurisdiction when the alleged offender is present in its
territory and it does not extradite him. Some writers consider that these
jurisdictional clauses amount to “universal jurisdiction”, which go even further
than the jurisdiction over the crime of piracy in the law of the sea, since the
latter “only created the possibility for States to exercise universal jurisdiction,
without however obliging them to do so”.73 Others classify it as “quasi-univer-
sal jurisdiction”.74 Despite these different views in academic discussions, it
67 Zhao, supra note 3 at 459.
68 Boyle, cited by Abeyratne, supra note 3 at 161.
69 Cheng, supra note 3 at 32.
70 Subsequent to The Hague Convention, a number of treaties on counter-terrorism expressly
excluded the political offence exception. For details, see infra notes 150 and 151.
71 See infra 78 for the discussion of the case.
72 Art. 4, The Hague Convention.
73 van den Wyngaert, supra note 57 at 142.
74 Zhao, supra note 3 at 465.
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is the clear intention of The Hague Convention to cast the net as wide as
possible, so that the culprits of hijacking could not take advantage of juris-
dictional loopholes, at least from a strictly legal point of view. As van den
Wyngaert observes: The Hague Convention has “developed rules that aim
at being comprehensive, in order to ensure that ‘aviation terrorists’ do not
go unpunished. The system is probably as comprehensive as it can possibly
be in the political circumstances of the present international scene.”75
Another contribution of The Hague Convention, which is not often dis-
cussed in the academic literature, but is important to the safety mandate of
ICAO, is the establishment of the reporting requirement under Article 11, which
reads:
Each Contracting State shall in accordance with its national law report to the
Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization as promptly as possible
any relevant information in its possession concerning:
(a) the circumstances of the offence;
(b) the action taken pursuant to Article 9;
(c) the measures taken in relation to the offender or the alleged offender, and, in
particular, the results of any extradition proceedings or other legal proceedings.
The obligation to report to an international organization represents a relatively
new feature which was uncommon in traditional international law. The terms
“in accordance with its national law” gives a Contracting State a high degree
of latitude to determine the content of the report, but its national law should
not be construed to the effect that no information should be provided to ICAO.
Otherwise, the purpose of Article 11 would be defeated. Article 9 basically
repeats Article 11 of the Tokyo Convention concerning the duty to restore
control of the aircraft commander and to facilitate continuation of the journey.
The reporting requirements concerning action taken under Article 9, as well
as other requirements under Article 11 of The Hague Convention, will assist
the ICAO Council to be aware of situations critical to the safety of aviation and
to take international action, if necessary. It therefore gives potential power
to the Council for monitoring the implementation of the Convention.
The remarkable achievements of The Hague Convention do not mean that
there is no room for improvement. The Convention is strictly applicable to
offenders on board an aircraft in flight. It does not cover those accomplices
on the ground, let alone the directors, organizers or financial backers who are
the masterminds of the offence but never set foot on board the aircraft. Neither
does the Convention cover the seizure of aircraft through bribery of, conspiracy
with or deceit against, the aircraft commander.76 Last but not least, the Conven-
tion only covers one offence; it does not cover other crimes, such as sabotage
75 Supra note 57 at 138.
76 Zhao, supra note 3 at 449.
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of aircraft. This explains why the Montreal Convention was needed nine
months later.
4.3 THE MONTREAL CONVENTION
Even before the conclusion of The Hague Convention, it was realized that
hijacking was not the only crime against the safety of civil aviation; sabotage,
very often through detonation of explosives on board aircraft, became a grow-
ing concern. Consequently, the Montreal Convention was adopted in 1971.
The aim of the Montreal Convention is clearly expressed in its title: the
suppression of unlawful acts against the “safety of civil aviation”. Its preamble
repeats almost verbatim the preamble of The Hague Convention, underlining
the “grave concern” of the States parties for the unlawful acts against the safety
of civil aviation, and highlighting the urgent need to provide appropriate
measures to deter such unlawful acts. Obviously, suppression of unlawful acts
is not an end in itself, but is one of the means to bolster the confidence of the
peoples of the world in the safety of civil aviation.
The Convention of 1971 goes further than The Hague Convention by
criminalizing at treaty level a number of acts against the safety of civil aviation.
It has also filled the gap left by the Tokyo Convention, which does not provide
adequate enforcement measures for offences committed on board aircraft. The
offences listed under the Montreal Convention include, inter alia, acts of
violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight, destruction of an
aircraft in service, causing damage to an aircraft rendering it incapable of flight,
placing or causing to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any means what-
soever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, destruction
of or damage to air navigation facilities or interference with their operation,
and communication of information which is knowingly false. In most cases,
these acts would be considered as offences only when they are “likely to
endanger the safety of aircraft in flight”.77
To illustrate, Article 1, paragraph 1 (a) of the Montreal Convention provides
that any person commits an offence if he unlawfully and intentionally “per-
forms an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight if that
act is likely to endanger the safety of that aircraft.” According to this provision,
77 See the preparatory work in support of this point, in ICAO Doc 9081-LC/170-1, International
Conference on Air Law, Montreal, September 1971, Vol. 1 Minutes (1973) at 27 to 30. In
particular, the Delegate of the People’s Republic of the Congo stated that the protection
of human life would have to be related to the safety of air navigation. If there was no
relationship to aviation, then he would question whether the Conference was acting
competently. Supporting this view, the Delegate of Spain mentioned that the purpose of
the provision was not the individual protection of the person on board but the safety of
the flight. After the discussion, the President indicated that all had been in agreement on
the principle to include acts of violence likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight.
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the likelihood of endangering the safety of an aircraft in flight forms an integral
part of the actus reus, the physical part of the offence, in the absence of which
the act of violence itself does not constitute the offence. In other words, the
Convention does not punish a simple act of violence, but an act of violence
which is likely to endanger the safety of flight. The legislative intent is to
protect aviation safety. In the case of communication of information which
is known to be false, the mere likelihood of endangering safety would not in
and of itself constitute an offence; Article 1, paragraph 1 (e) requires that the
act must be “endangering the safety of an aircraft in flight”. Consequently,
the act of communicating a hoax that an aircraft will be bombed would not
constitute an offence unless it led to the actual result of endangering the
aircraft in flight.
Subparagraphs (b) and (c) of Article 1, paragraph 1 in the Montreal Conven-
tion contemplate certain situations in which the offences do not contain the
element of “endangering the safety of an aircraft in flight” in the actus reus.
This is the case when the aircraft subject to the offences is in service but not
in flight. Under Article 2 paragraph (b) of the Convention, an aircraft is con-
sidered to be in service from the beginning of the preflight preparation of the
aircraft by ground personnel or by the crew for a specific flight until twenty-
four hours after any landing. Since this notion of “in service” is broader than
the notion of “in flight”, destroying or damaging an aircraft in service does
not necessarily endanger the safety of flight of such an aircraft, because the
flight may not have yet started or may have terminated. Nevertheless, even
in the cases of destruction or damage to aircraft which are not in flight, these
offences still present serious threats to the safety of aviation in general,
although they may not necessarily endanger the specific flights. From this
perspective, the Montreal Convention is not merely a criminal law treaty, but
constitutes a treaty for the protection of aviation safety.
Aside from enlarging the scope of offences against the safety of civil
aviation, the Montreal Convention basically mirrors The Hague Convention,
including the famous principle of aut dedere aut judicare. The subsequent
application of the Montreal Convention, particularly in the Lockerbie case,78
provides enlightening experience concerning this principle, giving rise to
interesting topics for discussion.
On 21 December 1988, a Boeing 747 of Pan American Airlines (Pan Am
Flight 103) exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 256 persons on board
78 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States) Provisional Measures, Order of
14 April 1992, [1992] ICJ Reports 114. On 31 October 2008, BBC reported that Libya paid
1.5 billion US dollars to compensate the victims of Lockerbie and UTA 772. http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7703110.stm. For UTA 772, see ICAO Circular 262-
AN/156, Aircraft Accident Digest, No 36, 1989 and “UTA 772: The forgotten flight” in the
BCC above website.
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and 11 persons on the ground. In November 1991, the Lord Advocate of
Scotland charged two Libyan nationals alleging, inter alia, that they had caused
a bomb to be placed aboard that flight, which bomb had exploded causing
the aeroplane to crash. Following on the charges, the United Kingdom and
the United States declared on 27 November 1991 that Libya must:
surrender for trial all those charged with the crime; and accept responsibility for
the actions of Libyan officials; disclose all it knows of this crime, including the
names of all those responsible, and allow full access to all witnesses, documents
and other material evidence, including all the remaining timers; pay appropriate
compensation.79
The subject of the declaration by the UK and the US was subsequently con-
sidered by the United Nations Security Council, which on 21 January 1992
adopted resolution 731 (1992), strongly deploring the fact that the Libyan
Government had not yet responded effectively to the above requests contained
in the declaration and urging the Libyan Government immediately to provide
a full and effective response to those requests so as to contribute to the elimina-
tion of international terrorism.80
Libya took the position that it had fully complied with the 1971 Montreal
Convention by submitting the case to its competent authorities for the purpose
of prosecution, and therefore was not obliged to extradite the alleged offenders.
Furthermore, Libyan law prohibits the extradition of Libyan nationals. On 3
March 1992, Libya instituted proceedings in the International Court of Justice
against the UK, seeking, inter alia, the declaration that it had fully complied
with the Montreal Convention, and provisional measures to enjoin the
United Kingdom from taking any action against Libya calculated to coerce
or to compel Libya to surrender the accused individuals to any jurisdiction
outside of Libya.
On 31 March 1992, three days after the close of the hearing of the case and
before the Court rendered its decision, the Security Council adopted resolu-
tion 748 (1992) expressing deep concern that the Libyan Government had still
not provided a full and effective response to the requests in its resolution 731
(1992) of 21 January 1992, and imposing sanctions on Libya under Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter.
On 14 April 1992, the Court, by 11 votes to 5, found that the circumstances
of the case were not such as to require the exercise of its power under
Article 41of its Statute to indicate provisional measures. The Court cited the
Security Council resolution 748 (1992) as the sole ground for its order: “both
Libya and the United Kingdom, as Members of the United Nations, are obliged
to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance
79 Id. at 122.
80 Id. at 123-124.
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with Article 25 of the Charter”. “[T]he Court, which is at the stage of pro-
ceedings on provisional measures, considers that prima facie this obligation
extends to the decision contained in resolution 748 (1992)”.“[I]n accordance
with Article 103 of the Charter, the obligations of the Parties in that respect
prevail over their obligations under any other international agreement, inclu-
ding the Montreal Convention.”81
The Court stated, at the same time, that this decision in no way prejudged
any other questions raised by the parties, and left unaffected the rights of the
parties to submit arguments in respect of any of the questions. Thus, despite
the rejection of provisional measures, the proceedings continued. Subsequently,
the Court, in two judgements rendered on 27 February 1998, dismissed the
preliminary objections of the United Kingdom and the United States, which
challenged the jurisdiction of the Court. It found, inter alia, that the objection
raised by them on the ground that the Security Council resolutions would
have rendered the claim of Libya without object did not, in the circumstances
of the case, have an exclusive preliminary character.82
In the meantime, negotiations were taking place between the parties. In
April 1999, Libya agreed that the two suspects be delivered to the Netherlands
for a trial before a Scottish court composed solely for this purpose at Camp
Zeist in Utrecht, the Netherlands. On 31 January 2001, the special court found
one suspect guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment, with a minimum
of 20 years in jail. The other suspect was acquitted.83 On 9 September 2003,
all parties discontinued the proceedings before the ICJ.84
From the order of 14 April 1992 of the ICJ, it may be concluded that the
Security Council may override the treaty rights and obligations of States,
including the applicability of the principle aut dedere aut judicare in The Hague-
Montreal system, when it decides to take action under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter. The Court did not have the opportunity in the Lockerbie case to
address the contentious issue as to whether the validity of the Security Coun-
cil’s decision could be challenged, because the case had been discontinued
by agreement and the merits of the case have never been examined. Theoretical
debates among scholars permeate the literature in international law, but tend
81 Id. para. 42.
82 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, [1998] ICJ Reports at 115, as well as the corresponding judgement in Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom.
83 “Secretary-General Expresses Hope that Healing Process Can Begin Following Lockerbie
Verdict”, UN: SG/SM/7694, 31 January 2001. See also CNN report “Lockerbie trial: Quotes
of the day”, 31 January 2001, available in http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/
01/31/lockerbie.quotes/index.html. Date of access: 8 August 2008.
84 See Order of 10 September 2003, ICJ, in http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/89/7247.pdf.
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to concentrate on the analysis of the relationship between the Security Council
and the International Court of Justice.85
For aviation lawyers, it would also be worthwhile to understand the
implications of the Lockerbie case upon the relationship between the Security
Council, as one of the bodies of the United Nations, and ICAO, as one of the
UN specialized agencies. While academic discussions may continue regarding
what the lex ferenda would be, the lex lata clearly indicates that it is possible
to depart from the principle aut dedere aut judicare in The Hague-Montreal
system, if the Security Council wishes to do so. This development presents
both positive and negative implications.
On the positive side, the above-mentioned development arguably addresses
the deficiencies of The Hague-Montreal system by providing better assurances
for punishing hijackers or saboteurs. The system has long been subject to
criticism for its ineffectiveness. In theory, it is aut dedere aut judicare; in reality,
it is neither extradition nor prosecution.86 The conventions do not contain
the clause excluding the political offence exception.87 They do not provide
a clear answer as to whether States may refuse, on political grounds, to extra-
dite suspects in crimes of hijacking and sabotage. The duty to prosecute, as
mentioned above, is also far from being absolute. Even if the alleged offender
is prosecuted and eventually found guilty, the “severe penalties” under
national laws could be as low as two years’ imprisonment.88 Prior to the
Lockerbie case, ICAO had convened another diplomatic conference in 1973 to
consider the adoption of a new treaty with a view to providing sanctions
against a State for non-compliance with The Hague and the Montreal Conven-
tions. Nevertheless, “the Conference terminated without having adopted any
instrument”.89
Through the Lockerbie case in the early 1990s, the UN Security Council
to certain extent succeeded in compelling a State to surrender the alleged
offenders. Its measures of sanctions have thrown new light on the possibility
of severe and effective penalties against offenders. They provide powerful
85 See, for example, Gowlland-Debbas, V., “The Relationship Between the International Court
of Justice and the Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case” (1994) 88 AJIL 643;
Alvarez, J. E., “Judging the Security Council” (1996) 90 AJIL.1; David, M., “Passport to
Justice: Internationalizing the Political Question Doctrine for Application in the World
Court” (1999) 40 Harvard International Law Journal 81 at 128; Cronin-Furman, K.R.,“The
United Nations Security Council: Rethinking a Complicated Relationship” (2006) 106
Columbia Law Review 435.
86 See Sochor, E., The Politics of International Aviation (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press,
1991) at 174.
87 See supra note 65 et seq and accompanying text.
88 Sochor, supra note 86 at 170.
89 The Final Act of the International Conference on Air Law held under the auspices of the
International Civil Aviation Organization at Rome from 28 August to 21 September 1973.
ICAO Doc 9225-LC/178, International Conference on Air Law, Rome, August-September 1973
(1978).
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deterrence to prospective offenders and strong discouragement to those who
would otherwise harbour them, and consequently protect aviation safety. The
Security Council also conveys the message that sabotage against the safety
of aviation could under certain circumstances be considered as a threat to the
peace or a breach of the peace. In view of its importance, the Security Council
may apply Chapter VII of the UN Charter and legitimately encroach upon the
sovereign domain jealously guarded by States, including the discretionary
power for prosecution. Moreover, the action taken is supported by a treaty
provision which is of overriding nature, namely, Article 103 of the UN Charter.
Indirectly, it gives rise to the prospect that aviation safety, which has become
the common concern of the world community, may have overriding effect
against other considerations, especially when it is linked to international peace
and security.
On the negative side, the Lockerbie case raises an important issue with
regard to maintaining the integrity of the legal system. The rule of law requires
a certain degree of stability, certainty and transparency. It would create diffi-
culties and confusion if a State, which has in good faith complied with the
requirements of a treaty, is subsequently told that the treaty has been over-
ridden by a decision of a higher hierarchy, which decision is beyond the
control of such a State. The international community had opted to establish
the UN as a general organization and ICAO as a special body for international
civil aviation, which subsequently became one of the UN specialized agency.
This implies that they have different competencies, which should not overlap.
Article 13 of the Montreal Convention clearly spells out that each contracting
State has a duty to report to the ICAO Council any information concerning “the
measures taken in relation to the offender or the alleged offender and, in
particular, the results of any extradition proceedings or other legal proceed-
ings”. It seems that these avenues should first be exhausted before a case is
presented to the Security Council as the last resort. This does not by any means
imply that the latter could not act if the case has indeed presented a threat
to international peace and security. In his dissenting opinion in Lockerbie,90
Judge Bedjaoui, while recognizing that the Security Council may discretionally
characterize a situation as likely to threaten international peace and security,
went on by quoting the dissenting opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice in another
case:
Limitations on the powers of the Security Council are necessary because of the
all too great ease with which any acutely controversial international situation can
be represented as involving a latent threat to peace and security, even where it
is really too remote genuinely to constitute one. Without these limitations, the
functions of the Security Council could be used for purposes never originally
90 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bedjaoui, supra note 78 at 143 et seq, para.20.
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intended ... [There was] no threat to peace and security other than such as might
be artificially created as a pretext for the realization of ulterior purposes.’91
Judge Bedjaoui further pointed out that “no small number of people may find
it disconcerting that the horrific Lockerbie bombing should be seen today as
an urgent threat to international peace when it took place over three years
ago”.92 “Whatever the legitimate indignation that this detestable outrage may
have aroused, its perpetrators must be brought to book only in strict conform-
ity with international legality.”93 Judge Ajibola also underlined the importance
of the issue of the validity of the Security Council’s decision, which “will be
resolved one way or the other”, but preferred to “let sleeping dogs lie” at that
moment.94
Since the resolutions of the Security Council prevail over the Montreal
Convention, the alleged offenders may be exposed to multiple prosecutions.
The Montreal Convention provides for concurrent jurisdiction without indi-
cating the priority, which already carries the risk of double jeopardy. However,
Article 7 of the Convention only applies aut dedere aut judicare to the “alleged
offender”. It may be argued that there is no obligation to extradite the offender
or to submit the case for prosecution if that offender is no longer “alleged”
but “convicted” by any country. When the Security Council intervened, the
situation might have been different since the Montreal Convention may be
inapplicable. The wording of the Security Council’s Resolutions seems to
require unconditional surrender of the two suspects, whether they had been
previously convicted or not. While double jeopardy did not actually occur
in the judgements of the special Scottish Court, such a possibility could not
be completely ruled out in any future case when the Security Council inter-
venes. Of course, any court or tribunal seised of the case may take into account
any previous conviction or judgement. However, due to the divergent legal
systems, such as the difference in evidentiary rules and statutory penalties,
an alleged offender who has been acquitted or given a light sentence in one
jurisdiction might be found guilty or given a heavier sentence in another
jurisdiction, if the alleged offender goes through another trial. In that case,
the situation might not be compatible with the principle of non bis in idem.95
91 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, [1971] ICJ
Reports 16 at 294 para. 116.
92 Supra note 90 at para. 21.
93 Id. para.1.
94 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ajibola, supra note 78 at 196.
95 Derived from the Latin maxim nemo bis vexari pro una et eadam causa meaning “a man shall
not be twice vexed or tried for the same cause”. For more discussion of the principle, see
Daniels, R. N., “Non Bis in Idem and the International Criminal Court” (2006) in bepress
Legal Series, Year 2006 Paper 1365. Available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=6282&context=expresso. Date of access: 9 August 2008.
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It should be noted further that the UN Charter is not the only international
treaty which contains an overriding clause such as that provided in Article
103. Although ICAO belongs to the United Nations system, it is governed by
a different constitutional instrument, namely the Chicago Convention. Article
82 of this Convention also contains a similar overriding clause:
The contracting States accept this Convention as abrogating all obligations and
understandings between them which are inconsistent with its terms, and undertake
not to enter into any such obligations and understandings.
From a strict legal point of view, both the UN Charter and the Chicago Con-
vention are international treaties duly accepted by their respective parties and
one does not have superior legal status over another. Moreover, although the
Chicago Convention was concluded in 1944 before the UN Charter, it entered
into force in 1947 after the entry into force of the UN Charter. Technically, an
argument could be made that the later law prevails over the earlier law. In
the event that the UN Security Council wishes to override the provisions of
the Chicago Convention, the reasoning that the UN obligations prevail over
others would not appear as convincing as in the case of Lockerbie. More cogent
and elaborative arguments might be needed, probably through the invocation
of the concept of jus cogens (peremptory norms). Eventually, “the sleeping dog”
mentioned by Judge Ajibola will wake up and bite. To resolve the conflicts
between the two equally ranked treaties containing overriding clauses, a
judicial intervention would be inevitable.96
In view of the importance of the rule of law, the scope of competence of
each organization should be clearly defined. In times of peace, matters of civil
aviation could be left to the ICAO system. In case of war and emergency condi-
tions, the Chicago Convention, the constitution of ICAO, provides in Article
89 that the provisions of this Convention shall not affect the freedom of action
of any of the contracting States affected, whether as belligerents or as neutrals.
This will allow the UN bodies, such as the Security Council, wide latitude in
their action.
4.4 THE MONTREAL SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL
As the baseline of reasoning, The Hague and Montreal Conventions clearly
focused on the safety of aircraft. Although the Montreal Convention criminal-
izes the acts of destroying or damaging air navigation facilities, and the act
of communicating false information, the purpose of such criminalization, as
already discussed above, is to protect “the safety of aircraft in flight”. With
respect to the safety of airports, it had been considered as forming part of the
96 See infra Ch.5, particularly 5.1.2 relating to jus cogens and 5.5 relating to checks and balances.
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domestic affairs of the State of location, falling within its territorial jurisdiction.
Subsequently, it was realized that the actors of unlawful interference did not
limit their attacks to aircraft but targeted airports as well. A general feeling
gradually emerged that airports serving international aviation would also need
international protection. This feeling was amplified by the simultaneous
machine gun and grenade attacks at the airports in Rome and Vienna in
December 1985.97 On 8 October 1986, the 26th Session of the ICAO Assembly,
upon the initiative of Canada, adopted a resolution calling for a new instru-
ment for the “suppression of unlawful acts of violence at airports serving
international civil aviation”. Eventually, the Montreal Supplementary Protocol
was adopted in 1988, which extends the application of the Montreal Conven-
tion to cover two additional offences, namely, an act of violence against a
person at an airport, and an act of destroying or seriously damaging the
facilities of an airport or aircraft not in service or disrupting the services of
the airport. To constitute an offence, it is a prerequisite that the act in question
“endangers or is likely to endanger safety at that airport”.98 Again, the pri-
mary focus is aviation safety.
A special reference should be made to the concept of “an airport serving
international civil aviation” introduced by the Montreal Supplementary
Protocol. The concept represents the international element or elements on
which the Protocol is based. The legislative intention was made clear that the
instrument is applicable only to airports serving international civil aviation.
Domestic airports which do not have any international element are within
the exclusive domain of the State where the airports are located, and will
continue to be regulated by domestic law. There were discussions as to whether
the term “an airport serving international civil aviation’ should be further
defined when the draft protocol was tabled at the ICAO Legal Committee. The
majority of delegations were of the view that any definition or qualification
would be to the detriment of the necessary flexibility in the application of the
instrument. They emphasized that it should be a matter of fact to be deter-
mined by the State concerned or by the judge in the proceedings whether an
airport in fact served international civil aviation and that the answer may be
different at different times.99 The Diplomatic Conference subsequently decided
to keep the term as it was. From the discussion, it transpired that “an airport
serving international civil aviation” would at least include the following: 1.
an airport designated as a customs airport under Article 10 of the Chicago
Convention; 2. an airport designated under Article 68 of the Chicago Conven-
97 Wallis, “Prevention of Aviation Terrorism, the Airlines’ Point of View”, in Conference
Proceedings, Aviation Security, supra note 3 at 75.
98 Art. II, the Supplementary Protocol.
99 ICAO Doc 9823-DC/5, International Conference on Air Law (Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Montreal,
9-24 February 1988, Minutes and Documents (2003) at 161. See also supra note 160 in Ch.2.
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tion for the use by any international air service; and 3. an airport not desig-
nated under 1 or 2 but which is in fact used as an alternate airport by an
international flight. It remains to be seen to what extent flexibility will be
applied in the interpretation of the term by the competent authorities. For
instance, if a group of international passengers are attacked at a feeder or
“spoke” airport, while they intended to fly to a “hub” airport for a connection
of a long-haul international fight, would the feeder airport be considered as
“serving international civil aviation”? One may argue that in this case the
feeder airport contains sufficient international elements for the purpose of the
application of the Protocol, while another may argue that the feeder airport
is merely a domestic airport and the flight of those passengers is a domestic
flight. While interpretations may differ, it is arguable that the safety of these
passengers forms an integral part of the safety of international civil aviation.
The confidence of the traveling public would be affected if they are not pro-
tected by uniform international rules when they are on feeder flights. From
this perspective, an airport where feeder flights for an international hub are
provided might under certain conditions be considered as “an airport serving
international civil aviation”.
Another issue relating to the scope of the applicability of the Protocol is
whether it covers the acts of States. The 1971 Montreal Convention provides
in its Article 4 that the Convention shall not apply to aircraft used in military,
customs or police services. Based on this provision, if an aircraft used for
military services is hijacked, the alleged hijacker will not be covered by the
Convention. However, does the Convention or its Protocol apply to a person
who uses a military aircraft to destroy or damage air navigation facilities or
airports serving international civil aviation, if the act of such a person is likely
to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight or the safety of airports? This issue
became a hot topic of debate when 18 States of the Arab Civil Aviation Com-
mission presented an information paper to the High-level, Ministerial Confer-
ence on Aviation Security held in Montreal on 19 and 20 February 2002. The
information paper reported the following:
On 4 December 2001, Israeli military forces attacked the Gaza International Airport,
destroyed the air navigation facilities and bombarded runways and taxiways until
the airport became unserviceable. When the Palestinian Authority attempted a repair
on 11 January 2002, the Israeli military forces bombarded once again the airport
and its facilities by aircraft, artillery and tanks, thereby destroying the runway,
the taxiways and all facilities.100
The 18 States cited the preambles of the Chicago Convention and the 1971
Montreal Convention, and considered the act of Israel as “disrespect of inter-
100 ICAO Information Paper AVSEC-Conf/02-IP/29, “Destruction of Gaza International
Airport”, 18 February 2002, at para. 2.1.
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national laws [sic], including the conventions on civil aviation security”.101
They called for “strong condemnation by the aviation community of all acts
of unlawful interference against civil aviation wherever and by whomsoever
and for whatever reason they are perpetrated”.102
The ICAO Council, after lengthy debate, adopted a resolution by 24 votes
in favour, two against and with seven abstentions,103 which reads, in part:
THE COUNCIL,
Having considered the fact that Gaza International Airport facilities were destroyed
by Israeli military forces on 4 December 2001 and 10 January 2002 so as to render
the airport inoperable;
...
Noting that such action is a violation of the principles enshrined in the Convention
on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention, 1944);
Noting that such action is contrary to the principles of the Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal Convention,
1971) and the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports
Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary thereto (Montreal Protocol, 1988),
which considers that unlawful acts of violence jeopardizing the safety of airports
disturb the safe and orderly conduct of civil aviation for all States;
…
1. Strongly condemns all acts of unlawful interference against civil aviation, wher-
ever, by whomever and for whatever reasons they are perpetrated;
2. Strongly condemns the destruction of Gaza International Airport and its air
navigation facilities;
3. Reaffirms the important role of the International Civil Aviation Organization
to facilitate the resolution of questions which may arise between Contracting
States in relation to matters affecting the safe and orderly operation of inter-
national civil aviation throughout the world;
4. Urges Israel to fully comply with the aims and objectives of the Chicago Con-
vention; …
The resolution demonstrates that the destruction of an international airport
within a contracting State could be “a matter of grave concern to the inter-
national community”.104 Military activities clearly have direct implications
for the safety of civil aviation, and it is within the competence of ICAO to
address the concern in this respect in accordance with its constitution.105
What is not clear is why the 1971 Montreal Convention and its Supplementary
101 Id. para. 2.4 to 2.7.
102 Id. para. 4.1 b).
103 ICAO Doc 9802-C/1141 C-Min. 165/1-13, Council -165th Session, Summary Minutes with Subject
Index (2002), C-Min 165/10, 13 March 2002 at 125 and 129.
104 Id. at 129.
105 See supra Ch.3 for discussions of military use of airspace and its relation with aviation safety.
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Protocol of 1988 were referred to in this resolution. The statement that the
action to destroy Gaza airport facilities “is contrary to the principles” of the
Montreal Convention and its Protocol would give the impression that the
military action of a State may also be covered by the Convention and the
Protocol, which does not seem to be the case.
The preparatory work of the Montreal Convention and its Protocol does
not indicate that the drafters envisaged the possibility of applying the offence
provisions to the official actions of State military forces.106 The history which
triggered the adoption of these instruments, as briefly mentioned above, tends
to demonstrate that the instruments were aimed at non-State actors, such as
the actors of aircraft sabotage that occurred in Europe on 21 February 1970
respectively against Swissair and Austrian Airlines, and actors participating
in the attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports.107
The safety of civil aviation would require the prevention and suppression
of all acts of unlawful interference against it, “wherever, by whomsoever and
for whatever reasons they are perpetrated”.108 On the other hand, the rule
of law also requires the precise application of an international instrument. On
previous occasions, when ICAO dealt with the acts of States which endangered
the safety of aviation, it usually referred to the Chicago Convention, but did
not mention The Hague Convention, the Montreal Convention or the Supple-
mentary Protocol.109 For instance, in a resolution adopted on 20 August 1973,
the ICAO Council condemned Israel for violating Lebanon’s sovereignty and
for the diversion and seizure of a Lebanese civil aircraft, and considered that
the actions by Israel “constitute a violation of the Chicago Convention”, but
did not refer to The Hague and Montreal Conventions.110 On the contrary,
the Council specifically recommended to the Diplomatic Conference to be held
8 days later in Rome that “it make provision in the conventions for acts of
unlawful interference committed by States.”111 This may be considered as
evidence that the Council was of the view at that time that there was no treaty
provision for acts of unlawful interference committed by States. Had The
106 ICAO Working Paper, SSG-ASC/3-WP/2, “The Importance of Including Military Exclusion
Clauses in any Amendments to the ICAO Aviation Security Instruments”, presented by
Stephen Pomper, 30 January 2007.
107 See supra notes 41, 42 and 97 and accompanying text. See also, id. SSG-ASC/3-WP/2.
108 The Council Resolution, supra note 103.
109 See, for example, Assembly Resolution A20-1: Diversion and seizure by Israeli military aircraft
of a Lebanese civil aircraft, A24-5: Extraordinary Session of the Council, A28-7: Aeronautical
consequences of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, all reproduced in ICAO Doc 9848, Assembly
Resolutions in Force (as of 8 October 2004), I-27 to I-29. See also the resolution of the Council
on 16 September 1983 regarding the tragic incident which occurred on 1 September 1983
to Korean Airlines Flight 007, in ICAO Doc 9416-C/1077, Council – Extraordinary Session,
Minutes, 1983 at 59.
110 ICAO Doc 9225-LC/178, International Conference on Air Law, Rome, August-September 1973,
Minutes and Documents (1978) at 385-386.
111 Id. at 386.
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Hague and Montreal Conventions been applicable to acts of unlawful inter-
ference by States, there would have been no need for the Council to make such
a recommendation. Coincidently, the Diplomatic Conference in Rome did not
result in any amendment to the then existing conventions,112 strongly indica-
ting that the international community was not ready to extend The Hague
and Montreal Conventions to the acts of unlawful interference by States. The
Montreal Protocol of 1978 did not change this status quo, and therefore the
lex lata remains the same: the offence provisions in these conventions and
protocol do not apply to the acts of States.
From a jurisdictional point of view, it would also be inconceivable that
these conventions and protocol could be applicable to the acts of unlawful
interference by States, since this would have implied that a State would be
subject to the jurisdiction of the criminal court of another State, which is
inconsistent with the principle of sovereign equality.
To conclude, the Montreal Supplementary Protocol does not go beyond
the scope of The Hague and Montreal Conventions. It is not applicable to acts
of unlawful interference by States, and consequently has not reached the stage
of punishing “all acts of unlawful interference against civil aviation, wherever,
by whomever and for whatever reasons they are perpetrated”.113 This task
should probably be left to the UN and its Security Council, particularly with
respect to the acts of States. However, the Protocol has moved one step further
from the previous conventions in protecting the safety of aviation. The Hague
Convention focuses only on the safety of civil aircraft, the Montreal Convention
extends the protection to air navigation facilities, and the Supplementary
Protocol further enlarges the scope of protection to the safety of airports
serving international civil aviation. The Protocol was considered as “filling
an important gap left by the unamended Montreal Convention”.114
With hindsight, it would be quite easy almost 40 years later to say that
The Hague Convention could have included the specific offences listed in the
Montreal Convention and its Supplementary Protocol under one umbrella.
Instead of consolidating all issues into one international legal instrument, ICAO
has opted to have three diplomatic conferences for three instruments in the
course of 18 years. Cheng has questioned whether this piecemeal and purely
reactive approach is the best way to tackle international problems in general
and international terrorism in particular. At the same time, he also realizes
that “the hope for any comprehensive approach, however desirable in itself,
is probably, apart from its inherent difficulties, not very realistic.”115 Rome
was not built in one day. There may not have been the momentum in 1970
to establish comprehensive coverage for crimes against the safety of civil
112 Id. the Final Act at 443 to 446.
113 The Council Resolution, supra note 103.
114 Zhao, supra note 3 at 473.
115 Cheng, supra note 3 at 38.
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aviation. On the contrary, given the fact that the delegations in The Hague
were negotiating the drafting of the instrument until the last minute, it may
have greatly risked not having The Hague Convention today had the Confer-
ence been more ambitious in its goal. Even after 18 years, the Supplementary
Protocol did not constitute the last stepping-stone towards aviation safety.
As long as aviation remains the primary target of terrorism or other acts of
unlawful interference, law-making efforts in ICAO will continue, with a view
to minimizing the adverse impact of terrorism on aviation safety.
4.5 THE MEX CONVENTION
Another major effort of ICAO to curb unlawful interference was the adoption
of the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection,
done at Montreal in 1991 (the MEX Convention). Unlike The Hague Convention,
the Montreal Convention and its Supplementary Protocol, which criminalize
certain acts, the MEX Convention has shifted from a repressive to a preventive
approach. The importance of preventive measures has long been recognized.
The system of criminal law may bring the perpetrators to justice, but will not
cure/remedy the damage caused by their criminal activities. In view of this,
ICAO has since its early days undertaken a proactive approach toward preven-
tion. In 1974, ICAO initiated the adoption of Annex 17 to the Chicago Conven-
tion, which contains specific technical measures to prevent terrorists and other
offenders from bringing weapons, explosives and any other harmful devices
and substances on board aircraft or even to airports. In 1988, the catastrophe
in Lockerbie again highlighted the need to take preventive measures through
modern technology, since it was determined that the destruction of the Pan
Am aircraft was caused by a small amount of SEMTEX, a hard-to-detect, high
performance explosive.116 Consequently, the objective of the MEX Convention
is to establish a uniform international system, under which certain explosives
will be marked by one of the detection agents specified in the Convention,
in order to enhance their detectability by certain equipment.
From a law-making perspective, the MEX Convention presents a number
of innovative features which warrant further discussion. The subject-matter
of the Convention goes beyond the traditional competence of ICAO, since the
impact of plastic explosives is not limited to the civil aviation sector. The
mandate to develop the Convention was given to ICAO by the UN Security
Council, which, in its Resolution 635, urged ICAO “to intensify its work … on
devising an international régime for the marking of plastic or sheet explosives
for the purpose of detection”. Once again, it was demonstrated that the safety
116 Augustin, J., “The Role of ICAO in Relation to the Convention on the Marking of Plastic
Explosives for the Purpose of Detection” (1992) XVII AASL 33 at 33.
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of aviation was not simply a technical matter but may have profound implica-
tions for international peace and security. Furthermore, as Augustin observes:
[E]ven without the involvement of the United Nations, it would have been proper,
and within ICAO’s constitutional framework, for the instrument to be adopted under
its auspices. The Chicago Convention, in its preamble, speaks of the “undersigned
governments having agreed on certain principles and arrangements in order that
international civil aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly manner …”
Article 44 of the same Convention refers to the aims and objectives of the Organiza-
tion as being, inter alia:
a. to insure the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation;
b. to meet the needs of the peoples of the world for safe, regular, efficient and
economic air transport; and
c. to promote safety of flight in international air navigation.
The motives underlying the adoption of the new instrument fit squarely within
these objectives.117
Obviously, the Convention represents the concerted efforts of States to limit
their own freedom of action for the sake of common safety. The regulation
of plastic explosives is closely related to the military and police functions of
States, touching the core elements of State sovereignty. On the other hand,
the Convention is not an arms control or disarmament treaty. It does not
restrict or prohibit the manufacture of plastic explosives per se. It merely
prohibits the manufacture of unmarked plastic explosives. The purpose is to
prevent these explosives from being diverted to the unlawful use against the
safety of aviation, or that of other public facilities. The object of the law-making
is not arms control, but the protection of safety. To strike a balance between
the common interests of safety and the legitimate use of explosives by the
authorities performing military and police functions, the terms of the Conven-
tion were carefully crafted to allow certain flexibility for such use. For instance,
Article IV of the Convention imposes certain obligations upon the States parties
to destroy the unmarked explosives within a certain period of time, but such
obligations do not extend to the unmarked explosives which have been incor-
porated as an integral part of duly authorized military devices.
The regime of the Convention only applies to certain explosives as defined
in the Technical Annex. The list of detection agents to be used to enhance the
detectability of explosives is also provided in the Annex. While the Technical
Annex forms an integral part of the Convention,118 its amendment procedure
differs from the body of the Convention proper. The Convention does not
contain any provision concerning the amendment to the main body of the
Convention. It is presumed that the general rules in the Vienna Convention of
the Law of Treaties will apply. According to one of the rules, the amendment
117 Id. at 51 to 52.
118 Art. X of the Convention, supra note 33 in Ch. 1.
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will bind any State which has expressed the consent to be bound by it.119
As for an amendment to the Technical Annex, the architects of the Convention
were certainly inspired by the amendment procedure applicable to the Annexes
to the Chicago Convention.120 The amendment does not require the express
consent of any State party. Instead, the ICAO Council has been given a crucial
role in the amendment process. Simply stated, the Council may, upon the
recommendation of an expert body called the International Explosives Techni-
cal Commission, propose an amendment to States parties for adoption. If the
amendment has not been objected to by five or more States parties within
ninety days from the date of notification of the amendment by the Council,
it shall be deemed to have been adopted and becomes binding on all States
parties which do not object to it.121 This procedure has been designed to cope
with the requirements of rapid technical changes which need to be incorpor-
ated into the Technical Annex promptly, without going through the lengthy
process of ratifications of a treaty amendment. At the same time, it has granted
the ICAO Council new legislative power, subject to a veto right by five or more
States. While the threshold for veto is very low, States parties are generally
cautious in exercising their veto rights. Since the conclusion of the MEX Conven-
tion in 1991, the Technical Annex has been amended twice, and none of the
amendments has been objected to by any State party. The International Ex-
plosives Technical Commission, consisting of fifteen to nineteen experts,
generally represents various geographical regions and different schools of
thought. In formulating its recommendations, it has already taken the different
views into account. Before the Council proposes the amendment for adoption,
States parties also have opportunities to comment and to participate in the
consultation process. This will minimize the need to raise a formal objection
to the amendment as a last resort. For States which do not have sufficient
expertise in this respect, it is difficult to come up with a well-reasoned ob-
jection within 90 days on a well-informed basis. They tend to base their
respective decisions upon the credibility and expertise of ICAO. This attitude
tends to reinforce the central role of the ICAO Council on this matter.
In addition to the legislative power mentioned above, Article IX of the
Convention further provides:
The Council shall, in co-operation with States Parties and international organizations
concerned, take appropriate measures to facilitate the implementation of this
Convention, including the provision of technical assistance and measures for the
119 Arts. 11 and 40, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331.
120 Report of the Rapporteur on the Subject of the Preparation of a New Legal Instrument
Regarding the Marking of Explosive for Detectability, reproduced in ICAO Doc 9801-DC/4,
International Conference on Air Law (Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the
Purpose of Detection),1991, Vol. II Documents (2002) 27 at 30 and 31.
121 Arts. VI and VII, supra note 118.
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exchange of information relating to technical developments in the marking and
detection of explosives.
This provision is based on the consideration that in aviation security, the chain
is only as strong as its weakest link. “Many developing countries can ill-afford
existing security equipment, and may be unable to finance the purchase and
maintenance of new detection equipment, or the training of staff needed to
man the equipment. Consequently, in the interests of safety of the whole
aviation community, there is a recognized need in this area for assistance to
developing countries.”122 The provision “recognized the central co-ordinating
role of the Council, but did not mandate the Council nor commit the budget
of ICAO.”123
A question has been raised whether the ICAO Council is legally competent
to assume these functions, since “there is nothing in Articles 54 (Mandatory
functions of Council) and 55 (Permissive functions of Council) of the Chicago
Convention which specifically mandates or permits the Council to assume
the functions assigned to it by the Plastic Explosives Convention”.124 When
the issue was debated at the Legal Committee, some delegations believed that
the Chicago Convention had to be amended before the Council could perform
these functions; others considered that it was a primary duty of the Council
to implement the decisions of the Assembly, since the latter had given highest
priority to the preparation of the MEX Convention.125 In the end, the latter
view prevailed.
Article 49 k) of the Chicago Convention specifies that the Assembly may
deal with “any matter within the sphere of action of the Organization not
specifically assigned to the Council”. The Assembly may also delegate to the
Council under Article 49 h) “the powers and authority necessary or desirable
for the discharge of the duties of the Organization”. From the broad terms
of these provisions, it is not ultra vires for the Council to assume the functions
assigned by the MEX Convention, since any of these functions “would simply
be a practical means of fulfilling the specific mandate given by the Assembly’s
directive on aviation security.”126 To be on the safe side, the Council, when
accepting the invitation of the Diplomatic Conference to assume these func-
tions, decided to seek the endorsement of the Assembly, which the latter gave
in its 29th Session held in September-October 1992.127
122 Augustin, supra note 116 at 48.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 55.
125 ICAO Doc 9556-LC/187, Report of the 27th Session of the Legal Committee at 3-13. See also
Augustin, id.
126 Augustin, id.
127 ICAO Doc 9746-C/1131 C-Dec 132/1-21, 133/1-22, 134/1-26 Council – 132nd, 133rd and 134th
Sessions, Summary Decisions with Subject Index, 1991, C-Dec 134/6 at 242. See also Assembly
Resolution A29-6, ICAO Doc 9600, A29-RES.
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In view of the foregoing and given previous and subsequent practice, there
seems to be no constitutional obstacle to the ICAO Assembly directing the
Council to perform certain functions even if such functions are not specified
in the Chicago Convention, provided the Assembly itself is acting within its
own competence.128 It has also been well established in the theory and
practice of international law, that the General Assembly of the United Nations,
or its counterpart in the UN specialized agencies, may decide, with binding
effect, on internal institutional matters of the relevant organization, including
the competence of the subordinated bodies, and other “house-keeping”
matters.129
It is another matter whether the Assembly may take a decision which may
affect the treaty rights and obligations of the States parties rather than those
of the Organization per se. This issue arose when the International Explosives
Technical Commission recommended in June 2002 an amendment to the
Technical Annex by increasing the minimum concentration of 2,3-Dimethyl-2,3-
Dinitrobutane (DMNB) from 0.1 to 1.0 per cent by mass.130 The increase of
the concentration of this detection agent was expected to enhance the detectab-
ility of the plastic explosives. However, there were already plastic explosives
in the stocks, which were manufactured according to the then existing
standard, with the lower concentration of the detection agent. When the new
amendment entered into force, these existing explosives became incompatible
with the new legal requirement of the higher concentration. As the Convention
requires that explosives be marked “in accordance with the Technical
Annex”,131 these existing explosives could be regarded as “unmarked”, simply
because they no longer complied with the provisions of the Technical Annex.
A question was raised whether these previously marked explosives, which
had become unmarked due to the amendment to the Technical Annex, should
be destroyed, consumed for purposes not inconsistent with the objectives of
the Convention, marked according to the new standard, or rendered per-
manently ineffective within the applicable period prescribed by Article IV,
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Convention. The International Explosives Technical
Commission recommended, in essence, an affirmative answer to this ques-
128 Augustin has cited some examples in this respect, including Resolution A1-23 authorizing
the Council to “act as an arbitral body on any differences arising among Contracting States
relating to international civil aviation, when expressly requested to do so by all parties
to such differences.” See supra note 116 at 56-59. There were also other more recent in-
stances, where the Council accepted to assume certain functions under multilateral treaties.
For example, the Council agreed to act as the supervisory authority for the registry estab-
lished under the Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on
Matters specific to Aircraft Equipment (Cape Town, 2001), ICAO Doc 9794.
129 See infra Ch.5.2.1.4 “Directive Resolutions”.
130 ICAO Assembly Working Paper A35-WP/62, “Interpretation of Art. IV of the Convention
on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection”, 12 July 2004.
131 Art. I, para. 3, the MEX Convention.
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tion.132 Some States expressed doubt as to whether the imposition of such
an obligation would be in conformity with the principle of non-retroactivity
of law.133
The relevant provisions of the MEX Convention indicate that the duty of
a State party to ensure the destruction of the explosives within the prescribed
periods exists only with respect to the “unmarked explosives which have been
manufactured in or brought into its territory prior to the entry into force of this
Convention in respect of that State.”134 The duty is not extended to unmarked
explosives manufactured in or brought into its territory prior to the entry into
force of any amendment to the Technical Annex. To illustrate, the MEX Convention
entered into force on 21 June 1998 and the amendment to the Technical Annex
concerning DMNB entered into force in 2005. For a State which is bound by
the Convention and the amendment on these respective dates, it is clear that
it has an obligation to destroy or otherwise dispose of within the specified
period the unmarked explosives which existed prior to 21 June 1998. However,
it is not clear whether it has an obligation to take the same action with regard
to the unmarked explosives manufactured or brought into its territory between
21 June 1998 and 2005, if these explosives complied with the law in force at
that period. Arguably, the law enacted in 2005 should not be retroactively
applied to the explosives manufactured before that year and States parties
have a vested right to be protected regarding these explosives. While para-
graphs 4 and 6 of Article IV of the Convention impose additional duties on
States parties to take necessary measures to ensure the destruction of these
explosives, they only require States parties to do so “as soon as possible”,
without the deadline of three years or 15 years as mentioned respectively in
paragraphs 2 and 3.
Nevertheless, it was considered highly desirable, in the interests of aviation
safety, to maintain a uniform regime for the explosives detection system,
particularly after the amendment to the Technical Annex. Otherwise, the
coexistence of different explosives marked in accordance with different criteria
would require multiple checking systems at airports, which are difficult to
implement. To resolve this problem, three options were referred to the ICAO
Legal Committee for advice. The first option was to amend the Convention
to achieve the full applicability of the amended Technical Annex, even with
some elements of retroactivity. This option was quickly dismissed since it
would be “using a hammer to strike a fly”; it was not considered worthwhile
and efficient to resolve this issue through a diplomatic conference and the
lengthy ratification process.135 The second option was to incorporate the
requirements into the Technical Annex. While this option would be expedient,
132 A35-WP/62, supra note 130 at 2.
133 Id. at para. 1.4.
134 Art. IV, paras. 1, 2 and 3, emphasis added.
135 The statement of the French Delegation. See also A35-WP/62 at para.1.4.
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a clear majority of the Legal Committee considered that the Technical Annex
was not the proper place for such action, since the mandate of the International
Explosives Technical Commission was strictly limited to technical matters.
The third option was to adopt an Assembly resolution to state that Article
IV of the Convention should be applied mutatis mutandis, without amending
either the Convention or its Technical Annex. This option was recommended
by the Legal Committee.
In September/October 2004, the ICAO Assembly adopted Resolution 35-2,
which urges the States parties to the Convention to apply Article IV in their
mutual relations in the manner specified in the four operative paragraphs of
the Resolution.136 In a nutshell, when the amendment increasing the concen-
tration of DMNB enters into force, each State party bound by the amendment
shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the explosives in its territory
which do not comply with the amendment are destroyed, or otherwise dis-
posed of in accordance with Article IV within a period of three years from
the entry into force of the amendment, if these explosives are not held by its
authorities performing military or police functions. In the case that the explos-
ives are held by its authorities performing military or police functions and
are not incorporated as an integral part of duly authorized military devices,
the time limit is 15 years instead of three years. The resolution further provides
that the same approach applies mutatis mutandis to any future amendment
to the Technical Annex unless any contracting State notifies all others and the
Council that it does not agree to such application.
This resolution presents a number of legal implications. One implication
relates to its legal effect. The member States of ICAO, instead of choosing the
long road of a diplomatic conference to amend the Convention, opted for a
short cut through an Assembly resolution to clarify the mode of application
of the provisions of a treaty. While the term used by the Assembly is “urges”,
which is generally considered as non-binding, the resolution still represents
a collective declaration by States, to be honoured in good faith. It would be
difficult for a contracting State which supported or even sponsored the resolu-
tion to declare afterward that it would not follow its urging, without giving
any reason. On the other hand, the language employed in the resolution does
not reach the threshold of a binding declaration as defined by the ICJ in the
Nuclear Tests case.137
136 ICAO Doc 9848, supra note 109 at VII-11, reproduced in Doc 9902, Assembly Resolutions in
Force (as of 28 September 2007) at VII-16.
137 Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Judgment, [1974] ICJ Reports 457at 472 para. 46. Accord-
ing to the Court, “[w]hen it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it should
become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character
of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of
conduct consistent with the declaration.”
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Alternatively, the resolution may be considered as evidence of “subsequent
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or
the application of its provisions” within the meaning of Article 31, paragraph 3
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The resolution was carefully
negotiated and drafted by legal experts of various contracting States. It is
submitted that its significance should not be considered less than the unwritten
acquiescence by States. On the other hand, the States participating at the 35th
Session of the ICAO Assembly were not exactly the same as those who are
parties to the MEX Convention, although there is a high degree of overlap
between the two groups. For States which were both participants at the 35th
Session of the Assembly and parties to the MEX Convention, Resolution A35-2
may be considered as their common understanding of certain provisions of
the Convention. For those States which were not parties to the Convention,
a theoretical question may be raised as to why they should have been involved
with the interpretation of the Convention. From a strictly legal point of view,
it would have been more appropriate if a conference of the States parties would
have been held concurrently with the 35th Session of the Assembly to formulate
and adopt such a resolution, rather than involving non-States parties.
A further question may be asked as to whether the States parties which
did not participate at the 35th Session of the Assembly may claim that they
are not bound by the resolution. This issue should be addressed by taking
into account the specific situation of the case at hand. As a matter of principle,
since a State party may denounce a treaty, it has a fortiori the right to deviate
from an Assembly resolution, particularly if it did not participate in the formu-
lation of the said resolution. From a broader perspective, a member State of
ICAO has an implied duty to cooperate with its organization. Accordingly, in
this writer’s view, a State which did not participate in the Assembly and
wishes subsequently to challenge the Assembly’s decision should at a minimum
provide a reason for its absence.
Finally, Resolution A35-2 does not limit itself to the current amendment
concerning DMNB, but also prescribes the course of conduct for future amend-
ments to the Technical Annex. In this respect, it adopts the approach of
“approval by default”, which is in vogue in ICAO: if States do not give notifica-
tion, they will be deemed to agree with the application of the resolution. The
adoption of this approach appears to confirm that Resolution A35-2 has gone
beyond the level of purely persuasive value by acquiring certain mandatory
elements. Had the Resolution been considered as purely persuasive in nature,
there would not have been any resulting requirement for States to notify others
for not following it.
Among the five international air law instruments on security adopted under
the auspices of ICAO, the MEX Convention is the only one not dealing with
criminal matters. It is designed for the prevention rather than the suppression
of terrorist and other unlawful acts. In retrospect, it is somehow regrettable
that while a regime of marking plastic explosives has been established, there
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is not yet a treaty which makes it mandatory for States to install equipment
at their airports for the purpose of detecting the marked explosives.
Consequently, the benefit of the marking system has not been fully material-
ized. This gap could still be filled by Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention,
which is the main instrument containing SARPs relating to aviation security.
As a matter of fact, the experience of ICAO has shown that it would be much
more convenient to deal with the matter of prevention in SARPs or other less
binding material. An instrument in the form of a treaty is more cumbersome
to adopt and could not promptly address the rapidly changing modes of
terrorist and other threats. For example, following the attempted attack using
man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) against a civil aircraft taking off
from Mombasa, Kenya, in November 2002, there was a debate whether a treaty
for controlling MANPADS should be developed within the auspices of ICAO.138
It was subsequently decided that ICAO would not develop such a treaty but
would participate in the work of the United Nations to negotiate an inter-
national instrument to enable States to identify and trace illicit small arms and
light weapons.139 At the same time ICAO had developed SARPs and procedures
that incorporated preventive measures on the ground, which were accessible
on the secure ICAO AVSEC website.140 All these were developed within two
years, which would be considered too short for the adoption of a treaty.141
In summary, the MEX Convention has contributed to the protection of
aviation safety by adopting a preventive approach against unlawful inter-
ference, by demonstrating the important link between aviation safety and
international peace and security, and by establishing an international regime
for the detection of plastic explosives. Its provisions, as well as the subsequent
practices relating to their application, have also provided valuable experience
138 See ICAO Council Working Paper C-WP/12238, “International Legal Instrument Dealing
with Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS)”, 13 April 2004.
139 See Statement of ICAO at the United Nations Second Biennial Meeting of States to Consider
the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, (11 to 15 July 2005) in http://
www.un.org/events/smallarms2005/regional-intlorg-pdf/ICAO.pdf. Eventually, the UN
itself did not adopt a treaty but “an international instrument of a political character”. See
UNGA A/60/88 “Report of the Open-ended Working Group to Negotiate an International
Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit
Small Arms and Light Weapons”, 27 June 2005 at para.26.
140 See UN Press Release DC/2977 (12 July 2005), statement of Jiefang Huang on behalf of
ICAO, in http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/dc2977.doc.htm.
141 There are numerous other instances in which ICAO resorted to non-treaty material to
address the issue of prevention. The issue of unruly passengers was dealt with by a
resolution of the Assembly, despite the earlier call to conclude a treaty; see infra note 119
in Ch.5. The establishment of the Public Key Directory, a computer system facilitating the
identification of travel documents, is wholly based on a memorandum of understanding
which is not a treaty; see ICAO Assembly Working Paper A36-WP/18, “Progress Made
in Implementing Resolution A35-18, Appendix D, Section III: International Cooperation
in Protecting the Security and Integrity of Passports”, 28 June 2007.
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regarding the functions of the ICAO Assembly and the Council in implementing
the regime. This regime could have been more beneficial to aviation safety,
had it been supplemented by a mandatory requirement to equip major inter-
national airports with the devices to detect the explosives which have been
marked in accordance with the Convention.
4.6 ADDRESSING NEW AND EMERGING THREATS AFTER 11 SEPTEMBER 2001
The five aviation security treaties mentioned above are valuable legal instru-
ments for combating unlawful interference against civil aviation. However,
with the passage of time and changes of circumstances, there are new and
emerging threats which are not adequately covered by these treaties. The
abhorrent terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 have provoked the rethinking
of the need to strengthen the international legal framework to protect the safety
of aviation. Immediately after the event, the ICAO Assembly adopted in Septem-
ber/October 2001 Resolution A33-1 – Declaration on misuse of civil aircraft as
weapons of destruction and other terrorist acts involving civil aviation, which, among
other things, called for the review of the adequacy of the existing aviation
security conventions. Pursuant to this resolution, the Secretariat of ICAO com-
pleted a study and a survey on legal measures to cover new and emerging
threats to civil aviation and drew a preliminary conclusion that the conventions
could be updated in several instances.142 This preliminary conclusion was
confirmed by an ICAO Study Group composed of more than ten experts from
different countries.143 A special Sub-Committee of the ICAO Legal Committee
has prepared draft texts to amend The Hague and Montreal Conventions,
which will be submitted to the Legal Committee in 2009 for further considera-
tion.144 The salient features of the draft texts include punishment of the act
to use civil aircraft in flight as a weapon, explicit criminal responsibility of
the directors and organizers of the crimes, prohibition of the use of certain
dangerous substances, exclusion of political offence exception, and criminaliza-
tion of certain credible threats.
One unforgettable lesson learned on 11 September is that civil aircraft,
which have become one of the essential means of transportation in modern
society, may be misused and diverted by terrorists to become weapons of mass
destruction. The attacks on 11 September were the aggregation of various
offences, such as the unlawful seizure of an aircraft in flight, the intentional
142 ICAO Information Paper A35-WP/88 EX/29, “ICAO Aviation Security Plan of Action,
Project 12: Legal”, 24 September 2004.
143 ICAO Council Working Paper C-WP/12851, “Final Report Relating to the Secretariat Study
Group on Aviation Security Conventions”, 20 February 2007.
144 ICAO Council Working Paper C-WP/13111, “Report on the Second Meeting of the Special
Sub-Committee of the Legal Committee on the Preparation of One or More Instruments
Addressing New and Emerging Threats”, 14 May 2008.
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destruction of an aircraft in service, acts of violence on board aircraft, murders,
and other criminal acts causing injuries and damage. While the provisions
of the existing aviation security instruments cover various components of these
offences in a somewhat piecemeal fashion,145 they do not cover all aspects
of the misuse of aircraft as weapons. For instance, the use of civil aircraft as
a weapon to cause death, injury and damage on the ground is not specifically
criminalized under the existing conventions. Moreover, using a hijacked aircraft
to murder innocent people in the air or on the ground constitutes a criminal
act of immense gravity which is utterly different from a simple hijacking for
immigration purposes without causing death or injury. The aggravated aspect
of the former is not specifically reflected in the existing conventions.
The existing conventions focus on the persons actually committing the
punishable acts, mainly on board an aircraft or at an airport, without specific
provisions addressing the persons organizing and directing the commission
of the offences. In the case of suicidal attacks similar to those on 11 September,
the attackers on board the aircraft perished during the attacks and could no
longer be held accountable under criminal law.146 It has become much more
important to pursue the directors and organizers behind the scene. While the
culprits on board aircraft may perish after their suicidal attacks, their master-
minds on the ground should not be allowed to have any safe haven. In this
connection, it should be mentioned that the more recent U.N. conventions,
such as the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings,147
and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terror-
ism,148 specifically extend the offence provisions to a person who (a) parti-
cipates as an accomplice in an offence, (b) organizes or directs others to commit
an offence, and (c) in any other way contributes to the commission of one or
more offences by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. It is
highly desirable, if not imperative, for ICAO to follow the same.
There are also other new and emerging threats to civil aviation which are
not covered or fully covered by the existing ICAO instruments, such as the act
of using biological, chemical and nuclear substances for the purposes of attacks
on board or against a civil aircraft in service, or using civil aircraft to unlawful-
145 For example, the unlawful seizure of aircraft is listed as an offence under Art. 1 of The
Hague Convention; destruction of aircraft is covered by Art. 1, para. 1(b) of the Montreal
Convention; an act of violence on board may be covered by Art. 1, para. 1(a) of the Montreal
Convention.
146 The same result occurred when suicide bombers destroyed two Russian civil aircraft on
24 August 2004. See Assembly Resolution A35-1: Acts of terrorism and destruction of Russian
civil aircraft resulting in the deaths of 90 people – passengers and crew members, in ICAO Doc
9848, supra note 109 at I-30.
147 Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1997, available
at http://untreaty.un.org.
148 Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1999, available
at http://untreaty.un.org.
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ly spread these substances for such purposes. It is noted that the use of these
substances may cause serious injury to passengers on board aircraft or at the
airports without necessarily endangering the safety of the aircraft or the
airports themselves. As a result, this act may not be covered by Article 1,
paragraph 1(a) of the Montreal Convention or Article II of the Supplementary
Protocol, which respectively provide that the act in question “is likely to
endanger” the safety of the aircraft or airport. This is particularly true when
the substances are discharged on board an aircraft or at an airport without
explosive consequences but having a delayed adverse effect against the per-
manent health of the persons on board aircraft or at the airports. For this
reason, a suggestion has been made to criminalize this type of act in a new
legal instrument.149 From this, one could also perceive that the attention of
the law-making bodies has been extended to cover not only the safety of
aircraft and airports, but also directly the safety of persons on board aircraft
and at airports.
As most of the ICAO instruments were concluded decades ago, they did
not and could not possibly include the provisions which reflect the more recent
developments in international law. It may be recalled that during the nego-
tiations of The Hague Convention, the efforts to exclude the political offence
exception were not quite successful, and the possibility of pardoning a hijacker
on political offence grounds could not be ruled out.150 As the campaign
against international terrorism developed, the international community
gradually became more receptive to the concept that terrorist acts should be
treated as ordinary rather than as political offences. A number of the more
recent international treaties specifically exclude the political offence exception.
For instance, Article 11 of the Terrorist Bombings Convention reads:
None of the offences set forth in article 2 shall be regarded, for the purposes of
extradition or mutual legal assistance, as a political offence or as an offence con-
nected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by political motives.
Accordingly, a request for extradition or for mutual legal assistance based on such
an offence may not be refused on the sole ground that it concerns a political offence
or an offence connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political
motives.151
This provision, representing the progressive development of international law,
should also be incorporated into the existing aviation security conventions.
149 See ICAO Working Paper LC/SC-NET-WP/2, “Report of the Rapporteur on the Develop-
ment of New Legal Instruments for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Civil Aviation”, 7 June 2007 at para. 46. See also Report of the Secretariat Study Group
on Aviation Security Conventions – Third Meeting (Montreal, 31 January to 2 February
2007) at para. 3.3.1.3.
150 See supra note 65 et seq and accompanying text.
151 Supra note 147.
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It may provide additional deterrence to unlawful acts against the safety of
civil aviation.
In addition to the gaps or lacunae identified above, the ICAO Study Group
was of the view that the time has arrived for criminalizing a credible threat
to commit an offence specified in the aviation security conventions. The exist-
ing conventions only criminalize commission of certain acts, but not the threat
to commit such acts. However, as pointed out by the Study Group, “a threat
to commit an act, without the actual commission of the act contemplated, may
cause grave adverse consequences to civil aviation.”152 One example in this
respect is the threat to use chemical or biological substances and other lethal
devices to seriously disrupt air transport, which may create chaos and en-
danger the safety of aviation in general, without their actual use.
The aviation security conventions concluded under the auspices of ICAO
have provided a classical and valuable legal framework. This framework has
served as a model for others and represents the pride of its architects. Never-
theless, with the passage of time, this classical framework may require certain
revamping to reflect the state of the art of the contemporary world if it is
expected to protect the safety of civil aviation continuously and effectively.
4.7 CHARACTERIZATION OF CRIMES AGAINST THE SAFETY OF CIVIL AVIATION
Among five international air law instruments adopted under the auspices of
ICAO, three instruments, namely, The Hague and Montreal Conventions and
the Supplementary Montreal Protocol, prescribe certain acts as offences. These
acts are commonly referred to in ICAO’s terminology as “acts of unlawful
interference”.153 The term is used to avoid the reference to “terrorism” or
“a terrorist act”, which has created long-standing controversies regarding its
definition.154 This term had been well understood in ICAO, until the ICAO
Council introduced in Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention the following
definition:
Acts of unlawful interference. These are acts or attempted acts such as to jeopardize
the safety of civil aviation and air transport, i.e.:
· unlawful seizure of aircraft in flight,
152 C-WP/12851, supra note 143 at para. 2.1.2.7.
153 See, for example, the Report of the 33rd Session of the Legal Committee, Attachment D, which
defines an act of unlawful interference as “an offence in the Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970, or the Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal
on 23 September 1971, and any amendment in force at the time of the event.”
154 See, for example, “Agreed Definition of Term ‘Terrorism’ Said to be Needed for Consensus
on Completing Comprehensive Convention Against it”, UN General Assembly GA/L/3276,
7 October 2005.
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· unlawful seizure of aircraft on the ground,
· hostage-taking on board aircraft or on aerodromes,
· forcible intrusion on board an aircraft, at an airport or on the premises of an
aeronautical facility,
· introduction on board an aircraft or at an airport of a weapon or hazardous
device or material intended for criminal purposes,
· communication of false information such as to jeopardize the safety of an
aircraft in flight or on the ground, of passengers, crew, ground personnel or
the general public, at an airport or on the premises of a civil aviation facility.
This definition has been criticized as being inaccurate, since it is over-exclusive
in some aspects and over-inclusive in others.155 It is over-exclusive because
it does not capture a number of the relevant offences under existing treaties.
For instance, the definition does not cover the destruction or damage of air
navigation facilities, which is an offence under Article 1, paragraph 1(d) of
the Montreal Convention. On the other hand, the definition is also alleged
to be over-inclusive because it goes beyond the scope of the existing aviation
security conventions. For instance, the reference to the “introduction on board
an aircraft or at an airport of a weapon or hazardous device or material
intended for criminal purposes” is overly broad. The current treaties adopted
under the auspices of ICAO do not contain any general prohibition on the
introduction on board an aircraft or at an airport of a weapon or other device
where the “criminal purposes” have no nexus to aircraft or airport safety.156
A person using a knife to cut through another person’s bag at an airport to
steal valuables may be considered as introducing a weapon “for criminal
purposes”, but such a person is not punishable under the treaties.
The definition was clearly introduced impromptu with haste, without
careful consideration of its implications. It demonstrated that the ICAO Council,
like everyone else, is not necessarily always correct and therefore may also
require checks and balances. It also raises the issue whether the term “unlawful
interference” is the best description for the offences listed in the three treaties
mentioned above. Indeed, the word “unlawful” may actually beg rather than
answer the question regarding what is lawful or unlawful. The word “inter-
ference” in the context of Annex 17 may have a wider connotation than the
offences listed in the three treaties. Perhaps all the offences under the treaties
may be considered as “acts of unlawful interference”, but not all “acts of
unlawful interference” constitute crimes under the treaties. For instance, a
mentally unstable person could climb the perimeter fence of an airport and
therefore “unlawfully interfere” with aircraft operations; but his act may not
amount to a crime prescribed by the treaties. A robbery of a large shipment
of diamonds at an airport is a serious crime which may be considered as
155 The statement of the United States in one of the ICAO meetings relating to aviation security.
156 Id.
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“unlawful interference”, but it will not come within the purview of the treaties
unless it endangers or is likely to endanger the safety at that airport.
In view of this, there seems to be a need to distinguish two types of
offences. One type includes those cardinal offences endangering the safety
of international civil aviation, which are subject to the specific treaty regimes,
including the principle of aut dedere aut judicare. Another type includes those
offences, and perhaps some acts, which are not subject to the specific treaty
regimes, but still have security implications. From the point of view of Annex
17, the latter type also needs to be covered for the purpose of preventing or
minimizing security risks. When a particular incident takes place on board
an aircraft or at an airport, it might be difficult to determine at first sight
whether the act in question will constitute one of the cardinal crimes regulated
by the three treaties. For the purpose of prevention, the coverage of Annex
17 should necessarily be wider than that of the three treaties. The fundamental
character of the offences established under these three treaties is that they
target the safety of civil aviation. This is very clear from the Montreal Conven-
tion and its Supplementary Protocol. The offences mentioned therein contain
the common element that the relevant act endangers or is likely to endanger
the safety of the aircraft in flight or safety at the airport.157 In The Hague
Convention, its operative part does not specifically mention that an act of
unlawful seizure of an aircraft must endanger or be likely to endanger the
safety of the aircraft in flight, but such a prerequisite seems to be implicit as
the preamble of the Convention states that “unlawful acts of seizure or exercise
of control of aircraft in flight jeopardize the safety of persons and property,
seriously affect the operation of air services, and undermine the confidence
of the peoples of the world in the safety of civil aviation”. Accordingly, the
offences under the three treaties are not simply “acts of unlawful interference”,
but should be characterized as crimes against the safety of civil aviation.
As recognized by the preambles of the three treaties, crimes against the
safety of civil aviation are a matter of grave concern to the international
community. Could they be regarded as akin to crimes against humanity? After
the abhorrent attacks on 11 September 2001, numerous statesmen and commen-
tators considered the attacks as crimes against humanity. As Cassese observes:
The terrorist attack of 11 September has been defined a crime against humanity
by a prominent French jurist and former Minister of Justice, Robert Badinter, by
the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, as well as by the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights, Mary Robinson. Distinguished international lawyers have taken
the same view. Indeed, that atrocious action exhibits all the hallmarks of crimes
against humanity: the magnitude and extreme gravity of the attack as well as the
157 See supra notes 77 and 98 and accompanying text.
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fact that it has targeted civilians, is an affront to all humanity, and part of a wide-
spread or systematic practice.158
Accordingly, there seems to be a prevailing view that large-scale acts exhibiting
the atrocious elements of the 11 September attacks, or similar attacks, fall
within the notion of a crime against humanity, so long as they meet the re-
quirements of that category of crime.159
There are of course cases in which crimes against the safety of civil aviation
do not reach the magnitude of 11 September and therefore may not fulfil the
“widespread or systematic” requirement of crimes against humanity. In those
cases, can these crimes also be considered as “an affront to all humanity”?
There have been suggestions from early on that hijackers be treated as airborne
analogues of pirates and characterized as “hostis humani generis”, enemies of
the human race.160 Undeniably, piracy, hijacking and other serious crimes
covered by international law share similar features in their treatment, such
as wide jurisdiction over the offences, severe punishment of the offenders,
and strong reaction by the international community as a whole to the serious
threats presented by the offences.
The existence of universal or quasi-universal jurisdiction may be considered
as one of the indicators of the seriousness of the crime in question. Piracy has
been subject to universal jurisdiction by international customary law. While
the term “universal jurisdiction” is not used in The Hague Convention, the
wide jurisdictional grounds provided by the Convention, coupled with the
provision that “this Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction
exercised in accordance with national law”,161 suggest that universal juris-
diction is not prohibited. As pointed out by Judge Oda in his dissenting
opinion in Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Belgium):
158 Cassese, A., “Terrorism Is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International
Law” (2001)12 EJIL 993 at 994. According to Cassese, Badinter and Annan have made
statements to the French radio and CNN respectively. For the statement of Robinson, see
UN Daily Highlights, 25 September 2001, http://www.un.org/News/dh/20010925.htm.
159 Cassese, id. Arnold, R., “The Prosecution of Terrorism as a Crime Against Humanity”, 64
ZaöRV 979 (2004); Ratner, M., “A Crime against Humanity and not War: Making Us Safer
at Home and Stopping Carnage Abroad” (2001) HeinOnline -- 58 Guild Practitioner 131;
Mallat, C., “The original sin: ‘Terrorism’ or ‘crime against humanity’?” (2002) 34 Case Western
Reserve Journal of International Law 245. Opinions are still divided whether such a crime
may be prosecuted under the current Statute of the International Criminal Court or not.
Moreover, Cassese is of the view that in considering the attacks of 11 September as a crime
against humanity, no special account should be taken of one of the specific features of
terrorism, namely, the intent to spread terror among civilians.
160 Joyner, N. D., Aerial Hijacking as an International Crime (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1974).
161 Art. 4, para. 3 of The Hague Convention and Art. 5, para. 3 of the Montreal Convention.
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From the base established by the Permanent Court’s decision in 1927 in the “Lotus”
case, the scope of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction has been expanded over the
past few decades to cover the crimes of piracy, hijacking, etc. Universal jurisdiction
is increasingly recognized in cases of terrorism and genocide.162
In fact, the jurisdiction under The Hague Convention, and also that under the
Montreal Convention is broader than the jurisdiction under the Genocide
Convention, since the latter only refers to “a competent tribunal of the State
in the territory of which the act was committed” and an “international penal
tribunal”.163 The Hague and Montreal Conventions are also comparable to
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment.164 Arguably they even go beyond the traditional jurisdictional
ground for piracy since the latter authorizes but does not oblige States to
162 [2002] ICJ Reports 3 at 51.
163 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, New York, 9 December
1948, 78 UNTS 277. Art. VI of the Convention provides: “Persons charged with genocide
or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal
of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal
tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have
accepted its jurisdiction.” For the jurisdiction of The Hague Convention, see supra notes
73 and accompanying text.
164 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
New York, 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85. Art. 5 of that Convention reads:
1.Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction
over the offences referred to in Article 4 in the following cases:
1. When the offences are committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or on board a
ship or aircraft registered in that State;
2. When the alleged offender is a national of that State;
3. When the victim was a national of that State if that State considers it appropriate.
2.Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged offender is present in any territory
under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him pursuant to Article 8 to any of the States
mentioned in Paragraph 1 of this Article.
3.This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with
internal law.
The wording and even the structure of this article follow the pattern of Art. 4 of The Hague
Convention, except its para.1, subparas. 2 and 3 concerning the new grounds of jurisdiction
based on active and passive nationalities. With respect to these new grounds of jurisdiction,
they are not reflected in The Hague and Montreal Conventions but are reflected in Art. 7
of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, to which The
Hague and Montreal Conventions are annexed as its integral part. The ICAO Legal Sub-
Committee has also proposed to amend The Hague and Montreal Conventions to include
these jurisdictional grounds. See supra note 144, the Report of the Second Meeting of the
Special Committee on the Preparation of Legal Instrument(s) Addressing New and Emerging
Threats (June 2008), Appendices 4 and 5. Based on this widespread and representative
practice, it may be argued that there is emerging opinio juris that the jurisdiction on the
basis of active and passive nationalities in the context of The Hague and Montreal Conven-
tions have been accepted as customary rule independent of any provision of a treaty.
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exercise the jurisdiction.165 On the basis of this, it seems safe to conclude
that as far as jurisdiction is concerned, the international community has given
at least the same serious treatment to aircraft hijacking, as well as to other
crimes against the safety of civil aviation, as it does to such international crimes
as piracy, genocide and torture.
The severity of punishment regarding hijacking and other crimes against
the safety of civil aviation is also comparable to piracy and other international
crimes. Piracy is a criminal act which every State is authorized to punish.
Crimes against the safety of civil aviation are declared by both The Hague
and Montreal Conventions as “punishable by severe penalties”. Arguably, the
reference to “severe penalties” is stronger than “to provide effective penalties”
in Article V of the Genocide Convention and “punishable by appropriate
penalties which take into account their grave nature” in Article 4 of the Torture
Convention.
Last but not least, piracy and hijacking represent serious threats to the
international community as a whole and call for global concerted action to
suppress them. Gentili wrote in 1612: ‘Pirates are common enemies, and they
are attacked with impunity by all, because they are without the pale of the
law. They are scorners of the law of nations; hence they find no protection
in that law.’166 The same applies to hijackers and other similar attackers
against the safety of civil aviation. Their vicious attacks on humanity transcend
individual States to become the grave concern of the international community.
They are “common enemies” and “scorners of the law of nations”. Accordingly,
global concerted action is required so that “they are attacked with impunity
by all”.
In view of the foregoing, there are good reasons to argue that hijacking,
as well as other crimes against the safety of civil aviation under the Montreal
Convention have been ranked by the international community as serious
international crimes having similar status as the crimes against humanity,
piracy and torture. They constitute an affront to all humanity and are punish-
able by all.
4.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS
From the treaty-making activities of ICAO concerning the protection of civil
aviation against acts of unlawful interference, one could discern a clear trend
which is moving in the direction of strengthening the paramount consideration
of aviation safety, and limiting the scope of the traditional freedom of action
by States. In its efforts to curb terrorism and other acts of unlawful interference,
165 See supra note 73.
166 Alberico Gentili, De Iure Belli Libri Tres (1612) 423 (John C. Rolfe trans., William S. Hein
& Co., Inc., 1995).
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the international community has expanded, step by step, the scope of treaty
protection for civil aviation operations. At the initial stage, the protection by
treaties was extended to aircraft in flight, as provided in the Tokyo and The
Hague Conventions; at a later stage, treaty protection was extended to aircraft
in service and to air navigation facilities under the Montreal Convention; it
was later extended to airports serving international civil aviation and to aircraft
not in service under the Supplementary Protocol. There are also ongoing efforts
to extend the protection directly to persons on board aircraft and at airports
by criminalizing certain acts of using biological, chemical and nuclear sub-
stances. Moreover, efforts have been made to apply the treaty provisions not
only to those persons who actually commit the acts of hijacking, sabotage,
and other acts against the safety of international civil aviation, but also to the
masterminds of such acts, such as directors and organizers. The international
community has gradually progressed from its initial reluctance to deny political
asylum to aerial hijackers, to the predominant, if not the unanimous view,
that the political offence exception should not apply to this type of perpetrator.
There is, to say the least, an emerging consensus that abhorrent terrorist acts
such as those committed on 11 September 2001 constitute crimes against
humanity and therefore the perpetrators should not be allowed to find any
safe haven. The firm determination of the international community to suppress
and prevent these acts, the wide jurisdictional grounds for the offences and
the exclusion of the political offence exception all point to the conclusion that
like pirates, perpetrators of hijacking and sabotage against civil aviation must
be declared as hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.167 Parallel to
this development, it has also been recognized that preventive action is more
important then punitive action ex post facto. Consequently, international regula-
tion has been extended to such areas as the manufacture of plastic explosives.
This exercise, coupled with the universal security audit programme initiated
by ICAO, demonstrate the increasing presence of international authority in the
traditionally exclusive domain of sovereign States, thereby reinforcing the belief
that the safety of international aviation is a common concern. It should be
pointed out, however, using a new treaty for preventive action appears to be
an exception to the rule, since most preventive measures are embodied in the
SARPs and other less binding regulatory material, whereas the treaty regimes
are reserved for more serious crimes.
167 See infra note 83 in Ch.5.
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5.1 SAFETY OBLIGATIONS AND FUNDAMENTAL NORMS
5.1.1 Safety and Obligations Erga Omnes
As demonstrated in earlier chapters, the main connotations of safety obligations
include the duty to provide safety oversight, the duty to refrain from the use
of weapons against civil aircraft in flight, and the duty to punish certain
criminal acts endangering the safety of civil aviation. Further analysis is
necessary as to the nature of these obligations. Are they obligations inter se
on the basis of reciprocity or obligations toward the international community
as a whole, namely, obligations erga omnes? Determination of this issue may
have a bearing upon the enforcement of these obligations and ICAO’s present
and future role in the aviation community.
According to Simma, now a judge in the International Court of Justice,
traditional international law is essentially “bilaterally minded”; it “does not
generally oblige States to adopt a certain conduct in the absolute, urbi et orbi,
as it were, but only in relation to the particular State or States (or other inter-
national legal persons) to which a specific obligation under treaty or customary
law is owed.”1 In the words of the International Court of Justice in its Repara-
tion for Injuries opinion, “only the party to whom an international obligation
is due can bring a claim in respect of breach”.2 As Simma further observes,
“an injured State may also renounce such a claim unilaterally. In this case,
third States will have no possibility to object to such a course of action.”3
The development of contemporary international law has gone beyond
traditional bilateralism and focused more on community interest. In its ad-
visory opinion in the Reservations to the Genocide Convention case, the ICJ pointed
out that in such a convention, “the contracting States do not have any interests
of their own; they merely have, one and all, common interest, namely, the
1 Simma, B., “From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law” (1994:IV) 250
RdC 217 at 230.
2 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, [1949]
ICJ Reports 174 at 181.
3 Simma, supra note 1, at 231.
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accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison d’être of the
convention”4 In the Barcelona Traction case, the Court manifestly referred to
this type of obligation as obligation “erga omnes” (towards all) in the following
obiter dictum:
… an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State
towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another
State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the
concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States
can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga
omnes.
Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the
outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and
rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from
slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection
have entered into the body of general international law … others are conferred
by international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character.5
Since then, the concept of obligations erga omnes has been a fascinating subject
repeatedly discussed in the judgements of the ICJ,6 in the reports of the Inter-
national Law Commission, and in innumerable publications.7 While its legal
4 Advisory Opinion, [1951] ICJ Reports 15 at 23. See also, “Fragmentation of International
Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law”,
Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti
Koskenniemi, in UN General Assembly A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006 at 195 (hereinafter
referred to as “ILC Study”).
5 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain) Judgement, [1970]
ICJ Reports 3 at 32.
6 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America) Merits, Judgement [1986] ICJ Reports 14 at 100-101 para. 190; see also Legal Conse-
quences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion,
[2004] ICJ Reports 136 at 155 (hereinafter referred to as “the Wall case”).
7 ILC Study, supra note 4; Seiderman, I. D., Hierarchy in International Law: The Human Rights
Dimension (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2001) at 123; Allott, P., Eunomia. New Order for a New
World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) at 324; Weil, “Towards Relative Normativity
in International Law?” (1983) 77 AJIL 413, Tams, C. J., Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes
in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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significance is still hotly debated,8 the concept itself “has been deeply rooted
in international practice”.9
5.1.1.1 Obligations towards “the International Community as a Whole”
One of the characteristics of obligations erga omnes is their universality and
non-reciprocity, i.e., they are obligations of a State “towards the international
community as a whole”, which are “the concern of all States”. The corres-
ponding rights to these obligations “have entered into the body of general
international law” or “are conferred by international instruments of a universal
or quasi-universal character.”
The reference to “international community as a whole” in the Barcelona
Traction case could hardly be a pure coincidence, if one recalls that one year
before that judgement, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the Vienna
Convention) defined the “peremptory norm (jus cogens)” as “a norm accepted
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole”.10
Subsequently, the term has been used in various fora “in an almost inflationary
way”.11 Nevertheless, “the concept denotes an overarching system which
embodies a common interest of all States and, indirectly, of mankind.”12 It
is the prioritization of common interest as against the egoistic interests of
individuals that distinguishes a “community” from its components.13 Based
on this priority, some commentators tend to consider obligations erga omnes
as “non-reciprocal” or “non-bilateralisable”, in the sense that they exceed the
reciprocal legal relations between pairs of States, and all States have a legal
8 For the views expressing certain reservation, see, for example, the separate opinion of Judge
Higgins, as she then was, in the Wall case, in which she stated that “[t]he Court’s celebrated
dictum in Barcelona Traction … is frequently invoked for more than it can bear. Regrettably,
this is now done also in this Opinion … That dictum was directed to a very specific issue
of jurisdictional locus standi. … It has nothing to do with imposing substantive obligations
on third parties to a case.” She added: “That an illegal situation is not to be recognized
or assisted by third parties is self-evident, requiring no invocation of the uncertain concept
of ‘erga omnes’. … The obligation upon United Nations Members of non-recognition and
non-assistance does not rest on the notion of erga omnes.” [2004] ICJ Report at 1009 (separate
opinion of Judge Higgins) paras. 37 and 38, see also, ILC Study, supra note 4 at 201.
9 ILC Study, supra note 4 at 193.
10 Article 53, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, 8
International Legal Materials (1969) 679.
11 Simma, supra note 1 at 244. See, for example, UN General Assembly resolution ES-10114
adopted on 8 December 2003 at its Tenth Emergency Special Session, which underlines
the “unanimous opposition by the international community” to the construction of the wall
in the occupied Palestinian territory, as cited in the Wall case, supra note 6 at 140. For other
examples, see Dupuy, R. J., La communauté internationale entre le mythe et l‘histoire (Paris:
Economica, 1986) at 15. Allott, supra note 7.
12 Tomuschat, C., “Obligations Arising for States without or against their Will” (1993) 241
RdC 209 at 227.
13 Dupuy, supra note 11at 15.
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interest in their observance.14 These obligations “are grounded not in an
exchange of rights and duties but in an adherence to a normative system”.15
The Chicago Convention was adopted in 1944, when the bilateral or reci-
procal mode of operation was prevailing in inter-State relationships, and the
concept of erga omnes was not yet proclaimed. There is evidence, however,
that certain safety obligations “are grounded not in exchange of rights and
duties but in an adherence to a normative system”.16 One of the most im-
portant aims and objectives of ICAO, as pronounced in Article 44 of the Chicago
Convention, is to insure “the safe and orderly growth of international civil
aviation throughout the world”. The underlying rationale clearly “denotes
an overarching system which embodies a common interest of all States and,
indirectly, of mankind.”17 To illustrate, according to Article 33 of the Chicago
Convention, certificates of airworthiness and certificates of competency and
licenses must at least meet the minimum standards established under the
Convention. If a member State does not impose the minimum standards in
the issuance of the certificates or licenses, other member States may refuse
to recognize the validity of certificates and licenses issued by the non-comply-
ing State but could not take retaliatory action by, for example, reducing their
own requirements for the certificates of airworthiness for aircraft flying to that
State. The non-complying State, on the other hand, could not legally refuse
to recognize the validity of certificates and licenses issued by other States,
solely on the ground that the latter States have refused to recognize the validity
of the certificates and licenses issued by the former. The safety standards laid
down within the framework of the Chicago Convention are designed to protect
the common interests of the international civil aviation community and to
enhance the global normative system for the safety of civil aviation. They are
not pronounced on the basis of quid pro quo, under which States could derogate
from obligations inter se. A State is obliged to comply with the requirement
irrespective of how other States may have behaved. In other words, States are
not pursuing their national, individual interests. Instead, they had a “common
interest, namely, the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the
raison d’être of the convention”.18 The obligations are therefore incurred
14 Annacker, C., “The Legal Regime of Erga Omnes Obligations under International Law”
(1994) 46 Austrian Journal of Public International Law 131. She stated that “The distinguishing
feature of an obligation erga omnes is its non-bilateral structure.” See, also, the summary
of Tams concerning the structural approach, supra note 7 at 130 et seq.
15 Provost, R., “Reciprocity in Human Rights and Humanitarian Law” (1994:IV) 65 BYIL 383
at 386.
16 See Provost, id.
17 See Tomuschat supra note 12.
18 A statement in Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Advisory Opinion, supra note 4 at 23.
See also ILC Study, supra note 4 at 195.
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toward the international community as a whole or at least towards all of the
member States of ICAO.19
Even before the pronouncement of the celebrated dictum in the Barcelona
Traction case, Fitzmaurice, who later became a judge at the ICJ, already men-
tioned that certain obligations are in the nature of jus cogens, compliance with
which is “not dependent on corresponding compliance by others, but is re-
quisite in all circumstances, unless under stress of literal vis major”.20 He
specifically mentioned, for example, the obligation to maintain certain
standards of safety of life at sea and emphasized that “no amount of non-
compliance” on the part of other States “could justify a failure to observe”
the obligation. This remark applies, a fortiori, to the obligation to maintain
certain standards of safety of life in the air, since civil aviation is not only
essentially international by its nature, but is also more vulnerable than mari-
time transport. “When safety standards and procedures are involved on
international flights, one cannot even take the position that non-compliance
by a sovereign State affects only the citizens of that State. Any other State that
receives flights of aircraft registered in the non-complying State has every
reason to be concerned about whether international standards and procedures
are in fact being followed with respect to such aircraft and crews.”21 For this
reason, the ICAO Assembly recognizes that a primary objective of ICAO is to
ensure the safety of international civil aviation “worldwide”, and that member
States also have this responsibility “both collectively and individually”.22 In
a nutshell, certain safety obligations, such as those under Article 33 of the
Chicago Convention, are not designed for reciprocal purposes, but for higher
aims. They are grounded “in an adherence to a normative system”, namely,
a normative system for promoting the safe and orderly development of inter-
national civil aviation.
5.1.1.2 “The Importance of the Rights Involved”
The obligations owed to the international community could acquire erga omnes
status only “[i]n view of the importance of the rights involved”.23 While the
Court does not indicate the criteria for determining the degree of importance,
19 It may be argued that the obligations arising from the Chicago Convention are obligations
among the parties to that treaty. However, since the Chicago Convention has 190 parties,
it would most likely meet with the criteria of “international instruments of a universal or
quasi-universal character” as mentioned in Barcelona Traction case. For all practical purposes,
it may be argued that the 190 States parties to the Chicago Convention do represent the
international community as a whole.
20 Fitzmaurice, G., “The General Principles of International Law” (1957:II) 92 RdC 1 at 120.
21 Kotaite, A., supra note 221 in Ch.2.
22 Assembly Resolution A35-7; the 1st and 2nd paras, in ICAO Doc 9848, supra Ch.1, note 48
at I-60.
23 ICJ Reports, supra note 5; see also Tams, supra note 7 at 136.
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it does state that obligations erga omnes may derive “from the principles and
rules concerning basic rights of the human person, including the protection
from slavery and racial discrimination”.24 A significant number of scholars
appear to agree that obligations erga omnes reflect “certain overriding universal
values”, such values include “a sense of humanity” and “respect for human
rights”.25 In its Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences of the Construction
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Court mentions that a great
many rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict are fundamental
to the respect of the human person and “elementary considerations of human-
ity”. These rules “incorporate obligations which are essentially of an erga omnes
character.”26 From this, it could be deduced that “elementary considerations
of humanity” is one of the core values underlying the concept of obligations
erga omnes.
Aviation safety is directly linked to the most important basic human right,
the right to life. As pointed out by Ramcharan, “[t]here can be no issue of more
pressing concern to international law than to protect the life of every human
being from unwarranted deprivation.”27 A threat to aviation safety is a threat
to life. According to a psychological study, safety is one of the few “basic
human needs like food, shelter and health”.28 The need for safety is even more
obvious in the context of aviation. As stated in a working paper presented
by the Kingdom of the Netherlands: “Aviation takes place in a hostile environ-
ment, unfriendly to human beings, in which a passenger has no control and
is enclosed in a vulnerable cocoon, outside of which human life cannot be
supported.”29 Under these circumstances, it is of paramount importance to
offer protection against threats to life.
The link between aviation safety and elementary consideration of humanity
is convincingly demonstrated in cases relating to shooting-down of civil aircraft
as well as terrorist attacks on civil aviation. When the ICAO Assembly adopted,
24 Id.
25 For more discussion on obligations erga omnes and “universal values”, see Gowlland-Debbas,
V., “Judicial Insights into Fundamental Values and Interests of the International Com-
munity”, in Muller, A.S., et al (eds.), The International Court of Justice. Its Future Role after
Fifty Years (The Hague, Kluwer, 1977) at 335-342; Tam, supra note 7 at 3; ILC Study, supra
note 4 at 195 para. 385. For the influence of universal values on international law, see
Schrijver, N., “The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty” (1999) 70 BYIL 65 at 89, where
he mentions that in addition to international peace and security, other universal values
include a sense of humanity, respect for human rights, sustainable development of all
countries, alleviation of poverty and environmental conservation.
26 ICJ Reports, supra note 8 at 199 (para. 157).
27 Ramcharan, B.G., “The Concept and Dimensions of the Right to Life” in Ramcharan, B.G..
ed. The Right to Life in International Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985) 1
at 2.
28 ICAO Working Paper, DGCA/97-IP/5, “Safety Oversight, An International Responsibility”,
20 October 1997 at para. 5.5.
29 Id. at para. 5.5.
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on 10 May 1984, Article 3 bis to the Chicago Convention, prohibiting the use
of weapons against civil aircraft in flight, the Assembly declared that the safety
and the lives of persons on board civil aircraft must be assured in “keeping
with elementary considerations of humanity”.30 As mentioned previously,
the case decided by the constitutional court of Germany further emphasizes
that the right to life as such should not be deprived of.31 Moreover, reacting
to the abhorrent terrorist acts on 11 September 2001, the ICAO Assembly
strongly condemned such terrorist acts as “contrary to elementary considera-
tions of humanity”.32 In summary, aviation safety, in the final analysis, is
rooted in the elementary considerations of humanity.
5.1.1.3 Concern of All States
The very nature of obligations erga omnes determines that such obligations
are the concern of all States. Consequently all States can be held to have a legal
interest in their protection. “What this probably means is that it is only through
being a member of this community that an individual State requires a legal
interest in the protection of such norms. …Only if the community of States
is entitled to demand fulfillment of an obligation we are [sic] in the presence
of a true rule with effect erga omnes.”33 While obligations erga omnes do not
deprive an individual State of the capacity to react to the breach of an obliga-
tion, their distinct character is reflected in the capacity of other States which
are not directly injured to take counter-measures against the State which is
in breach of such obligations.
In the context of civil aviation, two instances have been cited by commenta-
tors as examples of counter-measures against the breach of erga omnes.34 The
first relates to the “Bonn Declaration on Air-Hijacking” of 1978,35 in which
the seven heads of State or government of the economic summit (G7) under-
took to act in concert against any country harbouring hijackers. In 1981, when
Afghanistan provided refuge to the hijackers of a Pakistani aircraft, these seven
States proposed to suspend all flights to and from Afghanistan and called upon
all States which share their concern for air safety to take appropriate action
to compel Afghanistan to honour its obligations under The Hague Convention.
The non-punishment of hijackers is therefore regarded as “a violation of an
30 Protocol Relating to an Amendment to the Convention on International Civil Aviation
[Article 3 bis], ICAO Doc 9436.
31 See Ch. 3, in particular 3.1.3 “Revisiting Article 3 bis in the Context of 11 September 2001”.
32 ICAO Assembly Resolution A33-1: “Declaration on misuse of civil aircraft as weapons of
destruction and other terrorist acts involving civil aviation” at the third paragraph, in ICAO
Doc 9848, supra note 22 at VII-1.
33 Simma, supra note 1 at 298.
34 Frowein, J. A., “Reaction by Not Directly Affected States to Breaches of Public International
Law” (1994:V) 248 RdC 345 at 417-420. Tam, supra note 7 at 217 and 225.
35 17 ILM (1978) at 1285.
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obligation for the safety of international air traffic.”36 The action taken by
the seven States implicitly recognized, at least from their point of view, that
States are under an obligation erga omnes to refrain from providing safe haven
for hijackers. When such an obligation is breached, even States which are not
directly injured may take counter-measures against the violating State.
The second example of counter-measures relates to the aerial incident
involving the Korean airliner, Flight 007, which was shot down on 1 September
1983 by the Soviet Union. In this case, despite the fact that they were not
directly injured by the act of the Soviet Union, certain States still took action
to suspend the landing rights of Soviet civil aircraft in their territory. Moreover,
the ICAO Council adopted a resolution on 6 March 1984, pointing out that such
use of armed force “constitutes a grave threat to the safety of international
civil aviation” and “is incompatible with the norms governing international
behaviour and elementary considerations of humanity.”37 This seems to
support that the prohibition of the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight
is an obligation erga omnes. The breach of such an obligation will entitle any
State to take counter-measures whether or not it has suffered any individual
injury.
While there is still controversy on the issue of third party intervention,
the above-mentioned actions of third parties lend some support to the argu-
ment that the outlawing of hijacker-harbouring and the prohibition of the use
of weapons against civil aircraft in flight may be considered as rules reflecting
obligations erga omnes. With respect to the duty to provide safety oversight,
further analysis is required because such a duty involves positive prescriptions.
Some doubts have been expressed in academic circles whether positive obliga-
tions may acquire erga omnes status.
5.1.1.4 Positive Prescriptions of Obligations Erga Omnes
The examples of obligations erga omnes cited by the International Court of
Justice, such as the outlawing of acts of aggression and of genocide, are viewed
as negative obligations rather than positive obligations.38 A negative obligation
commands its bearer to abstain or refrain from performing certain acts, whereas
a positive obligation commands its bearer to do or perform certain acts.39
Since obligations erga omnes in international law are considered analogous to
public law obligations or public policy in domestic law,40 views have been
36 Frowein, supra note 34 at 418.
37 ICAO Doc 9416, C/1077, C-Min, Extraordinary, Minutes (1983) at 59. See also supra Ch.3,
note 24.
38 Ragazzi, M., The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1997) at 133.
39 Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence at 346.
40 ILC Study supra note 4 at 200 para. 395.
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expressed that all rules of public policy “are merely disabling”, in the sense
that they can do no more than prohibit “anything contrary to the supreme
interests of international society.”41 Moreover, “the implementation of positive
prescriptions depends on the particular circumstances, which may or may not
allow a positive prescription to achieve its stated aim.”42 Consequently, some
writers are inclined to hold the view that obligations erga omnes must have
a prohibitory content.43
If this reasoning is followed, the duty to provide safety oversight will not
qualify as an obligation erga omnes. Nevertheless, even if the examples cited
in the famous orbiter dictum of the Barcelona Traction case may be considered
as only encompassing negative obligations, it does not mean the ICJ has fore-
closed the possible existence of obligations erga omnes in positive prescriptions.
On the contrary, there are some instances in which the Court refers to positive
rules in the context of obligations erga omnes, since negative obligations will
also give rise to corresponding positive action.44 In its Advisory Opinion in
the Wall case, the Court, in affirming that the right of peoples to self-determina-
tion has an erga omnes character, refers to the provision of the UN General
Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) that “[e]very State has the duty to promote,
through joint and separate action, realization of the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples, in accordance with the provisions of the
Charter, and to render assistance to United Nations in carrying out the respons-
ibilities entrusted to it by the Charter regarding the implementation of the
principle . . .”(emphasis added).45 From this, it may be perceived that the
right of self-determination, which has an erga omnes character, also carries with
it certain positive obligations.
International law in general has long evolved from “an essentially negative
code of rules of abstention to positive rules of cooperation”.46 Ramcharan
observes:
[I]n its modern sense, the right to life encompasses not merely protection against
intentional or arbitrary deprivation of life, but also places a duty on the part of
each government to pursue policies which are designed to ensure access to the
41 Schwarzenberger, G., “International Jus Cogens?” at 469, cited by Ragazzi, supra note 38
at 151.
42 Ragazzi, supra note 38 at 152.
43 Id. at 153.
44 In the Corfu Channel case, the prohibition of unnotified mining will give rise to the positive
obligation to give notice, see supra note 11 in Ch.3. In the Case Concerning the Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzego-
vina v. Serbia and Montenegro) Judgment of 27 February 2007 [2007] ICJ Reports 1 at 44 et seq.
at paragraphs 155-179, the prohibition of genocide, which could be characterized as a
negative obligation, entails the positive obligation to prevent and punish the acts of geno-
cide.
45 Supra note 6, at paragraph 150.
46 Friedmann, W., The Changing Structure of International Law (New York, 1964) at 62.
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means of survival for every individual within its country. If, after its best efforts,
in good faith, a government is unable to meet the survival requirements of its own
people, then a residual duty vests upon the international community to assist
through appropriate forms of international cooperation.47
In international civil aviation, numerous legal obligations involve both negative
and positive prescriptions. For instance, the obligation to refrain from resorting
to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight may be regarded as a
negative prescription, but the corresponding and incidental obligation to have
due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft when issuing regulations
for aircraft used in military and police services is of a positive nature.
In the context of the obligations to prevent unlawful interference against
civil aviation, positive prescriptions are not limited to undertakings correspond-
ing or incidental to prohibitive prescriptions, but have been developed into
a system which is predominantly composed of positive principles and rules.
To illustrate with the Montreal Convention of 1971, when outlawing certain
acts of sabotage against the safety of civil aviation, the Convention also lays
down certain correspondent obligations, such as the famous obligation to
extradite the alleged offenders or submit the case to competent authorities
for the purpose of prosecution, as well as the obligation to provide assistance
in criminal proceedings. The Convention goes even further than that by pro-
viding that the contracting States shall, in accordance with international and
national law, endeavour to take all practicable measures for the purpose of
preventing the offences mentioned in the Convention.48 Moreover, beyond
the Montreal Convention, Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention requires
member States of ICAO to establish a national aviation security programme,
while the MEX Convention imposes obligations upon its State parties regarding
a detection system against plastic explosives. All these form the international
system of positive prescriptions, without which the global concern for aviation
safety would not be adequately addressed.
With respect to the positive prescriptions of obligations relating to safety
oversight, the main issue is how to measure a State’s compliance. Unlike
prohibitive rules which have the virtue of binding in absolute terms, “the
implementation of positive prescriptions depends on the particular circum-
stances, which may or may not allow a positive prescription to achieve its
stated aim.”49 The implementation of safety oversight obligations will depend
upon available financial and technical means. Due to differing stages of devel-
opment, not all States will achieve the same results from their respective safety
oversight functions. However, this does not mean that positive prescriptions
regarding safety oversight could not find their place in obligations erga omnes.
47 Ramcharan, supra note 27 at 6.
48 Article 10, para.1.
49 Ragazzi, supra note 38 at 152.
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As mentioned above,50 the obligation to promote the realization of the right
of self-determination does not prevent the principle of self-determination from
obtaining the erga omnes status. Similarly, the existence of positive prescriptions
concerning the duty of safety oversight should not present obstacles to its being
categorized as an obligation erga omnes.
There has been consensus in ICAO that member States “collectively and
individually” assume the responsibility for “ensuring the safety of international
civil aviation”.51 By virtue of this conviction, member States are required to
do something to promote aviation safety. They certainly do not have the right
to do nothing. This obligation does not require a State to guarantee that there
is no aerial accident in its jurisdiction, but it does require the State to take all
necessary measures to implement the safety standards, or at least to demon-
strate that it is impossible to take such measures. A practical question may
arise concerning how to evaluate the extent and specificity of the obligation.
“In this area, the notion of ‘due diligence’, which calls for an assessment in
concreto, is of critical importance.”52 The ICAO audit process may provide
means to verify whether a particular State has fulfilled the obligation of safety
oversight under particular circumstances. In this connection, it should be noted
that Ragazzi, while generally favouring the argument that obligations erga
omnes must have a prohibitive content, does indicate that “the identification
and enforcement of positive obligations erga omnes would require, in practice,
a high degree of cohesion within the international community”.53 The ini-
tiatives of ICAO in establishing audit programmes, and their follow-up, may
be considered as one stepping stone toward the realization of such cohesion
within the international civil aviation community.
In summary, safety obligations are laid down not for the interest of an
individual State, but for a higher purpose: the safe and orderly development
of international civil aviation. These obligations “are grounded not in an
exchange of rights and duties but in an adherence of a normative system.”54
In essence, they are intrinsically linked to elementary considerations for
humanity. Such considerations become important in an aviation context with
the rapid growth of this mode of transportation and with the increase of
terrorist activities. This concern transcends territorial boundaries and national-
ities, and has become the concern of the international community as a whole.
One can find some evidence to demonstrate that when aviation safety is
jeopardized due to such acts as hijacking or the use of weapons against civil
50 Supra notes 6 and 45, the Wall case.
51 Assembly Resolution A35-7, supra note 22, superseded by Resolution A36-2 of the same
title, in ICAO Doc 9902, Assembly Resolutions in Force (as of 28 September 2007) at I-91.
52 Judgement of the ICJ in the case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 44 at para. 430.
53 Ragazzi, supra note 38 at 153.
54 ILC Study supra note 4 at 198, note 552; Provost, supra note 15 at 386.
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aircraft in flight, the reaction of third parties which are not directly injured
could come forward. To that extent, outlawing of hijacking and similar acts
of sabotage, as well as the prohibition of the use of weapons against civil
aircraft in flight, may have acquired or are in the process of acquiring an erga
omnes character. As for the duty to provide safety oversight, doctrinal com-
mentators have not yet reached consensus whether a positive duty to act could
form an obligation erga omnes. However, there seems to be no legal obstacle
to prevent such a duty from becoming an obligation erga omnes, particularly
in view of its intrinsic link with the right to life.
5.1.2 Safety Obligations and Jus Cogens
Analysis of the relations between aviation safety and obligations erga omnes
would be incomplete without any reference to the concept of a peremptory
norm (jus cogens), since obligations erga omnes are “generally regarded as just
another name for rules of jus cogens focusing on a different, but equally impor-
tant and unavoidable element of these rules”.55 Jus cogens is defined in the
Vienna Convention as “a norm accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is per-
mitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character”.56
The similarities between the concept of jus cogens and the concept of
obligations erga omnes have been recognized by numerous writers.57 Simma
called them two sides of the same coin, namely, that of the existence of certain
rules of international law which are, in the words of the ICJ, “the concern of
all States”.58 Both concepts lay emphasis on the international community “as
a whole”; the examples of obligations erga omnes given in the Barcelona Traction
case largely coincide with the examples of peremptory norms mentioned by
the International Law Commission during the drafting of the Vienna Conven-
tion.59 However, the study of the International Law Commission has pointed
out the difference between them: jus cogens norms have to do with the norm-
55 Von der Dunk, F. G., “Jus Cogens Sive Lex Frerenda: Jus Cogendum”, in Air and Space Law:
De Lege Ferenda, Essay in honour of Henri A. Wassenbergh (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff,
1992) at 226. Frowein, supra note 34 at 364.
56 Article 53, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 10.
57 Ragazzi, supra note 38 at 72. See also Von der Dunk, supra note 55, Wang, X., “The New
Development of International Law in Environmental Field” (in Chinese), in The Contemporary
International Legal Issues, edited by Shao, S. and Yu, M., (Wuhan University Publisher, 2002)
at 288, Gomez Robledo, A., Le ius cogens international: sa genèse, sa nature, ses fonctions
(1981:III) 172 RdC 9 at 158. Tams, supra note 7 at 140.
58 Simma, supra note 1 at 300.
59 Ragazzi, supra note 38 at 72.
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ative “weight” of a norm, obligations erga omnes with its procedural “scope”.60
With respect to the “scope”, obligations erga omnes give rise to a legal interest
of all States, including those States which are not directly affected by the breach
of the obligations. With respect to the “weight”, jus cogens norms enjoy a higher
legal rank than other norms and no derogation from them is allowed. Under
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention, a treaty is void if, at the time of its
conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.
Certain developments after the Vienna Convention also indicated that jus cogens
may also render conflicting customary rules invalid. The same applies to a
conflict between jus cogens and resolutions of international organizations, or
unilateral acts of a State.61 It should be further pointed out that all jus cogens
create obligations erga omnes, but not all obligations erga omnes possess the
non-derogatory character of jus cogens. According to Kadelbach, jus cogens “are
of a peremptory nature from which no exception may be made, not even by
consensus.”62
Given their peremptory or non-derogative character, it is of paramount
importance to be able to identify what norms constitute jus cogens. However,
this has been proven to be a most controversial issue. There is no single
authoritative list of jus cogens, nor any agreed criteria for determining what
constitutes jus cogens. According to one school of thought, and in line with
the terms of the Vienna Convention, the constitutive element of jus cogens is
the consent or acceptance of States. Consent or acceptance is required not only
for a norm to become a norm of international law, but also for a norm to gain
the peremptory character. This is the so-called “double consent” requirement
which consists of both opinio juris and opinio juris cogentis.63
The double consent requirement has been subject to criticism due to a
“disturbing circularity” about it. “If it is the point of jus cogens to limit what
may be lawfully agreed by States – can its content simultaneously be made
dependent on what is agreed between States?”64 “Some norms seem so basic,
so important, that it is more than slightly artificial to argue that States are
legally bound to comply with them simply because there exists an agreement
60 ILC Study, supra note 4 at 185 para. 367. See also supra note 83, the judgement of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in Prosecution at 260 para. 153.
61 See the remarks of Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, infra note 283.
62 Kadelbach, S., “Jus Cogens, Obligations Erga Omnes and other Rules – The Identification
of Fundamental Norms”, in Tomuschat, C., & Thouvenin, J., ed. The Fundamental Rules of
the International Legal Order – JUS COGENS and Obligations ERGA OMNES (Leiden/Boston:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006) 21 at 29.
63 van Hoof, G.J.H., Rethinking the Sources of International Law (Deventer, 1983) at 164;
Rozakis, C.L., The Concept of Jus Cogens in the Law of Treaties (Amsterdam, 1976) at 54.
64 ILC Study, supra note 4 at 190, para. 375. See Koskenniemi, M., From Apology to Utopia. The
Structure of International Legal Argument (Reissue with a new Epilogue, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2005) at 323-325.
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between them to that effect”.65 In other words, jus cogens “involve not only
legal rules but considerations of morals and of international good order”.66
They “consecrate values which are not at the disposal of individual States (any
more)”.67Non-compliance with them “would shock the conscience of mankind
and be contrary to elementary considerations of humanity”.68
This is reminiscent of the dichotomy between positivist and naturalist
schools. According to positivists, represented by van Bynkershoek in early
days, the sole origin of law is “the will of the State”. “International law can
in logic be reduced to a system of rules depending for their validity only on
the fact that States have consented to them.”69 According to naturalists repres-
ented by Pufendorf, States submit to international law because their relations
are regulated by the higher law – the “law of nature”.70 The concept of the
“law of nature” denotes “the ideal law founded on the nature of man as a
reasonable being, the body of rules which Nature dictates to human reason.”71
For practical purposes, each view has its own merit. On the one hand, States
do not accept and recognize jus cogens at random, by accident or in a vacuum.
They are guided by their judgement of values in their acceptance and recogni-
tion. In this sense, jus cogens are indeed value oriented. On the other hand,
any value, no matter how important it is, will not be embodied in and elevated
to jus cogens until it is accepted by at least the major components of the inter-
national community of States. Once it is accepted as a peremptory norm, no
State can anymore derogate from it until the international community as a
whole agrees to modify the existing norm with another norm having the same
character.
The judgment of values may also be subject to change as the international
community evolves. For instance, there were times when hijackers of civil
aircraft could expect “a hero’s welcome”,72 but today this is no longer the
case. Not only have the acts of hijacking been declared serious criminal
offences under the applicable treaty regimes, consensus has also been achieved
to condemn “all acts of unlawful interference against civil aviation wherever
65 Koskenniemi, M., “The Pull of the Mainstream [review article on T. Meron, Human Rights
and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law]” (1990) 88 Michigan Law Review 1946 at 1952.
66 Fitzmaurice, G., (1958) 2 Yearbook of International Law Commission, at 40 to 41.
67 Simma, supra note 1 at 292.
68 Koskenniemi, supra note 65 at 1952.
69 Starke, J.G., An Introduction to International Law (London: Butteworth & Co. (Publishers)
Ltd., 1958) at 21; Steiner, H.J., “International Law, Doctrine and Schools of Thought in the
Twentieth Century”, in Bernhardt, R., (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol II
(1992) 1216, supra note 23 in Ch.2 at 1224; Ago, R., “Positivism”, in Bernhardt, id. Vol. III
at 1072.
70 Starke, id. at 10 and 19.
71 Id. at 19.
72 Faller, E., “Aviation Security: The Role of ICAO in Safeguarding International Civil Aviation
against Acts of Unlawful Interference” (1992) XVII-I AASL 369 at 381.
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and by whomsoever and for whatever reason they are perpetrated.”73 Whether
a particular norm has at the particular juncture been elevated to a peremptory
norm by the international community as a whole is a matter requiring careful
analysis based on the available evidence of State practice. In this respect, as
Von der Dunk points out, the ICJ would be the forum most suited and author-
ized to define what specific norms have to be considered as norms of jus
cogens.74 So far, the ICJ has been cautious. Reference to jus cogens is usually
found in separate or dissenting opinions. In the Wall case, the Court refers
to the rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict as the rules
incorporating “obligations which are essentially of an erga omnes character”,75
but avoids calling them “jus cogens” as many academic writers may have
done.76 In doing so, it “opens the floor for speculation as to whether jus cogens
and erga omnes norms coincide.”77
In the context of civil aviation, certain elements of safety obligations have
been referred to as having the status of jus cogens. In the Lockerbie case, Judge
Weeramantry quoted Bassiouni’s statement that the widespread use of the
formula aut dedere aut judicare, as stipulated in certain aviation security conven-
tions, “attests to the existing jus cogens principle”.78 As previously mentioned,
Fitzmaurice considers that the obligation to maintain certain standards of safety
of life in the sea is in the nature of jus cogens.79 The same rationale may apply
to the obligation to maintain certain standards of safety of life in the air. There
is even an argument, albeit questionable, that the duty to comply with the
international standards and recommended practices under the Chicago Conven-
tion has become jus cogens.80
73 ICAO Assembly Resolution A35-9: Consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies
related to the safeguarding of international civil aviation against acts of unlawful inter-
ference. Appendix A, General Policy, para. 1, in ICAO Doc 9848, supra note 22 at VII-4.
74 Von der Dunk, supra note 55 at 225. Referring to Article 66(a) of the Vienna Convention,
under which a dispute concerning the application or the interpretation of the provisions
relating to peremptory norms may be submitted to the ICJ, he is of the view that the ICJ
has authority in questions of interpretation of international law, although the majority of
States do not accept its compulsory jurisdiction. Refusal to accept jurisdiction only prevents
those interpretations from being involved in specific cases.
75 Supra note 6 at para. 157.
76 Kadelbach, supra note 62 at 30-36.
77 Id. at 36.
78 ICJ Reports (1992) at 163. See Bassiouni, M. C., International Extradition: United States Law
and Practice (1987) at 22; Gowlland-Debbas, V., “Judicial Insights into Fundamental Values
and Interests of the International Community” in Muller, A.S., Raiè, D., & Thuránszky eds.
The International Court of Justice. Its Future Role after Fifty Years (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 1997) 327 at 335.
79 Fitzmaurice, G., “The General Principles of International Law” (1957:II) 92 RdC 1 at 120.
80 Abeyratne, R.I.R., ”The Legal Status of the Chicago Convention and its Annexes” (1994)
19 Air Law 113. Contra, van Antwerpen, N., Cross-border provision of Air Navigation Services
with specific reference to Europe (2007), doctoral thesis at Leiden University, ISBN 13 –
9789041126887, at 38.
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The principle aut dedere aut judicare is applicable to the offences of hijacking
of civil aircraft or sabotage against civil aviation. In earlier days, these offences
were mentioned as “aerial piracy” in academic publications, borrowing the
analogy of the concept of piracy in the law of the sea.81 While international
lawyers have not reached agreement on the list of jus cogens, there seems to
be little controversy in regarding the prohibition of piracy as a peremptory
norm.82 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia quoted
the following statement of a court of the United States in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
“the torturer has become, like the pirate and the slave trader before him, hostis
humani generis, an enemy of all mankind”.83 Compared with piracy, there
is at least equal if not more revulsion in the contemporary world against
hijacking and sabotage. As previously discussed, perpetrators of hijacking and
sabotage against civil aviation, like pirates, should be declared as hostis humani
generis.84 Accordingly, the prohibition of hijacking and sabotage against civil
aviation could be supported as a candidate for a peremptory norm.
The prohibition of the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight may
be considered as a norm of jus cogens. This norm is the natural and specific
application of the norm of the prohibition of the use of force, which is widely
regarded as jus cogens.85 As demonstrated above, the paramount consideration
of the right to life has rendered the statutory authorization to shoot down civil
aircraft null and void.86 Furthermore, if international humanitarian law pro-
hibits hostilities directed at civilian populations in times of war,87 the element-
ary considerations of humanity, which are “even more exacting in peace than
in war”,88 will apply a fortiori to outlaw the use of force against civil aircraft
in flight in times of peace.
81 McWhinney, E., Aerial Piracy and International Terrorism, 2nd revised ed. (Dordrecht/Boston/
Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987).
82 Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law, (Oxford, 1992) at 513. He cites several the
least controversial examples of jus cogens, including the prohibition of the use of force, the
law of genocide, the principle of racial non-discrimination, crimes against humanity, and
the rules prohibiting trade in slave and piracy. See also Wang T., International Law –
Introduction, in Chinese (Beijing University Publishers, 1998) at 242; Alexidze, L.A., “Legal
Nature of Jus Cogens in Contemporary International Law” (1981:III) 172 RdC 219 at 262;
Whiteman, M. M., “Jus Cogens in International Law with a Proposed List” (1971) 7 Georgian
Journal of International and Comparative Law 625.
83 Prosecutor v. Anto Furund_ija, Judgement of 10 December 1998, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Trial
Chamber II, 121 ILR (2002) 260, para.147. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876 (2d
Cir.1980).
84 See supra Ch.4, note 158 et seq.
85 Brownlie, supra note 82 and other writers cited therein. See also von de Dunk, supra note 74
at 236.
86 Supra note 73 et seq. in Ch.4.
87 This rule is also widely regarded as jus cogens, See ILC Study supra note 4 at 189, para.
374.
88 The Corfu Channel case, [1949] ICJ Reports at 22. See supra note 11 et seq. in Ch.3.
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As regards the positive prescriptions to promote aviation safety, it would
be more difficult to find sufficient evidence to support their status as jus cogens.
The notion of jus cogens, which “has undoubtedly been influenced by domestic
laws that provide for the nullity of agreements conflicting with order public
or pubic policy objectives”,89 seems to inherently carry with it prohibitive
elements. The essence of the notion is to prohibit States from contracting out
or opting out the requirements of the norms. Accordingly, the duty to comply
with international standards and recommended practice under Article 37 of
the Chicago Convention falls short of the status of jus cogens since Article 38
of the Convention specifically allows States to opt out such compliance.
Article 40 of the Chicago Convention contains another provision for con-
tracting out certain obligations, which reads as follows:
No aircraft or personnel having certificates or licenses so endorsed shall participate
in international navigation, except with the permission of the State or States whose
territory is entered.
The term “endorsed” is used in Article 39 of the Convention to denote cases
which do not meet the standards established by ICAO. Consequently, as a
general rule under Article 40, aircraft and personnel so endorsed could not
participate in international navigation. An exception could be made if the flown
State or States so permit. This arrangement may give rise to the impression
that the issue concerning airworthiness and personal licensing could be “bi-
lateralized”, namely, handled by the relevant States inter se without the invol-
vement of the international community. As long as the flown State has no
objection, aircraft and personnel which fail to satisfy ICAO minimum standards
are not the concern of other States. However, such interpretation is acceptable
only when the following two conditions are fulfilled: firstly, the aircraft or
the person holding the license does not carry nationals of any third State; and
secondly, the flight so conducted does not involve the airspace of any third
State or international air space. If these two conditions are not fulfilled, the
matter is not simply a matter inter se but may affect the interests of other States.
Safety requirements today are different from those of the time when Article
40 was drafted. Even at that time, the derogation clause was an exception
rather than the rule. In the interest of the international community, restrictive
interpretation may and should be given to this derogation clause with a view
to limiting it to isolated cases. Nevertheless, derogation from the standards
is still possible. Based on this, it is difficult to support the conclusion that the
duty to comply with ICAO standards has become jus cogens.
From the point of view of lex ferenda, a question may be raised whether
the concept of “safety first” may be elevated to an overriding principle similar
to constitutional rules in national jurisdictions. Unlike domestic law which
89 ILC Study supra note 4 at 182, para. 361.
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is “organized in a strictly hierarchical way, with the constitution regulating
the operation of the system at the higher level”,90 international law is far from
being settled with its system of constitution. The notion of jus cogens may offer
one possible way for organization of such a system. Attempts have been made
in the present study to identify phenomena in which safety considerations
did prevail over other considerations. The provisions of Article 4 of the Tokyo
Convention “derogate from the general provisions of the Chicago Convention
(Articles 11-13)” in order “to preserve the safety of air navigation”.91 The
importance of certain ICAO standards has outweighed the right of individual
States to file differences.92 Further reference could be made to Article 2 of
the Tokyo Convention which provides that “[w]ithout prejudice to the provi-
sions of Article 4 and except when the safety of the aircraft or of persons or
property on board so requires, no provision of this Convention shall be inter-
preted as authorizing or requiring any action in respect of offences against
penal laws of a political nature or those based on racial or religious discrimina-
tion.” On the basis of this provision, when the safety of the aircraft or of
persons or property on board so requires, the Convention could be interpreted
as authorizing action “in respect of offences against penal laws of a political
nature”. Viewed in the context of the later development in which the political
offence exception yields to the need to punish hijackers and saboteurs,93 one
could perceive that safety considerations have been given overriding priority
by international law-makers.
Are these legal phenomena demonstrating the willingness of the inter-
national civil aviation community to upgrade the concept of “safety first” to
the status of jus cogens? It appears premature to jump to a positive conclusion.
While States may agree that safety considerations may override certain specific
rules under certain circumstances, overall endorsement of the status of jus
cogens is not yet apparent. Moreover, there is also the need to define the exact
scope and connotation of the concept of “safety first”. For this purpose, it
would be indispensable to have a judicial body similar to the constitutional
courts in domestic jurisdictions, which could at the first instance apply the
concept to specific facts. But the concept may be useful, since it may assist
to provide solutions for some of the issues currently surrounding ICAO. For
example, it may be used to resolve the issue regarding the protection of safety
information, particularly information obtained in the course of investigations
of aircraft accidents. In principle, safety information should be used for safety-
related purposes, namely, to ensure that proper and timely preventive actions
can be taken and aviation safety improved. Nevertheless, there have been
instances in which safety information was used for disciplinary and enforce-
90 ILC Study, supra note 4 at 166, para. 324.
91 Supra notes 18 and 19 in Ch.4.
92 Supra notes 144 in Ch.2 and 83 in Ch.3.
93 Supra note 151 in Ch.4.
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ment action and admitted as evidence in judicial proceedings. This may
compromise the continued availability of information. If the concept of “safety
first” is recognized as a constitutional principle having a sort of “peremptory”
status, it may provide an opportunity to apply this principle to render certain
requirements under domestic law inoperative.
In this connection, it may be recalled that Article 82 of the Chicago Conven-
tion provides that the contracting States accept this Convention as abrogating
all obligations and understanding between them which are inconsistent with
its terms, and undertake not to enter into any such obligations and understand-
ing.94 Unlike jus cogens which render a conflicting treaty void at the time of
its conclusion, the Chicago Convention obliges contracting States to abrogate
inconsistent obligations. The practical effects are similar in the sense that they
override the inconsistent obligations. While it is impossible to claim that every
term of the Chicago Convention has become jus cogens, it may be argued that
Article 82 contains the seed of “constitutionalism” of ICAO, which may one
day sprout if conducible climate and fertile soil are given.
5.2 SAFETY AND ICAO’S REGULATORY FUNCTION
As mentioned at the beginning of the current study, ICAO has been subject
to both praise and criticism.95 Past records do not necessarily imply future
performance. In the third millennium, to cope with the new challenges arising
from more stringent safety requirements, ICAO should strengthen its two hands,
one being its regulatory function and the other its implementing or enforce-
ment function.
ICAO has performed certain regulatory functions for the global aviation
community over six decades, but the nature of its regulatory power has not
been completely clarified. Is it similar to parliamentary law-making function,
but limited to the sphere of civil aviation? While ICAO has served as a forum
for its member States to negotiate and adopt treaties relating to civil aviation,
States are the ultimate decision-makers to adopt the treaties and to accept them
as binding. The ICAO Council possesses the power to adopt international
standards and recommended practices, but except in relation to the rules of
the air over the high seas, member States generally retain a high degree of
freedom to deviate from the standards, let alone recommended practices. ICAO
has also developed other forms of regulatory material, such as Assembly
94 Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations contains the similar provisions. For the
analysis of these provisions and their possible application, see supra notes 81 and 96 in
Ch.4 and infra note 244.
95 See supra notes 5 and 6 in Introduction. See also Zhao, supra note 3 in Ch.4; See also,
Alvarez, J.E., International Organizations as Law-makers (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005) at 589.
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resolutions, PANS, SUPPS, regional air navigation plans, model clauses or
model legislation; and guidance material; but the legal effect of these regulatory
materials has not been precisely and systematically characterized. Certain
inconsistencies or confusions may even be found in practice. As mentioned
above, while one of the earliest Assembly resolutions distinguishes recom-
mended practices from standards and specifies that their compliance is merely
desirable, later resolutions tend to deemphasize the distinction between
standards and recommended practices.96 Since in both instances, the authorit-
ative pronouncements originated from the Assembly resolutions rather than
from the Chicago Convention, it is necessary to clarify the effect of the Assem-
bly resolutions.
Assembly resolutions deserve further consideration because they are often
used as the vehicle to carry other forms of regulatory material, such as draft
treaties, model legislation and model clauses. For this reason, Assembly resolu-
tions will be the focus of the analysis. On the basis of this, the nature of ICAO
regulatory power will be further explored.
5.2.1 The Legal Effect of ICAO Assembly Resolutions
The legal effect of ICAO Assembly resolutions is considered to be similar to
that of the UN General Assembly resolutions.97 There is consensus that organ-
izations within the UN system have the power to make binding “internal rules”,
such as rules concerning their structure, functioning or procedures.98 Views
become diverse regarding the effect of “external” resolutions, i.e., resolutions
directly addressing member States. At one end of the spectrum, there are those
who believe that resolutions have no legal effect at all.99 At the other end,
there are strong opinions that resolutions are tantamount to legislation binding
96 See supra note 147 in Ch.2 and infra note 137. See Resolution A36-13: Consolidated Statement
of continuing ICAO policies and associated practices related specifically to air navigation,
ICAO Doc 9902, Assembly Resolutions in Force (as of 28 September 2007) at II-7.
97 ICAO Council Working Paper C-WP/12979 “Draft Assembly Working Paper – The Role
and Effect of Assembly Decisions and Resolutions”, 25 May 2007, at para. 3.2. See also
Augustin, J., “ICAO and the Use of Force against Civil Aerial Intruders”, supra note 1 in
Ch.3 at 219.
98 Separate Opinions of Judges Klaestad and Lauterpacht in the South-West Africa-Voting
Procedure, Advisory Opinion of June 7th, 1955, [1955] ICJ Reports 67 at 88 and 115; Schermers,
H. G., & Blokker, N. M., International Institutional Law, 4th Revised Edition (Leiden: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 2003) at 757 et seq; Alvarez, supra note 95 at 122, citing the budgetary
powers and the legal personality as two examples of classic internal powers. Skubiszewski,
K., “Enactment of Law by International Organizations” (1965-1966) XLI BYIL 198 at 226.
99 Szasz, P., “General Law-Making Processes” in Joyner, C.C., ed., The United Nations and
International Law (Washington DC: American Society of International Law, 1997) 27 at 58.
Szasz observes that intergovernmental organizations in general, and those of the UN system
in particular, do not have any inherent authority and cannot create international norms
that are directly binding on States generally or even just on their members.
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on member States.100 As summarized by Mosler, after a long and fierce dis-
pute, these two extreme views were replaced by the emerging consensus:
There can be no single answer to the question – resolutions must be distinguished
according to various factors, such as the intention of the General Assembly, the
content of the principles proclaimed and the majority in favour of their adop-
tion.101
Accordingly, it will be necessary to analyze different resolutions on their own
merits.
5.2.1.1 Declaratory Resolutions
Numerous writers have discussed the status of the resolutions of the United
Nations General Assembly and provided conclusive evidence that some of
these resolutions may declare customary rules.102 When Higgins, who later
became the President of the ICJ, wrote in 1963 that the UN “is a very appro-
priate body to look to for indications of developments in international law”
and that “the votes and views of States have come to have legal significance
as evidence of customary law”, her view had been regarded as somewhat
radical.103 Today, very few international lawyers, if any, will categorically
deny that resolutions of international organizations could present evidence
of customary rules. In the context of ICAO, several Assembly resolutions may
also be regarded as declaratory or confirmatory of customary international
rules. For example, Resolution A25-1: Amendment of the Convention on Inter-
national Civil Aviation (Article 3 bis) contains the statement to “reaffirm the
principle of non-use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight”, indicating the
pre-existence of such a principle independent of Article 3 bis.104
100 See, for example, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Alvarez in Effect of awards of compensation
made by the UN Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion of July 13th, 1954 [1954] ICJ Reports
67 at 71, in which it is stated that “the Assembly is becoming a real international legislative
power for, apart from recommendations made to States, it adopts resolutions whose provisions
are binding on them all. This fact is of great importance for the future of international law.”
101 Mosler, H., The International Society as a Legal Community (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff &
Noordhoff, 1980) at 88-89.
102 Higgins, R., The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United
Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) at 2-5. Falk, R.A., “On the Quasi-Legislative
Competence of the General Assembly” (1966) 60 AJIL 782 at 785. Arangio-Ruiz, G., “Normat-
ive Role of the General Assembly of the UN” (1972:III) 197 RdC 431. White, N. D., The Law
of International Organizations, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005) at
174. Wang, supra note 82 at 106 et seq. Conforti, B., “Le rôle de l’accord dans le système
des Nations Unies” (1974:II) 142 RdC 250. Schermers & Blokker, supra note 98 at 782 et seq.
103 Higgins, id. See also her work, Problem and Process: International Law and How We Use It
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) at 22-23.
104 ICAO Doc 9848, supra note 22 at I-6. See also Ch.3 above.
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Following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and in response to UN Security
Council Resolutions 662 and 671, the ICAO Assembly adopted Resolution A28-7:
Aeronautical consequences of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which, inter alia, declares
that the unilateral registration of aircraft of Kuwait Airways by Iraq is null
and void and calls upon the Iraqi government to return the Kuwaiti aircraft
to the legitimate Government of Kuwait. Strictly speaking, this is the declara-
tion of factum juridicum (juridical fact) as a consequence of the application of
law rather than the declaration of law per se. Nevertheless, by declaring the
results of the invasion null and void, the Resolution affirms the principle of
the non-use of force. It may also be argued that Resolution A28-7 is in fact
enforcing one of the obligations erga omnes, namely, the outlawing of acts of
aggression.105
One may wonder whether all resolutions intended to be “declaratory” will
mirror exactly the customary rules in photographic accuracy. In many cases,
the very purpose for adopting declaratory resolutions is to “fix, clarify, and
make precise” the terms and scope of customary rules which may otherwise
be subject to controversy.106 Moreover, the efforts to formulate declaratory
resolutions will often involve not only codification but also progressive devel-
opment of international law. As Sloan points out: “there is only a thin line,
or perhaps a porous fence, between codification and development, and declara-
tory resolutions may creep over the line or slip through the fence. Again, under
the guise of formulation they may interpret, elaborate and in fact develop the
law while maintaining the umbrella of customary international law.”107 To
the extent that these resolutions reflect “hazy, intermediate, transitional,
embryonic, inchoate situations”,108 a question may be raised whether they
are purely restating rules or representing “embryonic norm”, quasi-legal rules,
or “nascent legal force”.109
5.2.1.2 Interpretative Resolutions
Some resolutions provide interpretation to existing treaty provisions. For
instance, an early ICAO Assembly resolution resolved that the journey log book
105 ICAO Doc 9848, supra note 22 at I-29. ICAO resolution was based on the Security Council
resolutions 661 and 662 in 1990, in which the Security Council declared the annexation
of Kuwait by Iraq null and void and required specialized agencies to take such measures
as may be necessary to give effect to the terms of its resolutions. See also supra note 34
et seq concerning counter-measures against the breach of obligations erga omnes.
106 Castaneda, J., Legal Effects of United Nations Resolutions (New York and London: Columbia
University Press, 1969) at 169.
107 Sloan, B., “General Assembly Resolutions Revisited (Forty Years Later)” (1987) LVIII BYIL
41 at 69.
108 Castaneda, supra note 106 at 176.
109 Sloan, F.B., “The Binding Force of a ‘Recommendation’ of the General Assembly of the
United Nations” (1948) XXV BYIL 1 at 32. See also Castaneda, id. at 176.
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required under Article 29 of the Chicago Convention may be replaced by a
declaration.110 Article 30 concerning aircraft radio equipment has also been
de facto amended.111 In 2004, Assembly Resolution A35-2 urged contracting
States which are parties to the MEX Convention to apply Article IV of that
Convention in the manner described in the Resolution.112 These resolutions
by and large constitute “subsequent agreement between the parties regarding
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions” or “sub-
sequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement
of the parties regarding its interpretation”, as mentioned in Article 31, para-
graph 2 (b) and (c) of the Vienna Convention. It is submitted that in these
instances, they go far beyond “political or moral value” but create pre-
sumptions of binding commitments, at least for those States which have voted
in their favour.113
As observed by some commentators, every interpretation holds within it
the seeds of development.114 “The line between interpretation and modifica-
tion, like the line between codification and development, is a thin one and
the distinction is often difficult, if not impossible to make.”115
5.2.1.3 Pre-legislative Resolutions
Treaties adopted under the auspices of ICAO will fall squarely within the scope
of Article 38(1)(a) of the Statute of the ICJ. However, this is the situation when
a treaty has entered into force and the relevant States have expressed their
consent to be bound by its terms. What is the status of the text of a treaty
which has been adopted by ICAO but has not yet been ratified, accepted,
approved or acceded to by the relevant States? Writing in 1962, Cheng con-
sidered the ICAO’s function in the preparation of treaties as a “pre-legislative
110 Assembly Resolution A10-36: Journey Log Book, in ICAO Doc 7707, A10-P/16 at 51. See also
ICAO Council Working Paper C-WP/3924, “Proposed Preparation of a Repertory of Practice
of the Assembly, the Council and Other Organs in Relation to the Convention on Inter-
national Civil Aviation”, 25 January 1964. App. C.
111 Article 30 requires the licensing of aircraft radio equipment. This would literally prohibit
the use of telephones by passengers for air-ground communications. However, Resolution
A29-19: Legal aspects of the global air-ground communications provides that “nothing in Article
30(b) of the Chicago Convention shall be taken to preclude the use by unlicensed persons
of the radio transmitting apparatus installed upon an aircraft where the use is for non-safety
related air-ground radio transmission.” (ICAO Doc 9848, supra note 22 at I-9). For more
information, see Brisibe, supra note 7 in Ch.2 at 71.
112 See supra note 136 in Ch.4.
113 According to Lauterpacht, there is probably no good reason to deny that States may assume
an obligation or give their consent through an Assembly resolution. Lauterpacht, H., ed.
Oppenheim International Law, 7th ed. at 139, n.1.
114 Asamoah, O.Y., The Legal Significance of the Declaration of the General Assembly of the United
Nations (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966) at 6 and 31; Sloan, supra note 107 at 60.
115 Sloan, id.
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function”.116 In view of the adoption of the Vienna Convention in 1969, in
particular its Article 18, there are now some grounds to consider such a
function also as a “quasi-legislative function”. The said Article 18 reads:
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose
of a treaty when:
(a) It has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty
subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention
clear not to become a party to the treaty; …
Accordingly, the Vienna Convention, as a cardinal treaty governing treaty
relationships, fully recognizes that an instrument may produce some legal
effects even though it is not fully binding. As a result, between “law” and “non
law”, or the fully binding norms and non-binding norms, there is a twilight
area where “quasi-law” may provide “quasi-binding norms”.
In ICAO, a new treaty to amend the Chicago Convention will first take the
form of an Assembly resolution.117 This was the case when ICAO introduced
Article 83 bis.118 Under Article 94 of the Chicago Convention, an amendment
to the Convention must be approved by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly.
The amendment will then enter into force when ratified by at least two thirds
of the total number of contracting States. Accordingly, approval by a two-thirds
vote of the ICAO Assembly is equivalent to the signing of the treaty or exchange
of the instrument constituting the treaty subject to ratification. On the basis
of Article 18 of the Vienna Convention, member States of ICAO, or at least those
which have agreed with the adoption of the amendment, are under an obliga-
tion not to defeat the object and purpose of the amendment even before they
ratify it. Such an obligation will persist until the relevant State has made its
intention clear not to become a party to Article 83 bis. This type of obligation
seems to fall between the obligation of a full-fledged State party and non-
obligation of a non-signatory. Strictly speaking, this twilight zone of obligation
does not directly fall within the sources of international law identified in
Article 38 (1) of the Statute of International Court of Justice. Indirectly, it may
be argued that this obligation derives from Article 18 of the Vienna Conven-
tion, which by itself falls within the scope of the aforementioned Article 38 (1).
Some resolutions are not used as a means to authenticate a multilateral
treaty, but to prepare model legislation or model clauses which may be incor-
porated into domestic law or bilateral treaties. One example is Assembly
Resolution A33-4 dealing with the issue of unruly passengers. While the acts
116 Cheng, B., The Law of International Air Transport (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1962) at
63-76. In more recent years, some other writers consider the activities of drafting treaties
also as a quasi-legislative function; see, for example, Liang, X, “International Society and
International Law” (in Chinese) in Shao and Yu, ed., supra note 57 at 27.
117 See, Assembly Resolutions A23-2 and A25-1, supra note 104 at I-5 and I-6.
118 Id. Resolution A23-2.
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of these passengers do not amount to the offences stipulated in The Hague
and Montreal Conventions, they still present a negative impact on the safety
of aircraft or persons on board. On numerous occasions, when an aircraft
commander delivered an unruly passenger to the State of landing pursuant
to Article 9 of the Tokyo Convention, the latter found that it did not have
jurisdiction over such a passenger, because the alleged unlawful act did not
take place in its territory, the passenger was not its national, and the aircraft
with the passenger on board was not on its registry. There was no basis for
the State of landing to claim territorial jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction or
flag jurisdiction. To remedy this situation, a model legislation was proposed,
which in a nutshell would grant the first State of landing the power to exercise
jurisdiction over such a passenger, despite the absence of jurisdictional con-
nections mentioned above119 This is considered as breaking new ground on
jurisdiction, since it goes beyond the scope of traditional territorial, personal
or flag jurisdiction. The model legislation was not adopted as a treaty but as
an appendix to Assembly Resolution A33-4 which urges member States of ICAO
to incorporate so far as practical the provisions in the model. Following this
resolution, a number of States have now established their jurisdiction as the
first State of landing in accordance with the model provision.
Similarly, Appendix G of Assembly Resolution A35-9 urges all member
States to insert into their bilateral agreements on air services a clause on
aviation security, taking into account the model clause adopted by the Council
on 25 June 1986 and to take into account the model agreement adopted by
the Council on 30 June 1989.120 The same approach was also taken regarding
the model clause on technical safety.121
The model provisions proposed by the organization, while not automatic-
ally binding on its member States, will eventually find their way to become
law either through domestic legislation or bilateral agreements. The initiative
taken by the organization undoubtedly forms an important part of the law-
making process. Unlike the traditional mode of formulation of customary rules,
which were gradually crystallized from the repeated but decentralized practice
of States, model provisions prepared by an international organization originate
from centralized efforts, followed by the proliferation in practice. The some-
what “top-down” approach is more powerful and influential than the tradi-
tional “bottom-up” approach and constitutes more speedy formation of the
rules. The expertise brought by the organization also ensures that the proposed
119 ICAO Resolution A33-4: Adoption of national legislation on certain offences committed
on board civil aircraft (unruly/disruptive passengers). In ICAO Doc 9848 supra note 22
at V-4. See also ICAO Circular 288 LE/1, Guidance Material on the Legal Aspects of Unruly/
Disruptive Passengers (June 2002).
120 A35-9: Consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies related to the safeguarding
of international civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference, Appendix G, in ICAO
Doc 9848 supra note 22 at VII-8.
121 See supra note 44 in Ch.2.
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rules are based on internationally resourceful research rather than resulting
from an unorganized and impromptu reaction for the purpose of expediency.
In some instances, the existence of ICAO model provisions has assisted certain
States in shortening the length of the parliamentary or similar process in the
enactment of the relevant law. It may also establish a presumption which is
in favour of States which act in accordance with the model provisions, vis-à-vis
those who act differently. In this sense, model provisions proposed by ICAO
have indeed served as “pre-legislation” and “quasi-legislation”.
5.2.1.4 Directive Resolutions
Directive resolutions, commonly called “internal rules”, refer to those which
give instructions to subordinate bodies. However, many resolutions contain
internal and external elements. Furthermore, as Schermers and Blokker observe,
internal rules may have important external effects.122 Examples cited in this
respect include resolutions relating to termination of the mandate to administer
the territory under the previous system of the League of Nations,123 establish-
ment of international criminal tribunals,124 and operation of peace-keeping
forces.125 All these resolutions, which may be classified as internal decisions,
have profound effects on the substantive rights and obligations of States. As
pointed out by the ICJ in its advisory opinion on the financial consequences
of the decision on peace-keeping, the functions and powers of the General
Assembly “are not confined to discussion, consideration, the initiation of
studies and the making of recommendations”; but include decisions “on
important questions”. These decisions “do indeed include certain recommenda-
tions, but others have dispositive force and effect.”126 The Court further states
that “when the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that
122 Schermers and Blokker, supra note 98 at 758.
123 On 27 October 1966, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 2145 (XXI) on the
termination of the mandate for South West Africa in Namibia. According to White, this
resolution could be viewed as an internal decision, since the “trusteeship” issues, analogous
to the mandate, are included in Article 18(2) of the UN Charter alongside budgetary and
membership issues; supra note 102 at 165. See also Legal Consequences for States of the Con-
tinued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, [1971] ICJ Reports 16.
124 White, id. at 82. In Tadic case, the defendant submitted that the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was illegally created and therefore had no
jurisdiction. The Appeal Chamber refuted this argument by stating, inter alia, that the
Security Council may establish subsidiary organs pursuant to Articles 7(2) and 29 of the
UN Charter. Case No. IT-94-1-T (Tadic case), 10 August 1995, para.2. Decisions to establish
subsidiary organs fall within the category of internal competence. However, as pointed
out by White, the ICTY did not address the issue whether the Security Council could
delegate to a subsidiary the judicial power which the Council itself may not have. Id.
125 See Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory
Opinion of 20 July 1962, [1962] ICJ Reports 151.
126 Id. at 163.
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it was appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United
Nations, the presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organiza-
tion”.127 Such presumption is equally applicable to action taken by ICAO.
Numerous ICAO resolutions on safety programmes are formulated as
internal rules binding on the organization, which at the same time contain
recommendations for member States. For instance, the Assembly resolves in
its Resolution A32-11 that a Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme be
established. It further directs the Council to bring the audit programme into
effect from 1 January 1999. At the same time, the Assembly urges all contracting
States to agree to audits to be carried out upon ICAO’s initiative, “but always
with the consent of the State to be audited”.128 On one hand, the terms used
clearly indicate that this resolution is purely recommendatory for member
States and does not create legal obligations; on the other hand, the decision
to establish the audit programme internally binds the bodies of the organiza-
tion, and the direction to bring the programme into effect by certain date binds
the Council. Due to the effect of these internal decisions, the Council must
trigger its institutional machinery to promote the audit programme with its
best efforts. The member States, for their part, could not in good faith refuse
to cooperate with the permanent body of the organization, since this may also
be regarded as an implied duty arising from the membership.129 The combina-
tion of internal rules and external recommendation naturally led to the rapid
development of the audit regime, which is now entrenched in the institutional
system of ICAO. Other ICAO programmes follow mutatis mutandis the same path,
such as the Universal Security Audit Programme, the unified strategy to resolve
safety-related deficiencies,130 and the International Financial Facility for Avi-
ation Safety.131 Creation of the machinery is as important as the substantive
127 Id. at 167-168.
128 ICAO Doc 9848, supra note 22 at I-56. See supra note 171 et seq in Ch.2.
129 Castaneda observes: In every international organization there is a general rule according
to which member States are bound to cooperate in achieving its purposes. The basic
obligation of the members is to act in such a way that the charter’s goals may be fulfilled.
Supra note 106 at 12.
130 Assembly Resolution A35-7, in ICAO Doc 9848 supra note 22 at I-60. The strategy promotes,
among other things, the sharing of critical safety information which may have an impact
on the safety of international air navigation. The Assembly directs the Council to further
develop practical means to facilitate the sharing of the safety information. The Council,
through the convening of the Conference of Directors General, implemented the principle
of transparency in safety information, which is regarded as “one of the fundamental tenets
of a safe air transportation system”. (The last preambular paragraph of Resolution A35-7).
See also, supra note 212 in Ch.2.
131 Assembly Resolution A35-8, in ICAO Doc 9848, id., at I-61. IFFAS is a fund based on
voluntary contributions of member States of ICAO and other stakeholders in the civil
aviation industry. It is independent from ICAO’s regular programme budget and is designed
to assist States to correct safety-related deficiencies identified through ICAO audits. For
more information, see ICAO website: www.icao.int, and search for IFFAS.
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issue.132 Even the establishment or adjustment of the internal structures of
the ICAO Secretariat may produce external effect. When the audit programme
was first introduced, the establishment of the Safety Oversight Audit Section
within the Secretariat promoted the programme through its daily work. In
2007, the Audit Report Review Board was established purely as an internal
coordinating mechanism within the ICAO Secretariat. Nevertheless, its work
may also have an impact on the assessment of the performance of the audited
States and therefore affect the interests of States. In many cases, as mentioned
by Alvarez, the lines between “legislative”, “executive”, and “dispute settle-
ment” actions also tend to dissipate in practice. “The premise that law-making
only occurs when an organization undertakes charter-authorized legislative
action, at either the internal or external level, and that this does not occur when
its executive officers or dispute settlers act, is at best misleading.”133
It may therefore be concluded that the power of the ICAO Assembly is not
limited to recommendations. By combination of internal rules and external
recommendation, the Assembly may directly create certain institutional obliga-
tions for member States. To echo the statement of the ICJ, “[i]t would not be
correct to assume that, because the General Assembly is in principle vested
with recommendatory powers, it is disbarred from adopting, in specific cases
within the framework of its competence, resolutions which make determina-
tions or have operative design.”134
To what extent are the “spill-over effects” of internal rules permitted? To
apply the criteria set out by the ICJ in the Certain Expenses case, so long as they
are appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the Organiza-
tion, the presumption is that such action is not ultra vires.135 Until this pre-
sumption is rebutted, these internal rules do have some external effects, “which
will in practice determine the way in which people act.”136
5.2.1.5 Recommendatory Resolutions
A significant number of resolutions in ICAO, or the provisions therein, are
directly addressed to the member States. They contain normative provisions
which are not subsequently crystallized into a treaty or indisputably recognized
as customary rules. They remain for an indefinite period at the level of resolu-
132 Vallat, “The Competence of the United Nations General Assembly” (1959) 87 RdC 203 at
228. See also Skubiszewski, K., “The General Assembly of the United Nations and its Power
to Influence National Action”, in Falk, R.A. and Mendlovitz, S. H., The Strategy of World
Order, Vol. III, The United Nations (New York: World Law Fund, 1966) 238 at 240.
133 Alvarez, J.E., International Organizations as Law-makers (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005) at 145.
134 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, Advisory
Opinion, supra note 123 at 50.
135 Certain expenses case, supra notes 125 and 127, and accompanying text.
136 Montgomery, Health Care Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
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tions and could not be classified as internal rules in the sense understood in
the aforementioned discussion. One example is Assembly Resolution A36-13,
which blurs the distinction between standards and recommended practices
when it requests the filing of differences. Appendix D of the Resolution pro-
vides in paragraph 2 of “Associated practices” the following:
Contracting States should continue, and where necessary should intensify,
their efforts to apply at their operating installations practices and procedures
that are in accordance with the current SARPs and PANS. In this regard, Con-
tracting States should consider the practicability of modifying the internal
processes by which they give effect to the provisions of SARPs and PANS, if
such modifications would expedite or simplify the processes or make them
more effective.
Paragraph 3 of “Associated practices” reads:
The Council should urge Contracting States to notify the Organization of any
differences that exist between their national regulations and practices and the
provisions of SARPs as well as the date or dates by which they will comply with
the SARPs. If a Contracting State finds itself unable to comply with any SARPs, it
should inform ICAO of the reason for non-implementation, including any applicable
national regulations and practices which are different in character or in prin-
ciple.137
Paragraph 2 directly addresses the member States of ICAO. It not only assimi-
lates international standards and recommended practices, but also puts SARPs
and PANS on the same plane. Paragraph 3 seemingly takes the form of an
instruction to the Council but in fact indirectly addresses the member States.
The propositions clearly go beyond the Chicago Convention since the Conven-
tion does not impose an obligation to file differences with respect to recom-
mended practices. If the notification of differences with certain recommended
practices is so important, the ICAO Council, as the body adopting SARPs, may
well decide to elevate these recommended practices to the level of standards,
which will then automatically make the filing of differences compulsory.
Nevertheless, the Council does not choose this route, and consequently the
status of standards remains different from that of recommended practices.
The provision requiring the filing of differences to recommended practices
in Appendix D of Resolution A36-13 could only be considered as a recom-
mendation which does not have the binding force of Article 38 of the Chicago
Convention.
What then is the effect of such a recommendation? Does it merely present
“political or moral” force? This recommendation has been repeated in a series
of Assembly resolutions, and has become continuing policy and firm associated
137 ICAO Doc 9902, Assembly Resolutions in Force (as of 28 September 2007) at II-7. See supra note
147 in Ch.2.
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practice of ICAO. The purpose, as may be perceived from Appendix D, is to
monitor the differences between the regulations and the practices of contracting
States and SARPs and PANS “with the aim of encouraging the elimination of
those differences that are important for the safety and regularity of inter-
national air navigation or are inconsistent with the objectives of the inter-
national Standards”. Corresponding to this aim, the ICAO audit teams not only
verify the status of the implementation of standards but also that of recom-
mended practices. The differences with recommended practices may thus be
noted in the audit reports and become a subject under the correction plans.
The Council, as the permanent body responsible for the Assembly, is again
under a duty to carry out the policy and directives of the Assembly by moni-
toring the implementation of the correction plans. When all these are taken
into account, a question may be raised whether these arrangements are
intended to go beyond “political or moral” force.
The position taken by ICAO appears to be that this type of resolution is
not completely devoid of legal effect. According to one working paper pre-
pared by the Secretariat, the legal authority “may vary according to the voting
conditions. It may be stronger in case of unanimity than the case of majority
vote. If a State has voted in favour of an Assembly Resolution or Decision,
it can be expected that the State will abide by its terms in good faith, unless
there are overriding compelling reasons to the contrary.”138 When a question
in this respect was raised in the Council, the Director of the Legal Bureau of
ICAO replied:
The effect of any provision in a resolution of the Assembly was that all States who
had participated in the Assembly Session were, once the resolution was adopted,
expected to apply and implement the provisions of such resolutions. However,
if States, in the debate relating to the resolution, placed their position on the record
that they had a reservation to certain provisions of the resolution or to the resolu-
tion as a whole, it was clear that other States could not necessarily expect those
States which had placed their reservation to in fact apply the provisions of the
resolution.139
This statement could only be understood as referring to the “external” resolu-
tions, since “internal” resolutions, such as a budgetary decision, are binding
on all members once they are approved by the majority, regardless of the
negative votes cast. To that extent, doctrinal support for the statement could
be found.140
138 ICAO Council Working Paper C-WP/12979, supra note 97 at para. 3.2.
139 ICAO Doc 9738-C/1127 C-Min. 156/1-16, Council – 156th Session, Summary Minutes with
Subject Index (1999), C-Min 156/16 at 188.
140 Castaneda, J., “Valeur juridique des resolutions des Nations Unies” (1970:I) 129 RdC 227
at 306.
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However, different views have also been expressed. Arangio-Ruiz believed
that when States vote for a resolution, they “don’t mean it”. “That is to say,
States often don’t meaningfully support what a resolution says and they almost
always do not mean that the resolution is law.” Schwebel holds the same view.
According to him, the size of majority, or even “consensus”, has nothing to
do with the intention of States voting for it.141 Schermers and Blokker write:
A positive vote estops a member from later claiming that the organization lacked
the competence to adopt recommendation in question, but it does not oblige the
member to execute the recommendation. Members vote in their capacity as elements
of the organization, as contributors to the development of legal rules, not as con-
tracting parties. Accordingly, their vote expresses their desire to help establish a
rule which is equally applicable to all members. Unless a member expressly declares
otherwise, its vote cannot be interpreted as representing an undertaking by the
State to adhere to the rule thus established.142
The two writers further observe that “[a] negative vote, on the other hand,
does not allow a State subsequently to ignore a recommendation complete-
ly.”143
From the foregoing, there seems to be the lack of agreement regarding the
effect of a positive or negative vote. However, consensus could be drawn to
the point that a recommendation in a resolution of this kind is not devoid of
legal effect. This point has been incisively and eloquently articulated by Judge
Lauterpacht in his separate opinion in the Voting Procedure on Questions relating
to Reports and Petition concerning the Territory of South West Africa:
141 Arangio-Ruiz, G., “The Normative Role of the General Assembly of the United Nations
and the Development of Principles of Friendly Relations” (1972-III) 197 RdC 431; Schwebel,
“The Effect of Resolutions of the UN General Assembly on Customary International Law”
(1979) Proceedings of American Society of International Law 301; cited by Higgins, R., Problem
and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) at 26. The
procedure of “consensus” had been used for a long period of time in the United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and it is still widely used in
ICAO. The essence of the procedure is to reach agreement without need for voting. See
D’Amato, A., “On Consensus” (1970) 8 CYIL 104. See also infra note 255 and accompanying
text.
142 Schermers and Blokker, supra note 98 at 770.
143 Id. In his separate opinion in the South West Africa case, Judge Klaestad stated that a
recommendation “adopted by the General Assembly without the concurrent vote of the
Union Government does not create a binding legal obligation for that Government. Its effects
are, in my view, not of a legal nature in the usual sense, but rather of a moral or political
character. This does not, however, mean that such a recommendation is without real
significance and importance, and that the Union Government can simply disregard it. As
a Member of the United Nations, the Union of South Africa is in duty bound to consider
in good faith a recommendation adopted by the General Assembly under Article 10 of the
Charter and to inform the General Assembly with regard to the attitude which it has
decided to take in respect of the matter referred to in the recommendation.” See supra note
98 at 88.
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It is one thing to affirm the somewhat obvious principle that the recommendations
of the General Assembly … addressed to the Members of the United Nations are
not legally binding upon them in the sense that full effect must be given to them.
It is another thing to give currency to the view that they have no force at all
whether legal or other and that therefore they cannot be regarded as forming in
any sense part of a legal system …144
According to the eminent authority, a member State of the United Nations
is “under a duty” to treat a recommendation in a resolution of the General
Assembly “with a degree of respect”.145 “The State in question, while not
bound to accept the recommendation, is bound to give it due consideration
in good faith. If … it decides to disregard it, it is bound to explain the reasons
for its decision.”146 In other words, the right of a State to decline to act upon
the recommendations has not been challenged, what has been challenged is
“its right simply to ignore the recommendations and to abstain from adducing
reasons for not putting them into effect or for not submitting them for examina-
tion with the view to giving effect to them.” To reinforce this important
exposition, the learned judge continues:
An administering State may not be acting illegally by declining to act upon a
recommendation or series of recommendations on the same subject. But in doing
so it acts at its peril when a point is reached when the cumulative effect of the
persistent disregard of the articulate opinion of the Organization is such as to foster
the conviction that the State in question has become guilty of disloyalty to the
Principles and Purposes of the Charter. Thus an Administering State which consist-
ently sets itself above the solemnly and repeatedly expressed judgment of the
Organisation, in particular in proportion as that judgment approximates to unanim-
ity, may find that it has overstepped the imperceptible line between impropriety
and illegality, between discretion and arbitrariness, between the exercise of the
legal right to disregard the recommendation and the abuse of that right, and that
it has exposed itself to consequences legitimately following as a legal sanction.147
The penetrating remarks of Judge Lauterpacht, expressed in the context of
resolutions of the UN General Assembly, are equally applicable to resolutions
of the ICAO Assembly. Two critical points deserve close observation. Firstly,
a recommendatory resolution may generate obligations of legal nature. No
matter how “rudimentary, elastic and imperfect”148 they are, these obligations
144 In Voting Procedure case, Separate Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht, ICJ Report, supra note 98
at 118.
145 Id. at 120.




have gone beyond “political or moral duties”.149 Secondly, the limited and
qualified authority of recommendations necessarily implies that their require-
ment for compliance is different from that of fully mandatory rules. They do
not absolutely require performance strictly in conformity with their provisions,
but they must be considered in good faith and cannot be ignored
arbitrarily.150
5.2.2 Concept of Quasi-Legislation or Quasi-Law
5.2.2.1 Doctrinal and Constitutional Basis for Quasi-Law
The above survey, which is by no means exhaustive, demonstrates that certain
ICAO resolutions do produce certain legal effect, although these resolutions
could not be attributed with ease to one of the sources of international law
listed in Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
Declaratory, interpretative and internally directive resolutions may under
certain conditions produce fully binding effect. The picture is more blurred
with respect to pre-legislative, recommendatory and externally directive
resolutions. Borderline cases exist in all categories of resolutions identified
above. Declaratory resolutions may go beyond the mere restatement of the
existing law and creep into the area of progressive development of law; inter-
pretative resolutions may slip into de facto amendment to the instrument; pre-
legislative resolutions may create obligations not to defeat the object and
purpose of the texts; internal resolutions may generate external effect, and
recommendatory resolutions may set the contiguous zone between impropriety
and illegality. Instead of continuing the simplistic approach to brand these
resolutions as merely having political or moral force, one is tempted to ack-
nowledge that a twilight zone exists between the sources of international law
under the aforementioned Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ and the non-
binding guidance of purely political and moral nature. Article 18 of the Vienna
Convention authoritatively confirms this notion. In New Jersey v. Delaware,
Justice Cardozo stated: “International law, or the law that governs between
States, has at times, like the common law within States, a twilight existence
during which it is hardly distinguishable from morality or justice, till at length
the imprimatur of a court attests its jural quality”.151 Judge Lauterpacht, in
the Voting Procedure case quoted above, also refers to “the imperceptible line
between impropriety and illegality, between discretion and arbitrariness,
149 In International Status of South Africa, Advisory Opinion, the ICJ states that it was not for
the Court to “pronounce on the political or moral duties”. [1950] ICJ Reports 128 at 140.
150 Schreuer, C.H., “Recommendations and the Traditional Sources of International Law” (1977)
20 German Yearbook of International Law 103 at 118.
151 New Jersey v. Delaware (1933), 291 U.S. 383, cited by Sloan, supra note 109 at 33.
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between the exercise of the legal right to disregard the recommendation and
the abuse of that right.”152
In the efforts to conceptualize the “twilight existence” of the norms or the
“imperceptible line between impropriety and illegality”, the notion of “soft
law” has been widely employed in academic circles.153 While the concept
may provide abundant food for thought, it is also considered as “a contra-
diction in terms”.154 As pointed out by Weil, on one hand, some legal norms
may be “soft”, and “are not in practice compelling” because they are too vague,
but they do not cease to be legal norms; on the other hand, there are provisions
“which are precise, yet remain at the pre- or subnormative stage.” “To discuss
both of these categories in terms of ‘soft law’ or ‘hard law’ is to foster con-
fusion.”155 The concept is difficult to grasp because it may cover all resolu-
tions notwithstanding their different legal effect on their own merits.
White, on the other hand, considers the “legal output” of international
organizations as a potentially new source of law. According to him, it seems
“a little perverse” to continue to recognize the provisions of Article 38(1) of
the Statute of the ICJ as “a completely accurate list of sources of international
law”.156Although “it is possible to try to force the legal output of organiza-
tions into the established sources of international law, it would be better to
assess such output as a separate, and potentially new, source of international
law.”157
Another possible theoretical approach is to refine the concept of “quasi-law”
or “quasi-legislation” on the basis of “quasi-legislative functions” of ICAO as
described by Cheng.158 The notion of “quasi-law” or “quasi-legislation” also
exists in domestic systems. Montgomery stated that “[t]he term quasi-law
covers rules which are not usually legally binding, although they may have
some legal force, but which will in practice determine the way in which people
act.”159 In Quasi-Legislation: Recent Developments in Secondary Legislation, Ganz
uses “quasi-legislation” to cover “a wide spectrum of rules whose only com-
mon factor is that they are not directly enforceable through criminal or civil
152 Supra note 147.
153 Shelton, D., Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-binding Norms in the Inter-
national Legal System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
154 Hillgenberg, H., “A Fresh Look at Soft Law” (1999) 10:3 EJIL 499 at 500.
155 Weil, P., “Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?” (1983) 77:3 AJIL 413 at 414
& 415.
156 White, supra note 102 at 159.
157 White, id.at 160.
158 Cheng, supra note 116. See also Falk, supra note 102; Liang Xi, supra note 116 at 27. Saba,
H., “L’activité quasi-législative des institutions spécialisées des Nations Unies” (1964) 111
RdC 603; Schrijver, N., Sovereignty over Natural Resouces: Balancing Rights and Duties (Cambrid-
ge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) at 371.
159 Montgomery, supra note 136.
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proceedings”.160 The forms of quasi-legislation include codes of practice,
circulars, guidelines, practice statements and others. He believes that “the line
between law and quasi-legislation becomes blurred because there are degrees
of legal force” and many of the rules in the spectrum “do have some legal
effect”. He proposes to “draw the line at rules which have a limited legal effect
at one end of the spectrum and purely voluntary rules at the other end.”161
At the international level, in their joint dissenting opinion in the South West
Africa cases, Judges Spender and Fitzmaurice characterize the resolution of
the Council of the League of Nations for setting up a Mandate as “a quasi-
legislative act”.162 This is probably the earliest and most authoritative refer-
ence to the concept, which may be understood as an act of “an organ of an
international organization, in the active exercise of powers conferred on it by
its constitution”.163 Much of the ICAO regulatory material which could not
be considered as falling squarely within the sources of international law
identified in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ will probably fall within the
category of “quasi-legislation” or “quasi-law”.
The term “quasi-law” is not employed in the Chicago Convention, but a
number of its provisions and their context contain the seed for the notion.
Article 54 j) provides that the Council shall report to contracting States “any
infraction of this Convention, as well as any failure to carry out recommenda-
tions or determinations of the Council”. In this provision, a clear distinction
was made in the mind of the drafters between two types of acts or omissions:
one is “any infraction of this Convention”, which constitutes a classical breach
of a treaty obligation under international law; another is “any failure to carry
out recommendations or determination of the Council”, which might be
considered as a novel, sui generis type of behaviour not in conformity with
institutional quasi-law. This distinction is further reinforced by Article 69 of
the Convention:
If the Council is of the opinion that the airports or other air navigation facilities,
including radio and meteorological services, of a contracting State are not reasonab-
ly adequate for the safe, regular, efficient, and economical operation of international
air services, present or contemplated, the Council shall consult with the State
directly concerned, and other States affected, with a view to finding means by which
the situation may be remedied, and may make recommendations for that purpose.
160 Ganz, G., Quasi-Legislation: Recent Developments in Secondary Legislation (London: Sweet
& Maxwell, 1987) at 1.
161 Id.
162 Joint Dissenting Opinion of Sir Percy Spender and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in South West
Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgement
of 21 December 1962: [1962] ICJ Reports 319 at 486.
163 Id. While this is only a dissenting opinion, it must be pointed out that the judgement in
that case was rendered by eight votes to seven, with three judges issuing separate opinions.
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No contracting State shall be guilty of an infraction of this Convention if it fails to carry
out these recommendations. (Emphasis added.)
The combined effect of Articles 69 and 54 j) reasonably leads to the conclusion
that the failure to carry out the recommendations under Article 69 is not “an
infraction” of the Chicago Convention, but it still constitutes a reportable
incident under Article 54 j) of the Convention. In other words, the act of not
following a recommendation does not imply any “guilt”, but still represents
a “failure” to meet expectations within the system of ICAO, which is less than
creditable. Article 70 further provides that a contracting State, in the circum-
stances arising under the provisions of Article 69, may conclude an arrange-
ment with the Council for “giving effect” to such recommendations. While
the State is clearly not obliged to conclude such an arrangement, Article 70
seems to contemplate certain follow-up action, which will in one way or
another give “effect” to the recommendations. Reading Articles 69, 70 and
54 j) together, one could conclude that the drafters of the Convention had the
intention to treat “recommendations” as something less than a fully binding
rule, but something more than a non-binding statement bearing no legal
consequences. Had the drafters of the Chicago Convention considered that
recommendations do not have any legal effect at all and could simply be
ignored, they would not have included as reportable events in Article 54 j)
“failure to carry out recommendations” side by side with “any infraction” of
the Convention. In this connection, one may recall the observation by Higgins:
in some international organizations even the term “recommendation” in its
context sometimes signals more than one would expect from a literal reliance
on that word. Thus “recommendation” may still in context entail a duty of
compliance or an obligation to act.164 The nature of this type of recommenda-
tion matches with the concept of “quasi-law”.
A question may be raised that in the absence of the express terms excluding
infraction as in the case of Article 69, whether a failure to carry out recom-
mendations under other provisions of the Chicago Convention would be
considered as an infraction of the Convention. For instance, under Article 15
concerning the levy of charges, the Council may also make recommendations
for the consideration of the State concerned. However, Article 15 is silent on
whether the failure to carry out the recommendations will amount to an
infraction. Does it imply that the possibility of an infraction is not excluded?
In view of the specific distinction made in Article 54 j), it seems that the answer
should be in the negative. On the other hand, this would not completely
exclude the possibility of crossing the “imperceptible line”, as mentioned by
Judge Lauterpacht in his oft-quoted passage.165
164 Higgins, supra note 141 at 25. She cites Article 19 (b) of the constitutional instrument of
the International Labour Organization.
165 Supra note 147.
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Article 54 j) not only refers to “recommendations”, but also to “determina-
tions”. The scope of the latter term is not defined. Does it include “any decision
by the Council on whether an international airline is operating in conformity
with the provisions” of the Chicago Convention as mentioned in Article 86?
While the English version of the Convention uses “determinations” in Article
54 j) and “decision” in Article 86, the French and Spanish versions use the
same words in both cases. According to the Black’s Law Dictionary, “determina-
tion” is defined as a decision by judiciary or administrative agency.166 If the
term “determinations” is interpreted as the synonym of “decisions”, it may
be argued that Article 54 j) not only covers “recommendations”, but also covers
binding decisions of the Council against an airline which is not operating in
conformity with the provisions of the Convention.
Presumably, since under Article 54 n) the Council may consider any matter
relating to the Convention which any contracting State may refer to it, it may
also make a recommendation or determination on this matter if it so wishes.
If such a recommendation or determination is made and the relevant contract-
ing State does not follow it, Article 54 j) will come into play. From this per-
spective, one could see that the scope of the applicability of Article 54 j) could
be very large and that the power of the Council could be used to prescribe
and apply the rules of conduct to promote aviation safety.
In view of the foregoing, there is no legal obstacle in the Chicago Conven-
tion to the establishment of a system of quasi-law. On the contrary, there is
a constitutional support inherent in the Convention which confirms the exist-
ence of two levels of obligations or compliance systems. The primary compli-
ance system is composed of the obligations directly laid down by the Chicago
Convention, which are backed by traditional sanctions under international
law against the breach of a treaty. The secondary compliance system consists
of norms with certain obligatory effect backed by the institutional mechanisms
within ICAO, in particular the power of the Council under Article 54 j). There
are different degrees of obligatory character in the two compliance systems,
and the less obligatory one may be broadly referred to as “quasi-law”, which
includes recommendations of the Council and the Assembly. While these
recommendations are not strictly binding as traditional sources of law, they
cannot be ignored and must be considered and acted upon in good faith. They
constitute norms of conduct forming an integral part of the institutional regime
and legal order of ICAO. Failure to respect them does not amount to infractions
of the rules of international law but may represent non-fulfillment of the shared
expectation of the community and entail, in FitzGerald’s words, “a dis-
entitlement to enjoyment of the activity in the company of other States be-
166 Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1990) at 450.
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longing to the norm-establishing organization.”167 Under certain circum-
stances, non-compliance with these norms may also overstep “the imperceptible
line” mentioned by Judge Lauterpacht and lead to “consequences legitimately
following as a legal sanction”.168
5.2.2.2 The Essence of Quasi-Law
For the purpose of the present inquiry, and without attempting to formulate
a precise definition, it is submitted that in essence, quasi-law is the authoritat-
ive norms formulated by competent bodies in an international organization,
which will either evolve into positive law in due course or be implemented
by the institutional mechanisms. Since the line between law and quasi-law
is inherently “blurred”169 or even “imperceptible”,170 attempts to distinguish
them could only based on very general guidelines.
First and foremost, the provisions of quasi-law should be prescriptive and
not descriptive. They must contain specific and precise requirements to do
or refrain from doing something. In assessing the role of quasi-legislative
competence of the UN General Assembly, Falk observes:
It is, first of all, essential to classify as accurately as possible the nature of the
legislative claim; that is, to identify the claim that is being made and what must
be done by whom to comply. In making this assessment, the language of the
resolution must be carefully analyzed to see whether it formulates specific duties
to be discharged by specific actors.171
Judge Lauterpacht also states: “A resolution recommending … a specific course
of action creates some legal obligation which, however rudimentary, elastic,
and imperfect, is nevertheless a legal obligation.”172 In ICAO, most quasi-law
provisions are formulated to specify requirements in daily operation of aviation
activities, or to supplement the existing law. The resolution mentioned above,
which urges the States to file differences with recommended practices, is one
example. This requirement of specificity distinguishes quasi-law from the so-
called soft law, which may include vague and imprecise provisions.
The second prerequisite of quasi-law is the act of a competent body to
adopt, approve or endorse its content. According to FitzGerald, in ICAO, there
are resolutions of the Assembly, Council and various subsidiary bodies. “None
167 FitzGerald, G. F., “The International Civil Aviation Organization – A Case Study in the
Implementation of Decisions of a Functional International Organization”, in Schwebel, S.
M. ed., The Effectiveness of International Decisions (Sijthoff Oceana, 1971) 156 at 161.
168 Supra note 147.
169 Ganz, supra note 160.
170 Lauterpacht, supra note 147.
171 Falk, supra note 102 at 786.
172 In Voting Procedure case, supra note 98 at 119.
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of the resolutions of bodies below the level of the Council would have binding
force”.173 The Assembly, by virtue of Article 49 j) of the Chicago Convention,
may “deal with any matter within the sphere of action of the Organization
not specifically assigned to the Council.” The Council, in its turn, is specifically
mandated by Article 54 l) to adopt international standards and recommended
practices. Other bodies are not conferred such a power by the Convention.
Consequently, manuals, circulars and other guidance material prepared by
the Secretariat may have professional value as guidelines, but at most they
could only represent usage in ICAO and could not be regarded as quasi-law,
unless they are specifically approved or endorsed by the Assembly or the
Council. Under certain circumstances, a plenipotentiary diplomatic conference
convened for the purpose of adopting a treaty may be considered as having
at least equal status to the Assembly with respect to the competence to adopt
quasi-law. Some of the resolutions adopted thereat may carry certain obligatory
effects, although they are not officially incorporated into the treaty under
consideration.
Is there any relation between the status of quasi-law and the voting pattern
in its adoption? Article 90 of the Chicago Convention requires the vote of a
two-thirds majority of the members of the Council for the adoption or amend-
ment of Annexes to the Chicago Convention. Unanimity is not required.
Resolutions of the Council and those of the Assembly are adopted by simple
majority. In the current practice, except in the case of the adoption or amend-
ment of an Annex, ICAO seldom resorts to vote but prefers to reach a decision
by consensus. In the event that a resolution is adopted by a majority but does
not include major powers whose vital interests are affected, it will be less
effective or even ineffective in its implementation. The international community
is not yet ripe for “majoritarianism”.174 “As long as might and majority
coincided, this immaturity remained concealed. However, as soon as the
powerful started to be outvoted, the problem could no longer be ignored.”175
Consequently, while the majority may de jure make decisions, concurrence
by the dominant section is de facto required to make quasi-law effective.
The third prerequisite of quasi-law is that it will enter the realm of positive
law in due course, or if it does not become full-fledged law, it will still be
implemented by institutional mechanism. Quasi-law may take different forms,
such as a duly adopted treaty which has not yet entered into force, an inter-
national standard adopted by the Council contemplating the absence of dis-
approval by member States, a recommended practice to be accepted by States,
a model clause to be incorporated into a bilateral agreement, or model legisla-
tion to be incorporated into domestic law; but all these forms of quasi-law
173 FitzGerald, supra note 167 at 164.
174 Claude, I., Sword into Plowshares: the Problems and Progress of International Organizations (4th
ed. 1971), Chapter 7.
175 Schermers & Blokker, supra note 98 at 533. See also infra note 255.
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share one common feature: they will become law in due course after certain
act or acts of “imprimatur”. Some quasi-law material is not intended to become
law but will remain to be a law-supplementary forming part of the institutional
regime. In this case, it is monitored and implemented by the internal mechan-
isms of ICAO, such as those identified above in the second part of Article 54 j)
of the Chicago Convention. In short, quasi-law is different from law because
it will require the act of “imprimatur” to become law; it is also different from
non-law, because its implementation is safeguarded by the institutional machin-
ery.
5.2.2.3 Scope of Quasi-Law
The scope of quasi-law is very wide. Many resolutions, as analysed above,
may be included. Other forms also exist, such as PANS, SUPPs, Regional Air
Navigation Plans and others.
Standards have long been regarded as the output associated with the
“quasi-legislative function” as described by Cheng. “The reason why this
function of the ICAO is described as quasi-legislative rather than legislative
is that these international standards are not binding on member States against
their will.”176 Unlike the annexes adopted under the Paris Convention which
were binding on member States of ICAN, standards adopted by ICAO may be
subject to the filing of differences, which are commonly called contract-out
or opt-out provisions.
The notion of “quasi-law” may be expanded to include the provisions
which States could opt-in, such as recommended practices adopted by the
Council. The procedure for the adoption of the standards and recommended
practices is exactly the same. No distinction is made in this respect under
Article 94. The Chicago Convention does not define standards and recom-
mended practices. The Assembly worked out the definitions to underline their
differences.177 It is the Assembly again that is blurring their differences.178
There is a predominant view that standards are more binding than recom-
mended practices, but the actual difference between them is that standards
are opt-out provisions, while recommended practices are opt-in. In the case
of standards, silence means consent; in the case of recommenced practices,
consent has to be expressed. Once they are opted in, the effect would for all
practical purposes be the same. An international standard for which half of
ICAO member States file differences is not more effective or binding than a
recommended practice which is incorporated into domestic law by more than
half of the member States. Standards may become binding due to the passive
inaction by States, while recommended practices could only be binding through
176 Cheng, supra note 116 at 64.
177 See supra notes 86 and 147 in Ch.2 .
178 See supra notes 96 and 138.
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active commitment by States. Because of this, the conscious acceptance of
recommended practices may even display a stronger will to implement them.
Even if a State decided not to follow a recommended practice, it does not
necessarily mean that this recommended practice will become totally irrelevant.
For example, paragraph 3.2.1.2 of Annex 17 contains a recommended practice
that each contracting State should include in its bilateral agreements on air
transport a clause related to aviation security. Consequently, a State which
has opted out this provision might need to opt in again in a bilateral nego-
tiation, if the other side has opted in.
It follows from this that model clauses and model legislation may also
become quasi-law to be opted in. With respect to duly adopted treaties which
have not yet come into force, both situations of opt-in and opt-out may exist.
A State may opt out by clearly indicating that it will not become a party to
a treaty. It may also opt in by ratifying the treaty and becoming fully bound
by it. Alternatively, it may choose to maintain the status quo by obliging itself
to refrain from any act which may defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.
Regulatory material contained in resolutions, PANS, SUPPS or regional air
navigation plans may also be considered as quasi-law material if they reflect
the essence of quasi-law described above. On most occasions, they are adopted
by consensus; there is no clear procedure of opt-in or opt-out.
When the provisions of quasi-law are elevated to full-fledged law, they
will naturally be removed from the scope of quasi-law. This may take place,
for example, when a State ratifies a duly adopted treaty, refrains from filing
a difference to a standard, accepts a recommended practice, embodies model
clauses in an agreement, incorporates model legislation into its domestic law,
concludes an arrangement with ICAO to give effect to its recommendation, or
implements a regional plan. In other cases, it may happen that a particular
provision has become full-fledged law for some States, but remains as quasi-
law for others.
5.2.2.4 Effect of Quasi-Law
The issue concerning the effect of quasi-law is likely to generate controversial
discussions. Some commentators do not accept the degree of obligation or legal
force. For them, there can be no sliding scale of legal commitment: a norm
is either binding under international law or it is not.179 In their view, “proli-
feration of a para-international law” will carry “negative implications for the
credibility of international law as a whole”.180 Others hold a different view.
For example, Hillgenburg expresses his doubt to the aforementioned position
by raising the following question: “[i]n the field of agreements intended by
179 Several German publications by Heusel, W., and Thürer separately, as cited by Hillgenberg,
H. in “A Fresh Look at Soft Law” (1999) 10:3 EIJL 499 at 507.
180 Schwarzenberger, as cited by Hillgenberg, id. at 502.
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those involved to be normative, is there merely a choice between international
treaties on the one hand and exclusively ‘political’ or moral commitments on
the other?”
A clear-cut division between law and non-law may present difficulties,
at least in the context of the ICAO system. Article 38 of the Chicago Convention
allows a member State to file a difference to a particular standard and therefore
not be bound by it. On the other hand, while this standard is a non-law for
this State, it could not be totally disregarded since it is still law for others.
For instance, after the events of 11 September 2001, a standard was introduced
to strengthen the cockpit doors of certain categories of aircraft. Any member
State may file difference to render this standard inapplicable in its territory.
But if its aircraft do not comply with this standard, they may encounter
difficulties in their operation and admission to other States where that standard
is in force. A clear-cut distinction between law and non-law would not be
feasible in reality. Despite the filing of differences by a State, some standards
may continue to be quasi-law which could not be completely ignored.
The existence of the degree of obligations or legal force seems to be undeni-
able. As mentioned above, under the Vienna Convention, there are obligations
imposed by peremptory norms which could not be contracted out. Then, there
are “regular” treaty provisions which are binding but could be derogated or
contracted out under certain circumstances. Further down the sliding scale
are treaties which are not yet in force and therefore are not binding, but the
object and purpose of which could not be defeated. Outside the Vienna Con-
vention, there are so-called “nonbinding international agreements”.181 As
Hillgenberg points out, since the decisive factor in international law is the
intention of States, “there appears – at least at first glance – to be no reason
why States should be denied the possibility to take on commitment with lesser
legal consequences than a treaty would have.”182
Based on the premise that quasi-law represents the twilight zone between
law and non-law, its effect or legal consequences should stand in the middle
of the spectrum which has “full effect” on one end, and “no force at all” on
the other.183 The first implication of the effect, as mentioned above, is that
quasi-law, be it in the form of a recommendation or otherwise, must be con-
sidered by States in good faith. The classic statement by Judge Lauterpacht
was endorsed by a number of commentators.184 Accordingly, while States
are not fully bound by quasi-law, they could not disregard it without giving
any reason. Some commentators further believe that at least in some circum-
stances, the obligation not only implies a duty to consider it in good faith,
181 Schachter, O., “The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements” (1977)
71 AJIL 297.
182 Hillgenberg, supra note 179 at 506.
183 Words of Judge Lauterpacht in the Voting Procedure Case, supra note 144.
184 Sloan, supra note 107 at 121.
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but also to cooperate with the organization in good faith for the purpose of
the implementation. “When these obligations to cooperate in good faith, which
go beyond a mere duty to consider, are ignored to the point of becoming an
abuse of right, a breach of duty to act in good faith emerges.”185
The second implication of the effect of quasi-law relates to the concept of
estoppel. It is not certain whether a positive vote for a resolution could give
rise to the legitimate expectation of compliance, but active sponsorship or
strong advocacy of a provision of quasi-law may generate such expectation.
It would be unthinkable if a member State of ICAO which had actively advo-
cated that States should file differences regarding recommended practices
would subsequently refuse to file its own differences. Definitely, there is an
element of estoppel, although the degrees of expectation will need to be
analyzed on a case by case basis.
The third implication of the effect of quasi-law is that it creates a favourable
presumption for those who comply with it. Schreuer analyses this effect of
a recommendation as follows:
A recommendation can, moreover, usually serve as a presumption of legality in
favour of conduct which is in accordance with its tenets. A State acting in accord-
ance with the recommendation of [an international organization] will enjoy the
benefit of the doubt should the legality of its conduct be called into question. On
the other hand, action contrary to the provisions of a recommendation can result
in the shifting of the burden of proof against the person violating it.186
These remarks are made in the context of a recommendation, but they are
applicable to other forms of quasi-law. The practice of ICAO seems to be devel-
oping along this line, at least in some cases of non-compliance. For example,
in the previous practice, when States filed differences with standards and
recommended practices, they were not requested to explain the reason. In 2007,
the Assembly adopted Resolution A36-13, adding a new provision to request
contracting States which find themselves unable to comply to inform ICAO
of the reason for non-implementation.187 Consequently, the burden of proof
is now on the non-complying States to provide justification for their non-
compliance with SARPs. With respect to the cases of compliance, there are not
yet concrete cases to demonstrate exactly how favourable presumption would
actually operate. Presumably, quasi-law may legitimize those claims which
are in line with it. To illustrate through the case relating to unruly passengers,
States which have exercised jurisdiction over unruly passengers pursuant to
185 Sloan, id. 122. On abuse of rights, see also the passage of Judge Lauterpacht. supra note
147, also in Oppenheim, International law, Vol. I (8th ed. by Lauterpacht, 1955) 345-347.
186 Schreuer, C.H., “Recommendations and the Traditional Sources of International Law”,
German Yearbook of International Law 20 (1977) 103 at 118; see also White, supra note 102
at 169.
187 See supra note 144 in Ch.2.
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the model law endorsed by the Assembly will be presumed to act legally
although the jurisdiction so exercised may have gone beyond the traditional
limit set by international law.188
5.2.2.5 Implementation of Quasi-law
The term “implementation” is deliberately chosen instead of “enforcement”,
since many provisions of quasi-law are complied by voluntary acts. It is the
objective necessity for international cooperation that has motivated States to
give effect to quasi-law. Its compliance is enhanced more by the concerted
will to make the common system work rather than by enforcement procedures.
States not complying with the quasi-law will be confronted more with “natural
sanctions” than with legal sanctions. In the field of aviation, a breach of
technical code may trigger a disastrous accident.189 Milde has mentioned
that the Soviet Union had “meticulously” observed most ICAO standards long
before it became a member State in 1970s.190 Nothing could be more convin-
cing than this example to demonstrate that it is essential to be part of the
system.
The existence of natural sanction by no means implies that ICAO does not
have an institutionalized enforcement system. The reporting power vested
in the ICAO Council, particularly under Article 54 j) of the Chicago Convention,
has been the focus of attention in ICAO in the first decade of the 21st Cen-
tury.191 Requests for information as follow-up of resolutions or decisions
have been widely practiced in the UN system. “These procedures apply more
subtle pressures and when accompanied by machinery set up to supervise
the implementation of the resolution they may be more effective than sanctions
in nudging States toward compliance.”192 In ICAO, reporting requirements
not only stem from the Chicago Convention but also from some other conven-
tions adopted under its auspices.193 While this type of system of sanction
may be considered “soft”, it is not necessarily softer than some forms of
sanctions used in traditional international law. In the contemporary world,
the report of a UN specialized agency within its competence may carry with
it powerful political, economic and other effects against a State in non-compli-
188 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
189 FitzGerald, supra note 167 at 161. See also Fawcett, J.E.S., “The International Monetary Fund
and International Law (1964) 40 BYIL 34; Schermers & Blokker, supra note 98 at 774.
190 Milde, M., “Enforcement of Aviation Safety Standards – Problem of Safety Oversight” (1996)
45 ZLW 1 at 6, n. 14.
191 See infra 5.3 for more discussion of ICAO implementation and enforcement power.
192 Sloan, supra note 107 at 115, 134; van Hoof, supra note 63 at 270-275; Engel, “Procedures
for the De Facto Revision of the Charter” (1965) Proceedings of the American Society of
International Law, 59th Annual Meeting 108-116.
193 See supra Ch.4, notes 75 and 122 as well as accompanying text on the discussion of Article
11 of The Hague Convention. See also infra note 206.
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ance, which could affect its vital interests. Moreover, the implementation of
the secondary compliance system mainly depends upon the institutional value
and strength of an organization. Members that value their entitlements in the
institution will often think twice before they decide to disregard the decisions
of the institution.
In summary of the foregoing, it may be said that quasi-legislative power
has constituted the core of ICAO regulatory functions. The notion of quasi-law
in ICAO has rarely been discussed in the existing legal literature. The present
undertaking may be the first exploratory attempt to elaborate this notion and
to provide it with a doctrinal basis. While this study could only be embryonic
and non-exhaustive due to various constraints, a preliminary observation
reveals that the notion does capture the legal phenomenon in the ordinary
course of operation of ICAO. Between the fully binding legal rules and non-
binding political and moral undertakings, there is a twilight zone of obligatory
norms, which is primarily safeguarded by the internal institutional machinery
of ICAO. Although quasi-law is not fully binding as law it may create favour-
able presumption for those complying with it, and impose a burden on those
who do not wish to comply to justify their non-compliance. Some provisions
of quasi-law may have stronger binding force than others, but all impose
certain duties. Quasi-legislative activities of ICAO represent legal input of the
organization arising from its institutional capacity which is distinguishable
from the capacity of its members. These activities dominate the law-making
process in ICAO. Systemization, refinement and perfection of this notion may
enhance the role of ICAO and improve its regulatory activities. It may also
promote the sense of duty of the member States to comply with quasi-law.
ICAO does not serve simply to give political and moral guidance, it provides
an institutional code of conduct to regulate aviation safety.
5.3 ICAO ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION FUNCTIONS
Traditionally, ICAO focused on development and adoption of treaties, standards
and recommended practices, and other provisions relating to aviation safety,
leaving their implementation basically in the hands of its member States. Since
1990s, there has been a paradigm shift from this pattern with the landmark
decision to launch the universal safety oversight audit programme. This
initiative was followed by the universal security audit programme. The results
of the audits demonstrate not only the need to adopt safety regulations, but
also the more pressing need to enforce and implement them.
The enforcement and implementation functions of ICAO should be carefully
studied by the relevant bodies of ICAO and the academia, particularly if one
considers that some safety obligations in aviation have evolved into, or are
in the process of emerging as obligations erga omnes. One major issue in the
debate relating to these obligations is how to enforce them. Some writers have
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generally recognized and supported “decentralized enforcement” of obligations
erga omnes,194 namely, the counter-measures taken against the breach by
parties which are not directly injured or affected by the breach. Others would
have preferred centralized or institutional enforcement, such as enforcement
through the UN system, in order to prevent the possible abuse of counter-
measures by individual States.195 Frowein, after reviewing state practice regard-
ing third party reactions, arrived at the following conclusion:
The recognition of fundamental rules of the system would be meaningless without
any special procedures for implementing these rules. Only bilateral reactions would
always create the danger that the more powerful State in the bilateral relations
will prevail. Of course, it must be admitted that the danger in giving powerful
States the justification for disguised political action to further their interests is also
great where one accepts that third party reactions are lawful. With the decentralized
structure of present-day international law this danger cannot be fully avoided. What
one has to balance is on the one hand the need to protect the fundamental rules
of the system by all those belonging to the community of States and on the other
hand the danger that powerful States overstep the limits of the law. It is clearly
preferable, therefore, that collective institutions should be involved in the proce-
dure.196
The experience of ICAO in the implementation of its audit programmes has
confirmed that it is preferable to enforce safety obligations through the institu-
tional mechanisms of ICAO. Since some of these obligations are essentially of
erga omnes character, which are the concern of all States, it would be logical
for ICAO, as a world-wide and neutral organization, to oversee compliance
with these obligations. This may ensure the balance between “the need to
protect the fundamental rules of the system by all those belonging to the
community of States and on the other hand the danger that powerful States
overstep the limits of the law”.197
5.3.1 Enforcement Functions
UN organizations, with few exceptions, have been characterized as having
“intensive co-operation and monitoring, but little direct enforcement of legal
obligations”.198 The ICAO audit programmes represent some progress from
“monitoring” to “enforcement”. Although it is by no means comparable to
194 Cf, mainly Tams, supra note 7; Simma, supra note 1 at 313 et seq.
195 Wang, X., supra note 57 at 297, 298 and 301.
196 Frowein, supra note 34 at 423. See also, Ma, X., “Statement on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts (2007)” (2008) 7 Chinese JIL 563 at para. 6.
197 Id.
198 Simma, supra note 1 at 283.
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the enforcement procedure of a court, ICAO does have certain mechanisms on
hand to apply sanctions against non-compliance with its rules or other provi-
sions.
5.3.1.1 Enforcement under Article 54 j) of the Chicago Convention
The power of the ICAO Council to report infractions or failures under Article
54 j) has been previously discussed in the context of quasi-law.199 It consti-
tutes not only the central element in the machinery of ICAO for giving effect
to quasi-law, but also one of the important tools to enforce full-fledged law.
So far, there has been no decision of the Council based explicitly on Article
54 j),200 but its potential application is significant. The report of ICAO under
this provision may have great influence in the industry and create powerful
political, economic and other effects against the State that commits an infraction
or an act of non-compliance.
In June 2005, the Council approved a procedure for transparency and
disclosure of information regarding a State having significant compliance
shortcomings with respect to safety-related SARPs, including failure to act in
accordance with its safety oversight obligations. The procedure will be used
for safety-related purposes only. It is not aimed at States that lack the resources
for proper safety oversight201 or States which may have difficulties managing
the safety and effectiveness of their air navigation facilities. The procedure
for transparency and disclosure under Article 54 j) is envisaged to be applicable
only in the more serious scenario where a State demonstrates severe and
persistent safety oversight shortfalls. A typical example would be an excessive
number of large-transport aircraft on a State’s registry, well beyond its capabil-
ity for safety oversight. The aircraft so registered operate exclusively in distant
countries and regions without appropriate arrangements, such as the transfer
of certain functions and duties in accordance with Article 83 bis of the Chicago
Convention, thus making effective safety oversight virtually impossible. A
State may even openly advertise registration services for a fee, and some
operations may have been linked to illegal activities.202 Even in this scenario,
the first recourse will be to resolve the problems by working together with
the State through assistance programmes, support mechanisms and regional
partnerships. Only when the State is unwilling or unable to participate in the
cooperative efforts, will the case be presented to the Council for special con-
199 See supra 5.2.2.1 “Doctrinal and Constitutional Basis for Quasi-Law”.
200 ICAO Council Working Paper C-WP/11186, “Infractions of the Convention on International
Civil Aviation”, 10 November 1999, at 3. The working paper mentions, however, that there
were certain instances in which the Council, without referring to Article 54 j), made a
determination that an infraction had taken place. One instance was the shooting-down of
the Korean airliner, Flight 007 by the Soviet Union.
201 ICAO State letter AN 11/41-05/87, 12 August 2005.
202 State letter, id. at Attachment A, A-2.
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sideration and possible future action under the procedure for transparency
and disclosure under Article 54 j). The Council may then decide what course
of action should be followed. It may request more data or information, or
decide that no further action is warranted. It may also proceed with recom-
mendations urging the State to act within a specified time to explain its action,
to remedy safety (oversight) problem(s), or to immediately ban or discontinue
certain activity and take appropriate corrective action when it is determined
that the activity is clearly inconsistent with the State’s safety oversight obliga-
tions.203
The procedure was developed in 2005 and has not yet been tested. Further
experience is yet to be gained concerning its actual operation. It appears that
the emphasis will be put on the second part of Article 54 j), i.e., the failure
to carry out recommendations or determinations of the Council, rather than
on its first part, i.e., “any infraction of this Convention”. In other words, the
procedure at the outset aims at resolving the safety issues at quasi-law level.
Nevertheless, it does not exclude the possibility that if the State disregards
the recommendations of the Council, its act may become an infraction of the
Chicago Convention.
Two distinct steps are envisaged in the action of the Council. Firstly, the
Council needs to make a recommendation or determination concerning the
alleged non-compliance by a State. Only when the State fails to carry out the
recommendation or determination will the Council decide to report to other
contracting States under Article 54 j). At both stages of the process, a quasi-
judicial procedure and elementary principles of justice must be followed. “This
means that at a minimum, the State concerned must be given adequate op-
portunity to be heard by the Council under Article 53 of the Convention and
Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure for the Council.”204
One may query whether the State will have a right to review or appeal
if it does not accept the recommendations or determinations by the Council.
Article 84 of the Convention, which grants a member State of ICAO the right
to appeal to the International Court of Justice, is only applicable to “any
disagreement between two or more contracting States”; it does not seem to
cover the situation under Article 54 j), which typically only involves one State.
On the other hand, a determination of an infraction of the Convention will
necessarily require interpretation of the Convention. Conceptually, it is difficult
to understand why interpretation by the Council for two or more States could
203 State letter, id. Appendix C, C-2.
204 C-WP/11186, supra note 200 at 3, paragraph 2.6. Article 53 of the Chicago Convention reads:
Any contracting State may participate, without a vote, in the consideration by the Council
and by its committees and commissions of any question which especially affects its interests.
No member of the Council shall vote in the consideration by the Council of a dispute to
which it is a party. Rule 31 of the Rules of Procedure for the Council contains the similar
provisions, ICAO Doc 7559/7 Rules of Procedure for the Council, 7th ed. (2006).
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be appealed, but interpretation for one State could not. With respect to the
report of the failure to carry out recommendations and determinations by the
Council, while it may not be as serious as the report of an infraction of the
Convention, it may still affect the vital interests of the State concerned. For
instance, such a report may trigger reaction from other States to ban flights
by its airlines. From this point of view, one may wonder, in the interest of
the rule of law, particularly the requirement of natural justice, whether recourse
to a review process should not be established, if it does not exist.
5.3.1.2 Other Enforcement Mechanisms
In addition to Article 54 j), Chapter XVIII of the Chicago Convention contains
the procedure for the settlement of disputes, which is another important tool
of ICAO for law enforcement. Under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention, each
contracting State may submit to the Council any disagreement it has with
another contracting State or States relating to the interpretation or application
of the Convention and its annexes, if such a disagreement cannot be settled
by negotiation. The decision of the Council may be appealed to the Inter-
national Court of Justice, or to an arbitration tribunal if any party to the
dispute has not accepted the Statute of the International Court of Justice.205
Under Article 86, an important power is vested in the Council to decide
whether an international airline is operating in conformity with the provisions
of the Chicago Convention. While this power has never been used, it is a
potentially important tool to enforce safety standards and other regulations.
Once the Council decides that an international airline is not conforming to
its final decision, all member States of ICAO are obligated under Article 87 to
bar the operation of that airline in their territory until the decision of the
Council is reversed on appeal. The power to impose a penalty directly on
airlines may arguably be considered as being akin to supranational power,
which may have far-reaching effect. The fact that our grandfathers could agree
in 1944 on such a drastic and sweeping measure may be interpreted as their
strong determination to defend the safety of international civil aviation.
5.3.2 Implementation Functions
Articles 54 j), 86 and 87 apply to enforcement relating to the Chicago Conven-
tion. Whether some of their provisions could be applicable to enforcement
measures relating to other treaties is an issue to be determined when a specific
case arises. Nevertheless, several treaties adopted under the auspices of ICAO
also contain their own reporting requirements. For example, Article VIII,
205 Articles 84 and 85 of the Chicago Convention refer to the Permanent Court of International
Justice, which is now interpreted as the ICJ.
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paragraph 2 of the MEX Convention provides that States Parties shall keep the
Council informed of the measures they have taken to implement the provisions
of this Convention.206 Article IX further provides that the Council shall, in
co-operation with States Parties and international organizations concerned,
take appropriate measures to facilitate the implementation of this Convention.
These provisions, together with the general provision in Article 55 c) of the
Chicago Convention, which authorizes the Council to conduct research into
all aspects of air transport and air navigation which are of international import-
ance, leave the Council with a broad latitude to compel or enable States to
fulfill their obligations under the relevant treaties, if it so wishes. The ICAO
Assembly, under Article 49 k) of the Chicago Convention, may also deal with
any matter within the sphere of the organization not specifically assigned to
the Council.
In many cases, the issue is not one of disciplinary sanction but rather the
need for assistance. States may lack the resources for proper safety over-
sight.207 The main action contemplated from ICAO is to offer assistance to
these States through its programmes.208 Such programmes include, inter alia,
the Technical Cooperation Programme administered by the Technical Coopera-
tion Bureau of ICAO; the International Financial Facility for Aviation Safety
(IFFAS) established in 2002;209 and the Comprehensive Regional Implementa-
tion Plan for Aviation Safety in Africa (AFI Plan), established in 2007 to provide
a common framework for States and all partners to allow a more proactive
approach to aviation safety in the continent. Full description and analyses of
these programmes are beyond the scope of the present study. Suffice it to say
that while these programmes are helpful to developing countries through
numerous specific projects, their magnitude has not yet resulted in a quantum
leap for safety improvement on the global scale. To use IFFAS as an example,
its total assets only amount to several million U.S. dollars. To rely on its limited
funds for improving aviation safety worldwide would not be much different
from using a tea cup to extinguish a big fire. If the international community
is serious about these programmes, stronger determination and commitment
are required to pour in more financial resources.
Putting political will and financial power aside, one may argue from a legal
point of view that the current framework is sufficient to provide ICAO with
the implementation competence to assist developing countries. Chapter XV
of the Chicago Convention contains all necessary provisions for improvement
of air navigation facilities. Among them, Article 71 provides that “if a contract-
ing State so requests, the Council may agree to provide, man, maintain, and
206 See also supra note 193 as well as Article 13 of the Montreal Convention, which follows
Article 11 of The Hague Convention.
207 ICAO State letter AN 11/41-05/87, 12 August 2005.
208 State letter, id. in Attachment A.
209 Supra note 131.
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administer any or all of the airports and other air navigation facilities including
radio and meteorological services, required in its territory for the safe, regular,
efficient and economical operation of the international air services of the other
contracting States, and may specify just and reasonable charges for the use
of the facilities provided.” In the history of ICAO, this power has been scarcely
used, but its legitimacy has never been in doubt. The question is not whether
ICAO has implementation power, but how such power should be used.
5.4 IMPLEMENTATION AT THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEVEL
ICAO used to be less concerned with the modes of implementation of safety
regulations in domestic laws. Since embarking on audit programmes, there
has been gradual realization that the modes of implementation are also relevant
to the safety oversight functions of States because they involve the fundamental
question of whether a domestic court could apply international rules to decide
a case. Moreover, the rise of regional bodies and the acceleration of regional
integration in the implementation process also present new implications to
the safety regime.
5.4.1 Implementation in National Law in General
There are different ways in which States implement ICAO regulatory material.
In their practice, they are influenced by traditional doctrines of monism,
dualism and others.
5.4.1.1 Monism
The monistic approach is based on a unitary conception of law. According
to “radical” monism, pacta sunt servanda is the basic norm (Grundnorm) which
gives effect to international law. The legal order of municipal law is derived
from international law by way of delegation.210 The conflict “between an
established norm of international law and one of national law is a conflict
between a higher and lower norm”. The higher norm may abrogate the con-
flicting lower one.211 This radical position has been modified by “modest”
monists, who no longer insist that the power of a State is delegated by inter-
national law, but advocate the view that international law determines a margin
210 Kelsen, Principles of International Law (New York: Rinhart and Company Inc., 1952) at 403.
See also Partsch, K., J., “International Law and Municipal Law”, in Bernhardt (ed.) Encyclo-
pedia of Public International Law, supra note 69 at 1183-1185.
211 Id. at 421. See also, O’Connell, D. P., International Law, 2nd ed. (London: Stevens & Sons,
1970) 39 et seq.
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of action for each State which delimits its liberty of action.212 “Modest” mon-
ism has influence on the legislative framework of a number of countries. For
example, it is reflected in Article VI, clause 2 of the United States Constitution,
which provides that “all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land”. Similar-
ly, under Article 184 of the Civil Aviation Law of the People’s Republic of
China, the provisions of treaties to which China is a party shall prevail over
this Law in case of inconsistency, except the treaty provisions to which China
has declared a reservation. Accordingly, domestic courts will give international
treaties superior status over ordinary domestic law, but not over constitutional
law. In some other States, treaties even prevail over their constitutions.213
It should be noted, however, that the aforementioned examples only refer
to treaties, which may embrace the Chicago Convention and other international
air law instruments. They do not refer to standards and recommended practices
adopted under the Chicago Convention and other types of quasi-law developed
by ICAO. For these types of regulatory materials, the modes of implementation
vary from State to State. Some States just publish the Annexes to the Chicago
Convention in their original form, and the materials therein become directly
applicable at the domestic level. In these cases, the standards in the Annexes
are enforceable standards, whereas the recommended practices in the Annexes
remain as recommended practices. Other States incorporate the provisions
of the Annexes into their domestic regulations. In these cases, all standards
will become enforceable domestic regulations. As for recommended practices,
States will have to determine whether some or all of them should be incor-
porated into domestic law. If they decide to do so, the incorporated parts of
the recommended practices will also become enforceable domestic regulations,
and the distinction between standards and recommended practices will no
longer exist. For those recommended practices in the Annexes which are
deliberately omitted in domestic regulations, a question may be raised whether
they are devoid of any significance from the perspective of domestic law. Some
States still circulate these recommended practices in one form or another, which
may be used as guidance material, or even serve as quasi-law, which in
practice determines the way in which people act.214
5.4.1.2 Dualism
According to dualism, international law and domestic law are different legal
systems. They come from different sources and regulate different relationships.
The former regulates the relationship between States, whereas the latter regu-
212 Verdross, “Le Fondement du droit international” (1927) 16 RdC 287. See, also, Partsch, supra
note 210 at 1186; Wang, supra note 82 at 184 and 189.
213 Wang, id. at 208.
214 Montgomery, supra note 136.
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lates the relationship between individuals and the relationship between an
individual and the relevant State.215 Consequently, treaty provisions are not
directly enforceable by domestic courts, unless they are given such effect by
the legislative body of the relevant State. This point has been articulated by
Lord Templeman:
A treaty is a contract between the governments of two or more sovereign states.
International law regulates the relations between sovereign states and determines
the validity, the interpretation and the enforcement of treaties. A treaty to which
Her Majesty’s government is a party does not alter the laws of the United Kingdom.
A treaty may be incorporated into and alter the laws of the United Kingdom by
means of legislation. Except to the extent that a treaty becomes incorporated into
the laws of the United Kingdom by statute, the courts of the United Kingdom have
no power to enforce treaty rights and obligations at the behest of a sovereign
government or at the behest of a private individual.216
This dualistic approach not only prevails in the United Kingdom, but also in
other Commonwealth countries. In practice, it requires “enabling legislation”
to transform a treaty into domestic legislation. With respect to standards and
recommended practices as well as other types of quasi-law, they are normally
given effect through the transformation into orders, regulations, decrees or
other forms of secondary legislation under the delegated authority of the
legislative body of the relevant country. In the United Kingdom, the civil
aviation authority may adopt the Civil Aviation Publications (CAPs) and British
Civil Airworthiness Requirements (BCARs) to impose requirements for flight
crew licenses, certificates of airworthiness and air operator certificates. Accord-
ing to the Summary Audit Report issued by ICAO, the CAPs and BCARs contain
material which is both regulatory and advisory in nature. “These publications
are not considered to be law, and failure to comply with a requirement does
not constitute an offence, although it may form the basis upon which a license
or certificate is granted, refused, suspended, varied or revoked.”217
5.4.1.3 Sui Generis Approach
Between monism and dualism, a middle-ground approach exists which may
be a mixture or combination of the first two. For example, under the Swiss
215 Triepel, H., “Les Rapports entre le droit interne et le droit international” (1923) 1 RdC 77.
216 J. H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. v Department of Trade and Industry, 3 WLR 969 [1989] at 980;
cited by Shawcross and Beaumont, Air Law (London: LexisNexis Butterworth, loose-leaf)
Vol. 1 at I 209. See, also, Lord Denning, M.R., as he then was, in Pan American World Airways
v. Department of Trade [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Law Reports 257 (CA) (UK).
217 Audit Summary Report of the Civil Aviation Authority of the United Kingdom and the
Civil Aviation Authorities of the Overseas Territories of Bermuda and Turks and Caicos
Islands, available at http://www.icao.int/fsix/auditRep1.cfm, date of access: 7 June 2008.
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regulatory system, no regulation may apply unless it has been published in
the Official Compendium of Swiss Federal Law in the official languages which
are French, German and Italian.218 This is akin to the dualistic approach.
Nevertheless, Article 6a of the Federal Aviation Act (748.0) of 1948 refers to
the Annexes to the Chicago Convention and declares them directly applicable
as an exception. It also allows the publication of these Annexes in the Swiss
Journal of Law in a version other than the official Swiss languages.219 Such
direct application appears to be more in line with the monistic approach. In
practice, ICAO standards and recommended practices are still transposed to
the Swiss regulations.220
5.4.2 Regional Implementation
There was one important development in the second part of the 20th century
concerning the increased involvement of regional bodies in aviation safety.
While each region has its own aviation organizations of one form or another,
the European region has developed the most institutionalized regional or even
supranational system for regulation of aviation safety. In 1954, the European
Civil Aviation Conference was created. Its main objectives are to review
generally the development of European air transport in order to promote the
coordination, better utilization and orderly development of such air transport
and to consider any special problem that may arise in this field.221 The confer-
ence is to be consultative and its resolutions, recommendations or other con-
clusions are subject to approval by governments.222 The Joint Airworthiness
Authorities began its work in 1970. Originally, its objectives were to produce
common certification codes for large aeroplanes and for engines in order to
meet the needs of European industry and particularly for products manu-
factured by international consortia such as Airbus. Associated with ECAC, it
was later renamed as the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) and its mandate was
extended to operations, maintenance, licensing and certification/design
standards for all classes of aircraft.223 JAA represented the civil aviation regu-
latory authorities of a number of European States who had agreed to cooperate
in developing and implementing common safety regulatory standards and
procedures. This cooperation was intended to provide high and consistent
218 Audit Summary Report of the FOCA, available at http://www.bazl.admin.ch/dokumenta
tion/studien/, date of access: 6 June 2008.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Shawcross and Beaumont Air Law, supra note 216 at II 63B.
222 Id.
223 JAA website, http://www.jaa.nl/introduction/introduction.html, date of access: 8 June
2008.
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standards of safety.224 JAA developed Joint Aviation Requirements (JARs),
placing emphasis on harmonizing with those of the United States. JARs annexed
to European Regulation 3922/11 had automatic regulatory effect.225 Those
which had not yet been adopted under the European Union (EU) legislation
could be implemented at the discretion of an individual State.
On 15 July 2002, with the adoption of Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002226
by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union (EU), a
new regulatory body, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), was
created, which will replace JAA by 2009. EASA is a European Community
agency, governed by EU public law; it is distinct from the Community Institu-
tions (Council, Parliament, Commission, etc.) and has its own legal personality.
Its mission is to promote the highest common standards of safety and environ-
mental protection in civil aviation. The Agency develops common safety and
environmental rules at the European level. It monitors the implementation
of standards through inspections in its member States and provides the
necessary technical expertise, training and research. The Agency works hand
in hand with the national authorities which continue to carry out many opera-
tional tasks, such as certification of individual aircraft or licensing of pilots.
In a few years, the Agency will also be responsible for safety regulations
regarding airports and air traffic management systems. Accordingly, EASA is
regarded as the centrepiece of the European Union’s strategy for aviation
safety.227
The establishment of EASA is said to be based on the need for “a single
specialized expert body”, which “is independent in relation to technical matters
and has legal, administrative and financial autonomy.”228 The Agency has
been designed in order to ensure a degree of separation between the political
process (the role played by the European Commission, Council and Parliament
in drafting and enacting legislation relating to aviation safety) on the one hand,
and the design and implementation of the technical measures necessary for
safety, on the other. It is set up to ensure that “safety-related measures remain
free of any political interference which might prejudice the current high
standard of civil aviation safety enjoyed in Europe.”229
The renewed commitment to aviation safety by the European Community
is illustrated by the Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft (SAFA) pro-
224 Id.
225 Audit Summary Report, supra note 217.
226 Repealed and replaced by Regulation (EC) No 216/2008.
227 EASA website: http://www.easa.eu.int/; see, also Probst, C., “New regulatory agency
endowed with range of powers to ensure its effectiveness” (2005) 60:3 ICAO Journal 16.
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gramme230 and by the subsequent establishment of the Community list for
an operating ban.231 The SAFA programme was initiated in 1996 by ECAC,
under the management of JAA, which was subsequently transferred to EASA
for coordination.232 Under the programme, in each EC member State and those
States who have entered into a specific SAFA Working Arrangement with EASA,
third-country aircraft may be inspected. These inspections follow a procedure
common to all member States and are then reported on through a common
format. If an inspection identifies significant irregularities, these will be taken
up with the airline and the oversight authority. Where irregularities have an
immediate impact on safety, inspectors can demand corrective action before
they allow the aircraft to leave. Subsequently, in December 2005, the European
Parliament and the Council of the European Union adopted Regulation (EC)
No 2111/2005, establishing the general mechanism to create and update a
Community list of third-country air carriers that are subject to an operating
ban within the Community for not meeting safety criteria.233
The common criteria for consideration of an operating ban for safety
reasons at the Community level are set forth in the Annex to Regulation (EC)
No 2111/2005. Decisions to impose a ban will be made on the basis of the
merits of each individual case, but the following criteria will be taken into
account:
1. Verified evidence of serious safety deficiencies on the part of an air carrier;
2. Lack of ability and/or willingness of an air carrier to address safety deficiencies;
and
3. Lack of ability and/or willingness of the authorities responsible for the over-
sight of an air carrier to address safety deficiencies.234
In expressing its opinion concerning third-country aircraft, EASA states that
“commercial operations in the Community by third country operators must
be subject to Community legislation. This is needed to protect European
passengers and citizens on the ground. The Community shall therefore super-
230 Directive 2004/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on
the safety of third-country aircraft using Community airports, commonly known as the
“SAFA Directive”, published in the Official Journal of the European Union L 143 of 30 April
2004 and amended by Regulation 2111/2005 on “The establishment of a Community list
of air carriers subject to an operating ban within the Community and on informing air
transport passengers of the identity of the operating air carrier”, Official Journal of the
European Union L 344/15, 27 December 2005.
231 Id. Regulation 2111/2005.
232 Commission Directive 2008/49/EC of 16 April 2008 (Official Journal of the European Union
L 109/17).
233 Regulation 2111/2005, supra note 230. See also Reitzfeld, A.D., & Mpande, C.S., “EU Regula-
tion on Banning of Airlines for Safety Concerns” (April 2008) XXXIII:2 Air & Space Law
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vise such commercial operations while respecting international treaties, in
particular the relevant ICAO obligations.”235 From this, it is clear that the
Community has regarded aviation safety as the general concern of the whole
Community, rather than that of each individual member State.
5.4.3 Global Ramifications of National and Regional Initiatives
The initiatives taken at the national and regional level may have ramifications
beyond the nation or region, since foreign aircraft are affected. Similar to the
International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) Program initiated by the
United States,236 the SAFA programme and the subsequent operating ban have
also triggered some reaction, both positive and negative. It is said that the
operating ban mechanism “is already making a difference in aviation
safety”.237 Even if the ban only applies in the EU countries, European travelers
might access the list on the internet and elect to impose a personal ban on
travel on the listed airlines outside Europe. The spokesperson of the Commun-
ity appeared to be satisfied when he stated that the Community list “increas-
ingly serves as a pre-emptive rather than punitive tool for safeguarding avi-
ation safety. There are now numerous instances where the Community has
successfully addressed potential safety threats with third countries and airlines
in advance and before it is forced to take the drastic measure of imposing
restrictions.”238 At the same time, criticism has been voiced that the ramp
checks on the ground could not spot some critical factors in the air, such as
the behaviour and concurrence of the crew; that the list might be influenced
by political and/or commercial considerations since no operator of major fleets
of Boeing and Airbus aircraft has been included; that the black list “does not
at all contribute to solve the fundamental problem in the area of airline and
aviation safety: how to help economically and/or politically weak nations to
effectively and durably implement ICAO minimum standards.”239
There are good reasons to believe that certain national and regional ini-
tiatives, such as the IASA and SAFA programmes mentioned above, are the
driving force for improving and promoting aviation safety. They serve as
impetuses to push ICAO to take a more proactive approach to safety issues.
On the other hand, the limitation of these initiatives must not be ignored.
Safety of civil aviation is global in nature. The SAFA programme is designed,
in the words of EASA, “to protect European passengers and citizens on the
235 EASA Opinion No 3/2004, EASA website, supra note 227.
236 Supra note 222 in Ch.2, and accompanying text.
237 Reitzfeld & Mpande, supra note 233 at 153.
238 The Press Release, IP/07/1790, in http://ec.europa.eu/cyprus/news/latest_news/28112007a
_en.htm, cited by Reitzfeld & Mpande, id.
239 Knorr, A., “Will ‘Blacklists’ Enhance Airline Safety?”, Workshop of the German Aviation
Research Society (G.A.R.S.), Amsterdam, 29 June 2006.
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ground”. It has apparently done so, but only in Europe. European passengers
travel globally; Community aircraft fly to various destinations in the world,
using the airports and air navigation facilities of other countries and regions.
The strictest standards in Europe cannot guarantee the safety of its aircraft
and passengers in other regions. Extra-regional efforts are necessary and,
logically, they should be made through ICAO.
Even within Europe, the lack of uniformity may present problems. In the
Lockerbie case, the bomb exploded over Scotland, but it was generally believed
to have been imported from outside. Accordingly, the strictest security
measures in the United Kingdom would be effective only if the same also
applied to all places which have direct air links to the country. In another case,
the Netherlands banned the operation of Onur Air from Turkey in May 2005
due to safety concerns, and its action was followed by France, Germany and
Switzerland but not by Belgium and other countries.240 Consequently,
passengers of the banned flights were directed to neighbouring countries where
the airline was still allowed to operate, which made the ban less effective. The
EU transport commissioner, Jacques Barrot, was quoted as saying: “Europe
cannot tolerate a badly coordinated approach among member States where
a company is prohibited in one country and authorized in a neighboring
country.”241 It is submitted that the same principle is applicable to the whole
aviation world. Unilateral action, if not coordinated, may be less productive
or even counter-productive.
Moreover, the involvement of ICAO is at any rate inevitable in view of the
applicability of the Chicago Convention and its Annexes. Article 33 of the
Chicago Convention provides,
Certificates of airworthiness and certificates of competency and licenses issued or
rendered valid by the contracting State in which the aircraft is registered shall be
recognized as valid by the other contracting States, provided that the requirements
under which such certificates or licenses were issued or rendered valid are equal
to or above the minimum standards which may be established from time to time
pursuant to this Convention.
So long as the certificates comply with ICAO standards, the validity of such
certificates should be recognized by all member States of ICAO, including those
240 “EU plans to coordinate airline safety actions”, International Herald Tribune, 27 May 2005,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/27/business/fly.php, date of access: 14 June 2008.
241 Id. A counter-argument may be made that under the Chicago Convention, it is the sovereign
States, such as Belgium, that should be responsible for aviation safety in their respective
countries. The obligations under the Chicago Convention and those under the EU will also
need to be “coordinated”.
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which are member States of the European Community.242 It necessarily fol-
lows from such recognition that the operation of a particular aircraft in coun-
tries other than the State of registry should not be denied solely on the ground
that the certificates carried by it do not meet the more stringent requirements
imposed by the States where the aircraft operates. Otherwise, the purpose of
Article 33, i.e., to establish uniform minimum standards for mutual recognition
of the certificates, would be defeated.
As previously discussed in Chapter 2, the responsibility to ensure compli-
ance with these standards rests with the State of registry or the State of the
operator. Under Article 16 of the Chicago Convention, other States in whose
territory the aircraft operates may, without unreasonable delay, search the
aircraft on landing or departure and inspect the certificates and other docu-
ments. This may be considered as the legal justification for conducting the
ramp checks required by the IASA or SAFA programmes. However, such checks
can only apply ICAO standards since every member State of ICAO is obliged
to do so under Article 33 of the Chicago Convention and its Annexes. The
practice under the IASA programme seems to be in line with this presump-
tion.243 The same is applicable to Europe. The European Commission is not
a party to the Chicago Convention but its member States are. While the
Chicago Convention does not prohibit a contracting State from delegating its
responsibility or authority to a third body such as the European Community,
the delegated body could not have a greater power than the delegating State.
Consequently, in the implementation of the SAFA programme, the European
Community could only apply ICAO standards and could not impose more
stringent requirements. Otherwise, consistency with Article 33 of the Chicago
Convention and the relevant provisions of its Annexes could be questioned.
In this connection, it must be pointed out that as a matter of principle, regard-
less of whatever binding effect the Community law may have upon its mem-
bers, such law could not prevail over or be in conflict with the obligations
under the Chicago Convention, since Article 82 of the Convention requires
the member States of ICAO not to enter into any obligations or understandings
which are inconsistent with the terms of the Convention. It is therefore not
surprising that Annex II to the SAFA Directive specifically mentions Annexes
1, 6 and 8 to the Chicago Convention as applicable standards for a ramp
242 It should be noted, however, that Article 33 does not cover air operator certificates (AOC).
The obligation for mutual recognition of AOC derives from paragraph 4.2.1.3 of Annex
6, Part I, which provides that contracting States shall recognize as valid an AOC issued
by another contracting State, provided that the requirements under which the certificate
was issued are at least equal to the applicable Standards specified in this Annex. Theoretical-
ly, it would be possible for a State to file a difference to paragraph 4.2.1.3 and relieve itself
from the obligation; realistically, it may not be advisable to do so, because it may trigger
non-recognition by other States of the AOC issued by such a State.
243 Broderick, A. J. & Loos, J., “Government Aviation Safety Oversight-- Trust, But Verify”
(2002) 67 JALC 1034 at 1038.
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inspection.244 EASA in its opinion also acknowledged that “common rules
have already been established by the SAFA Directive, to verify that the third
country aircraft comply with the applicable ICAO Standards.”245 As a member
State of both ICAO and the European Commission, the United Kingdom, for
example, also acknowledges that the SAFA Programme is established “to
complement the top down approach adopted in the ICAO audit pro-
gramme”.246
Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005 defines the “relevant safety standard” as
“the international safety standards contained in the Chicago Convention and
its Annexes as well as, where applicable, those in relevant Community law.”
While it does not mention whether ICAO standards or the Community law
should prevail in case of conflict, the principle under Article 82 of the Chicago
Convention must be considered as having been entrenched in this definition.
If it is proven that certain certificates do not meet ICAO standards, any
member State of ICAO may refuse to recognize their validity. Moreover, as
advocated above, since the responsibility for safety oversight is emerging as
an obligation erga omnes, even the States which are not directly affected by
the breach of the obligation may take counter-measures against the breach.
From this perspective, European States are justified to take “community action”
against the breach of obligation to provide safety oversight. From another
perspective, whether a particular aircraft, airline, or eventually a State respons-
ible for it is in compliance with ICAO standards or not should not be unilateral-
ly decided by the State conducting inspection. In many cases, there will be
disputes between the latter and the former on the issue of whether ICAO
standards have actually been complied with or not. Such disputes, in the final
analysis, are disagreements “relating to the interpretation or application” of
the Chicago Convention and its Annexes, which come within the purview of
the ICAO Council under Article 84. In this sense, it is ICAO, rather than the
European Community or its members, that should be the arbiter for deter-
mining whether a particular certificate or license meets ICAO standards, subject
to the right of appeal to the International Court of Justice. Furthermore, as
indicated in the case of Onur Air, a decision to ban the operation of an airline
may be based on false grounds.247 Accordingly, fairness requires that certain
mechanisms for review exist, preferably by a third party.
From the enforcement perspective, Article 87 of the Chicago Convention
empowers ICAO to ban the operation of an airline worldwide if it is not con-
244 Supra note 230.
245 EASA Opinion No 3/2004, available at http://www.easa.eu.int/ws_prod/r/doc/opinions/
Translations/03_2004/easa_opinion_03_2004_en.pdf. Date of access: 14 June 2008.
246 Explanatory Memorandum to the Civil Aviation (Safety of Third-Country Aircraft) Regula-
tions 2006, (2006, No.1384), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/em2006/uksiem
_20061384_en.pdf. Date of access: 14 June 2008.
247 http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/resultpage.aspx?snelzoeken=true&searchtype=ljn&ljn=BB6588
&u_ljn=BB6588. Date of access: 12 July 2008.
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forming to a final decision by the Council. This sanction will be much more
powerful and probably less controversial than a ban or other sanctions imposed
by a State or a group of States.248
To summarize, either from a legal point of view or for practical considera-
tions, ICAO is indispensable in the implementation of national and regional
initiatives when such initiatives have global effects. Regional efforts should
supplement rather than replace the safety efforts within the framework of ICAO.
The system of ICAO may have weaknesses and deficiencies, but the better
approach is in improving this system to make it work, rather than taking
unilateral action with or without an intention to undermine it.
5.4.4 Reverted Monism?
The European Community is aware of the importance of the global concerted
action for safety promotion. This is evident from one of the proclaimed object-
ives of EASA: “to promote Community views regarding civil aviation safety
standards and rules throughout the world by establishing appropriate co-
operation with third countries and international organizations.”249
As mentioned above, the monist doctrines generally emphasize the suprem-
acy of international law. There were some monists in the past who believed
that municipal law was in its nature superior to international law.250 The
doctrine has been branded as “inverted monism” and is no longer fashion-
able.251 It does not mean, however, that States could not export their legal
concepts, rules and systems into international instruments. On many occasions,
States have been trying to do so through treaty-making or standard-setting
in ICAO. In theory, the ICAO system is based on an equal vote by its members,
which is different from the UN Security Council where some countries have
a veto, or the International Monetary Fund where weighted votes are recog-
nized by its constitution.252 In reality, particularly in law-making activities,
it is a plain truism that “some States are definitely more equal than others”.253
More specifically, the United States and European countries possess greater
248 For reaction to the IASA programme of FAA, see Barreto, O., “Safety Oversight: Federal
Aviation Administration, International Civil Aviation Organization, and Central American
Aviation Safety Agency” (2002) 67 JALC 651at 659; for reaction to the operation ban imposed
by the EC, see Knorr, supra note 239. See also infra note 268 et seq.
249 Article 2 (2), Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002, supra note 226.
250 Cf. O’Connell, supra note 211 at 42.
251 See, O’Connel, id. Partsch, supra note 210 at 1185; Wang, supra note 82 at 184 and 189.
252 Article 48, paragraph b) of the Chicago Convention provides that all contracting States shall
have an equal right to be represented at the meetings of the Assembly and each contracting
State shall be entitled to one vote. Article 52 provides that the decisions by the Council
shall require approval by a majority of its members. Cf, Art. 27 of the UN Charter and
Art. XII, Sec. 5 of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.
253 Cheng, B, Studies in Space Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) at 682.
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influential power upon the work programmes of ICAO, and in particular upon
the legal programme.254 Nothing is written in this respect in the constitutional
instrument or any document of ICAO; but any veteran participant of ICAO
activities knows this rule by heart: no major motion with legal implications
may survive in ICAO without the endorsement, acquiescence or tolerance of
the United States and member States of the European Community. This un-
written rule may be conveniently called the “North Atlantic Formula” for the
purpose of this enquiry.255 More often than not, this formula is applied under
the disguise of “consensus”, which in fact reflects the deal reached informally
by the major players.
In his in-depth studies in international space law, Cheng has provided
convincing evidence to demonstrate that in the law-making process of space
law, “the essential point was agreement between the two space powers”,
namely, the Soviet Union and the United States. The most critical part of the
negotiations was always carried out behind the scenes, among those who
considered themselves “the only ones that really matter”. Consequently,
consensus “requires the unanimity of the dominant section in a given situation.
It is a subtle way of bypassing the rigid one-State one-vote rule.”256
The general relations between the US and the EU could not be compared
with the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The political
and legal systems of the current European States are also completely different
from those in the former Soviet Union. However, the dominant position that
the US and the EU jointly have in ICAO bears certain resemblance to the position
the US and the former Soviet Union had in the United Nations Committee on
the Peaceful Use of Outer Space. The description by Cheng may, mutatis
mutandis, apply to the operation of the “North Atlantic Formula” in ICAO. The
Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme was established by ICAO without
any formal amendment to the Chicago Convention principally because it was
endorsed and in fact encouraged by the United States and most member States
of the European Community.257 The system of increased transparency for
the results of audits was also the result of the application of the “North At-
lantic Formula”.258 In the event that agreement could not be reached over
254 Cheng has given a number of convincing examples in this respect. One is that the 1971
Guatemala City Protocol could not come into force without the ratification of the United
States. Id.
255 For the ease of illustration, this formula could be abbreviated as W=UU. W stands for World
Aviation or ICAO, and double “U” respectively represents the USA and EU.
256 See Cheng, supra note 253 at 164, 165 and 682.
257 See Ch.2.3.3.3.
258 The press release issued on 22 March 2006 by the European Commission highlights its
position: “It is clear that all the aviation supervisory authorities need to have access to all
the information gathered by the ICAO’s inspectors, which is what we achieved at the last
ICAO General Meeting last September. We will use these new data to impose bans on
airlines where needed. However, at the ICAO conference (20-22 March in Montreal) we
will ask for even greater efforts to be made in terms of transparency.” See, http://
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the North Atlantic, the situation would be different. This is best illustrated
by the unsuccessful attempt to conclude an international convention relating
to the GNSS. The overwhelming majority of ICAO member States, including those
in Europe, preferred to adopt a binding new instrument governing the use
of GNSS. However, the proposal did not follow the “North Atlantic Formula”.
Consequently, after extensive discussions for at least 10 years by several
Assembly sessions and conferences, two sessions of the Legal Committee, three
panel meetings and eleven meetings of a study group, the convention on GNSS
was aborted.259
This is hardly surprising, if one looks at a number of statistics. First of all,
regarding “membership fees” to ICAO, the contributions of the United States
and Germany amount to approximately one thirds of the total ICAO budget.
If contributions of other “North Atlantic” members are added, they easily go
beyond 50% of the ICAO budget. In addition to the regular budget, the US and
EU also voluntarily contribute a large amount to extra-budgetary programmes.
Those who pay the piper call the tune.
The statistics of the world total revenue traffic also indicate that out of the
514,750 million total tonne-kms performed in 2006, 61.01% was done in Europe
and North America.260 Obviously, any rule adopted within the auspices of
ICAO would not be effective for its implementation without the endorsement,
acquiescence or tolerance of the North Atlantic region, or to be more precise,
the northern part of the North Atlantic region.
Some may argue that according to the rule of law, every State should be
equal in its law-making function. “But even in those systems of municipal law
where the principle of the Rule of Law and of equality before the law has been
scrupulously observed, universal suffrage has never been regarded as legally
an indispensable element. There is no reason why it necessarily be in inter-
national law.”261 In other words, “rules of general international law are made
and sustained by the will of the dominant section of international society in
each individual case”,262 including those States “whose interests are specially
europa.eu/rapid/showInformation.do?pageName=recentPressReleases&guiLanguage=en.
In another area of law making, despite the failure of the 1971 Guatemala City Protocol,
the 1999 Montreal Convention bearing the same title as the Warsaw Convention came into
force in a relatively short period of time on 4 November 2003, mainly because it is in
conformity with the North Atlantic formula. As of 25 November 2008, there are 87 parties
to the Convention, but only 11 out of the total 54 African States are parties.
259 See Assembly Resolution A35-3, which, unlike Resolution A32-20, omits the reference to
an international convention on GNSS. See supra note 63 et seq in Ch.2 and accompanying
text.
260 The breakdown in different regions is as follows (millions): Europe 141,740 (27.5%), Africa
11,450 (2.2%), Middle East 27,520 (5.3%), Asia and Pacific 147,460 (28.6%), North America
167,590 (32.6%), Latin America and Caribbean 18,990 (3.7%). See, ICAO Doc 9876, Annual
Report of the Council 2006, at A-95.
261 Cheng, supra note 253 at 681.
262 Id. at 686.
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affected”, as mentioned in the North Sea Continental Shelf case by the Inter-
national Court of Justice.263 The weight of States is not equal in law-making
and unanimity is not required.264 As Cheng acutely points out, it is important
to recognize this point, “instead of treating it as heretical or taboo, because
it seemingly flies in the face of the principle of sovereign equality.”265
The remaining issue is how to prevent the abuse of the dominant position,
and to ensure that justice could be done to the weak, the poor, the small and
the minor by the strong, the rich, the big and the major. One positive strategy
is to strengthen the unity among the former, particularly developing countries,
by combining their limited economic and technical resources in a particular
region, and by amplifying their voice in ICAO. For instance, one initiative in
the safety oversight area is the establishment of the Central America Aviation
Safety Agency (ACSA) on 15 December 1999. This joint effort “would allow
these countries to take into their own hands, and to defend on a combined
basis if necessary, the establishment of a proper framework for aviation opera-
tions and safety oversight”, rather than having major aviation powers “dictate
the level and quality of safety standards”.266 In ICAO, developing countries
have also taken concerted action to ensure that they are duly represented in
the Council. But more efforts are necessary, particularly at a micro level, such
as the work programmes of the committees, panels and study groups. From
the statistics mentioned above, the Asia and Pacific region, which is mainly
composed of developing countries, has exceeded the European region in
transport volume in 2006, but the Asian and Pacific voice in ICAO is much
weaker than that of the European region. This should provoke thinking
towards improvement, especially in the mind of Asian and Pacific countries.
Another possible measure to prevent the abuse of the dominant position
is to establish a certain form of judicial or quasi-judicial review within the
framework of ICAO. While judicial review is not a panacea, it may assist to
establish certain checks and balances in ICAO.
5.5 CHECKS AND BALANCES UNDER THE RULE OF LAW
The preceding passages have demonstrated that ICAO not only possesses the
competence to prescribe quasi-law, but also the competence to enforce and
implement law and quasi-law, including the power to ban the operation of
an airline under Article 87 of the Chicago Convention. If ICAO is considered
as having certain centralized power to police the safety of international civil
263 [1969] ICJ Reports at 42-43.
264 Cheng, supra note 253 at 687.
265 Id.
266 Barreto, supra note 248 at 673.
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aviation, who should police the police? ICAO is a body created by law and
it must adhere to the rule of law.
The rule of law requires that ICAO should delimitate its mandate within
the boundary of law. As its name indicates, its mandate is related to “inter-
national civil aviation”. First and foremost, the meaning of “international”
should be clarified. This will require that ICAO carefully handle the difference
and interface between international and domestic civil aviation. In exercising
its legislative or quasi-legislative function, ICAO has repeatedly encountered
the issue of whether rules adopted under its auspices should be applicable
to domestic civil aviation.267 In certain cases, when the issue of “fundamental
inseparability” between international and domestic civil aviation arises, there
is a possibility that ICAO regulatory material may have a “spill-over” effect
on the latter. Each case needs to be considered on its own merits and may
even warrant judicial scrutiny under certain circumstances. It is suggested
that if the obligation involved is of an erga omnes character, the competence
of ICAO over domestic aviation might be recognized.
Viewed from another angle, “international” also means “global” or
“worldwide”. Accordingly, ICAO’s responsibility is not, and should not be
limited to a particular region or regions. ICAO is a specialized agency of the
United Nations and is the only organization in the world in the field of civil
aviation which is global and inter-governmental in nature. This has vested
ICAO with prima facie legitimacy to coordinate safety issues at the global level
for civil aviation. In fulfilling its mandate, ICAO needs to cooperate with
regional bodies. This is particularly so since certain regions have spearheaded
efforts for higher civil aviation safety standards. Their initiatives represent
a dynamic force in the industry; they are the locomotive of the global train
advancing to the destination of maximum safety. On the other hand, a question
may be raised whether ICAO should reduce itself to being a rubber stamp on
these initiatives. It could not just witness the advance of the locomotive and
leave the rest of the train falling behind. Safety of civil aviation is global in
nature. Thus, speaking from an EU perspective, Onidi points out: “Having
created its internal aviation market (through which ICAO standards are being
uniformly applied), the EU is conscious of the need to lay down key rules
applicable to the worldwide aviation community and see them effectively
enforced.”268 He perceives that ICAO may play its core role as the “world
regulatory authority” and “world agency for technical assistance in aviation”,
as well as “the main promoter of the regional dimension in international
aviation”.269 As discussed previously, if certain safety obligations could be
considered as acquiring erga omnes character, as this writer perceives, the
267 See supra Ch.2.2.5.
268 Onidi, O., “A Critical Perspective on ICAO”, February 2008, xxxiii/1 Air & Space Law 38,
at 42.
269 Onidi, id. at 43 and 44.
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counter-measures against the breach of such obligations should ideally be
decided, coordinated or justified through the collective mechanisms in ICAO,
in order to ensure the legitimacy, credibility and efficacy of the measures.270
Cooperation between ICAO and regional bodies will constitute an important
aspect of civil aviation matters in the 21st century. Implementation of many
programmes, such as the CNS/ATM systems, will require a regional approach.
The current legal relationships between ICAO and various regional bodies are
handled in casual and laissez faire manner, mostly at the initiative of the
regional bodies rather than that of ICAO. A more systematic and integrated
approach on the basis of in-depth study is desirable, with a view to forging
a coherent and solid partnership to promote safety.
In addition to its “international” mandate, the “civil” dimension of ICAO
will also need to be properly defined. As discussed in the third portion of
Chapter 3 of the present study, the organization has not refrained from adopt-
ing decisions and regulations dealing with the safety of international civil
aviation even if that meant interfacing or coordination with the military
authorities. This is a challenging area for ICAO, where the implementation of
the rule of law is particularly required.
The third component of ICAO’s name is “aviation”, which distinguishes
ICAO from other UN bodies, particularly the UN Security Council. The drafters
of the Chicago Convention had already foreseen in its preamble that inter-
national civil aviation “can greatly help to create and preserve friendship and
understanding among the nations and peoples of the world, yet its abuse can
become a threat to the general security”. A breach of obligations relating to
aviation safety may under certain circumstances also present a threat to inter-
national peace and security. In general, the respective functions of the UN
Security Council and ICAO are well coordinated. When a Lebanese civil aircraft
chartered by Iraqi Airways was diverted and seized by Israeli military aircraft
on 10 August 1973, the Security Council adopted, on 15 August 1973, Resolu-
tion 337 (1973), condemning Israel and calling upon ICAO to take due account
of this resolution when considering adequate measures to safeguard inter-
national civil aviation. In the same vein, ICAO adopted Assembly Resolution
A20-1, solemnly warning Israel that if it continues committing such acts the
Assembly will take further measures against Israel to protect international
civil aviation. Further examples of smooth coordination are demonstrated in
the cases respectively relating to Liberia and Iraq.271 In these two instances
270 One example of such measures is reflected in ICAO Assembly Resolution A28-7: Aeronautical
consequences of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, supra note 105. A measure taken through the UN
system carries the presumption of legitimacy. It is also more credible and effective, due
to the neutrality of an international secretariat and the global scale of the measure. See
also supra notes 196 and 248.
271 For the case of Liberia, see supra Ch.2, note 18 et seq. For the case of Iraq, id.
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and others, ICAO may be considered as implementing the decisions of the
Security Council.
The cases relating to Lockerbie and Gaza International Airport present a
somewhat different picture.272 In the case of Lockerbie, the UN Security Coun-
cil intervened for two individual alleged offenders; in the case of Gaza, ICAO
intervened for the act of State military forces. Did everyone stay in their own
line of business? Ideally, the Security Council should focus on international
peace and security, and ICAO, on aviation safety. The actual roles in Lockerbie
and Gaza could have been transposed. Questions of State military acts are
not for ICAO, whereas the UN Security Council does not have to occupy itself
with the treaty application for crimes committed by individuals. These two
cases demonstrate the need to rationalize the functions of different UN bodies
on the basis of the rule of law. There might be some situations in which the
Security Council may find it necessary to intervene in the areas of competence
of specialized agencies, such as in the case of a food crisis in a State which
requires a humanitarian intervention. But in general, it should be possible to
leave the matter of aviation safety in the hands of ICAO.
The fourth part of ICAO’s name is “organization”. A solid organization not
only needs to interface effectively with external bodies, but must also exercise
its power with internal checks and balances. “Power entails accountability,
that is the duty to account for its exercise”.273 In domestic law, accountability
refers to a framework for the exercise of power, “within which public bodies
are forced to seek to promote the public interest and compelled to justify their
action in those terms or other constitutionally acceptable terms (justice, human-
ity, equity); to modify policies if they should turn out to have been ill-con-
ceived; and to make amends if mistakes and errors of judgment have been
made.”274 In international law, the concept has also drawn increasing atten-
tion.275 In the context of ICAO, its bodies have made numerous decisions
which have promoted the safety of international civil aviation. Some of the
decisions have encountered objections from States;276 several of these de-
cisions are not unquestionable from a legal point of view.277 In view of the
prospect of a more proactive exercise of ICAO’s power, a serious question may
272 See supra Ch.4, note 78 et seq concerning the Lockerbie case, and note 100 et seq regarding
Gaza.
273 Final Report of the International Law Association, Committee on the Accountability of
International Organizations (Berlin Conference, April 2004), 5 and 6.
274 Oliver, D., Government in the United Kingdom: The Search for Accountability, Effectiveness and
Citizenship (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991) at 28, cited by White, supra note
102 at 189.
275 See the Report of the ILA, supra note 273, and White, supra note 102.
276 Osieke, E., “Unconstitutional Acts in International Organizations: the Law and Practice
of the ICAO” (1979) 28 International Law and Comparative Law Quarterly 1.
277 See, for example, the decision relating to the Gaza Airport, supra Ch.4 note 100. See also
the issue relating to the definition of unlawful interference, supra Ch.4 note 150 et seq.
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be raised whether such a power should be subject to more rigorous checks
and balances, including certain forms of judicial review.
The issue of judicial review deserves treatment in a separate volume beyond
the present undertaking. Vast literature exists in the context of the Security
Council of the United Nations, particularly relating to the Lockerbie case.278
In its Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276, the International Court of Justice declared that it “does not
possess powers of judicial review or appeal in respect of the decisions taken
by the United Nations organs concerned.”279 However, the Court stated that
“in the exercise of its judicial function and since objections have been
advanced, the Court, in the course of its reasoning, will consider these ob-
jections before determining any legal consequences arising from those resolu-
tions.”280 In the Lockerbie case, the ICJ did not foreclose the possibility that
it may at a later stage be “called upon to determine definitively the legal effect
of Security Council resolution 748 (1992).”281 Judge ad hoc Sir Robert Jennings,
while dissenting from the majority view on the issue of admissibility, still
confirms that the Security Council decisions and actions should in no way
be regarded as enjoying some sort of “immunity” from the jurisdiction of the
ICJ:
The first principle of the applicable law is this: that all discretionary powers of
lawful decision-making are necessarily derived from the law, and therefore gov-
erned and qualified by the law. This must be so if only because the sole authority
of such decisions flows itself from the law. It is not logically possible to claim to
represent the power and authority of the law, and at the same time, claim to be
above the law.282
278 See, for example, Dugard, J., “Judicial Review of Sanctions”, in Gowlland-Debbas, V., ed.
United Nations Sanctions and International Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001)
at 83; White, N.D., “To Review or Not To Review: The Lockerbie Cases Before the World
Court” (1999) 12 LJIL 401; Watson, R., “Constitutionalism, Judicial Review and the World
Court” (1993) 34 Harvard Journal of International Law 1; Alvarez, J.E., “Theoretical Perspectives
on Judicial Review by the World Court (1995) 89 American Society of International Law
Proceedings 85.
279 [1971] ICJ Reports at 45, paragraph 89. See also the Certain Expenses case, [1962] ICJ Reports
at 168. According to Dugard, these dicta are premised on the silence of the UN Charter
on judicial review and on the travaux préparatoires, which saw a Belgian proposal for review
rejected, Dugard, id. at 85.
280 Id. [1971] ICJ Reports at 45.
281 [1992] ICJ Reports 126 at para. 43. Judge Lachs stated in his separate opinion that the Order
made should not be seen as an abdication of the Court’s powers (at 139).
282 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings in Questions of Interpretation and Application
of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, [1998] ICJ Reports 99 at 110.
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In the Case concerning the Application of the Genocide Convention, Judge ad hoc
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht implies that a Security Council resolution must not be
in conflict with jus cogens.283
From the foregoing, it is irrefutable that no organ of the United Nations
system is above the law. When the legality of its action is challenged, it should
not be the judge of its own case, or at least not in the final instance. This
inherently denotes that the International Court of Justice, as the principal
judicial organ of the UN, may exercise in one form or another judicial control
over the actions of other organs of the UN. As pointed out by Dugard, the “total
rejection” of judicial review by the ICJ “is unlikely to prevail”. “The debate
therefore shifts from whether the Court will exercise judicial review to how
much”.284 On one side, there are so-called “judicial romantics” who favour
the analogous application of the power of constitutional review in domestic
courts; on the other, there are “realists” who in principle oppose judicial
review, unless the Court acts upon the request of the relevant bodies, such
as the Security Council.285 Despite these different views, the consensus seems
to be clear: “An organization based on the rule of law cannot, in principle,
exempt itself from judicial control.”286
5.5.1 Checks and Balances in ICAO Quasi-Judicial Activities
When the ICAO Council hears disputes between member States regarding the
interpretation or application of the Chicago Convention, it exercises “a truly
judicial function” under Chapter XVIII of the Convention.287 In this respect,
a full appeal procedure is provided in that Chapter which ensures checks and
balances. When the Council exercises its quasi-judicial function under
Article 54 j) or even Article 54 n), a question remains whether a procedure
exists for checks and balances.
283 His statement is as follows: “The concept of jus cogens operates as a concept superior to
both customary international law and treaty. The relief which Article 103 of the Charter
may give the Security Council in case of conflict between one of its decisions and an
operative treaty obligation cannot – as a matter of simple hierarchy of norms – extend to
a conflict between a Security Council resolution and jus cogens. Indeed, one only has to
state the opposite proposition thus – that a Security Council resolution may even require
participation in genocide – for its unacceptability to be apparent.” Separate Opinion in
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia
and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia, Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, [1993] ICJ
Reports 325 at 440.
284 Dugard, supra note 278 at 88.
285 Cf. Alvarez, supra note 278 at 85. The term “judicial romantics” was coined by Reisman,
W. M., in “The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations” (1993) 87 AJIL 83.
286 Simma, supra note 1 at 283.
287 Cheng, supra note 116 at 52.
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As seen from the history of ICAO, cases submitted within the framework
of Chapter XVIII were all settled or discontinued without the need for the
Council to render a decision on the merits. It has become a long established
practice of ICAO that utmost efforts be made to settle disputes through negoti-
ation and consultation among the parties, using the good offices of the Council
and the Secretariat. The process of the negotiation ensures to a large extent
that the vital interests of different parties are duly taken into account. As a
result, no party will generally feel that it has suffered great injustice. In the
case of Article 54 j), there is no case at hand which illustrates how it will
actually be applied. From the orientation set by the Council, it is quite clear
that a heavy emphasis will be put on working together with the State whose
safety records have been questioned. Formal recommendations or determina-
tions by the Council will only be considered as the last resort. Accordingly,
it is expected that most issues would be resolved before the process contem-
plated under Article 54 j) would be completed, and the final number of
“failures” to be reported by the Council would be very low. This is in fact
a built-in mechanism for checks and balances which will alleviate the need
for an appeal procedure. However, in the event that some cases do reach the
stage of being reported to the member States, justice would not appear to have
been done if the State whose interests are affected does not have further
recourse to have the decision reviewed or even overturned. In the absence
of an appeal procedure, it is not predictable how the ICJ would handle the
case. In the view of this writer, if the State concerned could present a prima
facie case that the decision of the Council is questionable, and that its vital
interests are adversely affected, nothing prevents the ICJ, “as the general
guardian of legality within the system”,288 from exercising jurisdiction over
the case on the basis of its inherent superintendent and supervising power.
5.5.2 Checks and Balances of ICAO Quasi-Legislative Activities
In the sphere of quasi-legislative activities, some mechanisms currently exist
for checks and balances. The organizational hierarchy may present a built-in
opportunity for review. The higher level may always review the decisions or
recommendations of the lower level. For instance, the Council may review
the work of its subordinate bodies, the Air Navigation Commission and the
Secretariat. However, it is not clear who is entitled to review the decisions
of the Council. While Article 50 a) of the Chicago Convention provides that
the Council shall be a permanent body “responsible to the Assembly”,
Article 49 k) clearly specifies that the Assembly could deal with any matter
within the sphere of action of the organization “not specifically assigned to
288 Judge Lachs, Separate Opinion in the Lockerbie Case (Provisional Measures), Order, [1992]
ICJ Reports at 128.
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the Council”. Accordingly, some of the decisions of the Council, such as the
most important quasi-legislative acts of adopting standards and recommended
practices, are not subject to approval or amendment by the Assembly, since
this power has been specifically assigned to the Council under Article 54 l).
Other decisions of the Council which may have quasi-legal effect, such as
certain resolutions condemning certain acts violating international law, may
in theory be reviewed by the Assembly. However, the power of the Assembly
is in fact very limited. In 1998, one commentator questioned whether the ICAO
Assembly is “the most unsupreme” of supreme organs in the UN system.289
Despite the appeal to strengthen the power of the Assembly,290 the trend
since 1998 seems to be moving in the opposite direction. The Assembly meets
only once every three years. Due to budgetary constraints, the duration of the
session of the Assembly was reduced from three weeks previously to nine
working days in 2007. In 2004, the Assembly, in its resolution A35-3, recog-
nized “the importance of Item No. 1 of the General Work Programme of the
Legal Committee ‘Consideration with regard to CNS/ATM systems, including
global navigation satellite systems (GNSS), of the establishment of a legal
framework’, and resolutions or decisions by the Assembly and the Council
relating to it”.291 Not long after that, the Council decided to downgrade this
item from priority No. 1 to priority No. 3.292 In September 2007, the Assembly
approved a triennial budget for 2008 to 2010, listing “The Rule of Law” as
one of the strategic objectives of ICAO; three months later, at the very beginning
of the first year of the triennium, there was already an attempt to downgrade
“The Rule of Law” from a major strategic objective to a supporting
strategy.293 If one compares ICAO to an aircraft, the Council is like a pilot-in-
command and the Assembly is like a group of passengers. Effective review
of the Council’s decisions by the Assembly may be untenable in the current
political climate although it should be seriously considered in the future reform
of ICAO.
The lex lata of ICAO seems to give no other alternative but to leave it entirely
in the hands of the Council to review its quasi-legislative decisions. Indeed,
there was at least one instance in which the Council responded to a request
to review its decision which had been allegedly incorrect,294 which indicates
289 Fossungu, P. A., “The ICAO Assembly: The Most Unsupreme of Supreme Organs in the
United Nations System? A Critical Analysis of Assembly Sessions” (1998) 26 Transportation
Law Journal 1.
290 Milde, M., “The Chicago Convention – Are Major Amendments Necessary or Desirable
50 Years Later?” (1994) XIX:I AASL. 401 at 429 et seq. See also Fossungu, id.
291 ICAO Doc 9848, supra note 22 at V-7.
292 ICAO Doc 9865-C/1152, C-Min. 176/1-15, Council – 176th Session, Summary Minutes with
Subject Index (2006), C-Min. 176/12 at 154-155.
293 ICAO SG 1975/07 M2/5, 13 December 2007.
294 The review is related to the definition of unlawful interference in Annex 17. See supra Ch.4,
note 155.
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the usefulness of the self-review mechanism. However, in that instance, the
State which requested the review happened to be the strongest aviation power
in the world. It is not only a member of the ICAO Council but also the most
substantive contributor to ICAO’s budget. If a request for review were to come
from a State which is a non-member of the Council, the situation might be
different.295 Obviously, the mechanism of self-review is not sufficient if an
international organization such as ICAO is to be genuinely governed by the
rule of law.
Without conducting major surgery on the body of ICAO through the amend-
ment of the Chicago Convention, there are several ways possible to improve
the mechanisms of checks and balances within the current system. Several
commentators have proposed to increase the frequencies of the sessions of
the Assembly and to reduce those of the Council to enable the Assembly to
exercise more control over the work of the Council.296 While this proposal
is quite constructive, there is no sign of the political will to implement it.
Furthermore, even if the Assembly could take a greater supervisory role over
the work of the Council, the Assembly itself remains a self-reviewing body
and its decisions are not subject to review by any other body.
Another possibility is to entrust the Legal Committee to be the third body
for internal review. Within the ICAO system, the Legal Committee has a unique
status as the sole permanent committee constituted by the Assembly. It is open
to participation by all member States.297 Its duties and function shall inter
alia be:
a) to advise the Council on matters relating to the interpretation and amendment
of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, referred to it by the Council;
b) to study and make recommendations on such other matters relating to public
international air law as may be referred to it by the Council or the Assembly;…298
Since both the Council and the Assembly could refer to the Legal Committee
“matters relating to public international air law”, the Legal Committee is not
only responsible to the Council but also to the Assembly. Both organs may
seek opinions of the Committee in this respect. While these opinions may be
295 In 1998, two African States, Zimbabwe and Lesotho, presented a working paper to review
the election process of the President of the Council. The proposal in the paper was not
accepted by the Assembly (ICAO Assembly Working Paper A32-WP/66, “Constitutional
Matters” 10 July 1998). Almost ten years later, in 2007, the Assembly endorsed more or
less the substance of the proposal, i.e., a person who has served two full terms as the
President of the Council could not be admitted as the candidate for this office for the third
term (Assembly Resolution A36-28: Term limits for the Offices of Secretary General and
the President of the Council, in ICAO Doc 9902, Assembly Resolutions in Force (as of 28
September 2007) at VIII-2.
296 Milde, supra note 290.
297 Assembly Resolution A7-5, in ICAO Doc 9848, supra note 22 at I-16.
298 Resolution A7-5, id.
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considered “advisory” and non-binding, they could be useful for the considera-
tion of the legality of decisions of the respective organs. In this connection,
it may be recalled that the Council did seek the opinion of the Legal Committee
on the need to amend the MEX Convention, and the Assembly, on the basis
of the view of the Legal Committee, adopted a resolution relating to the
interpretation of certain provisions of the Convention. It is submitted that in
this instance, the opinion of the Legal Committee could create a favourable
presumption for member States which have acted in conformity with the
opinion.299 Regrettably, it is only on very rare occasions that the advice of
the Legal Committee is sought. Although the Rules of Procedure of the Com-
mittee stipulate that a session of the Committee shall normally be convened
annually, it is actually convened only once in three or four years. When
convened, it is usually tasked with the heavy workload for the preparation
of a draft treaty, leaving little time for other legal issues. If ICAO is serious
about enhancing the rule of law, the advisory function of the Legal Committee
should be strengthened. Many unresolved legal issues, such as the application
of standards and recommended practices to domestic flights, the application
of the Montreal Convention of 1971 to State acts, the definition of unlawful
interference, and the criminal jurisdiction of the State of the operator, could
be studied by the Legal Committee.
To make a bolder move, the role of the Legal Committee may be further
expanded to provide an advisory opinion relating to the legality of a quasi-
judicial decision of the Council or a resolution of the Assembly, upon the
request of a member State unfavourably affected by such a decision or resolu-
tion. In view of the advisory nature of the opinion of the Legal Committee,
this does not constitute a judicial review in its strict sense but may provide
a modest degree of checks and balances. To borrow the words of Judge Lachs,
the purpose of this exercise is “not to encourage a blinkered parallelism of
functions but a fruitful interaction” among different bodies of the organiza-
tion.300 In this connection, it should be mentioned that an individual member
State of ICAO does not have an automatic right to request advisory opinions
of the ICJ.301 Article X, paragraph 3 of the Agreement between the United
Nations and ICAO provides that “such request may be addressed to the Court
by the Assembly or the Council” of ICAO.302 Accordingly, without the cor-
responding action by the Assembly or the Council, a request from a member
State for an advisory opinion of the ICJ could not be processed. This makes
it all the more necessary to allow a member State to have a recourse through
the Legal Committee in order to safeguard the rule of law.
299 See supra Ch.4, note 135 and accompanying text. See also supra note 186.
300 Judge Lachs, Separate Opinion is the Lockerbie Case (Provisional Measures), Order, [1992]
ICJ Reports supra note 281, at 138.
301 In this respect, Osieke seems to hold a different view. See supra note 276 at 22.
302 UNTS (1947) at 332.
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5.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The rule of law is not only one of the strategic objectives of ICAO but also one
of the four goals identified in the outcome document of the UN millennium
conference. The Secretary General of the United Nations defines the rule of
law as follows:
The rule of law is a concept at the very heart of the Organization’s mission. It refers
to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public
and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly
promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are
consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as
well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality
before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law,
separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance
of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.303
A coherent, uniform and sustainable safety system for international civil
aviation must be solidly based on the rule of law. The rule of law first requires
the existence of the normative system with transparency, stability and author-
ity. In its history of 60 years, ICAO has developed numerous rules relating to
safety in various forms. In view of the new challenges it faces in the third
millennium, the time has arrived for an endeavour to systematize these rules
as coherently as the current political climate will permit. At the core of this
system are the values reflecting elementary considerations of humanity and
the respect for the basic rights of the human person. Based on these core
values, there is a hierarchy in the normative system. On top of the pyramid
are fundamental norms which, by their very nature, are the concern of all
States. Below them are rules embodied in the traditional sources of inter-
national law as stipulated in Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, such as international conventions and international customs.
Beneath these are numerous quasi-law provisions in the twilight zone between
fully binding rules and non-binding guidance.
In view of the importance of the rights involved, the obligations in the
first rank, namely, obligations erga omnes, could not comprise a long list£¬but
would at least include the duties of a State to provide safety oversight, to
refrain from the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight, and to prevent
and punish certain acts endangering the safety of civil aviation. These obliga-
tions are laid down not for the interest of an individual State, but for a higher
purpose: safe and orderly development of international civil aviation. They
“are grounded not in an exchange of rights and duties but in an adherence
303 “The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies”, Report of
the Secretary General, UN Doc. S/2004/616, 23 August 2004.
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of a normative system.”304 In essence, they are intrinsically linked to element-
ary considerations for humanity. Such considerations become vital concerns
in an aviation context with the rapid growth of this mode of transportation,
and with the increase of terrorist activities. This concern transcends territorial
boundaries and nationalities, and has become the concern of the international
community as a whole. When obligations are breached, the reaction of third
parties which are not directly injured is possible.
What is the significance of these obligations? First of all, they establish
important rights which are different from certain rights typically arising from
treaties and customs. Unlike certain reciprocal treaty obligations, obligations
erga omnes do not allow a State to make a reservation to, or unilaterally release
another State from, such obligations. Moreover, while a State may claim that
it is not bound by a customary rule which has been subject to its consistent
objection, it may not do so against obligations erga omnes. In other words, the
rights involved with obligations erga omnes are the rights of the international
community and must be universally respected with no exception.
Secondly, obligations erga omnes also give rise to the need of the machinery
for their protection. In view of the interests of the international community
which are at stake, who should act on its behalf to protect the interests, and
to claim the remedies in the event of the breach of such obligations? It is
generally recognized that when a State commits a breach of an obligation erga
omnes, all States to which the obligation is owed are entitled, even if they are
not specially affected by the breach, to claim from the responsible State.305
However, the judgements made by different States are more likely to be
different rather than to be the same. As it is often said, a terrorist for one State
may be a freedom fighter for another. To provide a fair and objective assess-
ment of an alleged breach, an international neutral body is necessary. At least
in one instance, when the UN Security Council was prevented by veto to make
a decision, the ICAO Council was able to adopt a resolution to condemn the
act of shooting down a civil aircraft in flight.306 Whether it is recognized as
an agent or representative of the international community or not, ICAO did
act for the international community in this instance. The audit programmes
carried out by ICAO may also be considered as the exercise of the mandate
given by the international community, in order to enhance safety as common
values.
If ICAO is considered as having a limited power to act on behalf of the
international community, such a power must be subject to the rule of law.
Anarchy could not be compatible with safety. Dictatorship, on the other hand,
304 ILC Study, supra note 4 at 198, n 552; Provost, supra note 15 at 386.
305 Resolution of the Institute of International Law, Fifth Commission, Obligations and rights
erga omnes in international law, 27 August 2005. Accessible through the website of the
Institute in: http://www.idi-iil.org/.
306 See supra note 37.
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is no solution for the sustainable safety. Checks and balances are indispensable.
There is a tendency, however, that the power of ICAO is over-concentrated on
the Council, which in turn is practically controlled by States in the northern
part of North Atlantic region. In view of its quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
functions, a review system should not only be in place, but also be rationalized.
Strengthening the role of the Legal Committee of ICAO could be a practical
solution. A proper division of power among the Assembly, the Council and
the Legal Committee will promote the rule of law in ICAO and protect the
interest of the community and its members.
General Conclusions
Civil aviation is to a large extent international by its nature. It transcends
territorial boundaries and various nationalities. It “could not have evolved
without worldwide uniformity in regulations, standards and procedures in
relation of air navigation”.1 Accordingly, efforts have been made since its
infant period to provide international regulation, culminating in the conclusion
of the Convention on International Civil Aviation in 1944 (Chicago Convention),
and the establishment of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
in 1947. Throughout the six decades of its existence, the focus of ICAO work
has been to ensure the safe and orderly development of international civil
aviation.
Aviation safety is often perceived as a technical matter, such as the technical
specifications of aircraft, and technical expertise of aviation professionals. A
closer scrutiny reveals that safety is not the exclusive domain of the technical
profession. It has policy and legal dimensions. Firstly, it involves a complex
decision-making process for risk management, i.e., to determine how safe is
safe on the basis of technical, economic and other considerations. Secondly,
once it is determined, the level of safety needs to be reflected in enforceable
legal terms. Consequently, safety entails obligations. In a positive sense, a State
is under a duty to act within its available means to promote aviation safety.
In a negative sense, it shall refrain from doing anything that is likely to en-
danger safety.
One of the tenets of the Chicago Convention is that every State is respons-
ible for safety oversight in civil aviation within its jurisdiction. Deriving from
this tenet is the requirement for a State to maintain a “genuine link” with
aircraft on its registry to ensure their continuous compliance with safety
standards, unless it transfers such duties and function to another State pursuant
to the applicable rules. The notion of “flags of convenience”, used for purposes
of avoiding safety regulations, must be ruled out from the system of the
Chicago Convention. The responsibility of a State also extends to the provision
of air navigation facilities and services within its territory in accordance with
ICAO standards. The issue as to whether such responsibility includes liability
is subject to a debate. Currently, the prevailing view is that Article 28 does
1 Milde, M., “Enforcement of Aviation Safety Standards – Problems of Safety Oversight”
(1996) 45 ZLW 3 at 4.
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not give a cause of action to private persons to claim compensation for damage.
Moreover, there is no precedent in ICAO in which one member State claimed
compensation from another on the basis of Article 28.
To assist States in achieving uniformity in technical regulations, ICAO has
developed international standards and recommended practices, as well as other
regulatory material. The levels of implementation of these technical regulations
vary from State to State. This has caused concerns because the safety oversight
function of one State will have impact upon another State. “When safety
standards and procedures are involved on international flights, one cannot
even take the position that non-compliance by a sovereign State affects only
the citizens of that State. Any other State that receives flights of aircraft regis-
tered in the non-complying State has every reason to be concerned about
whether international standards and procedures are in fact being followed
with respect to such aircraft and crews.”2 For this reason, the ICAO Assembly
recognizes that a primary objective of ICAO is to ensure the safety of inter-
national civil aviation “worldwide”, and that Member States also have this
responsibility “both collectively and individually”.3 Consequently, since the
last decade of the 20th century, one could witness the trend of collective efforts
in implementing safety standards, as demonstrated by the Universal Safety
Oversight Audit Programme of ICAO.
Civil aviation needs to overcome not only the natural or inherent hazards
of aircraft operations, such as mechanical failure, bad weather or human errors;
but it must also resist man-made dangers and threats. The relations between
civil aviation and military activities represent a crucial aspect of aviation safety.
The greatest risk posed by military activities to civil aviation has been demon-
strated by occurrences of civil aircraft being shot down deliberately or by
mistake, causing numerous fatalities. In this respect, international law has
evolved from certain State practice in which intruding aircraft “may be fired
upon” to the complete ban of the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight.
Shooting down a civil aircraft in flight is regarded “as a transgression from
the basic concept of humanity”, and goes against the “highest dictate of
conscience”.4
The most serious man-made threats to aviation safety come from terrorist
attacks and other acts of unlawful interference, as evidenced by the abhorrent
events on 11 September 2001. In this respect, the reaction of the international
aviation community in its law-making efforts could best demonstrate its firm
conviction to protect the safety of civil aviation. There were times when
2 Kotaite, A.,“Sovereignty under great pressure to accommodate the growing need for global
cooperation” (December 1995) 50 ICAO Journal 20.
3 ICAO Assembly Resolution A35-7: United strategy to resolve safety-related deficiencies,
1st and 2nd paras, ICAO Doc 9848, Assembly Resolutions in Force (as of 8 October 2004) at
I-60.
4 See supra notes 107 and 108 in Ch.3 and accompanying text.
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hijackers of civil aircraft could expect a hero’s welcome, but those days are
gone. The international community has gradually progressed from its initial
reluctance to deny political asylum to hijackers and sabotageurs, to the pre-
dominant position that the political offence exception should not apply to these
perpetrators. Like pirates, they are “common enemies, and they are attacked
with impunity by all, because they are without the pale of law. They are
scorners of the law of nations; hence they find no protection in that law.”5
The duty to provide safety oversight, the duty to refrain from the use of
weapons against civil aircraft in flight, and the duty to prevent and punish
the acts of hijacking and sabotage endangering the safety of civil aviation are
the trio-obligations associated with three major dimensions of aviation safety.
All of them are linked to the elementary considerations of humanity and the
right to life, a fundamental human right. “There can be no issue of more
pressing concern to international law than to protect the life of every human
being from unwarranted deprivation.”6 Unwarranted deprivation of life could
result from terrorist attacks, mistaken use of military forces, as well as prevent-
able failure to comply with safety standards. From this perspective, a threat
to aviation safety is a threat to life. To protect aviation safety is to protect the
right to life.
In view of the importance of the rights involved with aviation safety, the
trio-obligations mentioned above have become the concern of all States and
are emerging as obligations erga omnes. One of the characteristics of obligations
erga omnes is their universality and non-reciprocity. They are obligations of
a State “towards the international community as a whole”, which are “the
concern of all States”.7 They exceed the reciprocal legal relations between pairs
of States, and all States have a legal interest in their observance.8 These obliga-
tions “are grounded not in an exchange of rights and duties but in an ad-
herence to a normative system”.9 The trio-obligations mentioned above possess
this character. For example, an act by a State to shoot down a civil aircraft
in flight does not provide any justification for other State to take the same
action against the civil aircraft of that State. To use Fitzmaurice’s words, “no
5 See supra note 166 in Ch.4.
6 Ramcharan, B.G., “The Concept and Dimensions of the Right to Life” in Ramcharan, B.G.
ed. The Right to Life in International Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985) 1
at 2.
7 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain) (Second Phase) [1970]
ICJ Reports at 32.
8 Annacker, C., “The Legal Regime of Erga Omnes Obligations under International Law”
(1994) 46 Austrian Journal of Public International Law 131; Simma, B., “From Bilateralism to
Community Interest in International Law” (1994:IV) 250 RdC, 217 at 230.
9 Provost, R., “Reciprocity in Human Rights and Humanitarian Law” (1994) 65 BYIL 383
at 386.
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amount of non-compliance” on the part of other States “could justify a failure
to observe” the norm.10
Obligations erga omnes may contain both negative and positive obligations.
A negative obligation commands its bearer to abstain or refrain from perform-
ing certain acts, whereas a positive obligation commands its bearer to do or
perform certain acts.11 International law has long evolved from “an essentially
negative code of rules of abstention to positive rules of cooperation”.12 With
respect to the duty to provide safety oversight, it is not sufficient for States
to refrain from doing anything to endanger safety, they must do something
to promote safety. This obligation does not require a State to guarantee that
there is no aerial accident in its jurisdiction, but it does require the State to
take all necessary measures to implement the safety standards, or at least to
demonstrate that it is impossible to take such measures.
Obligations erga omnes imply that all States can be held to have a legal
interest in their protection. How an interested third State could be involved
with their enforcement has been an interesting topic for intensive debates
among the commentators. Many writers have supported “decentralized enforce-
ment” of obligations erga omnes,13 namely, the counter-measures taken against
the breaching State by other States which are not directly injured or affected
by the breach. However, counter-measures by third States are often contro-
versial. Under certain circumstances, they may be abused by certain States,
particularly powerful ones, “for disguised political action to further their
interests.”14 Accordingly, the best option is to establish a centralized and
institutional enforcement, such as the enforcement through the UN system.
The experience of ICAO in the implementation of its audit programmes has
confirmed that it is preferable to enforce safety obligations through the institu-
tion of ICAO, particularly those obligations which may essentially be of erga
omnes character. As the UN specialized agency responsible for civil aviation,
and as the universal, neutral and legitimate body in this field, ICAO is well-
positioned to take the proactive role in the global action of enforcing safety
obligations. This may ensure that a balance is maintained between “the need
to protect the fundamental rules of the system by all those belonging to the
community of States and on the other hand the danger that powerful States
overstep the limits of the law”.15
The founders of ICAO have granted it the immense powers of enforcement,
including the power to ban an airline of a Member State from the operation
10 Fitzmaurice, G., “The General Principles of International Law” (1957:II) 92 RdC 1 at 120.
11 Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence at 346.
12 Friedmann, W., The Changing Structure of International Law (New York, 1964) at 62.
13 See supra note 194 in Ch.5. Cf, Frowein, J. A., “Reaction by Not Directly Affected States
to Breaches of Public International Law” (1994:V) 248 RdC 345 at 417-420.
14 Frowein, id., at 423.
15 Id.
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though the territorial airspace of its Member States under Article 87 of the
Chicago Convention. The Convention also provides mechanisms, including
the appeal procedure, for settlement of disputes. Its contracting States have
pledged to abrogate all obligations and understandings which are inconsistent
with its terms. National and regional efforts should supplement rather than
replace the safety mechanisms within the framework of ICAO. The system of
ICAO may have weaknesses and deficiencies, but the better approach is to
improve this system to make it work, rather than taking unilateral action with
or without intention to undermine it.
If ICAO could be considered as an agent acting for the international civil
aviation community to oversee the safety of civil aviation worldwide, including
the enforcement of certain obligations erga omnes, it is essential to adhere
strictly and scrupulously to the rule of law. This requires the establishment
and rationalization of a normative system with transparency, stability and
authority. It is proposed that a hierarchy of the normative system should be
composed of three levels of norms: obligations erga omnes and jus cogens on
the top of the pyramid, followed by the traditional sources of international
law, such as treaty and customary rules, and then numerous quasi-law provi-
sions in the twilight zone between the fully binding rules and non-binding
guidance.
The quasi-legislative function of ICAO has never been questioned. What
is not clear is the legal status of its output, particularly when the practice of
the Assembly de-emphasizes the differences between “standards” and “re-
commended practices”. Confusion deepens when ICAO in fact audits the
compliance of certain regulatory material which could not be considered as
binding.16 In view of this, academic efforts have been made in this dissertation
to rationalize the practice of ICAO by refining the concept of “quasi-legislation”
or “quasi-law”. While this first attempt in the current study could only be
embryonic, imperfect and incomplete, the existence of this twilight zone
between the fully binding legal rules and non-binding political and moral
undertakings is hardly deniable. Aviation lawyers ignoring this phenomenon
would not be able to practice his or her profession effectively. As Judge Lauter-
pacht observes, there is an “imperceptible line between impropriety and
illegality, between discretion and arbitrariness, between the exercise of the
legal right to disregard the recommendation and the abuse of that right”.17
The constitution of ICAO does not contain any obstacle for establishing a
system of quasi-law. On the contrary, the Chicago Convention clearly dis-
tinguishes in its Article 54 j) two concepts, one is “infraction of this Conven-
tion”, and another is “failure to carry out recommendations or determination
of the Council”. Accordingly, there is a constitutional support for the existence
16 This includes associated procedures, guidance material and safety-related practices, see
ICAO Doc. 9735, AN/960, ICAO Safety Oversight Audit Manual, 2nd ed. (2006) at 3-1.
17 Supra note 147 in Ch.5.
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of two levels of obligations or compliance systems. The primary system is
composed of the obligations directly laid down by the Chicago Convention,
which are backed by traditional sanctions under international law against the
breach of a treaty. The secondary system consists of norms of quasi-law, backed
by the institutional mechanisms within ICAO, in particular the reporting power
of the Council under Article 54 j) of the Chicago Convention. In the contem-
porary world, the report of a UN specialized agency within its competence
may carry with it powerful political, economic and other effects against an
act of non-compliance.
In view of the potential role of ICAO, it is imperative to establish and
reinforce an effective system of checks and balances. ICAO must be able to
police itself before it could police the safety of international civil aviation. It
has been suggested that if ICAO does not wish to retire at approximately 60
years as a natural person usually does, it should “re-tire (as in ‘put on new
tires’) and go ahead towards an audacious renaissance”.18 To enhance its
neutrality, authority and efficiency, ICAO could maximize its attention on real
safety issues and minimize disguised political interventions.
The organization is composed of 190 States, and certain countries or groups
of countries may have greater influence upon the work of ICAO. In law-making
activities, “some States are definitely more equal than others”.19 This should
be openly recognized “instead of treating it as heretical or taboo, because it
seemingly flies in the face of the principle of sovereign equality.”20 However,
it would be possible to devise an appropriate system of checks and balances
to constrain the possible undue influence of the dominant section, to reduce
legally unsustainable political considerations, and to provide a minimum
protection to the weak, the poor, the small and the minor. A review process
may also assist in verifying the correctness of the decisions of ICAO bodies.
A system of full-fledged judicial review may need some time to come, but
strengthening the role of the Legal Committee of ICAO is not a far-fetched
solution. This Committee, created by the Assembly and responsible to both
the Assembly and the Council, could provide a review mechanism to advise
whether a particular decision of ICAO is legally sustainable.
A proposal has been made that ICAO should not only be a policeman but
also a doctor for curing safety defects.21 The ultimate purpose of detecting
safety deficiencies is to eliminate them. However, as a doctor needs medical
resources to cure a patient, ICAO also needs resources to deal with safety
deficiencies, particularly those in the developing countries. This is a challenge
18 Milde, M., Chicago Convention at Sixty – Stagnation or Renaissance, circulated as course
material in the Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University, ASPL – 633.
19 Cheng, B, Studies in Space Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) at 682.
20 Id.
21 A topic of discussion at the Forum on Air and Space Law, organized by the American Bar
Association and the Institute of Air and Space Law of McGill University, Montreal, Canada,
18-19 September 2008.
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that requires a stronger determination of the international community. In the
aviation world where terrorism presents serious threats, the strength of the
chain of safety is in its weakest link. The global solidarity of the aviation
community is therefore required. In this context, one may recall the statement
of His Excellency, the Minister of Justice of the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Dr. Karl Polak:
The safety and smooth running of international civil aviation is a matter of prime
and common concern to countries and peoples throughout the world. All States,
however different their interests may be, share the same basic interest in the
preservation and promotion of international air transport. Modern society cannot
function properly without it.22
This statement, made in 1970 at the opening of The Hague Conference, holds
all the more true today. It is hoped that this common concern of all States
could continuously inspire them to “work together, so that the air may be used
by humanity, to serve the humanity …”23
22 ICAO Doc 8979-LC/165-1, International Conference on Air Law, The Hague, December 1970,
Volume I, Minutes (1972) at 1.
23 Supra note 52 in Ch. 1.

Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
LUCHTVAARTVEILIGHEID EN ICAO
Dit onderzoek bestudeert het mandaat van de intergouvernementele burger-
luchtvaartorganisatie (International Civil Aviation Organization) op het gebied
van luchtvaartveiligheid, zulks vanuit een juridisch perspectief. Het beschrijft
de bijdrage van ICAO op het gebied van het wereldwijde veiligheid. Tegelijker-
tijd worden, op basis van ervaringen uit het verleden, aanbevelingen gedaan
om ICAO’s mechanismen te rationaliseren ten einde de luchtvaartveiligheid
middels wetgeving te optimaliseren
Het eerste hoofdstuk analyseert het concept van luchtvaartveiligheid.
Veiligheid is niet het exclusieve domein van technici. Er is ook sprake van
beleid en een juridische dimensie. De geschiedenis van de civiele luchtvaart,
hetgeen kort wordt beschouwd in dit hoofdstuk, herbergt de grondslag voor
het verbeteren van veiligheid en vertoont een continue stroom van nationale
naar internationale regelgeving. ICAO is opgericht als een reactie op de nood-
zaak voor een globaal raamwerk. Luchtvaartveiligheid is de raison d’être van
ICAO. Vanwege de groei van de luchtvaart, de technologische ontwikkelingen,
de globalisering en de terroristische dreigingen, wordt ICAO geconfronteerd
met een nieuwe vraag voor het verbeteren van de luchtvaart veiligheid.
De drie hoofdstukken die daarop volgen richten zich op drie grote veilig-
heidsvraagstukken, te weten de goedkeuring en implementatie van technische
veiligheidsstandaards, het verbieden van het inzetten van wapens tegen civiele
luchtvaartuigen in vlucht, en het tegenhouden van terroristische- en andere
handelingen tegen de veiligheid van de civiele luchtvaart. In hoofdstuk twee
wordt de technische regelgeving behandeld. In eerste aanleg wordt de verant-
woordelijkheid van de staat aan de orde gesteld, met name voor wat betreft
veiligheidstoezicht. Deze verantwoordelijkheid rust bij de staat waar het
luchtvaartuig is geregistreerd en, meer recentelijk, kan ook behoren bij de staat
waarin de gebruiker van het luchtvaartuig zich heeft gevestigd. Er is ook
verantwoordelijkheid voor de staat voorzover er luchtverkeersdienstverlening
binnen het grondgebied van die staat wordt aangeboden. Vervolgens wordt
er in dit hoofdstuk gekeken naar de formulering van technische regelgeving,
het bijzondere onderwerp waarop de regelgeving betrekking heeft, de criteria
waaraan die regelgeving moet voldoen en het proces rondom de goedkeuring
van de regelgeving en juridische karakter ervan. In het laatste gedeelte van
het hoofdstuk wordt ook aandacht besteed aan het veiligheidscontrole
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programma van ICAO (ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programma) en
wordt geconcludeerd dat de controle activiteiten van ICAO baanbrekend zijn.
In tegenstelling tot het traditionele internationale recht is er sprake van auto-
riteit en toezicht door een international organisatie. De bevoegheden van ICAO
versterken de naleving van standaarden (standards) en aanbevelingen (recom-
mended practices) die door ICAO zijn uitgevaardigd.
Hoofdstuk drie beschrijft de relatie tussen luchtvaartveiligheid en militaire
activiteiten. Op dit vlak is er een gespannen verhouding tussen enerzijds de
noodzaak om bepaalde luchtvaart activiteiten te beschermen en anderzijds
om gelegitimeerde militaire activiteiten uit te voeren. Het gebruik van wapens
tegen civiele luchtvaartuigen heeft tot diverse slachtoffers geleid, hetgeen heeft
geresulteerd in Artikel 3bis van het Verdrag van Chicago (Verdrag over de
internationale burgerluchtvaart) waarin het gebruiken van geweld tegen civiele
luchtvaartuigen is verboden. In dit hoofdstuk wordt de praktijk van staten
beschreven, met name vanwege de implicaties van de voorvallen op 11 Septem-
ber 2001. De internationale gemeenschap geeft sinds die tijd de hoogste priori-
teit aan zaken die gerelateerd zijn aan de bescherming van het individu. Ook
worden bepaalde aspecten die gerelateerd zijn aan de coördinatie tussen
civiele- en militaire activiteiten bestudeerd. Er moet een einde worden gemaakt
aan potentieel gevaarlijke aktiviteiten jegens civiele luchtvaartuigen.
In hoofdstuk vier komen terrorisme en wederrechtelijke handelingen aan
de orde, zoals militaire-, terroristische- of overige handelingen aan de orde.
Het pionierwerk van ICAO sedert de jaren 1960 heeft geresulteerd in een vijftal
internationale verdragen die in dit hoofdstuk nader zijn bestudeerd. Zoals
blijkt uit de Lockerbie zaak kan luchtvaartveiligheid ook verweven zijn met
internationale vrede en veiligheid. Het gevecht tegen terrorisme is een cruciaal
onderdeel van de veiligheidsmaatregelen van ICAO. Kaping en sabotage versus
de veiligheid van civiele luchtvaart worden gezien als serieuze internationale
misdaden vergelijkbaar met piraterij, mishandeling en misdaden tegen de
menselijkheid. Tegelijkertijd, verdragen over luchtvaartveiligheid die onder
auspiciën van ICAO zijn geratificeerd moeten bijgehouden worden opdat ze
expliciet de aanstichters en uitvoerders van criminele handelingen sanctioneren,
alsmede serieuze dreigingen strafbaar stellen die substantiële nadelige gevolgen
zouden kunnen hebben voor de civiele luchtvaart. Bovendien, in aanvulling
op deze strafrechtelijke maatregelen, moeten er ook preventieve maatregelen
worden ontwikkeld en bijgehouden.
Hoofdstuk vijf onderstreept het belang van rechtsregels ten einde ICAO
in staat te stellen om haar veiligheidsmandaat te kunnen uitvoeren. Allereerst
wordt de relatie tussen veiligheidsverplichtingen en het concept van erga omnes
verplichtingen bestudeerd. Bepaalde veiligheidsverplichtingen zijn niet geba-
seerd op een uitwisseling van rechten en verplichtingen, maar op een systeem
dat zich uitstrekt tot toezicht op luchtvaartveiligheid van civiele luchtvaart,
de verplichting om zich te onthouden van het gebruik van wapens tegen civiele
luchtvaartuigen, en de verplichting tot preventie van- en het bestraffen van
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criminele handelingen die gericht zijn tegen de veiligheid van de civiele
luchtvaart. Vanwege de relatie met de elementaire humanitaire grondslagen
en het fundamentele recht op leven kunnen ze worden beschouwd als erga
omnes. Iedere staat is gehouden om de rechten ten aanzien van deze verplich-
tingen te beschermen. Op basis van deze conclusie, wordt voorgesteld dat de
handhaving van de erga omnes verplichtingen geschiedt via het neutrale inter-
nationaal instrumentarium van ICAO. Dit ter voorkoming van tegenmaatregelen
die getroffen kunnen worden op het moment dat er op het niveau van staten
onderling een inbreuk wordt geconstateerd. Om er voor te zorgen dat ICAO
fair, effectief en met autoriteit kan handelen moet de systematiek van ICAO
worden gerationaliseerd. Ten eerst moet het regelgevingssysteem transparant,
coherent en juist gedefinieerd worden. In paats van een ambivalente positie
tussen verbindende- en niet-verbindende kracht van bepaalde normen, moet
het concept van quasi-regelgeving worden erkend, verhelderd en uitgewerkt
worden.
Alhoewel bepalingen afkomstig uit quasi-regelgeving misschien niet kunnen
worden gehandhaafd in de reguliere rechtbank, kunnen deze in de praktijk
wel bepalen hoe men moet handelen. Met name als deze bepalingen kernachtig
zijn geïmplementeerd in het institutionele mechanisme van ICAO. Vervolgens
moeten deze bepalingen nader worden bestudeerd, waardoor ze kunnen
worden geïntegreerd in een coherent, verifieerbaar en relatief stabiel systeem.
Ten tweede, bepaalde onderbelichte mechanismen uit het verdrag, zoals de
aanbevelingskracht van de Raad op basis van Artikel 54 j), en de bevoegdheid
onder Artikel 87 waarmee een luchtvaartmaatschappij kan worden verboden
om internationale vluchten uit te voeren, zouden heroverwogen moeten
worden. Tot slot, de controle mechanismen moeten worden gereorganiseerd
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